Continuity of Jurisdiction After Repeal: Section 104(1A) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 Preserves Existing Labour Adjudicatory Forums Until Code Tribunals Become Functional

1. Introduction

The decision in GLASTRONIX LLP v. THE PRESIDENT /GENERAL SECRETARY (Karnataka High Court, 18-02-2026) addresses a transitional problem created by the coming into force of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (“Code, 2020”) and the repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“Act, 1947”).

The petitioner-employer (GLASTRONIX LLP) challenged: (i) a State Government reference order dated 19.12.2025 referring an industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Bengaluru; and (ii) a Central Government notification dated 08.12.2025 (issued under Section 103 of the Code, 2020) purportedly to “remove difficulties”. The employee side was represented through the union (GLASTRONIX KARMIKA SANGHA), with State and Union Governments also arrayed as respondents.

The central issue was: after the Code, 2020 came into force and the Act, 1947 stood repealed (including with retrospective effect from 21.11.2025), did Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals under the Act, 1947 retain jurisdiction to entertain references and adjudicate disputes until Code tribunals are constituted?

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the reference order dated 19.12.2025. It held that:

  • Section 103 (power to remove difficulties) cannot be used to take actions inconsistent with the Code—specifically, it cannot be used to “restore” Act, 1947 jurisdiction if that would violate Section 51.
  • After the amendment dated 16.02.2026 introducing Section 104(1A), the “Tribunals and statutory authorities” under the repealed Acts continue to function until corresponding Code forums become functional.
  • Even though the Act, 1947 is treated as repealed with effect from 21.11.2025, the reference order made on 19.12.2025 is not invalidated; it is protected by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
  • The term “statutory authorities” in Section 104(1A) is wide enough to include Labour Courts.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment does not cite any judicial precedents by case name. Its reasoning is statutory and transitional in nature, turning on the text, structure, and inter-relationship of the Code, 2020 and the General Clauses Act, 1897.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Commencement of the Code, 2020 and “all provisions” coming into force

Relying on Section 1(3) of the Code, 2020, the Court noted that the Central Government may bring different provisions into force on different dates. However, because the notification (referred to in the judgment as dated 08.11.2025) brought the Code into force from 21.11.2025 without carving out exceptions, the Court treated all provisions of the Code as operative from that date.

B. Section 51 (Transfer of pending cases) and the “institutional vacuum”

The petitioner’s core submission relied on Section 51, which contemplates transfer of pending matters from Act, 1947 forums to Code tribunals. The Court acknowledged the admitted fact: the new tribunals were not constituted. That created a practical problem—if Section 51 were read rigidly without any saving/continuity mechanism, parties could be left without a functioning adjudicatory forum.

C. Why Section 103 could not lawfully “restore” Act, 1947 jurisdiction

The Court squarely limited the scope of the “remove difficulties” power in Section 103: it can only make provisions “not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code”. The Court held that using Section 103 to continue/restore Act, 1947 adjudicatory jurisdiction would collide with Section 51 and therefore would be impermissible.

In effect, the Court treated Section 103 as a gap-filling tool, not a power to amend the legislative scheme or to override the Code’s operative provisions.

D. The decisive turning point: Amendment introducing Section 104(1A)

The Court placed decisive weight on the amendment dated 16.02.2026 (Act No.1/2026), which inserted Section 104(1A): notwithstanding repeal, “the functioning of the Tribunals and statutory authorities functioning under the Acts so repealed shall continue” till Code tribunals/authorities become functional.

On this basis, the Court concluded there was “no difficulty” in holding that Tribunals, Labour Courts, and other statutory authorities under the Act, 1947 continue to have jurisdiction until Code forums are constituted and become functional.

E. Retrospective repeal vs. saving of actions: Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897

The petitioner argued that because the Act, 1947 stood repealed with effect from 21.11.2025, the reference order dated 19.12.2025 must be treated as without jurisdiction. The Court rejected this by finding that, when the reference was made, the Act, 1947 was “in force” operationally, and in any event, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 saves actions taken under a repealed enactment unless a contrary intention appears.

Thus, even amid a retroactive repeal framework, the Court preserved the validity of the reference through the combined operation of: (i) continuity under Section 104(1A), and (ii) saving of prior actions under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.

F. “Statutory authorities” includes “Labour Court”

Addressing a textual argument that Section 104(1A) does not expressly name “Labour Court,” the Court held that the phrase “statutory authorities” is broad and includes Labour Courts. This is a purposive reading aligned with the amendment’s object: preventing an adjudicatory gap during the transition.

3.3 Impact

  • Transitional certainty: The decision strengthens the legal position that, post-amendment, Act-era labour adjudicatory bodies may continue to function until Code institutions are operational, reducing the risk of a “no-forum” situation.
  • Limitation on executive “difficulty removal”: It underscores that notifications/orders under Section 103 cannot contradict the Code’s scheme, providing a judicial check against executive overreach during statutory transitions.
  • Preservation of references and procedural steps: By invoking Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Court signals that references/orders made under the old regime are not lightly invalidated merely because repeal is made effective from an earlier date.
  • Broader reading of “statutory authorities”: The inclusive interpretation may affect other repealed-act bodies whose continuity might be questioned on nomenclature.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Repeal and savings” (Section 104): When a law is repealed, a “savings” clause can preserve existing rights, proceedings, and actions, preventing chaos and protecting steps already taken.
  • “Remove difficulties” power (Section 103): A limited executive power to smooth implementation problems. It cannot be used to change the law’s substance or override express provisions of the statute.
  • “Transfer of pending cases” (Section 51): A mechanism to move cases from old institutions to new ones when a new legal framework begins. If new institutions are not yet functional, the system needs a continuity bridge—here, Section 104(1A).
  • Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897: A general rule that repeal does not undo what has already been validly done under the repealed law, unless the new law clearly intends otherwise.
  • “Retrospective effect”: When a change is stated to operate from an earlier date. Courts often rely on savings principles to avoid unfairness and administrative disruption.

5. Conclusion

This judgment clarifies the transitional regime under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 after the insertion of Section 104(1A): despite repeal of the Act, 1947 with effect from 21.11.2025, Act-era Tribunals/Labour Courts and statutory authorities continue to operate until Code institutions become functional, and references/orders made in the interregnum are protected, including through Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Equally significant is the Court’s holding that Section 103 cannot be used to create arrangements inconsistent with the Code’s architecture.