Illegal PCPNDT Search Does Not Automatically Nullify Prosecution; Seized Material Remains Usable Subject to Admissibility
1. Introduction
Case: DR. NARESH KUMAR GARG v. STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. (2026 INSC 176)
Court: Supreme Court of India (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Coram: Manoj Misra, J.; Ujjal Bhuyan, J. (Judgment by Ujjal Bhuyan, J.)
Date: 23-02-2026
The appellant, a radiologist, sought quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. of a complaint filed under the
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (“PCPNDT Act”),
arising from a 17.09.2015 decoy operation/raid alleging facilitation of illegal sex-determination.
The High Court refused to quash; the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Core issues included: (i) whether the raid/search was illegal because it was ordered by a single member (the Civil Surgeon/Chairperson)
rather than the District Appropriate Authority collectively under Section 30; (ii) if illegal, whether the entire complaint must fall;
(iii) whether the appellant’s earlier discharge in the FIR investigation barred the statutory complaint; and (iv) the significance of alleged record-keeping lapses
(Form F/register entries) under the PCPNDT framework.
2. Summary of the Judgment
- The Court accepted that, applying Ravinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, the 17.09.2015 authorization/direction to raid issued by the Civil Surgeon alone (without collective decision of the District Appropriate Authority) rendered the search illegal under Section 30.
- However, the Court held that illegality of the search does not automatically require discarding the material seized; such material may still be relied upon, subject to relevancy and admissibility.
- The Court rejected the argument that the appellant’s earlier discharge in the police case barred the statutory complaint, emphasizing that cognizance under the PCPNDT Act is complaint-driven (Section 28) and record-maintenance violations are independently actionable.
- The Court refused to quash the complaint (COMA/116/2018), leaving merits and evidentiary objections open for trial.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
This decision formed the foundation for the appellant’s challenge. The Court reiterated the ratio:
the power under Section 30(1) (search and seizure) is a “drastic” power and must be exercised by the
Appropriate Authority as a body; a single member (even the Chairperson) cannot unilaterally authorize a search.
Applying that ratio, the Court found the 17.09.2015 directive to conduct a raid was not shown to be a collective decision,
thus the search stood vitiated as illegal.
Critically, the present judgment limits the consequence that follows from that illegality: it treats the illegality as not
automatically fatal to the prosecution, particularly on the question of whether seized material is per se unusable.
FOGSI was relied upon to underscore that the PCPNDT Act is a social welfare legislation aimed at preventing female foeticide,
and that Form F compliance is mandatory. The Court extracted and adopted FOGSI’s reasoning that
non-maintenance of records is not a “clerical error” but a “springboard” for foeticide and attracts consequences under the Act.
This strengthened the Court’s unwillingness to terminate proceedings at the threshold where alleged record deficiencies existed.
The Court used this three-Judge Bench decision to support the principle that even if a search is illegal, seizure is not vitiated,
though courts may examine the seizure evidence more carefully. This case supplied the doctrinal bridge from “illegal search”
to “not necessarily exclusion of evidence.”
Cited for the proposition that evidence is not inadmissible merely because it was obtained by illegal means, subject to
standard tests such as relevance and proof of authenticity/genuineness.
The Court noted the caution in Malkani that judges retain discretion where strict admissibility would operate unfairly.
(E) Pooran Mal Vs. Director of Inspector (Investigation), New Delhi ((1974) 1 SCC 345)
The Constitution Bench authority was used to crystallize the Indian position: under the Evidence Act framework,
relevancy is the primary test of admissibility, and unless there is an express or necessarily implied legal prohibition,
material obtained via illegal search is not automatically shut out.
This case anchored the Court’s conclusion that illegal PCPNDT search does not mandate quashing where material is otherwise relevant/admissible.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(i) Illegality of search under Section 30 vs. survival of prosecution
The Court performed a two-step analysis:
- Step 1 (Validity): The 17.09.2015 order was by the Civil Surgeon “acting as” District Appropriate Authority, but it did not reflect a collective decision of the three-member authority. Bound by Ravinder Kumar, the Court treated the search as illegal.
- Step 2 (Consequence): The Court refused to treat illegality as a prosecution-killer. Drawing from Radha Kishan, Malkani, and Pooran Mal, it held that evidence from an illegal search may still be acted upon, subject to relevance/admissibility. Hence, the complaint could not be quashed merely because the raid authorization was defective.
(ii) Record-keeping violations as substantive statutory contraventions
The Court emphasized the statutory scheme:
under the proviso to Section 4(3), and Rules 9 and 10 read with Form F,
complete record maintenance is mandatory; deficiency/inaccuracy “shall amount to contravention” (subject to the accused proving the contrary).
Citing FOGSI, it treated record lapses as central to enforcement, not peripheral.
(iii) Effect of earlier discharge in FIR proceedings
The appellant argued the complaint was barred because he had been discharged in the FIR case. The Court rejected this on three linked grounds:
- Section 28 structure: PCPNDT offences are cognizable by courts only upon a complaint by the Appropriate Authority or its authorized officer (or by a noticed private complainant), not simply via police papers.
- Rule 18A (3) (iv) policy: police should generally not investigate PCPNDT cases; they are complaint cases.
- Independent gravamen: even the police discharge application noted discrepancies in record maintenance and identified the PCPNDT complaint route for that aspect—so discharge in the FIR track did not foreclose statutory action.
(iv) Challenge based on Rule 18A(2)(ii) (investigating machinery in Advisory Committee)
The Court dismissed the contention that participation of Dr. Saryu Sharma in the raid and alleged later role in the Advisory Committee invalidated proceedings.
It held Rule 18A(2)(ii) concerns persons who are “part of the investigating machinery,” which Dr. Sharma was not.
Additionally, the Court characterized Rule 18A guidelines as directory in nature—at most creating irregularity, not illegality, absent demonstrated prejudice.
3.3 Impact
- Strengthened enforceability despite procedural defects: The most significant practical consequence is that PCPNDT prosecutions are less likely to be quashed solely because the raid/search authorization was defective, since seized material is not automatically excluded.
- Refined reading of Ravinder Kumar: While reaffirming that Section 30 authorization must be collective, the Court narrows the remedial leap from “illegal search” to “quash the entire prosecution,” emphasizing evidentiary admissibility doctrines.
- Compliance pressure remains on authorities: The judgment does not dilute Section 30; it still labels such searches illegal. Authorities remain exposed to credibility challenges and heightened scrutiny of seizure evidence.
- Record-keeping prosecutions remain central: By reiterating FOGSI and the mandatory nature of Form F, the Court signals that prosecutions premised on deficient records will ordinarily proceed to trial.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Quashing): A High Court’s inherent power to stop criminal proceedings at the threshold when continuing them would be an abuse of process (but it is exercised sparingly).
- Appropriate Authority vs Advisory Committee: The Appropriate Authority (Section 17) is the enforcement decision-maker; the Advisory Committee’s role is to “aid and advise.”
- Section 30 search power: A statutory “raid” power allowing inspection and seizure of records/equipment where PCPNDT offences are suspected. Here, the defect was “who decided,” not what was seized.
- Form F: The mandatory statutory form that records why an ultrasound/prenatal diagnostic procedure was done, who referred, declarations of doctor/patient, and related details. Incomplete/incorrect Form F can itself trigger statutory contravention.
- Illegal search vs inadmissible evidence: An illegal search does not automatically mean the seized evidence cannot be used. Courts still test whether the evidence is relevant, genuine, and admissible under evidence law principles.
- Discharge vs bar to prosecution: Discharge in one track (a police FIR case) does not necessarily prevent a separate statutorily prescribed complaint prosecution, especially where the Act mandates a complaint for cognizance.
5. Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s key contribution is a clarified enforcement balance under the PCPNDT regime:
Section 30 requires collective authorization by the Appropriate Authority (search by a single member is illegal),
but illegality of the search does not, by itself, extinguish the prosecution because
materials seized may still be relied upon subject to relevancy and admissibility.
Reinforcing FOGSI, the Court also reiterates the centrality of Form F and record maintenance as substantive safeguards against sex-selection abuse.
The decision therefore narrows “technical quashings” while keeping evidentiary challenges open for trial scrutiny.