Defamation in a Private Complaint Cannot Be Referred for Police Investigation; Mandatory Pre‑Cognizance Hearing of the Accused Under Section 223 BNSS

Case: PROF. NIRANJANA v. STATE BY (Karnataka High Court, Criminal Petition No. 7806 of 2025)
Date: 23-01-2026
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Nagaprasanna

1) Introduction

The petitioner, Prof. Niranjana, Vice Chancellor of Bengaluru North University, approached the Karnataka High Court seeking to quash (i) the FIR in Crime No.71/2025 dated 06.06.2025 registered by Gulpeth Police Station and (ii) the reference order dated 04.06.2025 passed in PCR No.2/2025 by the Special Court at Kolar.

The complainant (respondent No.2), a former guest faculty member, had earlier been terminated pursuant to the University Syndicate’s decision. During the pendency of his challenge to termination (later remitted by a co-ordinate Bench on 08.07.2025), he initiated a private complaint alleging offences under Sections 3(1)(q) and 3(1)(u) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Section 356(2) of the BNS, 2023 (treated in the order as the defamation provision, corresponding to Section 500 IPC in the prior regime).

The key issues before the High Court were procedural/jurisdictional: (a) whether a complaint containing an offence of defamation could be referred for police investigation, and (b) whether the court could proceed without complying with the newly introduced mandatory hearing requirement under Section 223(1) BNSS.

2) Summary of the Judgment

  • The petition was allowed in part.
  • The High Court quashed:
    • the order of reference dated 04.06.2025, and
    • the consequent registration of Crime No.71/2025.
  • The underlying private complaint was not quashed; instead, it was remitted to the concerned court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

The Court’s intervention was driven not by an adjudication on the truth of the allegations, but by “legal snags” that vitiated the reference and the FIR.

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Outcome)

1) PRASHANTH SAMBARGI v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

The High Court treated this earlier Karnataka decision as directly governing the first procedural defect. In that case, where defamation (Sections 499/500 IPC) was part of the complaint, the Court held that sending such a matter for police investigation is impermissible because of the statutory bar under Section 199 CrPC (now referred to in this judgment as the corresponding bar under Section 222 BNSS). The present judgment applies that reasoning to a complaint alleging defamation under Section 356(2) BNS.

2) SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY v. UNION OF INDIA [(2016) 7 SCC 221]

This Supreme Court decision supplied the central rule: for criminal defamation, neither can an FIR be filed nor can a Magistrate direct investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, because cognizance is controlled by the special procedure in Section 199 CrPC. The Karnataka High Court used it (via PRASHANTH SAMBARGI) to conclude that the Special Court’s referral for investigation was legally unsustainable where defamation is in issue.

3) SURESH v. SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE [2019 (4) KLT 106]

The Kerala High Court decision (quoted in PRASHANTH SAMBARGI) reinforced the same statutory logic: defamation cannot culminate in cognizance on a police final report because the legislature permits cognizance for Chapter XXI IPC offences only upon a complaint by the aggrieved person. This buttressed the “nullity” reasoning: once an impermissible investigative route is chosen for defamation, downstream steps become legally fragile.

4) KUSHAL KUMAR AGARWAL v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221]

This Supreme Court ruling was decisive on the second procedural snag under the BNSS: the proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS creates an embargo— “no cognizance … shall be taken … without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard.” Because the Special Judge took steps without affording such hearing, the High Court treated the omission as fatal to the process.

5) BASANAGOUDA R. PATIL v. SHIVANANDA S. PATIL [2024 SCC OnLine Kar 96]

This High Court precedent operationalized Section 223 BNSS and was used to lay out the “procedural drill”: the court should (i) record the complainant’s sworn statement (and witnesses, if any), (ii) issue notice with sufficient materials to the accused, (iii) hear the accused, and only then (iv) decide whether to take cognizance and proceed further. The present judgment adopts this structured approach to hold that the mandatory Section 223 procedure was “given a go-by”.

The order also reproduces (through cited extracts) cautionary principles on issuance of process and abuse of criminal process from: Rajindra Nath Mahato v. T.Ganguly, Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, and Pepsi Foods Ltd., v. Special Judicial Magistrate, underscoring that criminal process must not become a tool of vendetta.

B. Legal Reasoning

(i) “Defamation bar” against police-investigation route

The High Court identified that the complaint included Section 356(2) BNS, treated as defamation (earlier Section 500 IPC). It reasoned that, once defamation is part of the allegations, the statutory scheme (earlier Section 199 CrPC, now referred to as Section 222 BNSS) prevents courts from setting the police machinery in motion through a referral for investigation in the manner used. In the Court’s formulation, even if defamation appears “as an amalgam of all other offences,” the bar “kicks in,” and the matter ought not to have been referred to investigation.

(ii) Mandatory pre-cognizance hearing under Section 223(1) BNSS

Independently, the Court held that Section 223(1) BNSS now mandates that before taking cognizance, the Magistrate must give the accused an opportunity of being heard—an express procedural safeguard not found in the old Section 200 CrPC. Since the court below did not follow this requirement, the referral order and the consequential FIR could not stand.

(iii) Calibrated relief: preserving the complaint but nullifying the invalid “referral + FIR”

Rather than terminating the dispute entirely, the High Court drew a distinction between: (a) the defective judicial act (reference for investigation) and the consequent police case, and (b) the complainant’s underlying right to pursue the grievance via the correct complaint procedure. Hence, it quashed the reference and FIR but remitted the complaint for fresh consideration in accordance with the BNSS procedure and the legal bar relating to defamation.

C. Impact

  • Strengthened gatekeeping at the complaint stage: Courts in Karnataka are reminded that Section 223 BNSS introduces a real, enforceable pre-cognizance hearing right for the accused.
  • Defamation cannot be “converted” into an FIR via clubbing: The judgment signals that adding other offences alongside defamation will not automatically justify a police investigation route where defamation is part of the bundle.
  • Practical consequences for SC/ST Act-linked complaints: Where SC/ST Act provisions are pleaded alongside defamation, trial courts must be procedurally careful to avoid invalid referrals that invite quashing and remand, delaying resolution for both sides.
  • Likely rise in remand-based outcomes: Instead of outright quash of complaints, higher courts may increasingly quash only the defective “reference/FIR” step and remand for strict BNSS-compliant processing.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Private complaint (PCR): A complaint filed directly before a court by an individual (not a police case initiated by FIR).
  • Reference for investigation: A judicial direction sending a complaint to police to register a case and investigate. The judgment holds this route is impermissible for defamation under the special cognizance bar.
  • Cognizance: The court’s formal act of taking judicial notice of an offence and deciding to proceed under criminal law. Under Section 223 BNSS, cognizance cannot be taken unless the accused is first heard.
  • Embargo/bar (Section 199 CrPC / Section 222 BNSS as referred): A statutory prohibition that restricts how and on what basis the court can take cognizance (here, defamation is to proceed on a complaint route—not via police report).
  • Quashing vs. remand: Quashing ends the impugned proceeding (here, the referral order and FIR). Remand sends the matter back to be reconsidered lawfully (here, the complaint survives for fresh processing).

5) Conclusion

PROF. NIRANJANA v. STATE BY crystallizes two procedure-centric principles under the post-2024 criminal law framework: (1) where a complaint includes defamation (Section 356(2) BNS), courts must respect the special statutory bar (earlier Section 199 CrPC; referred to as Section 222 BNSS) and cannot validate the police-investigation route adopted here; and (2) under Section 223(1) BNSS, the accused has a mandatory right to be heard before cognizance is taken.

By quashing the reference and FIR but preserving the complaint, the High Court balanced procedural legality with access to remedies—ensuring the complainant is not non-suited, while preventing legally impermissible criminal process from continuing.