Honorarium Stagnation as “Begar”: Binding Effect of PAB-Approved Teacher Remuneration and State’s Pay-&-Recover Duty under the RTE Framework

Case: U.P. JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL COUNCIL INSTRUCTOR WELFARE ASSOCIATION v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Citation: 2026 INSC 117 | Court: Supreme Court of India | Date: 04-02-2026
Bench: Pankaj Mithal, J.; Prasanna B. Varale, J.

1) Introduction

This decision arises from a long-standing dispute concerning remuneration of “part time contractual instructors/teachers” engaged in Upper Primary Schools (Classes VI–VIII) in Uttar Pradesh under a centrally sponsored elementary education programme (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan, later merged into the Samagra Shiksha Scheme, 2018). Pursuant to a Government Order dated 31.01.2013 and an advertisement dated 25.02.2013, instructors were appointed on 11-month contracts at a fixed honorarium of Rs.7,000 per month, renewable, and barred from taking any other employment.

Over the years, proposals were moved to increase honorarium; approvals oscillated between Rs.8,470, Rs.9,800, and even Rs.17,000 (for 2017–2018), but actual payments often remained at lower levels and were later reduced to Rs.7,000 again from 2019–2020. The High Court ultimately restricted payment of Rs.17,000 per month only for 2017–2018, prompting cross-appeals by (i) the Welfare Association and individual instructors seeking continuity and revision, and (ii) the State resisting the burden and contesting interpretation of the RTE financing provisions.

2) Summary of the Judgment

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

i) Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Union of India

The State objected to maintainability of the writ petitions by invoking an alternative statutory grievance redressal route under Section 24(3) of the RTE Act. The Court relied on Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Union of India to reiterate that existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction, especially where:

• the writ petitions have already been entertained,
• pleadings completed, and
• the matter adjudicated on merits.

This precedent supported the Court’s refusal to “turn back the clock” and send parties to an alternative forum after a full merits adjudication.

ii) Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.

The Court invoked Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. for the broader doctrinal proposition that the alternative-remedy bar is a rule of prudence and self-restraint, not compulsion; High Courts retain discretion to entertain writs depending on facts. This reinforced that the maintainability objection was not determinative, particularly given the nature of the controversy (systemic, recurring, and affecting a large class of teachers).

iii) JAGGO v. UNION OF INDIA and Ors.

To contextualize the exploitation inherent in long-term “temporary/contractual” labels, the Court relied on JAGGO v. UNION OF INDIA and Ors., which recognized “multifaceted exploitation” of temporary employees—misuse of labels, lack of progression, denial of basic benefits—despite performance of regular duties. This precedent helped the Court frame the instructors’ predicament as an institutional practice of prolonged stagnation and insecurity rather than a one-off contractual bargain.

iv) People's Union For Democratic Rights v. Union of India

The most consequential citation is People's Union For Democratic Rights v. Union of India, used to expand Article 23’s prohibition of forced labour to include economic compulsion—where a person is driven by necessity to accept remuneration below minimum standards. The Court applied this logic to hold that maintaining instructors on an artificially depressed, stagnant honorarium—especially coupled with a contractual bar on other work—can amount to “Begar”/forced labour in substance, even if the arrangement is labelled “contractual.”

B. Legal Reasoning

i) Maintainability: Section 24(3) does not bar writ jurisdiction in this dispute

The Court read Section 24 as a coherent whole and held that Section 24(3) grievance redressal pertains to grievances “in context with the default in performance of duties” and disciplinary action connected with Section 24(2), not salary/honorarium fixation disputes. Even otherwise, writ jurisdiction was not barred in principle (as per the cited precedents).

ii) Re-characterising “part time contractual instructors” as de facto full-time and no longer contractual after expiry

Two findings drive the Court’s re-characterisation:

• Contractuality fades after expiry/non-renewal: the Court noted that original contracts were last renewed in 2017–18; no renewed contract thereafter was shown. Hence, the instructors “would rather be treated as teachers simpliciter after 2017–18.”
• “Part time” label is deceptive: Clause 5 barred them from any other part-time/whole-time work. The Court reasoned that if the State prohibits supplementary employment and produces no material that their duties are only part-time, the label “part time” cannot justify depressed remuneration; in effect, they are “whole time teachers.”

iii) Permanency of need: “deemed substantive posts” through continuity and scheme design

The scheme contemplated one instructor per hundred students. The Court treated this as reflecting a continuing, recurring institutional requirement. Even without formally sanctioned posts, ten years of continuous engagement for work integral to implementing the constitutional/statutory mandate led the Court to conclude that the appointments had “more or less” become permanent and were against “deemed substantive posts.”

This is not a regularisation order in the classical sense; rather, it is a functional characterization: where the State runs a continuing statutory scheme requiring ongoing staff, it cannot indefinitely rely on precarious labels to avoid fair remuneration and periodic revision.

iv) Policy domain vs arbitrariness: honorarium fixation cannot be a licence for stagnation

The State argued that honorarium fixation is a policy matter immune from judicial interference. The Court accepted that it is a policy decision but squarely held policy cannot be arbitrary or result in “Begar.” The Court emphasised:

• honorarium must be consonant with duties and stature of teachers;
• periodic revision is inherent due to price rise/cost of living;
• once enhanced, it cannot be unilaterally reduced without natural justice.

v) Article 23 as a wage-floor principle in substance: depressed/stagnant honorarium as “Begar”

Drawing from People's Union For Democratic Rights v. Union of India, the Court held that “force” includes economic compulsion, and that paying teachers at a meagre, stagnant rate—particularly below minimum wage standards—can become forced labour. The judgment adds a crucial factual amplifier: the contractual prohibition on other employment creates a “coercive cage,” removing the instructors’ real choice to supplement income. On this footing, the Court held that continuing to employ instructors on Rs.7,000 per month as initially fixed amounts to “Begar” and violates Article 23.

vi) Governance and decisional authority under the Scheme: PAB’s primacy and binding nature

The Court undertook a structural reading of the Samagra Shiksha governance framework:

• PAB approves annual work plans and budgets and has “full financial powers” to sanction budgets.
• State-level Governing Council/Executive Committee have policy/administrative roles but no financial sanctioning power to override PAB.

Therefore, once PAB approved honorarium at Rs.17,000 per month for 2017–18 (and the State acknowledged acceptance via the letter dated 02.06.2017), no other authority could “sit over” that decision and dilute it through lower fixation or non-payment.

vii) Financing and Section 7 of the Act: State’s primary responsibility and “pay & recover”

The State argued that honorarium burden should be shared 60:40 and it cannot be saddled with the Central share. The Court’s answer hinges on Section 7(5), which “in unequivocal terms” makes the State responsible to provide funds for implementation, taking into account Central sums and its own resources. The Court therefore held:

• teachers cannot be denied payment due to inter-governmental funding disputes;
• the State must pay first and then recover from the Union (“pay & recover”).

This reframes Section 7 as protecting continuity of educational entitlements and teacher remuneration against fiscal coordination failures.

viii) Remedy design: Rs.17,000 from 2017–18 onwards + periodic revision mandate

The Court treated Rs.17,000 as the operative benchmark because it was PAB-approved for 2017–18 and not shown to be revised thereafter by PAB. It also issued a systemic direction: periodic revision at least once in three years. This converts what might have remained a one-time arrears dispute into a governance obligation designed to prevent stagnation from recurring.

C. Impact

i) Strengthening Article 23 scrutiny in public “contractual” engagements

The judgment extends the practical reach of Article 23 into State-led contractual teacher engagements, particularly where:

• remuneration is depressed or stagnated for years,
• workers are barred from alternative employment, and
• the work is integral and continuous under a statutory/constitutional mandate.

It signals that “contract” labels will not immunise the State from constitutional scrutiny where economic compulsion is structurally created.

ii) Institutional accountability under centrally sponsored schemes

By holding PAB’s financial approvals binding and insulating them from State-level dilution, the Court tightens administrative discipline within scheme implementation. Future disputes under centrally sponsored schemes may increasingly turn on:

• which body has final financial authority,
• whether approvals have been validly revised by that authority, and
• who bears interim payment responsibility.

iii) Recalibrating the “alternative remedy” objection in service-like disputes under the RTE framework

The Court’s reading of Section 24(3) narrows its utility as a general-purpose bar against writ petitions. Future litigation may rely on this decision to argue that teacher remuneration/benefits disputes are not necessarily within Section 24(3)’s grievance domain.

iv) Financial federalism: teacher payments insulated from Centre–State funding frictions

The “pay & recover” approach ensures that beneficiaries of the educational ecosystem (students and instructors) are not collateral damage in Centre–State coordination failures. This may influence how courts handle fiscal-sharing disputes in other social sector schemes where the State remains the proximate implementing authority.

v) Administrative obligation of periodic revision

The direction to revise honorarium at least once in three years is a forward-looking compliance standard. It may become a benchmark for challenging stagnant honorarium structures for educators and other scheme-based human resources.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

• Honorarium: a fixed payment often used for scheme-based or non-regular engagements; the Court treated it functionally like remuneration that must be fair and revisable.
• PAB (Project Approval Board): the national-level body under the scheme with financial sanctioning power for work plans/budgets; the Court held it is the sole competent authority for budget-linked honorarium approvals.
• “Begar” (Article 23): constitutionally prohibited forced labour; the Court applied it to economic compulsion created by depressed pay plus prohibition on alternative work.
• Alternative remedy: a statutory forum or mechanism available before approaching writ court; it is generally a prudential limitation, not an absolute bar.
• Deemed substantive posts: not formally sanctioned posts, but posts treated as effectively created because the work is permanent/recurring and the engagement continues for years under a continuing scheme.
• Pay & recover: the State must pay first to ensure implementation, then recover the other government’s share later, preventing denial of rightful payments due to inter-government disputes.
• Natural justice (in this context): fairness constraints on unilateral reduction of an already conferred benefit; the State cannot withdraw/curtail without a fair process.

5) Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling establishes a robust, welfare-oriented precedent in the governance of scheme-based education staffing. It holds that long-term “part time contractual” labels cannot justify indefinite wage stagnation, especially where the State prohibits supplementary employment and the work is continuous and integral to the right to education framework. By treating depressed, stagnant honorarium as potentially violative of Article 23’s ban on “Begar,” and by making PAB’s approved honorarium binding with a mandatory periodic revision expectation, the Court constitutionalises minimum fairness in remuneration for educators engaged under public schemes.

Equally significant is the Court’s fiscal-federalism solution: the State bears the primary duty to pay for implementation under Section 7(5) and may later recover the Union’s share—ensuring that teachers are not left unpaid because governments disagree over funding shares. The decision thus recalibrates accountability: educational rights and educational labour cannot be held hostage to administrative labels or budgetary deflection.