Contractual Service Termination by Non‑State Public-Function Bodies Not Amenable to Writ: “Public Law Element” as the Maintainability Threshold
1) Introduction
In Atal Khandelwal v. Institute of Health Management Research & Ors.
(2026 RJ-JP 7422, Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench; decided on 17-02-2026),
the petitioner challenged an order terminating his services dated 19.07.2008 and sought
reinstatement with consequential benefits.
A threshold objection was raised: whether the writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable
against respondent No.1, a society/institution engaged in the field of public health management and policy support.
The petitioner argued that the institution discharged public functions and therefore should be treated
as an “other authority” under Article 12 and/or otherwise be amenable to writ jurisdiction.
The respondents countered that the institution was a registered society, not a statutory body, not “State”
under Article 12, and that the dispute was a private service dispute arising from contract.
The case thus squarely presented the modern, recurring issue in Indian public law: even if an entity performs functions
with a public footprint, can an employee enforce contractual service rights through writ jurisdiction?
2) Summary of the Judgment
The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine on the ground of maintainability.
It held that the challenge was to a termination order arising from a service relationship between the petitioner
and the respondent institution; the dispute was contractual and private, with no demonstrable public law element.
Relying primarily on recent Supreme Court authority, the Court concluded that even if the institution’s broader activities
touch upon public functions, employment decisions rooted in private contract do not become writ-reviewable
absent statutory control or a public-law character to the impugned action.
3) Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Outcome)
A. Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust & Ors. v. V.R. Rudani & Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 691
This landmark decision broadened the reach of Article 226 by holding that writs can issue not only to statutory bodies
but also to “any person or authority” performing a public duty. It is often cited to argue that
private entities discharging public functions can be subjected to constitutional remedies.
Influence here: The petitioner invoked this line to contend that public function equals writ amenability.
However, the High Court’s reasoning (guided by later Supreme Court decisions) effectively narrows the operational reach
of Andi Mukta in service disputes: even where writs may lie against a public-function body, they do not
automatically lie for purely contractual employment grievances.
This decision is frequently relied upon in disputes involving educational institutions/universities to argue that certain
bodies, though not classic “State”, may still attract judicial review where public obligations are implicated.
Influence here: The High Court did not adopt the petitioner’s expansive reading. The later Supreme Court decisions
emphasized a distinction between an institution’s public-facing functions and its internal contractual employment
decisions.
C. Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 649
Zee Telefilms is central to Article 12 jurisprudence. It underscores that not every influential or public-impact entity is “State”;
the determining considerations include the level of governmental control, statutory flavor, and functional/structural indicators.
Influence here: It supports the respondents’ position that “public importance” or “public role” does not by itself convert a body
into “State” under Article 12.
This case is often cited for the proposition that private entities are generally not subject to writs for service matters unless the action has a
public law element or the body satisfies Article 12 criteria. It reinforces caution against converting writ jurisdiction into a substitute for
private law remedies.
Influence here: It aligns with the High Court’s conclusion that the petitioner’s remedy lies elsewhere when the dispute is anchored in
contract and not statute/public duty in relation to the impugned act.
The respondents relied on this decision to argue that registration under the Societies Act does not ipso facto make an entity “State” under Article 12,
absent statutory creation or effective governmental control.
Influence here: It undercuts any simplistic “society + public function = State” formula. The High Court’s approach is consistent with the idea that
organizational form and control remain crucial to Article 12 classification.
F. Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors., 2024 INSC 501
This is the High Court’s principal anchor. The Supreme Court framed two key questions:
(i) whether the society is “State” under Article 12 so as to make Article 226 maintainable; and
(ii) even if performing public duty, whether all decisions are reviewable or only those with a public law element.
The Supreme Court held the High Court erred in entertaining a writ for a service dispute: even if education is a public duty,
the employment relationship between staff and the private society arises from a private contract, and a breach of such covenant does not touch
a public law element. Importantly, it recognized that while an institution may perform public duty, employment decisions may still remain within
the private realm.
Influence here: The Rajasthan High Court essentially transposed this principle to the petitioner’s termination challenge and concluded:
contractual service termination by such a body—without statutory backing or public-law character—is not writ maintainable.
G. St. Mary's Education Society & Anr. v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors., (2023) 4 SCC 498
The Supreme Court held that while bodies discharging public functions may be amenable to judicial review, employees cannot invoke Article 226 in
respect of service matters where they are not governed or controlled by statutory provisions. Actions taken solely within an ordinary contract
of service, having no statutory force, are not amenable to writ challenge.
Influence here: This decision supplies the precise rule applied by the High Court: even assuming public function, the service dispute
lacks the statutory/public-law hook necessary for writ maintainability.
3.2 Legal Reasoning (Step-by-Step)
-
Threshold inquiry—maintainability first: The Court treated maintainability as “foundational” and decided it before merits.
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Article 226 breadth acknowledged but not unbounded: While Article 226 extends to “any person or authority” and “for any other purpose”,
the Court recognized that writ jurisdiction is not a universal forum for enforcing private contracts.
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Nature of the dispute controls: The petitioner challenged termination arising out of an employer–employee relationship.
The Court characterized the lis as essentially contractual and private.
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Public function is not enough for service matters: Even if the institution’s general work touches the public domain, the
particular decision under challenge—termination of service—was not shown to involve a public law element or statutory regime.
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Binding guidance from the Supreme Court: The Court applied Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors., 2024 INSC 501
and St. Mary's Education Society & Anr. v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors., (2023) 4 SCC 498 to conclude that such service disputes are not
writ maintainable.
3.3 Impact (What This Judgment Changes or Reinforces)
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Reinforcement of the “public law element” filter: The decision strengthens the screening rule that writ courts will not act as first-instance
tribunals for private contractual employment disputes, even when the employer is a public-function institution.
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Clarity for societies/NGOs/educational and research institutions: Merely operating in areas like education, health, or policy support does not
automatically expose all internal HR decisions to writ scrutiny. Petitioners must show either:
(i) the body is “State” under Article 12 (through statutory status/effective government control), or
(ii) the impugned action has a public law element (e.g., statutory obligation, public regulatory function, or rights traceable to public law).
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Channeling service disputes to appropriate fora: The judgment implicitly nudges litigants toward civil remedies, labour/industrial fora (where applicable),
or other statutory mechanisms rather than constitutional writs.
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Procedural economy: By dismissing in limine, the Court signals that maintainability objections in such contexts can be decisively dealt with at the outset,
preventing prolonged writ litigation over private contracts.
4) Complex Concepts Simplified
- Article 12 (“State”)
-
A constitutional definition used primarily for enforcing fundamental rights against the government and government-like bodies.
A private society does not become “State” merely because it serves the public; courts look for factors like statutory creation and deep, pervasive government control.
- Article 226 (Writ Jurisdiction)
-
High Courts can issue writs not only for fundamental rights but also “for any other purpose.” Yet, this is not meant to replace ordinary civil/service remedies for
purely private disputes.
- Public Function / Public Duty
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Activities that affect the public at large (e.g., education, health services) may attract judicial review. But judicial review typically targets the public-facing duty,
not every internal action of the body.
- Public Law Element
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A feature that connects the dispute to public law—such as statutory obligations, exercise of regulatory power, or performance of a duty imposed/structured by law.
A simple breach of an employment contract ordinarily lacks this element.
- Dismissed “in limine”
-
Dismissed at the threshold without examining the merits, because the case fails on a preliminary issue (here, maintainability).
5) Conclusion
The Rajasthan High Court’s decision in Atal Khandelwal v. Institute of Health Management Research & Ors. reiterates a decisive boundary in writ jurisprudence:
even where an institution performs public functions, a writ petition challenging termination arising purely from a private contract of service is not maintainable
absent a statutory framework or a demonstrable public law element.
By applying Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors., 2024 INSC 501 and
St. Mary's Education Society & Anr. v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors., (2023) 4 SCC 498,
the Court strengthens the doctrinal separation between public-law review and private-law employment enforcement,
providing clearer guidance on when Article 226 can (and cannot) be invoked against non-state, public-facing institutions.