Fixed-pay recruitment to regular State posts is unconstitutional: regular pay from initial appointment under “equal pay for equal work”

1. Introduction

This common judgment of the Tripura High Court (Division Bench) in Sri Zonunfela Rawihte and Ors. v. The State of Tripura and Ors. (W.A. No.74 of 2025 and W.A. No.75 of 2025, decided on 08-01-2026) arose from the dismissal of two writ petitions challenging Tripura’s long-standing “fixed pay” recruitment policy for Group-C/Group-D posts.

The appellants were selected through the Teachers Recruitment Board, Tripura pursuant to advertisements (27.5.2017 and 17.11.2017) for filling “permanent” posts of Graduate Teachers (Class IX-X) and Post Graduate Teachers (Class XI-XII). Despite the advertisements referring to permanent posts, the appointment letters described the appointments as “temporary” for one year, terminable by notice, and provided only fixed pay (75% of the minimum basic pay).

The appellants sought (i) quashing of the Government Memorandum dated 15.12.2001 and the Finance Department Memorandum dated 16.10.2007, and (ii) regular pay from the date of initial appointment with consequential benefits.

Key issues

  • Whether appointing candidates to sanctioned/regular (“permanent”) posts on fixed pay for five years violates Articles 14 and 16.
  • Whether the “equal pay for equal work” doctrine compels regular pay where the appointees perform identical work as regular employees.
  • Whether Cabinet-approved “policy decisions” on pay are immune from judicial review.
  • Whether acceptance of fixed-pay terms bars constitutional challenge (estoppel/waiver).
  • Whether the State can advertise permanent posts but issue temporary, terminable appointment letters.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge’s judgment and allowed the appeals. It:

  1. Struck down the Memorandum dated 15.12.2001 and Memorandum dated 16.10.2007 as arbitrary and unconstitutional, violative of Article 14.
  2. Held the appellants must be treated as regularly appointed from the initial date of appointment to regular posts.
  3. Directed regular pay and service benefits notionally from the date of joining, but limited arrears to three years prior to filing of the writ petitions, with 9% p.a. interest until payment (within three months).
  4. Declared the State’s post-selection conversion of “permanent” posts into “temporary, terminable” appointments as patently illegal, the State being estopped by its own advertisement.
  5. Awarded costs of Rs. 2000/- to each appellant.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and their role)

(i) Equal pay for equal work: constitutional footing and operational tests

The Bench anchored its core holding in the “equal pay for equal work” doctrine, relying primarily on:

  • Randhir Singh v. Union of India: Treated “equal pay for equal work” as a constitutional goal enforceable via Articles 14 and 16, read with Article 39(d). The Tripura High Court used this to reaffirm that pay discrimination for identical work, absent rational classification, violates equality.
  • State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh: The Court extracted and applied the structured principles (para 42 series), especially:
    • Para 42.1–42.5: parity requires functional equality in duties, quality, sensitivity, volume, and responsibility;
    • Para 42.2: different departments do not justify different pay for identical work;
    • Para 42.6: for regular pay scale, claimant must be a “regular appointee” selected through a regular recruitment process.
    The Bench treated the appellants as “regular appointees” because the posts advertised were “permanent” and selection was merit-based pursuant to Recruitment Rules.

(ii) Extending parity even to non-regular categories—used a fortiori

To strengthen the conclusion that regular appointees cannot be kept on fixed pay, the Bench invoked precedents where parity was granted even to daily wagers/temporary scheme workers performing identical work:

  • Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P: Daily-wage workers doing the same work as regular Class IV employees were entitled to equal salary; lack of sanctioned posts was not a valid excuse.
  • Surinder Singh v. CPWD: “Equal pay for equal work” is not abstract; the State must act as a model employer; daily-rated employees were granted parity with regular employees.
  • Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana: Fixed salary/temporary scheme label did not defeat parity when duties were the same.

The Bench used these decisions to reason that if parity can be granted in such weaker employment categories, then teachers appointed against permanent sanctioned posts through regular selection stand on an even stronger footing.

(iii) Judicial review of “policy decisions”

The Single Judge emphasized judicial restraint and treated pay fixation as executive policy, citing: State of West Bengal v. W.B.Minimum Wages Inspectors Association, State of Bihar v. Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, Munger & Others, S.C.Chandra . Jharkhand, Asif Hameed v. State of J & K, and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh.

The Division Bench did not treat these as controlling on the facts because the challenge here was not to “pay fixation” in the abstract, but to a policy that created irrational intra-cadre pay discrimination for identical work on regular posts.

It then relied on the settled line permitting constitutional review of arbitrary policy:

  • Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India: Policy can be struck down if arbitrary and violating Articles 14/19.
  • Nishi Maghu v. State of J & K: Policy label does not immunize arbitrariness from Article 14 scrutiny.
  • Shrilekha Vidyarthi (Kumari) v. State of U.P: Article 14’s “reasonableness” requirement applies even to governmental policy/contractual matters.
  • State of Rajasthan v. Sevanivatra Karamchari Hitkari Samiti: Courts avoid policy merits but will intervene when policy is capricious/arbitrary/whimsical or unconstitutional.

These authorities were used to reject the State’s “Cabinet decision/policy” shield and to justify striking down the 2001 and 2007 Memoranda.

(iv) Unequal bargaining power, public policy, and non-waiver of fundamental rights

  • Central Inland Water Transport Co. v. Brojonath: Employment clauses imposed by a powerful employer on a weaker employee can be void as against public policy (Section 23, Contract Act). The Bench applied this to condemn (a) “temporary/terminable” clauses after advertising permanent posts, and (b) fixed pay imposition.
  • Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (and Basheshar Nath v. CIT as discussed therein): No estoppel against the Constitution; no waiver of fundamental rights (especially Article 14). This was used to reject the State’s argument that appellants, having accepted fixed-pay terms knowingly, were barred from challenging them.
  • Lombardi Engg. Ltd. v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd.: Cited as recent reiteration of the non-waiver/estoppel principle in the constitutional context.

B. Legal Reasoning

(i) Classification failure and arbitrariness under Articles 14 and 16

The Bench identified a decisive comparison class within the same pool of teachers holding the same posts: (a) teachers appointed prior to 2001 (who received regular pay from day one), and (b) teachers recruited through Tripura Public Service Commission (who also received regular pay from day one), versus (c) the appellants appointed after 2007 (kept on fixed pay for five years).

The State did not dispute that duties, workload, and responsibilities were identical. With no rational differentiator, the fixed-pay regime produced unequal scales of pay for identical work—the very mischief condemned in Randhir Singh v. Union of India and systematized in State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh.

Hence, the policy embodied in the Memoranda was held irrational, arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Article 14 (and consequentially Article 16 in employment context).

(ii) “Regular appointee” status: advertisements for permanent posts + regular selection

Applying State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (para 42.6), the Bench treated the appellants as entitled to regular pay because they were selected through an open, competitive, rule-compliant recruitment to “permanent posts”. The State’s attempt to re-characterize their appointments as “temporary for one year” was treated as illegal, especially because it contradicted the advertisement.

(iii) Executive memoranda cannot neutralize the pay attached to a post

The State argued that Recruitment Rules only state the “extent of scale of pay” and the memoranda merely provide a “formula for determination of pay.” The Bench rejected this as “hair splitting,” holding that, in effect, the memoranda deprived appointees of the regular pay attached to regular posts for an arbitrary period, thereby offending constitutional equality.

(iv) Policy review: “Cabinet approval” does not cure unconstitutionality

Even assuming Cabinet approval and legislative discussion, the Bench held that an unconstitutional policy remains vulnerable. The Court reaffirmed the principle that policy decisions are subject to judicial review when arbitrary or violative of fundamental rights.

(v) Financial stringency as justification: rejected for lack of pleadings and proof

A notable corrective move was the Bench’s criticism of the Single Judge’s reliance on “financial constraints.” The Division Bench found:

  • No pleading in the State’s counter affidavit asserting financial stringency; and
  • No supporting material placed on record.

The Court held it was impermissible for the Single Judge to “create” a justification not pleaded or proven—reaffirming basic procedural discipline in constitutional adjudication.

(vi) Estoppel/waiver rejected: unequal bargaining power and constitutional supremacy

The Bench emphasized the structural imbalance between unemployed candidates and the State, invoking Central Inland Water Transport Co. v. Brojonath to characterize oppressive employment clauses as contrary to public policy and void under Section 23 of the Contract Act,1872.

It then applied Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation to hold that acceptance of fixed pay cannot amount to waiver of Article 14 rights; there is no estoppel against the Constitution.

(vii) Relief tailoring: notional benefits + limited arrears + interest

While declaring entitlement from the initial appointment date, the Bench limited monetary arrears to three years prior to filing of the writ petitions, reflecting a balancing approach against delay/laches, while still awarding 9% p.a. interest to deter prolonged non-compliance.

C. Impact

  • Immediate administrative impact in Tripura: The 2001/2007 memoranda—core instruments enabling fixed-pay recruitment to regular posts—stand struck down. The State will likely need to redesign recruitment/pay implementation to ensure regular pay for regular posts from initial appointment.
  • Ripple effect across similarly situated employees: Although the order grants relief to the appellants, the reasoning is of broader application to other fixed-pay recruits appointed against sanctioned regular posts through rule-compliant selection, potentially prompting further claims or State-wide regularization of pay.
  • Reinforcement of intra-cadre equality: The judgment is especially significant in condemning intra-post discrimination—where identical posts/duties within the same department attract different pay merely due to the date/mode of recruitment.
  • Limits on “fixed pay” as a fiscal tool: The decision signals that fiscal management cannot be pursued through constitutionally suspect pay depression for lower hierarchical groups, particularly where the State continues to demand full responsibilities of regular posts.
  • Judicial insistence on pleadings/evidence for fiscal-defence narratives: Courts may increasingly require States to properly plead and prove financial constraints, rather than rely on generic assertions of “stringency.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Equal pay for equal work”: If two sets of employees do substantially the same job with similar responsibility and qualifications under the same employer, paying one group less without a rational reason violates equality (Articles 14 and 16), even though Article 39(d) is a Directive Principle.
  • Article 14 “arbitrariness” test: Government action (including policy) must be reasonable and non-discriminatory. If a rule creates irrational inequality, it can be struck down.
  • “Regular post” vs “temporary appointment”: A “regular/permanent post” is a sanctioned position with a pay scale. Calling an appointment “temporary” after selecting for a permanent post cannot be used to dilute pay or security where the recruitment was for regular vacancies.
  • Executive instructions vs Recruitment Rules: The State may issue executive instructions where rules are silent, but it cannot use executive memoranda to produce outcomes that violate the Constitution (or effectively nullify the pay attached to a post in an arbitrary way).
  • Section 23, Contract Act (public policy): Contract terms opposed to public policy are void. In public employment, oppressive clauses imposed due to unequal bargaining power may be invalidated.
  • No waiver/estoppel of fundamental rights: Even if someone “agrees” to an unconstitutional condition (often due to lack of choice), they can still challenge it later—rights under Part III cannot be bartered away.
  • Notional fixation vs arrears: “Notional” pay means service benefits (seniority/pension calculations, scale placement) are treated as if regular pay applied from the beginning. But actual back-payment can be limited (here, three years prior to the writ filing), balancing fairness with delay.

5. Conclusion

The Tripura High Court’s decision establishes a clear constitutional rule: where the State fills regular/permanent sanctioned posts through a regular, rule-compliant selection process, it cannot lawfully impose a fixed-pay regime that pays less than the pay scale attached to the post for an arbitrary initial period.

By striking down the Memoranda dated 15.12.2001 and 16.10.2007, rejecting waiver/estoppel defenses, and condemning post-advertisement dilution of employment status, the judgment reinforces the State’s obligation to act as a model employer and places enforceable limits on austerity-driven pay policies that target lower cadres.