Loan Default Alone Cannot Justify a Bank-Requested Look Out Circular Against a Guarantor
Case: Bank of Baroda (Formerly Vijaya Bank) v. Kondepati Ganga Prasad
Court: Madras High Court
Judge: V. Lakshminarayanan J.
Date: 1 October 2026
Proceeding: REV.APLWP Crl. No. 12 of 2026 in W.P. Crl. No. 1951 of 2026
1. Introduction
This judgment examines the boundary between a bank’s efforts to recover outstanding dues and a guarantor’s constitutional right to travel abroad. The Madras High Court dismissed Bank of Baroda’s application to review an earlier order directing the removal of a Look Out Circular (“LOC”) against Kondepati Ganga Prasad.
The central principle is that borrowing money or furnishing a guarantee does not surrender constitutional rights. On the facts before the Court, continuing an LOC merely because the individual remained a guarantor, without any complaint alleging fraud or any further proceedings having been initiated on the proposed course of action, was unjustified. The Court also reaffirmed that review cannot become an appeal in disguise.
Importantly, the judgment concerns the legitimacy of restricting travel. It does not decide that approval of a corporate resolution plan automatically extinguishes a personal guarantor’s liability.
2. Background and Questions Before the Court
2.1 The lending relationship and corporate resolution
Ganga Prasad was a promoter-director of M/s.GVR Infra Projects, which had borrowed from Vijaya Bank. Following default and Vijaya Bank’s merger with Bank of Baroda, the latter initiated proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”) against the company in C.P. No. 941 of 2018.
The National Company Law Tribunal approved a resolution plan, which was implemented. The judgment records that the debt against the principal borrower had been satisfied. Nevertheless, an LOC continued against Ganga Prasad because he was a guarantor.
2.2 The original writ petition
Ganga Prasad sought withdrawal or revocation of the LOC. During the writ proceedings, the Central Government’s counsel confirmed that the LOC had been opened at Bank of Baroda’s request. The bank’s counsel produced an email indicating that the loan account had been closed pursuant to the resolution plan, while maintaining that the LOC should continue.
The Court directed removal of the LOC. The bank subsequently sought review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, read with Section 151 and Article 226 of the Constitution.
2.3 The bank’s grounds for review
- The discharge of the principal borrower’s debt did not justify discontinuing the LOC against the guarantor.
- The resolution professional had recommended bankruptcy proceedings against Ganga Prasad, and this allegedly material fact had been suppressed.
- An order of the Supreme Court dated 12 August 2024 in S.L.P (Civil) Nos.17194 to 17230 of 2024 allegedly required similarly situated persons to obtain High Court permission before travelling abroad.
2.4 The principal legal questions
- Did these grounds disclose an error apparent on the face of the record or otherwise justify review?
- Did an unimplemented recommendation to initiate bankruptcy proceedings amount to a material fact whose non-disclosure warranted interference?
- Could guarantor status and loan default, without allegations of fraud supported by any complaint, justify continued restriction of foreign travel?
- Did the Supreme Court’s permission requirement apply generally, or only to the parties in those proceedings?
3. Summary of the Judgment
The Court dismissed the review petition without costs, leaving the earlier direction for removal of the LOC undisturbed.
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No proper ground for review: The bank’s arguments had not been advanced during the original hearing. They were not newly discovered facts but an attempt to reopen the correctness of the earlier decision.
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No material suppression established: The resolution professional’s recommendation remained under consultation among the financial institutions. No further proceedings had been initiated on that advice.
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Default was not equated with fraud: The bank confirmed that it had lodged no complaint with the Central Bureau of Investigation or local police alleging fraudulent conduct by Ganga Prasad and his co-directors.
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Travel rights survived the lending transaction: A borrower or guarantor does not mortgage constitutional rights to the lender.
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The Supreme Court order was case-specific: Its requirement of prior permission applied to the petitioners before the Supreme Court, not universally to everyone wishing to travel abroad.
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No apparent error: Even after examining the bank’s submissions on their merits, the Court found no reason to review its earlier order.
4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
4.1 Parison Devi V.Sitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715
The Court cited this decision for the settled proposition that review is not an appeal in disguise. This principle supplied the threshold answer to the bank’s application.
Review jurisdiction addresses recognised defects in a judgment; it does not ordinarily permit a disappointed party to reconstruct its case by advancing arguments that could have been presented earlier. Here, the Court specifically observed that none of the grounds now urged had been placed before it at the original hearing and that they did not involve the discovery of new facts.
The precedent therefore influenced the procedural foundation of the decision: disagreement with the original conclusion was insufficient. The bank needed to establish a reviewable defect, which it failed to do.
Nevertheless, the Court did not stop at this procedural objection. It considered the substantive arguments as well, giving the dismissal both a review-jurisdiction basis and an alternative merits-based justification.
This decision supplied the constitutional foundation for protecting foreign travel under Article 21. Relying on it, the Court held that restrictions on that right must be in accordance with law.
Its importance here lies in shifting the analysis beyond the contractual relationship between lender and guarantor. A bank’s financial interest cannot, by itself, determine whether a citizen may leave India. The restriction must possess an adequate legal basis.
The Court expressed this distinction sharply: a bank manager’s letter requesting an LOC cannot itself be treated as “law.” The creditor’s demand and the legal authority necessary to restrict personal liberty are separate matters.
Although the judgment invokes the constitutional protection associated with this precedent, it does not undertake an extended examination of the entire LOC framework or expressly formulate a separate proportionality test.
4.3 Supreme Court order in S.L.P (Civil) Nos.17194 to 17230 of 2024, dated 12 August 2024
The supplied judgment does not state the case title for these proceedings. The bank relied on the order to argue that persons such as Ganga Prasad required High Court permission before travelling abroad.
The High Court rejected that interpretation. It explained that those proceedings concerned challenges to the executive measure empowering banks to request LOCs, and that the Supreme Court’s travel-permission direction was confined to the petitioners in those cases.
The Court distinguished a direction regulating identified litigants from a generally applicable declaration of law under Article 141. The order could not therefore be used to impose a universal permission requirement on people who were not parties to those proceedings.
This reasoning does not diminish the binding force of Supreme Court law. It requires courts and litigants to identify what an order actually decides and whom its operative directions govern.
5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning
5.1 Review is corrective, not a second opportunity to argue
The bank’s application was framed around alleged suppression and apparent errors. The Court examined whether those labels corresponded to an actual defect in the earlier order.
They did not. The guarantor argument, the proposed bankruptcy proceedings, and the Supreme Court order were matters that could have been raised previously. Their later presentation did not convert them into newly discovered material.
The decision thus protects the finality of adjudication while preserving review for genuine corrective purposes. A party cannot ordinarily use review to overcome its own failure to advance an available argument.
5.2 Material suppression requires more than identifying an omitted fact
The Court emphasised that not every fact must be disclosed: the relevant question is whether the omitted fact was material to the proceeding.
The resolution professional’s email dated 8 April 2026 recommended further proceedings following rejection of a repayment plan proposed by Ganga Prasad. However, the bank acknowledged that the institutions were still consulting one another about their next steps.
The Court treated this distinction as decisive. An internal recommendation that had not resulted in further proceedings could not, in these circumstances, sustain an accusation of material suppression.
This conclusion should not be expanded into a rule that contemplated proceedings are always irrelevant. Its immediate basis was the bank’s failure to act on the recommendation and to demonstrate its materiality to the LOC dispute.
5.3 Corporate debt resolution and personal liability remain distinct
The judgment records implementation of the company’s resolution plan and satisfaction of the principal borrower’s debt. Separately, it discusses a rejected repayment proposal associated with Ganga Prasad and the possibility of bankruptcy proceedings against him.
These are different matters. The Court did not hold that resolution of the company necessarily discharged every obligation under the personal guarantee. Instead, it rejected the proposition that continuing guarantor status automatically justified continuing an LOC.
The essential distinction is between enforcing a financial obligation and restricting personal liberty. Even where a creditor asserts an enforceable liability, it must independently justify the legal basis for restricting travel.
5.4 Commercial failure must not automatically be treated as fraudulent conduct
The Court asked whether the bank had lodged any complaint alleging fraud. The answer was no. It then distinguished a loan obtained with fraudulent intent from a business decision that merely proved unsuccessful.
Banking necessarily involves credit risk. The Court’s references to non-performing assets and the bank’s specialised stressed-assets branch illustrated that commercial failure is an anticipated feature of lending, not automatic evidence of wrongdoing.
Its comments about the officials who approved the loan similarly highlighted the commercial character of the transaction. They should not be read as creating a general obligation to prosecute bank officials whenever a loan defaults.
Equally, the absence of a criminal complaint is not a universal answer to every LOC dispute. Here, it supported the Court’s conclusion that the bank was seeking continued restraint essentially on the basis of default and guarantor status.
5.5 Constitutional rights are not collateral for a loan
The judgment’s strongest substantive statement is that obtaining a mortgage loan does not mean surrendering constitutional and legal rights to the bank.
The Court characterised foreign travel as protected by Article 21 and stated that “law” for this purpose implies legislation. It refused to equate a bank manager’s request with the legal authority necessary to curtail that right.
Its concern extended to the consequences of allowing travel restrictions to become routine instruments of collection. If a nationalised bank’s request alone sufficed, similar demands by other creditors could expose debtors’ liberty to private financial pressure.
However, the operative decision did not invalidate the entire executive LOC framework or determine every circumstance in which an LOC may lawfully issue. Its constitutional reasoning must be read alongside the particular facts and the review posture.
5.6 The practical contradiction in preventing income-generating travel
Ganga Prasad’s stated intention was to travel abroad, earn money, and return to repay the amount. The bank’s position was that he should repay before leaving.
The Court described this as a “catch-22”: the restriction could prevent the very earning activity through which repayment was proposed. This practical consideration reinforced its rejection of the bank’s position.
The reasoning does not establish an unconditional right to travel whenever a debtor asserts an intention to earn abroad. It shows why an LOC should not be continued mechanically, without examining its justification and practical consequences.
6. Potential Impact and Limits
6.1 Implications for banks and other creditors
The judgment cautions against using LOCs as substitutes for appropriate recovery, insolvency, or other legal proceedings. A creditor seeking a travel restriction must do more than identify an unpaid obligation or a continuing guarantee.
It also underlines the importance of presenting all available grounds at the original hearing and taking concrete action on proposed remedies rather than relying on prolonged internal deliberations.
6.2 Implications for borrowers and guarantors
The decision supports challenges to travel restraints maintained merely because of commercial default, particularly where no fraudulent conduct is alleged through a complaint and the creditor relies on proceedings it has not initiated.
It does not provide immunity from guarantee enforcement, bankruptcy proceedings, or other lawful measures. Nor does it resolve the extent of Ganga Prasad’s outstanding personal liability.
6.3 Implications for future litigation
- Courts should distinguish the existence of a debt from the justification for restricting travel.
- Allegations of suppression require an explanation of the omitted fact’s materiality.
- Case-specific Supreme Court directions should not be converted into universal rules without examining their terms.
- Review applications must identify a recognised review ground rather than merely seek reconsideration.
The decision is best understood as a fact-sensitive application of constitutional protection and review principles, not as a categorical ruling against every bank-requested LOC.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Look Out Circular
- An immigration alert whose terms may affect a person’s departure from or arrival in India. This case concerned an LOC restricting foreign travel at a bank’s request.
- Review petition
- A request asking the same court to correct a judgment on limited recognised grounds, rather than rehear the entire dispute.
- Error apparent on the face of the record
- An evident mistake, not merely a conclusion that a party believes could be changed through further argument.
- Material suppression
- Failure to disclose a fact sufficiently relevant to affect the court’s consideration. An omission is not necessarily material simply because the opposing party identifies it.
- Principal borrower and guarantor
- The principal borrower receives the loan. A guarantor undertakes responsibility under a guarantee. Questions about their respective liabilities are distinct from whether either may lawfully be prevented from travelling.
- Resolution plan
- An approved arrangement dealing with a corporate debtor’s insolvency. Its treatment of corporate debt should not be confused with a separate determination of personal guarantor liability.
- Article 21
- The constitutional protection of life and personal liberty, which includes protection of foreign travel subject to lawful restrictions.
- Article 141
- The provision making law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts in India. A direction addressed to particular parties is not necessarily a general legal rule.
8. Conclusion
The Madras High Court reaffirmed that a lending relationship does not place a debtor’s liberty at the creditor’s disposal. On the facts presented, guarantor status, commercial default, and an unimplemented proposal for bankruptcy proceedings did not justify continuing the LOC.
The judgment’s broader significance lies in separating debt enforcement from constitutional restraint, while insisting that review remain a limited corrective remedy. The bank’s review failed, but the Court did not extinguish any otherwise enforceable guarantee liability or prohibit every lawfully justified LOC.