Intent as the Threshold for Section 2, Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act: Edited/Digital Depictions Cannot Sustain Prosecution Without Mens Rea

Case: SRI VENUGOPAL B C v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru
Date of Decision: 21-02-2026
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Nagaprasanna
Proceeding: Criminal Petition No.11694 of 2024 (under Section 528, BNSS, 2023) seeking quashment of FIR in Crime No.377/2024 for offence under Section 2 of the Prevention of Insult to National Honors Act, 1971

1) Introduction

The petitioner, a Government High School Principal, was accused of disrespecting the Indian National Flag based on a WhatsApp status image allegedly showing him standing with slippers on the National Flag during Gandhi Jayanthi celebrations (02-10-2024). Respondent No.2 (President, Human Rights Protection Committee) lodged a complaint on 05-10-2024, resulting in registration of Crime No.377/2024 under Section 2 of the Prevention of Insult to National Honors Act, 1971 (“the Act”).

2) Summary of the Judgment

The Karnataka High Court quashed the FIR. It held that the essential ingredient of intention (mens rea) to show disrespect to the National Flag was absent. The Court found the allegation inherently improbable in the factual setting: the “standing on the flag” image was demonstrably an edited composite, and the student admitted misuse of the petitioner’s phone and unauthorised creation/circulation of the content. With no antecedents and no deliberate act attributable to the petitioner, permitting investigation would amount to abuse of process.

Operative Outcome: Criminal Petition allowed; FIR in Crime No.377/2024 pending before the XXXI ACJM, Bangalore City, quashed.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

The judgment is precedent-heavy, using a consistent nationwide line of authority: Section 2 of the Act targets deliberate or intentional disrespect, and criminal process should not be triggered where intent is missing or where the conduct does not fit the statutory contours.

• V.K. NASWA v. UNION OF INDIA (Supreme Court)
  The Court extracted the Supreme Court’s framing that the National Flag is “both a benediction and a beckoning,” and that legal action may follow where disrespect is shown. Crucially, it also recognised that whether a particular event constitutes disrespect is often a factual inquiry. The Karnataka High Court used this to underscore the seriousness of the symbol, while still insisting on the statutory ingredient of intentional disrespect before allowing criminal prosecution to continue.
• UNION OF INDIA v. NAVEEN JINDAL AND ANOTHER (Supreme Court)
  This authority anchors two ideas repeatedly relied upon across High Courts and reproduced in this judgment’s survey:
  • Flag Code is not “law” under Article 13(3)(a)—it is executive instruction; its breach alone does not attract penal liability under Section 2 of the Act.
  • The right to fly the flag is linked to free expression under Article 19(1)(a), but is accompanied by the duty to respect the flag; restrictions must be statutory to ground criminal punishment.
  Though the present case is not a “Flag Code violation” fact pattern, the principle informs the Court’s strict approach: criminality must be located within Section 2’s text and ingredients, not in moral indignation or non-statutory norms.
• VIKRAM DATTA V. STATE OF M.P (Madhya Pradesh High Court)
  Cited for the proposition that absence of mens rea undermines Section 2 prosecution and that duties cannot be presumed (and vicarious liability cannot be stretched) without material. The Karnataka High Court’s decision similarly rejects proceeding on an imputed or assumed intention—especially where the alleged “act” is in truth an edited portrayal created by others.
• Amgonda Vithoba Pandhare v. Union of India (Bombay High Court) and Umesh Kishanrao Chopde v. State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court)
  These were discussed to show the consistent judicial insistence on intentionality as an “essential ingredient,” and that certain omissions (e.g., not lowering the flag after sunset) do not fall within Explanation 4 and thus do not constitute Section 2 offences. The Karnataka High Court used this jurisprudence to reinforce that the criminal law in this domain is narrow: it punishes overt, intentional insult, not every perceived impropriety or accidental/third-party act.
• Satheesh Babu P.K. v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court) and SRI RAVIKUMAR S.B. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (Karnataka High Court)
  Both recognise that not every deviation relating to display of the flag is an offence under Section 2 and that mens rea is critical. The coordinate bench decision (SRI RAVIKUMAR S.B. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA) is particularly relevant: it reflects Karnataka’s own approach that the Act is not a catch-all and must be applied with fidelity to the statutory text.
• ANJU RATHAUR v. OMPRAKASH RATHAUR (Chhattisgarh High Court)
  The Court drew from this to emphasise that even where a flag is unfurled incorrectly (e.g., “saffron down”), prosecution requires proof of intention; absence of intent warrants quashment (also tied to the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal principles).
• SUSHRISUMAN BAHANJI v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND (Uttarakhand High Court)
  This decision was relied upon for its rejection of vicarious/omnibus attribution of responsibility in the absence of direct evidence that the accused intentionally insulted the flag. The present judgment mirrors that approach: the petitioner cannot be prosecuted merely because the image features him if the creation/circulation is by others and intent is missing.
• DYANDEO v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (Bombay High Court)
  The quoted reasoning is conceptually central: even if an act could technically resemble “trampling” (e.g., rangoli depiction), the word “intentionally” is “conspicuous” and requires mens rea; absent material showing intention to insult, continuing the criminal process is an abuse. The Karnataka High Court applies the same logic to the digital-editing context.
• STATE v. D. SENTHILKUMAR (Madras High Court)
  Treated as the most comprehensive exposition, this precedent was used to:
  • Reinforce legislative purpose: penalising deliberate disrespect, not bona fide/innocuous conduct.
  • Clarify that Actus Reus + Mens Rea must coexist for Section 2.
  • Warn against “fetishization” of compulsory patriotism by converting innocuous acts into prosecutions.
  The Karnataka High Court’s application is direct: an edited image, circulated without the petitioner’s knowledge, cannot supply the requisite intention to insult.
• GAURISHANKAR GARG v. STATE OF M.P (Madhya Pradesh High Court)
  Cited for strict construction of penal statutes and the proposition that conduct not falling within “four corners” of Section 2 cannot be criminalised. The present Court adopts that strictness: the statutory requirement of intentional disrespect cannot be bypassed by the mere appearance of a composite/edited image.
• STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL (Supreme Court)
  This is the doctrinal foundation for quashing: the Court invoked the illustrative categories, especially:
  • Category (1): Allegations, even accepted in full, do not constitute an offence.
  • Category (5): Allegations are absurd or inherently improbable.
  • Category (7): Proceeding attended with mala fide/ulterior motive (the judgment notes complainant’s posture and lack of basis; while it does not make a detailed mala fide finding, it frames the continuation as abuse where intent is absent and the factual premise is fabricated/edited by others).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three structured steps:

1. Statutory ingredient: “Intentional” disrespect is central to Section 2.
   The Court highlighted that Explanation 4(i) expressly uses “intentionally,” and that the broader Section 2 phrase “otherwise shows disrespect” has consistently been read (across High Courts) as requiring mens rea. The judgment aligns Section 2 prosecutions with a high threshold: overt act + intention to insult.
2. Factual filter: the record showed an edited/constructed depiction, not an act by the petitioner.
   The Court compared the “original” photograph of the petitioner and the “flag image” and found a clear composite/edited placement. It also relied on:
   • the student’s written admission and apology acknowledging unauthorised use of the petitioner’s phone and creation/circulation of the video/status;
   • the petitioner’s prompt explanatory reply to the departmental show-cause notice;
   • the absence of antecedents and the inherent improbability of a school principal intentionally standing on the flag during Gandhi Jayanthi celebrations.
   Together, these materials undermined the very premise needed to justify criminal investigation: a deliberate act by the petitioner.
3. Process control: continuation of investigation would be an abuse of process (Bhajan Lal).
   Since the ingredient of intent was not merely “disputed” but contradicted by the surrounding material (admission by student; visual indication of editing), the Court treated the FIR as falling within the quashment categories—especially inherent improbability and non-disclosure of offence.

3.3 Impact

• Digital/edited-content prosecutions under Section 2 will face early judicial scrutiny.
  The judgment effectively extends established “mens rea” jurisprudence into the modern communication ecosystem: a person’s criminal liability cannot be founded on an edited depiction circulated by third parties, absent material showing the accused’s intentional disrespect.
• Reinforces strict construction of symbolic-offence statutes.
  Consistent with GAURISHANKAR GARG v. STATE OF M.P and the broader line, the judgment discourages expansion of Section 2 beyond its text and legislative purpose (deliberate insult).
• Guidance to police and complainants: verify the “act” and the actor.
  The Court’s emphasis on the edited nature of the image and the absence of intent implicitly signals that registration/investigation should not proceed mechanically on viral content without basic verification of authenticity and authorship.
• Institutional context matters.
  By noting the petitioner’s role as principal, the celebratory setting, and lack of antecedents, the Court indicates that “intent” can be inferred (or excluded) from context; not every provocative image warrants coercive criminal process.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mens rea: The “guilty mind” or intention behind an act. Under Section 2 (and particularly Explanation 4(i)), disrespect must be intentional. If the accused did not intend to insult (and the alleged disrespect is attributable to others), the offence is not made out.
• Actus reus: The prohibited act itself (e.g., trampling upon, defacing, showing disrespect). The law generally requires both the act and the intention.
• Flag Code vs. Statute: The Flag Code is an executive guideline; it is not “law” under Article 13(3)(a) (as affirmed in UNION OF INDIA v. NAVEEN JINDAL AND ANOTHER). Violation of the Flag Code, by itself, does not automatically create criminal liability unless the conduct also fits Section 2 of the Act.
• Quashing of FIR (Section 528 BNSS / Section 482 CrPC): The High Court’s inherent power to stop criminal proceedings at the threshold to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice. The STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL categories are the standard judicial yardstick.
• “Inherently improbable” allegations: Claims that are so unlikely, when tested against basic common sense and available material, that no prudent person would proceed. Here, the edited composite image and student’s admission made the allegation of deliberate insult by the petitioner inherently improbable.

5) Conclusion

This decision crystallises a clear rule for Section 2 prosecutions: the offence is anchored in intentional disrespect, and courts will not permit criminal process to proceed where the alleged insult is the product of third-party manipulation (including digital editing) and where mens rea is absent on the face of the record. By applying STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL to a social-media/edited-image fact pattern, the Karnataka High Court both safeguards the dignity of national symbols (by insisting on the correct legal threshold) and prevents the Act from becoming a tool for over-criminalisation and harassment disconnected from deliberate wrongdoing.