Institutional Premises Excluded from “Re-Release” under ABC Rules, 2023: Article 21-Driven Stray Dog Removal, SOP Validity, and Feeder/Carer Tort Liability

I. Introduction

Key issues

• Statutory conflict: Whether the Court’s “non-re-release” directive contradicts Rule 11(19) of the ABC Rules, 2023.
• Meaning of “same place/locality”: Does it include controlled-access institutional premises?
• Article 142: Whether the Court’s directions exceed the “complete justice” power and supplant substantive law.
• SOP legality: Whether AWBI exceeded the Court’s mandate by covering more public spaces than the illustrative list in the 07-11-2025 order.
• Accountability: Whether persons/organisations feeding or maintaining dogs should bear legal responsibility for bite incidents.

II. Summary of the Judgment

• Interlocutory applications seeking modification/recall/stay were dismissed. The 07-11-2025 directions—especially “remove dogs from institutional premises and do not re-release there”—were reiterated.
• Interpretation of ABC Rules, 2023: Rule 7(2) (“street dogs… living on the street or within a gated campus”) is classificatory and does not create an enforceable right for dogs to inhabit all gated/controlled premises. Rule 11(19) must be read with the PCA Act’s definition of “street” (Section 2(i)), limiting “locality” to publicly accessible areas, not restricted institutional spaces.
• Article 142 challenge rejected: The Court held its approach neither overrides nor supplants the statutory scheme; it purposively operationalises it to protect Article 21 rights in high-risk spaces.
• Expert committee request refused: The Court prioritised implementation over further deliberation, given the calibrated and urgent nature of directions.
• NGO caution: While NGOs may be engaged for CSVR, municipal bodies must do stringent due diligence and audits; the Court referenced allegations of fraud in CSVR billing.
• Tortious liability framework introduced for campus feeding/care: An “experimental” permission for NALSAR University’s Animal Law Centre was conditioned on an undertaking of tortious liability; broadly, campus feeder/carer groups must file affidavits assuming liability, failing which feeding/maintenance within institutional premises is not permitted.
• AWBI SOPs upheld: Their extension to other high-footfall public spaces was considered consistent with the object of the Court’s directions; challenges were dismissed.
• Compliance architecture strengthened: States/UTs directed to create at least one functional ABC Centre per district; stronger vaccine availability; NHAI’s responsibility emphasised for highways; and monitoring devolved to High Courts through registered suo motu continuing mandamus matters.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the outcome)

• Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr. (1962 SCC OnLine SC 37)
  Invoked by applicants to argue Article 142 cannot contravene statutory provisions. The Court treated this line as not disabling Article 142 per se, and aligned it with later jurisprudence distinguishing “power existence” from “propriety of exercise”.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India ((1991) 4 SCC 584)
  The Court relied on this to reaffirm that statutory limits do not ipso facto constrain Article 142; rather, the Court must consider express statutory prohibitions rooted in fundamental public policy when deciding what counts as “complete justice”.
• Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India ((1998) 4 SCC 409)
  Used to reconcile Union Carbide and Prem Chand Garg: Article 142 is plenary and supplementary, but cannot be used to “supplant” substantive law or construct a new edifice ignoring express statutory provisions. The Court applied this to say it was not overriding the ABC Rules; it was reading them purposively and limiting their operation in restricted-access/high-risk premises.
• Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan ((2023) 14 SCC 231)
  Provided the contemporary doctrinal framework: restraints on Article 142 arise from “general public policy” (constitutional basics) and “specific public policy” (express pre-eminent prohibitions central to a statute). The Court used this to uphold its directions as consistent with public safety and Article 21 imperatives.
• K. Veeraswami v. Union Of India ((1991) 3 SCC 655)
  Cited (through quotation in Shilpa Sailesh) for the Supreme Court’s role as a “problem-solver in the nebulous areas,” reinforcing the Court’s remedial, systemic approach in a suo motu public safety context.
• Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967 SCC OnLine SC 14), Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat ((1991) 4 SCC 406), A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak ((1988) 2 SCC 602), DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. ((1996) 4 SCC 622)
  These were referenced in the extracted jurisprudential narrative on Article 142’s evolution—supporting breadth with restraint, and the idea that Article 142 is uncatalogued to preserve elasticity.
• City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price, In re ((2026) 1 SCC 774)
  The Court treated its own earlier order as the foundational policy/rights assessment establishing the immediate Article 21 threat and the need for uniform directions, particularly for institutional areas.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Statutory interpretation: ABC Rules, 2023 read with the PCA Act, 1960

• Rule 7(2) is classificatory, not rights-conferring. The Court held that describing “street dogs… living on the street or within a gated campus” cannot be transformed into a substantive entitlement for dogs to remain within all gated or controlled premises (especially sensitive institutions).
• Rule 11(19) “same place/locality” is context-bound. The Court read Rule 11(19) with Section 2(i) of the PCA Act, 1960 defining “street” as publicly accessible ways/open spaces. Consequently, “locality” cannot be extended to restricted-access institutional premises, where safety, hygiene, and controlled functioning are paramount.
• Purposive limitation: The Court treated schools, hospitals, sports/transport hubs as spaces requiring heightened safety and minimal risk tolerance. A mechanical “release back” rule, if applied to these premises, would frustrate the public safety object that underlies both Article 21 duties and the regulatory character of ABC.

2) Article 21 as the normative pivot

• The Court repeatedly framed stray dog attacks as a constitutional safety failure, not merely an animal management issue. It treated the State’s obligation as affirmative—to secure safe access to learning/healing/transit/recreation spaces.
• It explicitly stated that while animal welfare is significant, where human safety and life are at stake, the constitutional balance “must tilt” towards protecting human life (within legally permissible, humane measures).

3) Article 142: not “overriding” the law, but operationalising it

• Applicants argued the Court’s 07-11-2025 non-re-release direction “supplanted” Rule 11(19). The Court’s answer was doctrinal and interpretive:
  • First, on interpretation, Rule 11(19) does not extend to restricted institutional areas (so there is no true conflict).
  • Second, even within Article 142 scrutiny, the directions were characterised as calibrated, limited, and aligned with statutory purpose, justified by the urgent Article 21 safety context and systemic non-implementation.

4) Rejection of expert committee: “implementation deficit,” not “normative deficit”

• The Court considered the problem sufficiently identified and the remedial framework workable; further committees would delay urgent action in sensitive premises.

5) Accountability innovations: tortious liability for campus feeder/carer groups

• A notable development is the Court’s shift from abstract balancing to allocation of risk:
  • Those asserting a practical ability to “maintain” or “institutionalise” coexistence within campuses must accept tortious liability for bite incidents.
  • Campus feeding/maintenance is conditioned on a filed affidavit/undertaking to the Head of Institution; otherwise, it is disallowed.
• This approach attempts to correct what the Court perceived as an asymmetry: advocacy for continued dog presence without corresponding acceptance of legal responsibility for foreseeable harm.

6) SOP validity: illustrative directions can generate broader operational categories

• The Court held the 07-11-2025 list of institutional areas was illustrative, focused on functional attributes (high footfall, vulnerability, public safety risk). Thus AWBI SOPs could legitimately include comparable spaces (parks, religious/tourist sites, airports, etc.).

7) Governance architecture: decentralised judicial monitoring and strengthened infrastructure mandates

• One ABC Centre per district becomes a judicially mandated minimum governance standard.
• Continuing mandamus shifted to High Courts via required suo motu registrations, enabling regionally responsive oversight.
• NHAI responsibility clarified: cannot offload highway safety obligations entirely onto States/UTs.
• Good-faith protection for officials implementing Court directions, limiting chilling effects from frivolous criminal complaints, while preserving action for mala fides/gross abuse.
• Legally permissible euthanasia is expressly acknowledged in limited categories (rabid, incurably ill, demonstrably dangerous/aggressive), subject to statutory protocol—signalling a more safety-forward operational stance while retaining legality and procedure.

C. Impact

1) Immediate doctrinal impact (ABC Rules interpretation)

• The judgment effectively creates a site-sensitive reading of the ABC Rules, 2023: “release back” is not an absolute command applicable to all places where a dog is found, especially restricted-access/high-safety premises.
• This resolves (for now) a major operational conflict faced by institutions and municipal bodies: whether they are legally forced to reintroduce the very risk they are mandated to eliminate.

2) Institutional compliance and tort risk allocation

• By conditioning campus feeding/maintenance on assumed tortious liability, the Court introduces a quasi-regulatory lever likely to:
  • reduce informal “feeder sovereignty” within campuses without accountability;
  • push institutions towards formalised risk management (fencing, removal protocols, clear responsibility lines);
  • increase civil liability litigation focus on identifiable actors (not only municipal bodies).

3) SOPs gain enforcement legitimacy

• Upholding AWBI SOPs strengthens national uniformity and provides operational detail that High Courts can enforce under continuing mandamus, reducing the “policy vacuum” argument in future challenges.

4) Federal and administrative consequences

• The mandated High Court monitoring model will likely create diverse compliance jurisprudence across States while maintaining a Supreme Court baseline (“no dilution”).
• The “one ABC Centre per district” directive may drive budgetary reallocations and procurement/contracting—also increasing scrutiny of NGO engagement and audit trails.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• CSVR (Capture–Sterilise–Vaccinate–Release): A dog population management method: dogs are humanely captured, sterilised (to prevent reproduction), vaccinated (notably against rabies), and then released—typically to their capture area—so sterilised dogs occupy territory, reducing influx of unsterilised dogs over time.
• “Vacuum effect” (as argued by applicants): The claim that removing dogs from a territory creates a “vacuum” attracting other (often unsterilised) dogs, potentially increasing conflict and bite risk. The Court did not treat this as controlling for restricted institutional premises where safety imperatives prevail.
• Purposive interpretation: Reading legal text according to its purpose and context, not mechanically by isolated words. Here, “locality” in Rule 11(19) is read alongside the PCA Act’s “street” definition and the safety function of institutional premises.
• Article 142 (“complete justice” power): A constitutional power allowing the Supreme Court to craft remedies to do complete justice. Courts self-restrain it: they avoid orders that plainly override core statutory prohibitions rooted in fundamental public policy.
• Tortious liability: Civil liability for harm caused (e.g., negligence). The Court’s innovation is to require campus feeder/carer groups to accept civil responsibility for foreseeable bite injuries if they want to maintain/keep dogs on campus.
• Continuing mandamus: A case remains open for ongoing court supervision of compliance, with periodic reports and further directions—used for systemic governance failures.
• Ultra vires (in SOP challenge): Acting beyond legal authority. The Court held AWBI SOPs were within the mandate because the earlier directions were illustrative and purpose-driven, not a closed list.

V. Conclusion