Locus to Lodge FIR under the (Unamended) U.P. Conversion Act and Bar on Multiple FIRs: Supreme Court’s Framework for Quashing

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India (Bench: J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.) in Rajendra Bihari Lal and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 2025 INSC 1249 (decided on 17 October 2025), delivered a consequential judgment addressing a clutch of writ petitions and criminal appeals arising from six FIRs registered in Uttar Pradesh that alleged unlawful religious conversions and ancillary offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

At the core lay three clusters of allegations:

  • An alleged mass conversion event at the Evangelical Church of India, Fatehpur on 14 April 2022 (FIRs 224/2022, 54/2023, 55/2023, 60/2023).
  • An individual’s alleged conversion at Deviganj, Fatehpur on 25 December 2021 (FIR 47/2023).
  • An incident of alleged attempt to murder/extortion on 10 December 2023 (FIR 538/2023), to which Conversion Act offences were also appended.

The petitioners sought quashing of these FIRs and consequential proceedings, raising questions about:

  • Who was competent to lodge an FIR under the unamended Section 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (U.P. Conversion Act).
  • Whether multiple FIRs relating to the same “incident/transaction” are maintainable.
  • The scope of quashing post-charge sheet, and the maintainability of petitions under Article 32 seeking quashing.
  • The evidentiary integrity of the investigations (including “cyclostyled” affidavits and Section 161 CrPC statements, and unsubstantiated Aadhaar forgery allegations).

Summary of the Judgment

The Court allowed the petitions/appeals substantially and held:

  • Locus under unamended Section 4 (U.P. Conversion Act): For FIRs registered before the 2024 amendment, only the “aggrieved person” or close relatives by blood, marriage or adoption could validly set the criminal process in motion for offences under the Act. An FIR by an unrelated third party was non est. On this ground alone, FIR 224/2022 was quashed, along with all consequential proceedings.
  • Multiple FIRs bar (T.T. Antony/Babubhai “test of sameness”): FIRs 55/2023 and 60/2023—being cyclostyled replicas of FIR 54/2023 and relating to the same 14 April 2022 incident—were quashed as impermissible subsequent FIRs.
  • FIR 54/2023: Although the High Court had treated it as the “first competent FIR” (given 224/2022’s defect), the Supreme Court quashed it due to glaring credibility deficits: inordinate delay, contradictory Section 161 statements, “prototype” narratives, and lack of bona fides.
  • FIR 47/2023: The Court, exercising Article 32, quashed this FIR too, finding investigative mala fides and the same pattern of mechanical, recycled statements.
  • FIR 538/2023: Charges under the Conversion Act were quashed for want of locus under unamended Section 4 (complainant not a victim/relative). However, IPC charges (Sections 307, 386, 504) were kept alive; the case was de-tagged for further hearing, with interim protection continuing.
  • Quashing after charge sheet is permissible: Filing of a charge sheet does not denude the High Court/Supreme Court of power to quash (reaffirming Anand Kumar Mohatta and allied precedents).
  • Article 32 maintainability: Writ petitions for quashing are maintainable and can be entertained in exceptional cases to prevent abuse of process or secure ends of justice (reaffirming Vinod Dua, Amit Shah). The Court exercised Article 32 here.
  • Clarification on Neeharika Infrastructure: Neeharika does not curtail Bhajan Lal; it operates in a “cautionary domain.” High Courts should not use Neeharika to avoid genuine quashing in appropriate cases—even at a nascent stage (Imran Pratapgadhi).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Effect

  • Bhajan Lal, R.P. Kapur, Rajiv Thapar: Reiterate the principled grounds for quashing to prevent abuse and secure justice. The Court stressed that material of “sterling and impeccable quality” can be looked at; courts may “read between the lines” to detect mala fides (Mohammad Wajid).
  • Neeharika Infrastructure: Cited to clarify that it does not impose a rigid embargo on quashing during investigation; it counsels restraint, not abdication. The Court cautioned against High Courts treating Neeharika as a straightjacket rule barring intervention.
  • T.T. Antony; Babubhai; Anju Chaudhary; Arnab Goswami; Surendra Singh Rathore: Applied to hold that subsequent FIRs on the same incident/transaction fail the “test of sameness” and are impermissible, save limited exceptions (e.g., counter-cases, distinct incidents, or new facts revealing a larger conspiracy).
  • Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma (Drugs and Cosmetics Act): Crucial analogical support: when a special statute specifies who can institute prosecution, general CrPC/FIR rules yield. The Court extended this logic to hold that unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act is a mandatory lodging-locus provision, not a mere declaration.
  • Constitutional rights cases: Kesavananda Bharati (secularism as basic structure), Ratilal Gandhi, Shirur Mutt, Sardar Syedna, Rev. Stainislaus (propagate not compel), K.S. Puttaswamy (privacy; liberty of conscience), Shafin Jahan, Shakti Vahini (autonomy in choosing faith/partner) – collectively used to justify a narrow locus under Section 4, shielding intimate religious choices from third-party policing.
  • Quashing post-charge sheet: Anand Kumar Mohatta; Joseph Salvaraj; Abhishek; A.M. Mohan; Kailashben Patel; Somjeet Mallick—reaffirming that quashing can be considered even after filing of charge sheet/cognizance, by evaluating FIR plus charge sheet and materials.
  • Article 32 writs: Vinod Dua; Amit Shah; Priya Prakash Varrier—establish that this Court may quash in rare, exceptional cases. The Court emphasized “entertainability” versus “maintainability”: while ordinarily litigants should approach High Courts, gross abuse justifies direct intervention.

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Decision

1) Unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act: A Locus Bar, Not a Mere Formality

The central legal innovation is the Court’s construction of the unamended Section 4 (applicable to pre-2024 FIRs). It limited competent informants to the “aggrieved person” or close family relations. The State’s submission that Section 4 merely “recognised” a special locus, leaving CrPC Section 154 untrammelled, was rejected.

Drawing on Ashok Kumar Sharma, the Court held that a special statute’s procedural scheme prevails over general CrPC provisions, where Parliament/State Legislature has consciously carved out a distinct prosecutorial gateway. The Court linked this narrow locus to privacy and decisional autonomy in matters of faith (Puttaswamy), and the need to protect against third-party moral policing or vexatious complaints cloaked as public interest.

Result: FIR 224/2022—lodged by a VHP office-bearer, not a victim/relative—was non est and quashed.

2) Multiple FIRs and the “Test of Sameness”

Applying T.T. Antony, Babubhai and Anju Chaudhary, the Court reaffirmed:

  • Only the earliest FIR about an incident cognizable offence sets the investigative process in motion.
  • Subsequent information is to be captured as Section 161 CrPC statements or through alteration of sections; not by registering fresh FIRs.
  • Later FIRs on the same occurrence are an abuse of process, barring exceptions (counter-cases; new distinct offences/transactions; larger conspiracy surfacing).

On facts, FIRs 55/2023 and 60/2023 were virtual replicas of FIR 54/2023, were filed within hours at the same station about the same 14 April 2022 event, and were therefore quashed.

3) Evidentiary Integrity and “Reading Between the Lines”

The Court scrutinised the charge sheets and case diaries, stressing that where mala fides are alleged, courts must look beyond formal pleadings:

  • “Cyclostyled” affidavits by alleged victims, produced on near-identical e-stamp timings, with glaring internal errors (e.g., a deponent stating someone else’s name change).
  • Section 161 CrPC statements recorded a year apart, yet identically worded in structure, vocabulary and length—suggestive of pre-fabrication.
  • Witnesses who allegedly suffered conversion had earlier stated (on the day after FIR 224/2022) that they were informant-accompaniers, not victims, and that alleged victims had been taken away via backdoor—heightening suspicion of a post facto re-characterisation.
  • Aadhaar “forgery” allegations lacked any corroboration from the issuing authority or invocation of the Aadhaar Act. Discrepancies (different photos/names) might reflect permissible “updates” rather than crime; seizure of card printers was inconclusive without proof of illicit use.
  • Forensic material primarily showed faith-based gatherings or charity-related imagery (e.g., World Vision), which per se is not criminalised either under the Conversion Act or IPC.

Given these systemic infirmities, the Court held that continuing prosecution would be a travesty of justice—warranting quashing of FIR 54/2023 and, independently, FIR 47/2023.

4) Conversions, Privacy, and the Role of the State

While the judgment did not test the constitutionality of the U.P. Conversion Act (pending elsewhere), it reflected unease about onerous pre and post-conversion declarations and public disclosure—flagging tension with privacy jurisprudence post-Puttaswamy. It reiterated that religious choice—like marital choice (Shafin Jahan; Shakti Vahini)—is an intimate, autonomous decision. The narrow locus under unamended Section 4 was justified as a safeguard against third-party intrusion into this zone.

5) Quashing Powers: Post-Charge Sheet and Under Article 32

The Court reaffirmed:

  • Quashing is possible even after charge sheet and cognizance; the Court may evaluate FIR plus charge sheet and materials (Anand Kumar Mohatta; Somjeet Mallick).
  • Article 32 petitions seeking quashing are maintainable and, in appropriate cases, entertainable; the Court drew a distinction between “maintainability” and “entertainability,” cautioning against converting practices of deference to High Courts into hard rules.
  • There is no absolute rule that “nascent stage” of investigation bars quashing (Imran Pratapgadhi).

Application to Each FIR

  • FIR 224/2022 (Mass conversion, 14 April 2022): Quashed due to invalid lodging by an incompetent third party under unamended Section 4; materials lacked credibility.
  • FIR 54/2023 (Same incident): Quashed for delay, contradictions, and fabricated-style materials; complainant’s earlier 161 statement showed he was an accompanier, not a victim.
  • FIRs 55/2023 and 60/2023 (Same incident): Quashed as impermissible subsequent FIRs under the “test of sameness.”
  • FIR 47/2023 (Individual conversion, 25 December 2021): Quashed under Article 32 for the same mala fide patterns in investigation and materials.
  • FIR 538/2023 (Attempt to murder/extortion allegation): Conversion Act charges quashed for want of locus under unamended Section 4; IPC charges kept pending for fuller consideration; interim protection continues.

Impact

  • Immediate effect in Uttar Pradesh for pre-2024 cases: Any FIR under the U.P. Conversion Act registered before the 2024 amendment and not lodged by the “aggrieved person” or specified relatives is vulnerable to quashing.
  • Post-2024 FIRs: The 2024 amendment liberalises Section 4 to “any person” giving information. This judgment does not disturb post-amendment FIRs; its locus holding is confined to the unamended regime.
  • Across India (special statutes): The Court’s reliance on Ashok Kumar Sharma strengthens the principle that when special statutes specify who may institute prosecution (or set criminal process in motion), those gateways are mandatory and override general CrPC practice.
  • Multiple FIRs doctrine reaffirmed: Police and prosecutors must consolidate allegations about the same occurrence into a single FIR/investigation and avoid subsequent FIRs designed to cure earlier defects; complainants should provide further information as statements, not fresh FIRs.
  • Judicial approach to quashing: High Courts should not read Neeharika as a gag; quashing is available even at nascent stages or post-charge sheet where facts justify it.
  • Investigative integrity: The Court’s censure of “cyclostyled” affidavits and cookie-cutter 161 statements will likely embolden courts to probe for mala fides and insist on authenticity and corroboration (e.g., from issuing authorities for alleged document forgeries).
  • Rights lens in conversion prosecutions: By foregrounding privacy and autonomy, the judgment warns against third-party vigilantism and underscores that faith choices are protected zones—consistent with secular constitutionalism.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • FIR vs. Section 161 Statement: An FIR is the first information that sets the police in motion. Later inputs about the same incident should be recorded as witness statements under Section 161 CrPC, not as new FIRs.
  • “Test of Sameness” (Multiple FIRs): If a later FIR concerns the same incident/transaction as an earlier FIR, it is prohibited. Only distinct incidents or counter-cases justify another FIR.
  • Quashing: Courts can terminate criminal proceedings at an early stage to prevent abuse of process or secure justice; they may look at unimpeachable defence material, the FIR, charge sheet, and surrounding circumstances.
  • Special law vs. general procedure: If a special statute prescribes who can initiate prosecution, those requirements override ordinary CrPC rules of FIR registration.
  • Article 32 petitions for quashing: Maintainable before the Supreme Court; though litigants are generally expected to approach High Courts first, this can be bypassed in exceptional cases.
  • Unamended vs. amended Section 4 (U.P. Conversion Act): Before 2024, only victims/close kin could lodge FIRs. After 2024, “any person” may give information—altering locus going forward.

Practical Guidance and Compliance Pointers

  • For police/prosecutors (pre-2024 FIRs): Verify locus under the unamended Section 4; if the informant is neither the “aggrieved person” nor specified relative, FIRs under the Act are liable to be quashed.
  • For police in all periods: Avoid registering multiple FIRs for the same occurrence; capture later inputs as Section 161 statements; if offence sections change (e.g., victim dies), alter sections in the original FIR.
  • For evidentiary integrity: Avoid template affidavits or boilerplate 161 statements; corroborate document forgery allegations with the issuing authority; document the chain of custody and forensics.
  • For complainants: If you are a victim or close relative (pre-2024 matters), state facts promptly; unexplained delays or prior contradictory statements will erode credibility.
  • For defence counsel: In pre-2024 cases, raise locus objections; marshal unimpeachable material demonstrating mala fides (e.g., contradictory prior statements; document authority replies).

Conclusion

This judgment lays down a clear, two-fold doctrinal marker. First, under the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act, only a narrow class—victims and close relations—was competent to initiate criminal process. FIRs by unrelated entities were non est. Second, the Court robustly reaffirmed the bar on multiple FIRs for the same incident, insisting that subsequent information be folded into the original investigation.

Equally important are the procedural guardrails the Court emphasised: quashing powers survive past charge sheet; High Courts must not misread Neeharika to shun intervention; and in cases alleging abuse, courts may scrutinise the record “between the lines.” By foregrounding privacy and autonomy in matters of faith, the Court anchored locus limits in constitutional values, discouraging third‑party vigilantism in conversion prosecutions.

While the 2024 amendment to Section 4 now permits “any person” to give information prospectively, this ruling decisively governs pre‑amendment prosecutions and will likely recalibrate numerous pending cases. Ultimately, the decision strengthens the integrity of criminal process, reaffirms individual liberties, and clarifies the boundaries of lawful prosecution under special statutes.