Dismissal in Minority Schools: Termination Must Be by the “Manager” (Office-Holder) and Cannot Be Effected Through Ad-hoc Authorisation of a Non-Office Bearer

1. Introduction

The litigation arose from disciplinary action taken by the Ahmedabad Jesuit School Society (the “School”), a minority educational institution, against an Assistant Teacher (“Teacher”) appointed as a Shikshan Sahayak in 2006. The Teacher was issued a show-cause notice in April 2013 alleging multiple instances of misconduct—anonymous objectionable email, alleged instigation of students, complaints from parents and staff, misbehaviour with colleagues and supervisor, and conduct said to harm the School’s functioning and reputation. A departmental inquiry culminated in findings of guilt and the Teacher’s dismissal in December 2013.

The Teacher appealed to the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal (“Tribunal”). After earlier rounds of remand from the High Court and an “open remand” direction in LPA, the Tribunal (10.05.2019) set aside the dismissal not for breach of natural justice in the inquiry, but because the second show-cause notice and dismissal order were signed by Fr. M.G. Raj, S.J., who, according to the Tribunal, was not a competent authority/office-holder at the relevant time. Both School and Teacher challenged that order.

Key issues before the High Court:

• Whether the inquiry complied with principles of natural justice.
• Whether the second show-cause notice and dismissal order signed by Fr. M.G. Raj, S.J. satisfied Section 36(1)(a) of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1972 (“Act, 1972”) read with Section 2(j) and Section 40A.

2. Summary of the Judgment

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Teacher cited five Supreme Court decisions, principally to argue (i) breach of natural justice/fair hearing in departmental proceedings and (ii) discretionary denial of relief due to suppression/unclean hands by the School. The High Court did not undertake a lengthy ratio-by-ratio application, because the Tribunal’s findings on natural justice were supported by the inquiry record, and because the decisive defect ultimately lay in the competence of the signatory to the final steps of punishment.

• Rattan Lal Sharma V/s. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School and others, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 10
  Typically relied on for robust enforcement of fair procedure and absence of bias in domestic inquiries. Here, the Court accepted the Tribunal’s record-based conclusion that adequate opportunity existed, particularly noting the Teacher’s conduct in the 11th and 12th inquiry meetings (including leaving the room when cross-examination opportunity was given).
• Dalip Singh V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 and K. D. Sharma V/s. Steel Authority of India Limited and others, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481
  Generally invoked for the “clean hands/no suppression” doctrine in writ jurisdiction. Although the Teacher argued suppression (the School allegedly omitted reference to the Teacher’s parallel petition), the judgment ultimately turns on merits—natural justice compliance and competence under Section 36(1)(a)—without granting relief on a suppression-based threshold.
• Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and others V/s. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612
  Commonly cited on scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters. The High Court’s approach aligns with restrained review: it refused to interfere absent perversity/illegality, and treated Tribunal’s view on inquiry fairness as “plausible” and record-supported.
• Chowdamma (D) by LR and another V/s. Venkatappa (D) by LRs and another, reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 838
  Cited by the Teacher, but the judgment does not hinge on the proposition from this case; the decisive reasoning remained statutory competence and factual assessment of inquiry opportunity.

Notable feature: The Tribunal (para 18) also noted the School relied on judgments of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but these were not identified by title in the judgment text; the Tribunal found them factually distinguishable.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) Natural justice in the inquiry: “Opportunity offered” vs “Opportunity taken”

On Point No.1, the High Court endorsed the Tribunal’s reasoning (paras 16–17 of the Tribunal order reproduced in the judgment): the Teacher remained present through inquiry stages; the record did not support the claim that documents were withheld; and, critically, when witnesses were present for cross-examination in the 11th meeting, the Teacher left the room. The Court held that a party cannot manufacture a natural justice violation by declining to participate after being offered a reasonable chance.

The Court also gave weight to procedural posture: after remand, the Tribunal recorded that the Teacher did not specifically challenge the inquiry’s legality/propriety before it. Additionally, new arguments (e.g., competence of Principal to issue the first show-cause notice; alleged absence of charge-sheet) were viewed as not having been pressed before the Tribunal post-remand.

(B) Minority institution status: what Section 40A excludes—and what it does not

The School is a minority institution. Section 40A excludes the application of certain statutory controls—most notably, clause (b) of Section 36(1) (approval of an authorized officer) and other subsections—yet it does not exclude clause (a) of Section 36(1). Accordingly, even a minority institution must comply with the core procedural safeguard: the employee must be given a reasonable opportunity by the “manager” against the proposed action.

(C) Who is the “manager” under the Act, 1972—and can that power be delegated?

The Court’s most consequential reasoning lies in Point No.2. It accepted that “manager” under Section 2(j) is the person/body in charge of control/management. It further opined that the Principal, as administrative head controlling day-to-day management, can be treated as “manager” for purposes of issuing the initial show-cause notice.

However, the Court refused to validate the termination steps carried out by Fr. M.G. Raj, S.J.:

• It was undisputed that, at the time of signing the final show-cause notice and dismissal order, Fr. Raj was neither Trustee nor Principal (i.e., not an office-holder in management).
• The governing body’s resolutions (18.11.2013 and 09.12.2013) authorising Fr. Raj were found insufficient to cure statutory competence defects: the Act, 1972 does not provide a general delegation power enabling a “manager” to authorise a non-office bearer to issue the decisive statutory notices/orders.
• Even on the School’s internal Rules, delegation was indicated as permissible to “heads of the institution” (as argued), not to an external/non-office person; and the relied-on 15.06.2005 resolution was not before the Tribunal, so the High Court would not consider it.
• The resolutions themselves bore signatures in a manner that the Court found procedurally unsatisfactory/unclear (signed by one person despite stating quorum/presidential chair).

(D) Consideration of reply to second show-cause

The Court also noted that although the governing body’s resolution stated the Teacher did not respond within 15 days, the School had in fact received a reply before passing the dismissal resolution, yet it appeared not to have been considered. While the judgment does not rest solely on this omission, it reinforces the need for a lawful and procedurally regular “second show-cause” stage.

3.3 Impact

• Competence is a substantive safeguard: In disciplinary law under the Act, 1972, especially the final stage (second show-cause and dismissal), the identity and legal status of the signatory matter. A governing body resolution cannot, by mere authorisation, substitute an office-holder requirement where the statute contemplates action “by the manager.”
• Minority institutions remain bound by Section 36(1)(a): Section 40A’s carve-out does not eliminate the obligation of reasonable opportunity by the manager; it mainly removes governmental approval requirements. This judgment reinforces that minority autonomy is not immunity from the foundational fairness/competence architecture of Section 36(1).
• Litigation strategy and record discipline: The Court’s refusal to entertain certain arguments as not pressed before the Tribunal underscores the importance of raising (and evidencing) procedural objections at the earliest stage, especially after remand with defined scope.
• Administrative governance standards: Schools/trusts should maintain clear, properly executed resolutions and ensure disciplinary actions are taken by duly appointed office-holders to avoid remands and reinstatement risks.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Manager” (Section 2(j)): Not merely a title; it means the person/body actually in charge of control/management. The Court treated the Principal as fitting this role for initiating action.
• Second show-cause notice: A post-inquiry notice giving the delinquent employee a chance to respond to the inquiry report and proposed punishment before final penalty is imposed.
• Minority institution protection (Section 40A): It relaxes certain statutory controls (e.g., external approval) but does not remove the core requirement of giving reasonable opportunity under Section 36(1)(a).
• Judicial review under Articles 226/227: The High Court generally does not re-appreciate evidence like an appellate forum; it interferes mainly for illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error.
• “Office, not person”: The Tribunal’s idea (endorsed in substance) is that disciplinary competence attaches to a legally recognised office/authority; an individual cannot act validly merely because they were authorised ad hoc if they do not hold the relevant office contemplated by law.

5. Conclusion

The Gujarat High Court’s decision affirms a two-track discipline framework for minority schools under the Act, 1972: while detailed statutory approvals may be inapplicable due to Section 40A, the essential protections of Section 36(1)(a)—reasonable opportunity and action by the “manager”—remain operative. On facts, the inquiry was held fair, but the punishment stage failed because the second show-cause notice and dismissal order were signed by a person who was not a competent office-holder under the statutory scheme. The sustained remedy is corrective rather than punitive to the institution: the School must redo the final stage through a competent authority and consider the Teacher’s reply before imposing punishment.