IRC/MoRTH Fuel-Station Norms Apply to Non-Highway Roads Only on Proven State Adoption: Burden on Writ Petitioner; Unverified Letters Insufficient

1. Introduction

In INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED v. M/S ADITYA H.P. CENTRE (2026 INSC 182), the Supreme Court considered a batch of civil appeals filed by Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) against common orders of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh which had quashed IOCL’s allotments of certain retail fuel outlets in Himachal Pradesh.

The writ petitioners (including certain existing retail outlet dealers and one PIL petitioner) challenged the allotments primarily on the basis that the proposed outlets allegedly violated distance and access-safety norms said to flow from Indian Roads Congress (IRC) guidelines and Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) norms—particularly minimum distances from intersections and between outlets. IOCL’s core defence was that these guidelines were non-statutory and, in any event, not shown to be applicable to the disputed sites situated on Major District Roads (MDRs)/Other District Roads (ODRs).

The central issue, therefore, was: can allotments on MDR/ODR roads be struck down in writ jurisdiction for violating IRC/MoRTH norms without proving that the State has formally adopted or applied those norms to such roads?

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders quashing IOCL’s allotments.
  • It held that the High Court erred in treating an unverified letter of an Assistant Engineer (HPPWD) as sufficient basis to conclude that IRC/MoRTH guidelines applied to MDRs/ODRs in Himachal Pradesh.
  • The Court reaffirmed that in writ proceedings decided on affidavits, the burden lies on the writ petitioner to plead and prove the factual foundation for relief—here, the State’s adoption/applicability of the IRC/MoRTH norms.
  • In the absence of any notification/communication evidencing such adoption, the High Court’s interference was termed perverse and unsustainable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Others v. Aarti Devi Dangi and another

The High Court relied heavily on Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Others v. Aarti Devi Dangi and another to hold that since nothing showed Himachal Pradesh had excluded IRC norms, the guidelines should be treated as applicable. The Supreme Court rejected this use of the precedent.

The Supreme Court clarified that Aarti Devi Dangi supports the opposite proposition: IRC norms become applicable only upon formal adoption by the concerned State. Therefore, unless there is tangible material demonstrating the State’s adoption (especially for MDRs/ODRs), the precedent cannot be used to presume applicability.

(b) Rajasthan Pradesh Vaidya Samiti v. Union of India (relying on Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana)

On pleadings and proof in writ proceedings, the Court relied on Rajasthan Pradesh Vaidya Samiti v. Union of India, which in turn quoted Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana. The extracted principle is critical:

  • In writ proceedings (decided on affidavits), a party must plead not only facts but also the evidence supporting those facts (typically by annexing documents).
  • If a “point of law” depends on facts (e.g., whether the State adopted certain guidelines), those facts must be pleaded and proven; otherwise, the Court will not entertain the point.

Applying this, the Supreme Court held that the writ petitioners failed to produce any notification/communication by Himachal Pradesh adopting IRC/MoRTH norms for MDRs/ODRs; hence the High Court should not have invalidated the allotments on that unproven premise.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  1. Writ adjudication is affidavit-based and not suited for fact-finding via evidence: The Court emphasized that writ courts generally proceed on affidavits and do not conduct trials to resolve disputed factual foundations.
  2. Failure to implead the proper party (State) undermined the High Court’s approach: In key writ petitions, the State of Himachal Pradesh was not impleaded; where impleaded, it filed no reply. The High Court thus lacked an authoritative State position on whether IRC/MoRTH norms were adopted for MDRs/ODRs.
  3. An “unverified” departmental letter cannot substitute formal adoption or a categorical State stand: The Assistant Engineer’s letter was treated by the Supreme Court as an unreliable basis to conclude statewide legal applicability of guidelines.
  4. Misplaced shifting of burden: The High Court effectively shifted the burden to IOCL to prove “exclusion” of the guidelines. The Supreme Court held the correct rule is the opposite: the writ petitioner must prove adoption/applicability when relief depends on it.
  5. Non-statutory guidelines require proof of enforceability in the specific context: Even if guidelines exist, enforceability against projects on MDRs/ODRs requires demonstrated extension/adoption by the competent authority (here, the State), not assumption.

3.3 Impact

  • Higher threshold for “guideline-based” challenges: Petitioners challenging infrastructure/fuel outlet permissions on the basis of IRC/MoRTH norms must now squarely produce State adoption documents (notifications, circulars, policy decisions) showing applicability to the road category in question (MDR/ODR, etc.).
  • Limits judicial reliance on informal correspondence: The decision discourages writ courts from treating internal or informal letters as determinative of legal applicability, especially where the State’s formal stance is absent.
  • Clarifies the operational use of Aarti Devi Dangi: The precedent cannot be used to presume guideline applicability; it is authority for the proposition that guidelines apply upon adoption by the State.
  • Procedural discipline in public law litigation: The judgment reinforces that in regulatory/infrastructure disputes, impleading the State/competent authority and placing the relevant government instruments on record is often indispensable.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Non-statutory guidelines
Guidelines that are not enacted as legislation or rules under a statute. They may inform best practices, but they do not automatically become legally enforceable against all parties unless adopted/mandated by a competent authority or incorporated into binding permissions/conditions.
Adoption by the State
A formal decision by the State (often by notification, circular, policy order, or binding instruction) making particular guidelines applicable within its jurisdiction or to specified road categories.
Burden of proof in writ proceedings
The obligation of the party seeking relief (typically the writ petitioner) to plead the necessary facts and file supporting documents. Courts generally will not assume missing facts or require the respondent to disprove unproven assertions.
“Perverse” finding
In appellate review, a finding may be called perverse when it is not reasonably supported by the record or is reached by applying the wrong legal approach (e.g., reversing the burden of proof or relying on inadequate material).

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling establishes a clear procedural-substantive rule for challenges based on IRC/MoRTH norms: unless the writ petitioner produces tangible material showing the State’s formal adoption/applicability of such guidelines to the relevant road category, allotments/permissions cannot be quashed on alleged guideline violations. The judgment also reaffirms the evidentiary discipline required in writ litigation—facts essential to relief must be pleaded and proven by annexed material, and courts should not fill gaps by presumptions or informal letters.