Irregular (Not Illegal) District Court Class-III Appointments Made Pre-Rules Cannot Be Reopened After Decades; Mansukh Lal Saraf Applies Only to Illegal Appointments
1) Introduction
This common order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Jabalpur Bench) decided four writ petitions:
W.P. No. 11415 of 2018 (Mohd. Shamim and others),
W.P. No. 18436 of 2017 (Arun Thakur),
W.P. No. 20072 of 2017 (Vilas Kale), and
W.P. No. 20158 of 2017 (Mukesh Kashiv).
The petitioners were terminated by orders dated 28.10.2017 from Class-III posts in District Court establishments (e.g., Assistant Grade-III/LDC/Process Writer),
on the premise that their appointments (1994–1995) were “illegal” as being contrary to procedure/policy and in purported compliance with the Division Bench directions in
Mansukh Lal Saraf Vs Arun Kumar Tiwari & Others.
The factual backdrop was that petitioners’ parents were serving in the respondent establishment and had sought voluntary retirement (often citing personal/health reasons)
under Rule 42 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil services (Pension) Rules, 1976, and also requested appointment of their sons.
The petitioners asserted they were subjected to a selection process (written test/interview), were eligible/qualified, and served for about 22–25 years,
with promotions granted over time.
The central issues were:
- Whether these appointments could be treated as illegal/void ab initio (and hence terminable even after two decades) merely because they were linked to a compassionate/medical disability policy and were scrutinized after Mansukh Lal Saraf.
- Whether, in 1994–1995, there existed any binding recruitment rules for District Court Class-III posts, or any adopted State Government rules (including the M.P. Civil Services (Medical Examination) Rules, 1972) that could render the appointments illegal.
- Whether prior decisions, especially Rakesh Dubey v. District & Session Judge, Jabalpur, governed the controversy or were distinguishable/per incuriam.
2) Summary of the Judgment
The Court quashed the termination orders dated 28.10.2017 and directed reinstatement of all petitioners
without back wages but with consequential promotional and service benefits in accordance with law.
The Court held, in essence, that:
- At the time of these appointments (1994–1995), there were no statutory recruitment rules governing Class-III appointments in District Court establishments; the District Judge could recruit “in the usual manner” as per the then applicable High Court directions (not State Government recruitment rules).
- The M.P. Civil Services (Medical Examination) Rules, 1972 were adopted for the relevant establishment only later (the Court notes a High Court circular dated 17 August 1996), and therefore could not be used to invalidate 1994–1995 appointments.
- Even if there was any lapse (e.g., non-compliance with a requirement of prior approval from the High Court Registry), it would amount at most to an irregularity, not an illegality.
- The directions in Mansukh Lal Saraf Vs Arun Kumar Tiwari & Others apply to illegal appointments (made in breach of recruitment rules/selection procedure), not to irregular appointments in a regime where relevant rules were absent.
- Rakesh Dubey v. District & Session Judge, Jabalpur was treated as per incuriam because it did not consider the applicable High Court directions/circulars relevant to District Court recruitment at the material time, and in any event its correctness was noted as being under consideration before the Supreme Court.
- Reopening and annulling appointments after 22–25 years of service, in the absence of fraud/misrepresentation and where the employer acted “with open eyes”, was impermissible; reliance was placed on the principle in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others v. Umadevi & Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 that past cases should not be reopened.
3) Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
(a) Mansukh Lal Saraf Vs Arun Kumar Tiwari & Others (W.P.No.198/1999) / reported in (2016) 2 MPLJ 283
This decision was the engine of the State-wide scrutiny drive. In Mansukh Lal Saraf, the Division Bench condemned appointments to public posts made in
violation of the selection procedure under relevant recruitment rules, and issued broad directions for departmental scrutiny and revocation of such illegal regular appointments.
In the present judgment, the High Court carefully narrows the operational scope of Mansukh Lal Saraf:
it holds that those directions are triggered where appointments are illegal—i.e., made “without following the selection process prescribed under the relevant recruitment rules and in breach of statutory provisions”.
If, however, at the relevant time there were no applicable recruitment rules for District Court Class-III posts, the factual predicate for applying Mansukh Lal Saraf is missing.
(b) M.P. Nagar Palika Nigam Karamchari Sangh v. Mansukhlal Sarraf & Others
The respondents relied on the fact that Mansukh Lal Saraf stood affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The present Court accepts the affirmation, yet holds that affirmation does not convert the doctrine into one applicable to
irregular appointments or to appointments made where the relevant recruitment rules were not in force/adopted.
The precedent is treated as strong, but context-bound.
(c) Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others v. Umadevi & Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1
The petitioners invoked Umadevi to resist reopening old appointments; the Court used it in a limited but decisive way:
it emphasized the Constitution Bench observation that past cases should not be reopened.
Importantly, the Court did not apply Umadevi to deny relief; rather, it applied the “non-reopening” principle to
prevent belated invalidation where the State had allowed the petitioners to serve and be promoted for decades.
Cited by the respondents to stress the limited nature of compassionate appointment.
The Court distinguished it as factually inapposite, because the present matter concerned District Court establishment appointments
made in an environment lacking governing recruitment rules, and the petitioners claimed they were selected through written test/interview.
Thus, the judgment was not treated as determinative.
Also cited on compassionate appointment principles. The Court held it did not assist in resolving the controversy on these facts,
primarily because the core dispute was not the usual compassionate appointment matrix (death in harness, strict scheme compliance),
but rather the legality of terminating decades-old appointments on the assumption that a State scheme and medical rules governed District Court recruitment.
Cited by the respondents. The Court again found it factually different and declined to apply it to uphold termination here.
(g) Rakesh Dubey v. District & Session Judge, Jabalpur (W.P. No. 18610 of 2017, dated 27.02.2020)
This was the closest intra-court authority relied upon by the respondents. The present Bench refused to follow it, calling it
per incuriam for failing to consider the then applicable High Court directions governing District Court Class-III recruitment
(notably the 1984 memo) and for proceeding as if State Government recruitment/medical rules applied.
The Court also noted that Rakesh Dubey was under consideration before the Supreme Court
(Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.7409/2022 (Rakesh Dubey v/s District and Sessions Judge, Jabalpur)),
with an order dated 29/4/22 recording the submission about the timing of application under the 10.06.1994 policy and
noting that termination occurred after 21 years, and a later order dated 21-03-2023 tagging the issue with
SLP (C) No.30335 of 2017 reported in (2019) 5 SCC 600.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(i) Governing law for District Court Class-III recruitment (pre-2016): Article 235 context and High Court directions
The Court’s reasoning begins by identifying the legal architecture of recruitment in District Court establishments:
it relied on the High Court’s Memo No. 4014/III-18-34/84 dated 1st May, 1984, which clarified that
the M.P. Junior Services Selection Board Rules, 1983 did not apply to Class-III posts in subordinate courts,
as these posts are treated as “posts on the establishment of High Court” in the context of Article 235 of the Constitution.
Consequently, at the time of the petitioners’ appointments (1994–1995), District Judges were “entitled to recruit candidates in the usual manner”
against vacancies. This was the cornerstone for rejecting the “illegal appointment” label: if no recruitment rules applied,
an appointment cannot be declared illegal for non-compliance with non-existent rules.
(ii) Non-applicability (at the relevant time) of State Government medical rules
A major plank of the termination was alleged non-compliance with the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Medical Examination) Rules, 1972.
The Court held these rules were adopted for the District Court establishment only later (it refers to a High Court circular dated
17 August 1996). Therefore, using the 1972 rules to condemn 1994–1995 appointments was a category error:
the scrutiny committee and the termination orders applied an inapplicable legal framework.
(iii) Compassionate/medical disability policy: adoption and withdrawal not automatically binding
The Court accepted that the District Judge, while making appointments, appears to have drawn upon a State policy/circular structure
(including the 10.06.1994 “medical disability clause” and its later cancellation on 03.01.1995).
Yet it held that because this policy was not shown to be adopted by the High Court as governing recruitment rules for the establishment,
its application—and the effect of its later withdrawal—were within the District Judge’s operational discretion at that time.
The Court also drew a practical line: irrespective of the policy label (“compassionate”), once a vacancy existed and the District Judge
was empowered to recruit in the “usual manner”, the appointment could be sustained as a recruitment to a vacant post, not necessarily as an enforceable benefit under a scheme.
(iv) Illegal vs irregular appointments; “deemed approval” through long continuation and promotions
The judgment draws a decisive distinction:
- Illegal appointment: one made in breach of applicable statutory recruitment rules/mandatory selection procedure—treated as void/non est and vulnerable to annulment (the Mansukh Lal Saraf category).
- Irregular appointment: one where some procedural lapse occurred (e.g., not obtaining prior approval of the Registry), but not in violation of an applicable recruitment rule regime—capable of being cured/regularized by conduct and passage of time.
The Court held that at most there was an irregularity (not taking prior High Court sanction/approval), and emphasized that:
the petitioners served for two decades, were promoted, and the High Court did not object when promotion matters were forwarded—supporting an inference of deemed approval.
(v) Delay and fairness: non-reopening after decades; absence of fraud/misrepresentation
The Court stressed the petitioners’ long service (22–25 years) and the absence of fraud/misrepresentation.
Where the State/establishment appointed candidates “with open eyes”, the drastic step of termination after decades—based on later scrutiny applying inapplicable rules—
was held legally unsustainable and constitutionally unfair (Articles 14, 16, 21 were pleaded; the reasoning is aligned with arbitrariness and fairness).
3.3 Impact
- Limits on post-Mansukh Lal Saraf scrutiny: Departments/committees must first identify the correct governing recruitment regime at the time of appointment; Mansukh Lal Saraf cannot be used as a universal cancellation tool where recruitment rules were absent/not applicable.
- District Court establishment cases (pre-rule period): For appointments prior to the later rule-making (the Court notes rules framed in 2016 and amended in 2019), this judgment provides a strong defence against “void ab initio” characterizations, especially where selection was conducted and service continued for long periods.
- Per incuriam as an internal corrective: By declaring Rakesh Dubey v. District & Session Judge, Jabalpur per incuriam, the Bench signals that prior termination-upholding decisions in similar fact patterns may not control if they overlooked the High Court’s own recruitment directions and the adoption timeline of service rules.
- Remedial balance: Reinstatement without back wages indicates a balancing approach—recognizing wrongful termination while avoiding full financial retrospectivity—likely to influence remedies in analogous service disputes.
4) Complex Concepts Simplified
- Per incuriam: A decision given by a court while ignoring a binding law/rule or a binding precedent. Such a decision is not treated as a reliable authority to follow.
- Void ab initio: “Void from the beginning.” If an appointment is truly illegal (e.g., made in violation of mandatory recruitment rules), it can be treated as if it never legally existed.
- Illegal vs Irregular appointment: “Illegal” generally means contrary to an applicable mandatory legal rule; “irregular” means procedurally defective but not prohibited by the governing law—often capable of cure, especially after long acquiescence.
- Deemed approval: Not an express order of approval, but an inference drawn from official conduct—here, long continuation in service and approvals/processing of promotions without objection.
- Article 235 (control of High Court over subordinate courts): Constitutional provision underpinning High Court control over district judiciary administration; used here to explain why general State selection-board rules were not automatically applicable to subordinate court Class-III posts.
5) Conclusion
The High Court’s key contribution is a clarified rule of application:
terminations driven by post-facto scrutiny under Mansukh Lal Saraf cannot be sustained unless the appointment was illegal under the recruitment rules actually applicable at the time.
Where (as in 1994–1995 District Court Class-III recruitment) no such statutory recruitment rules governed appointments and relevant State service rules had not been adopted,
the appointment cannot be branded void ab initio; at most it may be irregular.
The judgment further reinforces institutional accountability: authorities must not apply inapplicable rules to undo decades of service,
particularly absent fraud, and courts may decline to follow earlier decisions rendered without noticing the true governing framework.
The relief—reinstatement without back wages but with consequential service benefits—reflects a pragmatic correction while maintaining fiscal restraint.