Introduction
This commentary analyzes the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s decision dismissing a constitutional writ petition by Mr. Dharam Singh Chhoker, who sought to set aside his arrest and consequential remand orders passed under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The case arises from allegations of diversion of homebuyers’ funds collected for an affordable group housing project at Sector 68, Gurugram, developed by M/s Sai Aaina Farms Infratech Pvt. Ltd. (SAFPL), allegedly controlled by the “Mahira Group” of the Chhoker family.
The petitioner challenged: (i) the arrest order dated 05.05.2025 under Section 19 PMLA; and (ii) remand orders dated 05.05.2025, 09.05.2025, 13.05.2025, and 17.05.2025 passed by the Special Judge-cum-Sessions Judge, Gurugram (PMLA Court). He alleged non-compliance with Section 19 PMLA, improper execution of non-bailable warrants (NBWs), assault by ED officers at the time of arrest, and that arrest was unnecessary since a prosecution complaint had already been filed and earlier High Court/Supreme Court orders would shield him.
The Enforcement Directorate (ED) countered that the arrest strictly complied with Section 19 PMLA; the petitioner was a key decision-maker in the “Mahira Group” operations; funds from homebuyers were allegedly siphoned off to related entities and family/personal use; and custodial interrogation was necessary to trace the money trail. ED relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions clarifying the scope of judicial review at the arrest stage under PMLA.
Analysis
1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 2 SCC 248. The High Court substantially relied on this decision to delineate the proper scope of judicial review of arrests under Section 19 PMLA. The Supreme Court clarified that:
- Courts should not undertake a mini-trial or evaluate the sufficiency/admissibility of evidence at the arrest stage.
- The statutory phrase is “material in possession,” not “evidence in possession.” Therefore, admissibility is not the touchstone; what matters is whether there exists some material that rationally informs the arresting officer’s “reasons to believe.”
- Judicial review is confined to whether the decision to arrest is rational, fair, and not arbitrary, and whether the officer recorded reasons in writing based on material.
Applying this, the High Court accepted ED’s documentation (reasons, grounds, 309‑page material, forwarding to Adjudicating Authority) as meeting the Kejriwal standard. The Court expressly rejected an “admissibility” objection at the arrest stage and declined to scrutinize sufficiency on merits.
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union Of India, 2022 SCC Online SC 929. This landmark upheld the PMLA framework, with contours relevant to arrest and investigation. The High Court read Vijay Madanlal together with Kejriwal to emphasize restraint at the stage of arrest review and to validate reliance on materials that may later be proved at trial.
V. Senthil Balaji v. State (2023). Cited to affirm that arrest under PMLA can be in aid of investigation. The High Court accepted ED’s submission that custodial interrogation was needed to trace the money trail and unravel complex fund flows, even after filing of a prosecution complaint. Thus, the existence of a complaint did not preclude further investigation or negate the need for custody.
M.C. Abraham v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 2 SCC 649. This decision underscores that arrest is a matter of executive discretion when justified by law; courts should not direct the police/agency to act mechanically. The High Court used this to resist the petitioner’s contention that past judicial observations either mandated or prohibited arrest; instead, it focused on the legality of the present arrest on its own record.
2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning
a) Section 19 PMLA: “Reasons to believe” and forwarding to Adjudicating Authority
The Court held that ED satisfied the textual requirements of Section 19:
- “Reasons to believe” were recorded in writing by an authorized officer based on “material in possession.” ED produced copies and explained the contents: a detailed “reasons to believe” note (~39 pages), grounds of arrest in Hindi and English (~22 pages), and a 309‑page compilation of supporting material.
- The petitioner was informed of the grounds of arrest “as soon as may be,” and he signed the arrest documentation; his later protest note did not negate compliance.
- Under Section 19(2), ED forwarded the arrest order and underlying material to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed cover. The Court accepted ED’s typed compilation (Annexure “A”) as proof of compliance.
The Court applied Kejriwal to hold that the “admissibility” of the material is not examinable at this stage; nor is the adequacy of the material. The review is confined to rationality and procedural fidelity, both of which were found satisfied.
b) Execution of NBWs: Compliance with Sections 75–76 CrPC using soft copy
The petitioner alleged non-compliance because he was shown only a soft copy of the NBWs on a mobile device. The Court rejected this contention, reasoning that:
- Section 75 requires notifying the substance of the warrant and, if so required, showing the warrant to the arrestee. The officer did notify the substance and showed a soft copy on the phone.
- The petitioner did not assert that he demanded a hard copy at the time. In the circumstances, showing a soft copy sufficed; the execution was not vitiated.
- The arrestee was thereafter promptly taken to ED’s office and produced before the Special Judge without undue delay, satisfying Section 76.
This is a notable clarification on modernizing procedural compliance for executing warrants.
c) Alleged manhandling at arrest
Competing versions regarding physical altercation at the hotel (including cross-FIRs) raised disputed facts inappropriate for determination in writ proceedings. The Court declined to treat those allegations as vitiating the arrest; they remain matters for trial.
d) Necessity of arrest despite pending complaint and earlier orders
The Court held that arrest “in aid of investigation” is permissible and can be justified by ongoing needs to trace proceeds of crime, even where a prosecution complaint exists. The petitioner’s reliance on earlier High Court/Supreme Court orders did not immunize him from arrest, particularly in light of multiple unexecuted NBWs, findings of non-cooperation, and ED’s demonstration of continuing investigative imperatives.
e) Similarity of reasons/grounds across co-accused
The Court rejected the argument that the petitioner’s “reasons to believe” and “grounds of arrest” were fatally defective because they resembled those recorded for his sons and other co-accused. Overlapping factual matrices can yield overlapping reasons; similarity, without more, does not establish non-application of mind, particularly where the decision is supported by a substantial material compilation specific to the case.
3. Impact and Significance
- Digital execution of warrants: The Court’s acceptance of soft-copy showing of NBWs, where the substance is notified and there is no demand for a hard copy, modernizes compliance expectations under Sections 75–76 CrPC. This may influence future arrests, especially in fast-moving or field contexts.
- Reaffirmation of the Kejriwal standard: The decision strengthens the jurisprudence that arrest under Section 19 PMLA hinges on “material in possession,” not admissible evidence. Accused persons challenging arrest must target the absence of material, irrationality, or procedural non-compliance, not the probative value of material at trial.
- Arrest after filing of complaint: By endorsing arrest as an investigative tool even post-complaint, the Court signals that further investigation (including custodial interrogation) can continue where complex money trails remain to be mapped.
- Template-driven compliance by ED: The Court’s appreciation of detailed compilations (reasons/grounds in both languages, paginated material, sealed forwarding to the Adjudicating Authority) suggests a best-practice “compliance packet” ED may replicate to withstand judicial scrutiny.
- Limited role of earlier protective observations: Prior High Court observations and Supreme Court clarifications not operating on merits did not foreclose a later, independently lawful arrest. Practitioners should be cautious in treating interim/interlocutory observations as arrest-proof shields.