Interim Orders Are Executable Under Section 36 CPC (Order XXXIX Rule 2-A Not Exclusive) and Mandatory Verification of AI/Digital Citations in Judicial Orders
1. Introduction
In PRINCIPAL WOODLAND HOUSE SCHOOL, SHIVPORA,SONWAR SRINAGAR AND OTHERS v. SHAKEEL AHMAD MALIK
(Jammu & Kashmir High Court, Srinagar; decided on 06-06-2026), the High Court examined whether an
interim monetary direction issued on an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC can be
executed using the execution framework (Order XXI) via Section 36 CPC, or whether the
aggrieved party is confined to Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC (consequences for disobedience of injunction).
The dispute arose from a civil suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff (Shakeel Ahmad Malik) seeking (i) declaration regarding his
designation/entitlement as Supervisor and illegality of the designations of defendant nos. 2 and 3, and (ii) consequential salary relief.
During pendency, the trial court passed an interim direction (14.06.2022) requiring the school to pay 50% salary for a defined
period (April 2021 to 11.05.2022), subject to an undertaking of refund if the plaintiff failed in the suit.
The petitioners (the school and two academic supervisors) repeatedly challenged and resisted implementation. When execution/implementation
was pursued, the executing court directed compliance and indicated coercive measures (attachment, detention, and contempt). The petitioners
invoked the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction to set aside the execution order (15.10.2025).
The judgment also contains a significant “Postscript” addressing the reliability of citations used by trial courts and the increasing
use of AI-based tools, laying down institutional guidance requiring independent verification of AI/digital outputs.
Key Issues
- Executability: Can an interim order under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 be executed under Section 36 CPC read with Order XXI?
- Exclusivity: Is Order XXXIX Rule 2-A the sole remedy for non-compliance of interim injunction-type directions?
- Effect of review: Does pendency of a review petition suspend enforceability of the interim order?
- Judicial process abuse: Should repeated challenges to implementation invite costs and be treated as abuse of process?
- Quality control in precedent use: What standards should courts follow when using AI/digital research and citing precedents?
2. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court dismissed the petition and upheld the executing court’s order dated 15.10.2025.
It held that:
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By virtue of Section 36 CPC, provisions relating to execution of decrees apply (as far as applicable) to execution of
orders, including interim orders; thus the interim direction is not rendered inexecutable merely because it is interlocutory.
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Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC is not the exclusive remedy; execution is independently maintainable, and Rule 2-A is
supplemental (a mechanism for consequence of disobedience).
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Mere pendency of a review petition does not operate as a stay; absent a specific stay, the order remains binding and enforceable.
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The interim salary direction did not amount to granting final relief because it was conditional and safeguarded by an undertaking for refund
(restitutionary protection).
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The petition was treated as a continuation of obstructive litigation; the Court imposed costs of Rs. 25,000 to deter abuse.
In the Postscript, the Court warned against inaccurate/unverifiable citations and directed that any reliance on AI or similar tools must be
independently verified from authentic sources. The order was directed to be circulated among judicial officers.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
(a) Sheela Jerald &Ors. v. Pushpadasan, Civil Appeal No. 7650 of 2018
This is the judgment’s central authority on executability. The High Court extracted and relied upon the Supreme Court’s reasoning that refusal
to entertain execution merely because the order is interim is “untenable” in view of Section 36, C.P.C. The Supreme Court’s emphasis,
echoed by the High Court, is functional: a valid order of a competent court must be capable of execution, otherwise it becomes meaningless.
Importantly, the Supreme Court in Sheela Jerald &Ors. v. Pushpadasan also addressed the argument that Order 39 consequences
(Rule 2-A) should bar execution. It rejected that exclusivity argument, clarifying that a provision prescribing consequences of disobedience does
not negate executability of an otherwise enforceable order.
(b) M.V.S. Manikyala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami&Ors., AIR 1966 SC 470
Cited within Sheela Jerald &Ors. v. Pushpadasan, this case supplies the doctrinal bridge: execution provisions applying to decrees
also apply to orders by virtue of Section 36 CPC. The High Court treated this as reinforcing that the decree/order distinction is not decisive when
Section 36 is engaged.
The High Court used this Bombay High Court decision to further support the proposition that, post the 1976 amendment to Section 36 CPC, execution
mechanisms can be extended to orders. It also draws attention to Order XXI Rule 32 (particularly sub-rule (5)) as a toolkit for enforcing
injunction-like decrees/orders—demonstrating that execution is not confined to money decrees and that courts may direct acts to be done at the
judgment-debtor’s cost.
Cited to justify a strict response to abusive litigation practices. The High Court invoked the Supreme Court’s systemic concern: frivolous litigation
imposes hardship on the opposite party and consumes judicial time, warranting deterrence.
(e) Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2010) 2 SCC 114
Used to reinforce the normative standard of litigant conduct: parties approaching courts must do so with clean hands and respect for truth. The High Court
employed it as an ethical-legal foundation for denying indulgence to litigants who “pollute the stream of justice” through obstructionist tactics.
(f) PandurangVithalKevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited [2024 INSC 1051]
Relied upon for the contemporary trend of imposing meaningful costs to send a “clear message” to unscrupulous litigants who waste judicial time. The High Court
used this to support its decision to impose quantified costs (Rs. 25,000) to curb repeated, meritless challenges aimed at delay.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(i) Section 36 CPC as the statutory gateway for executing “orders”
The High Court grounded its holding in the text of Section 36 CPC:
the execution provisions relating to decrees apply, “so far as they are applicable,” to execution of orders.
The petitioners’ attempt to confine execution to decrees (Section 2(2) CPC) was rejected because Section 36 expressly expands the execution regime
beyond decrees.
The Court’s interpretive move is straightforward but significant: since the legislature used the broad term “orders” (not “final orders”), interim orders
are not excluded by categorization alone. The controlling question becomes applicability of execution machinery to the nature of the direction.
(ii) Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC is not exclusive; it is supplemental
The Court rejected the “only remedy” argument. It treated Order XXXIX Rule 2-A as a mechanism to address disobedience of injunctions, but not as a bar against
seeking execution/implementation of an executable direction. This approach avoids a practical enforcement gap: if interim directions (especially monetary ones)
could not be executed, interim relief would become illusory.
(iii) Pendency of review does not stay operation of the order
The Court reaffirmed the settled procedural principle: filing of a review petition does not automatically suspend enforceability. Only a specific stay order can.
Therefore, the interim order continued to bind the petitioners.
(iv) Interim monetary directions and the “final relief” objection
The petitioners argued that enforcing salary payment would effectively grant final relief. The Court answered by pointing to the internal safeguards of the interim
order: it was limited to a defined period and made conditional on an undertaking to refund if the plaintiff failed (a restitutionary mechanism).
This reasoning treats interim monetary relief as a balance-of-equities device rather than a final adjudication. The Court emphasized that courts’ interim jurisdiction
must have practical effectiveness; otherwise, litigants could render interim relief meaningless by delay tactics until final disposal.
(v) Abuse of process, finality, and constructive res judicata
A notable feature of the judgment is its strong stance against repetitive litigation targeting implementation rather than merits. The Court referenced the principles
of finality of judicial decisions and constructive res judicata to prevent re-agitation of issues that had already been decided
at the interlocutory stage by multiple forums (trial, appellate, and Article 227 proceedings).
(vi) Coercive measures and “mode available in law”
The petitioners claimed the executing court misconstrued an earlier High Court order (22.05.2024) which stayed suspension of school registration but allowed “any
other mode available in law.” The Court clarified that the earlier order restrained only that extreme measure; it did not prohibit lawful execution methods.
The Court ultimately left enforcement modalities to the executing court “in accordance with law,” while upholding the execution order and directing compliance.
3.3 Impact
(i) Strengthening enforceability of interim civil orders
The judgment reaffirms a strong enforcement model: where an interim order contains a clear, implementable direction (including monetary directions), courts need not
be confined to contempt-like consequences under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A; they may utilize execution mechanisms through Section 36 CPC. This discourages strategic
non-compliance designed to outlast the litigation timeline.
(ii) Litigation discipline: costs and deterrence
By imposing quantified costs for an abuse-of-process pattern, the judgment signals that repeated supervisory challenges aimed at delaying compliance can attract
deterrent sanctions—aligning with the Supreme Court’s broader policy concerns in Subrata Roy Sahara Vs Union of India and
PandurangVithalKevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited [2024 INSC 1051].
(iii) Institutional guidance on AI/digital legal research in courts
The Postscript may have the widest administrative impact. The Court:
- Recognized increasing use of AI tools and digital platforms in judicial work.
- Flagged the risk of incorrect/untraceable citations and distortion of ratio decidendi through paraphrase.
- Directed that AI-generated/suggested citations and propositions must be independently verified from authentic sources.
- Required accurate, complete citations and encouraged verbatim extraction of relevant passages where a precedent is foundational.
- Ordered circulation to all judicial officers in the Union Territory, giving the guidance quasi-administrative force.
This creates a clear compliance expectation: technology may assist research, but it cannot substitute for judicial verification; responsibility remains with the authoring judge.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Interim order (Order XXXIX): A temporary direction issued to protect a party during the pendency of the case (e.g., to maintain status quo or provide
provisional monetary relief) until final decision.
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Execution (Order XXI): The process by which a court ensures its decree/order is actually carried out (e.g., recovery of money, attachment of property,
enforcement of injunction-related acts).
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Section 36 CPC: A provision that extends decree-execution rules to “orders” as far as applicable. This is the statutory basis for executing certain
non-decree orders, including interim directions.
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Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC: A mechanism dealing with consequences for disobedience of injunctions (often coercive/punitive in character). The judgment
clarifies it is not the only pathway; execution may also lie.
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Article 227 jurisdiction: Supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court over subordinate courts; interference is limited and typically reserved for grave
injustice or jurisdictional errors.
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Constructive res judicata: A principle that prevents parties from re-litigating issues that were raised or could/should have been raised earlier.
Here it is used to discourage repeated challenges to settled interim directions through different procedural forms.
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Restitution/undertaking to refund: A safeguard ensuring that if interim money is paid and the claimant later loses, the payor can recover it—reducing
the risk that interim payment becomes irreversible “final relief.”
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Ratio decidendi vs paraphrase: The binding legal principle of a case is what the court actually decided; paraphrasing can distort it. The Court urges
faithful quotation and verifiable citations.
5. Conclusion
The High Court’s decision consolidates two practical rule-of-law messages.
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Enforcement message: Interim orders—when they contain clear, implementable directions—are not toothless. By applying Section 36 CPC,
the Court affirms that such orders can be executed; Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC is not the exclusive remedial route. This protects the efficacy of interim
relief and discourages strategic defiance.
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Integrity message (AI/citations): Courts must treat precedent-citation accuracy as integral to adjudication. AI and digital tools may assist, but every
citation and proposition must be independently verified from authoritative sources, with preference for verbatim extracts where the precedent is foundational.
Coupled with costs for abusive litigation, the judgment strengthens both enforceability of interim judicial commands and quality assurance in judicial reasoning
in an era of increasingly technology-assisted legal research.