High Court–Ordered Disclosure of Aadhaar/Biometric Data for Forgery Investigations Under Section 33(1) of the Aadhaar Act

1. Introduction

Case: Shri Sitaramanjaneyulu Elaprolu v. The Union Of India and Others (W.A. No. 252 of 2026)
Court: High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati (Division Bench: Chief Justice Lisa Gill & Justice R. Raghunandan Rao)
Date: 07-05-2026

The appellant asserted ownership over land in Saripalli Village, Pendurthi Mandal, Visakhapatnam District, and alleged that a person (arrayed as respondent No.5 in the underlying writ petition) impersonated him by creating/using an Aadhaar card to execute and register two sale deeds (Document No.407 of 2021 and Document No.4077 of 2021) in favour of another private party (respondent No.4 in W.P. No.2417 of 2025).

A criminal case was registered as Crime No.430 of 2021, and a civil suit O.S. No.174 of 2021 was filed seeking declaration that the sale deeds were null and void, with an interim injunction protecting possession. Separately, registration authorities reportedly cancelled the sale deeds on 02.11.2021, and that cancellation was stated to be under challenge in W.P. No.26359 of 2023.

The immediate dispute in this writ appeal concerned the appellant’s effort to obtain Aadhaar-related details (including biometric information) linked to the alleged impersonation, which had been refused under the Right to Information regime and not requisitioned by the police, prompting the appellant to seek judicial intervention.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Division Bench set aside the learned Single Judge’s order dated 22.12.2025 in W.P. No.2417 of 2025 and directed respondents 2 & 3 (the Aadhaar/concerned authorities) to release information permissible under the Aadhaar Act, 2016 to the investigating authority (respondent No.6) within three weeks. The Court further permitted respondent No.6 to share that information with respondent No.7 for the purposes of investigating Crime No.430 of 2021.

The Court held that Section 33(1) of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 does not impose an absolute prohibition on disclosure; rather, disclosure is permitted with safeguards, including that it be backed by an order of a court not inferior to a High Court. The Court also reasoned that an alleged forger should not evade investigation by invoking privacy, particularly where the Aadhaar card in question was said to have been issued in the appellant’s name.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment does not cite or rely upon any prior reported judicial precedents by name. Its reasoning is anchored primarily in statutory interpretation and the application of statutory safeguards to the facts.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

  • RTI refusal and the statutory privacy bar: The appellant’s RTI request was rejected on the ground of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, 2005 (personal information). The Court’s approach implicitly accepts that RTI is not the appropriate route for obtaining Aadhaar/biometric data in such circumstances, because Aadhaar data is governed by a more specific disclosure framework with heightened safeguards.
  • Section 33(1) Aadhaar Act as the lawful disclosure gateway: The Court emphasized that Section 33(1) of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 contemplates disclosure pursuant to an order of a court not inferior to a High Court. The Court treated this not as a prohibition but as a controlled permission mechanism—disclosure is possible, but only after judicial oversight ensures safeguards.
  • Balancing privacy against investigation of serious fraud/forgery: The Court rejected the notion that “privacy” can become a shield enabling a person alleged to have committed forgery and impersonation to “get away” without effective investigation. This is a proportionality-type balance: privacy interests are not treated as absolute where disclosure is narrowly tailored to an investigation and ordered by a High Court.
  • Relevance of the Aadhaar being in the appellant’s name: The Court noted that the Aadhaar card was officially stated to have been issued in the name of the appellant. On that footing, the Court observed that “the question of privacy also may not arise” in the manner suggested, since the requested disclosure is tied to vindicating the identity/rights of the person in whose name the Aadhaar exists (and to detecting impersonation).
  • Limitation and purpose restriction: The direction to disclose was expressly confined: only information “permissible under the provisions of the Aadhaar Act, 2016” could be supplied, and it was to be routed to the investigating authority (respondent No.6), with onward sharing only for the investigation of Crime No.430 of 2021. This embeds data-minimisation and purpose-limitation within the operative order.
  • Correcting the Single Judge’s approach: The learned Single Judge had declined relief largely because the Commissioner of Police had not applied for the information. The Division Bench instead exercised the High Court’s own authority to issue an order enabling disclosure under Section 33(1), thereby preventing investigative inaction from defeating the statutory disclosure route.

3.3 Impact

  • Victim-initiated pathway to Aadhaar disclosure for investigations: The ruling demonstrates that where Aadhaar/biometric data is essential to probe impersonation and fraud, the High Court can directly facilitate disclosure under Section 33(1) of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, even if the police have not proactively requisitioned it.
  • Reinforcement that RTI is not a substitute for Aadhaar Act safeguards: By granting relief through Aadhaar Act–compliant disclosure rather than under RTI, the decision signals that Aadhaar information—especially biometrics—will be handled via the specialised statutory mechanism rather than general transparency law.
  • Privacy is protected through procedure, not by absolute denial: The judgment’s model is: disclosure may be ordered, but only (a) by a High Court or above, and (b) restricted to legally permissible material and investigation purposes—likely to influence how future litigants frame requests and how authorities respond.
  • Operational effect on land-fraud cases involving identity impersonation: In property fraud matters where forged identity documents facilitate registrations, the decision strengthens investigative capacity by permitting the identity trail (including authentication/biometric-related information, as permissible) to be obtained under judicial supervision.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Section 8(1)(j), RTI Act (personal information exemption): This clause allows public authorities to refuse disclosure of personal information where disclosure is not justified by public interest or would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy. The appellant’s RTI request was refused on this basis.
  • Section 33(1), Aadhaar Act (court-supervised disclosure): Aadhaar-related data can be disclosed only through a tightly controlled process. One key control is that a court order (from a court not inferior to a High Court) is required—so disclosure is possible, but only with judicial oversight.
  • Purpose limitation / data minimisation: Even when disclosure is ordered, it should be limited to what the law permits and what the investigation needs. The Court mirrored this principle by restricting disclosure to “permissible” information and tying it to the investigation of a specific crime number.

5. Conclusion

The Division Bench in Shri Sitaramanjaneyulu Elaprolu v. The Union Of India and Others clarifies that the Aadhaar framework does not create an absolute bar on disclosure of Aadhaar-related information for legitimate criminal investigations; rather, it mandates a safeguard-driven route under Section 33(1) of the Aadhaar Act, 2016. Where impersonation and forgery are alleged, and Aadhaar-linked information is necessary to progress the investigation, the High Court can order limited, lawful disclosure to investigating authorities, ensuring both investigative efficacy and statutory privacy protections.