4. Summary of the Judgment
The Supreme Court held that landowners whose properties were acquired under the NH Act before 1 January 2015 are not disentitled to solatium, interest and interest on solatium. However, the statute governing the calculation of those benefits depends upon the date of the initial compensation determination under Section 3G(1).
If the Competent Authority determined compensation before 1 January 2015, the benefits are calculated under the 1894 Act. If that determination was made on or after 1 January 2015, the 2013 Act applies.
The subsequent arbitral determination does not constitute the initial “award” for this purpose. Arbitration under Section 3G(5) is analogous to a reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act.
Since the Competent Authority made its determination on 11 July 2014, the appellant was entitled to solatium, interest and interest on solatium only at the rates available under the 1894 Act. The appeal was allowed to that limited extent, and the matter was remanded to the Competent Authority for computation and disbursal.
5. Analysis
5.1 Statutory Background
The 1997 amendments to the NH Act introduced Sections 3A to 3J. Section 3J excluded the application of the 1894 Act to highway acquisitions. Unlike the 1894 Act, the NH Act provided no equivalent statutory solatium and contained a less beneficial interest structure.
The 2013 Act came into force on 1 January 2014, but Section 105 initially excluded enactments listed in the Fourth Schedule, including the NH Act. Ordinance 9 of 2014 extended the compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement benefits of the 2013 Act to those enactments with effect from 1 January 2015.
5.2 Precedents Cited
Union of India & Another v. Tarsem Singh & Others, (2019) 9 SCC 304 — “Tarsem Singh-I”
This decision declared Section 3J of the NH Act unconstitutional as violative of Article 14. It held that landowners whose land was compulsorily acquired for national highways could not be arbitrarily denied solatium and interest when similarly situated landowners under other acquisition laws received those benefits.
The present Court emphasized that Tarsem Singh-I removed the complete denial of these benefits during the period between the 1997 amendment and the extension of the 2013 Act to highway acquisitions. It did not hold that the rates under the 2013 Act retrospectively governed every earlier award.
Union of India & Another v. Tarsem Singh & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 235 — “Tarsem Singh-II”
In this case, the NHAI sought prospective application of Tarsem Singh-I. The Court refused, reasoning that prospective application would perpetuate hostile discrimination—for example, between land acquired on 31 December 2014 and land acquired on 1 January 2015.
The appellant relied on this reasoning to claim the full benefits of the 2013 Act. The Supreme Court rejected that interpretation. It distinguished between:
- entitlement to solatium and interest, which extends to pre-2015 acquisitions; and
- the rate or statutory basis of calculation, which depends on when the initial award was made.
Thus, Tarsem Singh-II prevents total denial of benefits but does not retrospectively substitute the 2013 Act’s rates for those under the 1894 Act.
National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh & Others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 481 — “Tarsem Singh-III”
NHAI relied on this decision concerning acquisition proceedings that had attained finality. The Court observed that Tarsem Singh-III did not decide which enactment governs the rate of benefits where proceedings remained alive. The present controversy was therefore treated as res integra.
The Constitution Bench held that where no award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act had been made as of 1 January 2014, compensation had to be determined under the 2013 Act, although the acquisition proceedings themselves did not lapse.
This supported the principle that the date of the initial award—not the commencement of acquisition proceedings—determines the applicable compensation regime. The Court adapted that principle to NH Act acquisitions, subject to the one-year statutory hiatus under Section 105. Accordingly, the corresponding cut-off became 1 January 2015.
5.3 Legal Reasoning
A. The initial Section 3G(1) determination is the relevant award
The Court compared the three statutory schemes. An award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act corresponds to the Competent Authority’s determination under Section 3G(1) of the NH Act. By contrast, an arbitrator’s determination under Section 3G(5) corresponds to a civil court’s adjudication upon a reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act.
A later arbitral enhancement therefore does not change the law governing the original compensation award.
B. The 2013 Act became applicable to NH Act acquisitions from 1 January 2015
Although the 2013 Act generally commenced on 1 January 2014, the NH Act was included in the Fourth Schedule. Section 105 and the subsequent Ordinance postponed application of the beneficial compensation provisions to highway acquisitions until 1 January 2015.
The Court interpreted this interval as permitting Competent Authorities to complete pending initial determinations under the pre-existing regime. Where no such determination was made before 1 January 2015, the 2013 Act necessarily applied.
C. Entitlement and computation are distinct
Striking down Section 3J established that pre-2015 landowners could not be denied solatium and interest altogether. It did not erase the temporal operation of the 2013 Act. Constitutional equality required access to these heads of compensation, but not retrospective use of a statutory rate that had not yet become applicable to the NH Act.
D. The special Ministry notification did not assist the appellant
The notification provided for payment under the First Schedule to the 2013 Act where no Section 3G award had been announced by 31 December 2014, or where compensation had not been paid for a majority of the acquired “land holdings”.
The Court distinguished “land holdings” from “landowners”. Of 3.080 hectares acquired, compensation for 1.700 hectares had been paid in 2014. Since compensation had been paid for the majority of the acquired area, the notification did not bring the case under the 2013 Act.