Date: Feb 7, 2026

Dying Declaration in Burn Cases: Mandatory Reliability Safeguards and Limits of Section 106 Evidence Act

1. Introduction

The Rajasthan High Court (Division Bench) in SOMA v. STATE (2026 RJ-JD 6293-DB, decided on 06-02-2026) set aside a conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC where the prosecution case substantially rested on a purported dying declaration (Ex.P-1) of the deceased wife, who had sustained about 90% burn injuries.

The appellant-husband’s consistent defence was that the deceased was alone at home, he was at a community religious gathering (Ram Rasoda/Ram Rasoi Bhandara), and that he sustained burn injuries while attempting to rescue her. The prosecution alleged homicidal burning motivated by demand for money for liquor.

The key issues were: (i) whether Ex.P-1 was reliable enough to sustain conviction; (ii) whether alleged oral statements to relatives could corroborate or independently constitute dying declarations; (iii) whether Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act could shift the burden to the accused; and (iv) whether the defence hypothesis of suicide/accident and rescue-created injuries raised a reasonable doubt.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found serious infirmities in the recording and proof of the dying declaration Ex.P-1—notably absence of medical fitness certification, unclear authorship (written by a “Munshi” who was not examined), contradictions about the place of recording, and lack of procedural safeguards despite nearby availability of Executive/Judicial Magistrates.

The Court also found that the alleged oral dying declarations to PW-4 Kanji and PW-11 Shankar were unreliable due to documentary contradiction (including Ex.P-3 Fard Panchayatnama) and IO admissions that these witnesses reached Udaipur directly. The defence version was considered plausible and supported by medical evidence of the accused’s burns and testimonies placing him at the community event. The Court rejected invocation of Section 106 Evidence Act as the foundational facts of the accused’s exclusive presence/knowledge were not proved by the prosecution.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Manjunath and others v. State of Karnataka (2023) 14 SCR 727

This decision was central to the Court’s approach to scribe/author identification and evidentiary proof of the dying declaration. The High Court invoked the principle that a dying declaration becomes unreliable where the person who actually wrote it is not examined and the document lacks endorsement clarifying who recorded it and in whose presence.

Applying that ratio, the Court noted that PW-2 admitted that Ex.P-1 was written by his Munshi “Rajesh” (never examined), and Ex.P-1 itself did not disclose the scribe’s identity. This omission, in the Court’s view, materially impaired Ex.P-1’s credibility.

(b) Gargi (S) v. State of Haryana (S). (AIR 2019 SC 4864)

The Court used Gargi (S) to limit prosecutorial reliance on Section 106 Evidence Act. The precedent reiterates that Section 106 cannot be used to fill lacunae in the prosecution case and does not displace the prosecution’s primary burden.

Here, multiple witnesses (including prosecution-side witnesses on recoveries) and the IO’s own admissions suggested the accused was at a community gathering rather than inside the house. Because the prosecution did not establish the “foundational facts” for Section 106 (presence/exclusive knowledge), the Court refused to shift any burden onto the accused.

(c) Jayamma and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2021 SC 2399)

The High Court relied on Jayamma for the settled framework governing dying declarations: they can sustain conviction alone only when they are voluntary, truthful, and made in a fit condition; suspicious declarations need corroboration and careful scrutiny. Jayamma also discusses the non-universal nature of “percentage of burns” as a determinative factor, but stresses that medical fitness and surrounding circumstances matter.

Within the quotation adopted by the High Court, the following cases (as cited in the judgment text) informed the analysis:

P.V. Radhakrishna. v. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 443: no rigid rule that burn percentage alone decides capacity; depends on context.
Chacko v. State of Kerala . (2003) 1 SCC 112: where severe burns and lack of medical certification create doubt, detailed dying declarations may be unsafe.
Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra . (2006) 13 SCC 165 and Paniben (Smt) v. State of Gujarat . (1992) 2 SCC 474: consolidated principles—truthfulness, voluntariness, freedom from tutoring, and caution in suspicious cases.
Other authorities listed in the extracted principles (as cited in the judgment text): Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104, State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552, Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar . (1983 1 SCC 211), K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618, Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974) 4 SCC 264, Kake Singh v. State of M.P. 1981 Supp SCC 25, Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654, State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455, Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769, Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. 1988 Supp SCC 152, State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390, Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700.

The High Court’s application of these principles was direct: the absence of medical certification, unclear recording process, and contradictions about location/authorship made Ex.P-1 “suspicious,” requiring caution that the prosecution could not overcome.

(d) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramveer Singh (2025 INSC 952)

The High Court used Ramveer Singh as a cautionary benchmark on when the circumstances of recording create grave doubt about a dying declaration—e.g., non-recordable vitals, barely audible voice, and general medical precariousness. While Ramveer Singh arose in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court extracted the broader principle: when the factum and circumstances of recording are doubtful, reliance becomes unsafe.

(e) Appellate restraint cases (cited within Ramveer Singh)

The judgment text also references Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149, H.D. Sundara and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581, and Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. (2022) 3 SCC 471 on standards for interfering with acquittals. Although the present matter was an appeal against conviction, the High Court used the “two views” logic to reinforce the criminal standard: if reasonable doubt remains, the accused must get the benefit.

(f) Section 106 doctrinal anchor as quoted

The judgment’s quotation includes the principle (attributed in the extracted passage) to Sawal Das (supra): Section 106 does not absolve the prosecution of its primary burden. The High Court’s Section 106 discussion is built on this foundational approach—burden-shifting arises only after a prima facie case based on proved foundational facts.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(i) Why Ex.P-1 was treated as unsafe

The Court did not dispute the general rule that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction, but insisted on reliability safeguards. The following defects collectively undermined Ex.P-1:

No contemporaneous medical endorsement on fitness (consciousness/orientation) by the attending doctor; no pulse/BP/fitness parameters were recorded.
Unclear authorship/scribing: PW-2 stated his Munshi wrote it; the Munshi was not examined; Ex.P-1 did not reveal the scribe.
Procedural omission: no attempt to call an Executive/Judicial Magistrate despite offices being ~500 feet away.
Contradictions about place of recording (documentary reference to police station versus oral evidence that it was in hospital), impairing authenticity.

In effect, the Court treated Ex.P-1 not as inherently inadmissible, but as insufficiently trustworthy to ground a murder conviction.

(ii) Oral dying declarations to PW-4 Kanji and PW-11 Shankar rejected

The prosecution’s corroboration theory failed because contemporaneous documents and IO testimony contradicted the witnesses’ claim that they met the deceased at Salumber Hospital. The Court placed weight on Ex.P-3 (Fard Panchayatnama) and IO admissions that these witnesses went directly to Udaipur, making their “Salumber conversation” version unreliable. This removed the main external support to Ex.P-1.

(iii) Defence hypothesis found plausible and supported

Several witnesses (including attesting/recovery witnesses) spoke of the accused being at a community event, rushing on hearing cries, and attempting rescue. Medical evidence (Ex.P-2) showed burn injuries on the accused; PW-1 acknowledged such injuries could occur during rescue. The Court treated the Section 313 Cr.P.C. explanation as a relevant factor to test prosecution plausibility and found it consistent with “normal human conduct” and corroborated by record material.

(iv) Recovery circumstance (multiple burnt matchsticks) used to generate doubt

The Court noted that the recovery (Ex.P-06) included a matchbox and three burnt matchsticks, suggesting multiple ignition attempts. This, according to the Court, made the prosecution’s “sudden overpowering homicidal burning” narrative less natural and rendered the defence hypothesis more probable—at least enough to create reasonable doubt.

(v) Section 106 Evidence Act rejected

The Court held Section 106 inapplicable because the prosecution’s own evidence did not establish that the accused was present inside the house or that the incident was within his exclusive knowledge. Without those foundational facts, Section 106 could not be used to shift the burden to the accused. This was explicitly anchored in Gargi (S) v. State of Haryana (S). (AIR 2019 SC 4864).

(vi) Outcome: benefit of doubt

The Court emphasized the criminal law standard: suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof. Given the infirm dying declaration, unreliable corroboration, investigative omissions (including lack of proof of motive/alcohol demand/cruelty), and a plausible alternative hypothesis, the appellant was acquitted.

3.3 Impact

The decision is significant for burn-death prosecutions dependent on dying declarations, reinforcing a practical checklist of reliability requirements:

Medical fitness contemporaneity: Courts may treat the absence of contemporaneous certification and vital parameters as a major credibility deficit, especially in high-percentage burns.
Authorship transparency: If a declaration is written by a constable/munshi/third person, the prosecution should examine that scribe or clearly prove authorship; otherwise, Manjunath and others v. State of Karnataka (2023) 14 SCR 727 risk applies.
Magisterial recording where feasible: While not a strict legal mandate in every case, the easy availability of a Magistrate and failure to call one may add to suspicion.
Section 106 discipline: The judgment strengthens the proposition that Section 106 cannot be invoked unless prosecution first proves presence/exclusive knowledge.
Rescue injuries as exculpatory context: Injuries on the accused consistent with rescue can materially support a defence hypothesis and deepen reasonable doubt.

Operationally, investigators and prosecutors in Rajasthan (and persuasive elsewhere) are put on notice that dying-declaration-only cases require rigorous proof of fitness, authorship, and recording circumstances; otherwise, appellate scrutiny may undo convictions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Dying declaration: A statement made by a person about the cause of their death or circumstances leading to it. It can be used as evidence because the law assumes a person near death is unlikely to lie; but courts still require reliability (voluntary, truthful, fit mental condition).
Medical fitness endorsement: A doctor’s contemporaneous certification that the person was conscious, oriented, and capable of making a statement. Absence of such certification is not automatically fatal, but in severe burns it often becomes crucial for credibility.
Section 106, Indian Evidence Act: A rule about facts “especially within the knowledge” of a person. It does not relieve the prosecution from proving the basic case first. Only after foundational facts (like presence and exclusive opportunity) are proved can an adverse inference arise.
Section 313 Cr.P.C.: The accused’s opportunity to explain incriminating circumstances. It is not “evidence” in the same way as witness testimony, but courts may consider it to assess whether the prosecution story is credible and whether an alternative hypothesis is plausible.
Benefit of doubt: If the evidence leaves a reasonable doubt about guilt, the accused must be acquitted. Criminal conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, not mere probability.
Fard Panchayatnama (inquest document): A contemporaneous official document prepared after death, often recording who identified the body and basic circumstances. Courts may use it to test witness presence/claims when later testimony conflicts with contemporaneous records.

5. Conclusion

SOMA v. STATE recalibrates the evidentiary threshold for convictions resting primarily on dying declarations in burn cases. The High Court treated missing safeguards—medical fitness certification, clarity of scribe/authorship, consistent recording circumstances, and credible corroboration—as decisive in determining reliability. It further clarified that Section 106 Evidence Act cannot be used to compensate for prosecution failure to prove foundational facts.

The judgment’s broader significance lies in its reaffirmation that even in emotionally compelling burn-death prosecutions, procedural rigor and evidentiary reliability remain indispensable, and where two plausible views arise, the criminal justice system must prefer the one consistent with innocence.