Compensation for Discriminatory Rejection of Compassionate Appointment Claims When Reconsideration Is Barred by Delay

1. Introduction

In UDIT NARAYAN PURKAYASTHA v. THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 6 ORS (Gauhati High Court, decided on 16-12-2025), the petitioner challenged the decision of the State Level Committee (SLC) dated 03-10-2019 rejecting his claim for compassionate appointment, while recommending respondent no. 7 (Seema Deb) for such appointment. The petitioner also assailed the appointment of respondent no. 7 made on 18-11-2021.

The petitioner’s father (a Jugali under the Information & Public Relations Department, Barak Valley Region, Silchar) died in harness on 14-05-2012. The petitioner applied on 20-07-2012. The District Level Committee (DLC) recommended him on 28-02-2014. Respondent no. 7’s claim (her husband died later, on 19-06-2013) was not recommended in the same DLC meeting due to non-availability of vacancy, but was later recommended by the DLC on 23-12-2014. Both recommendations reached the SLC, which, however, rejected the petitioner while recommending respondent no. 7.

The key legal issues were: (i) whether the SLC applied inconsistent standards (“two different yardsticks”) to similarly situated applicants; (ii) how the “spent its force” (two-year validity) rule should be applied; (iii) whether the Court could direct reconsideration/appointment after a long lapse of time; and (iv) what relief is appropriate if the process was discriminatory but the claim has become stale.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court found that the SLC applied two different yardsticks to the petitioner and respondent no. 7, resulting in discrimination.
• The Court held that the State’s explanation (linking the two-year validity to the date of vacancy) was erroneous.
• Despite finding discrimination, the Court did not interfere with respondent no. 7’s appointment, noting she had completed about four years of service by the time of decision and the Court exercised restraint.
• The Court refused to direct fresh consideration of the petitioner’s claim because about 13 years had elapsed since the death, defeating the “immediate relief” purpose of compassionate appointment and rendering the claim stale.
• As a substitute remedy for the deprivation caused by discriminatory consideration, the Court awarded Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation, payable within two months.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Achyut Ranjan Das & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Ors. reported in 2006 (4) GLT 674.

The High Court relied on this decision to explain the origin and meaning of the State policy rule that compassionate appointment applications, if not considered due to lack of vacancy, are treated as having “spent their force” after two years from the date of application. The present judgment uses Achyut Ranjan Das to reject the respondents’ attempt to calculate the two-year period by reference to the “date of vacancy considered.” The Court treated the two-year limit as running from the application date, reinforcing a uniform, administrable rule and limiting discretionary manipulation.

(b) State of W.B. Vs. Debabrata Tiwari & Ors. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine(SC) 219

The Court cited the Supreme Court to emphasize the foundational principle of compassionate appointment: it is meant to provide immediate succor to the bereaved family and must be proximate to the employee’s death. On that reasoning, after a long lapse (here, about 13 years), the “immediacy” disappears and courts should not direct reconsideration or appointment. The precedent thus shaped the relief: even though the process was discriminatory, the claim could not be revived through a fresh direction to appoint.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Identification of unequal treatment by the SLC: The Court compared how the SLC treated two similarly situated applicants whose applications were both pending well beyond two years when considered in 2019. The SLC rejected the petitioner for “spent its force” and “no vacancy,” yet recommended respondent no. 7 by asserting vacancies existed and her application had not spent its force. The Court treated this as internally inconsistent and discriminatory.
2. Correct interpretation of the two-year “spent its force” rule: The Court held the respondents’ vacancy-linked explanation was erroneous. The policy, framed in pursuance of Achyut Ranjan Das & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Ors., requires counting two years from the date of application if the application remains pending due to non-availability of vacancy. This curbs ad hoc approaches and requires uniform application.
3. Equitable restraint regarding respondent no. 7’s appointment: Having found discrimination, the Court still refused to unsettle respondent no. 7’s appointment because she had already served for about four years. This reflects a pragmatic balancing: correcting an administrative wrong without causing disproportionate disruption to a third party who has already entered service based on the State’s decision.
4. No direction for reconsideration due to staleness: Applying State of W.B. Vs. Debabrata Tiwari & Ors., the Court held compassionate appointment cannot be used as a belated mode of public employment. After 13 years, the rationale of immediate relief collapses; thus, a direction to reconsider would be legally impermissible.
5. Compensation as a remedial substitute: The Court crafted relief by awarding monetary compensation for “deprivation caused” due to improper and discriminatory consideration, while declining to revive the compassionate appointment claim itself. This bridges two competing legal realities: (i) an identifiable wrong in decision-making; and (ii) the impossibility of granting the primary relief due to delay and the nature of compassionate appointment.

3.3 Impact

• Administrative discipline and uniformity: The decision strengthens the requirement that the SLC/DLC must apply the same standards to similarly situated applicants, particularly on the “two-year validity/spent its force” rule.
• Clarification on computation of two-year period: By rejecting vacancy-date computation and reaffirming application-date computation, the judgment reduces scope for selective reasoning and post-hoc justification.
• Relief architecture in stale compassionate claims: Even where discrimination is proved, courts may deny reconsideration/appointment if the claim has become stale, but may still award compensation for unlawful deprivation. This may influence future writ remedies where time has eroded the core object of compassionate appointment.
• Protection of third-party appointees: The Court’s restraint in disturbing respondent no. 7’s appointment signals that completed years of service can weigh heavily against setting aside appointments, even where the selection process is criticized, especially when the challenger’s claim is itself no longer grantable as compassionate appointment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate appointment

A special form of appointment given to a dependent family member of a government employee who dies in service, meant to provide immediate financial relief. It is not a routine recruitment channel and is typically governed by strict policy conditions.

Died-in-harness

The employee died while in service (before retirement).

DLC (District Level Committee) and SLC (State Level Committee)

Committees that scrutinize and recommend cases for compassionate appointment. The DLC typically makes initial recommendations; the SLC considers/approves at the State level as per policy.

“Spent its force” (two-year validity)

A policy concept that an application for compassionate appointment cannot remain pending indefinitely; if it is not considered due to lack of vacancy within two years from the date of application, it is treated as no longer valid for consideration.

Stale claim

A claim brought or pressed after a long delay such that the underlying purpose of the remedy is defeated—here, the loss of the “immediate relief” objective of compassionate appointment.

Compensation in writ jurisdiction

Monetary relief ordered by a constitutional court to remedy a demonstrable administrative wrong, especially where the primary relief (like appointment) is no longer legally or equitably grantable.

5. Conclusion

The Gauhati High Court held that the SLC discriminated by applying inconsistent standards to the petitioner and respondent no. 7 while applying the two-year “spent its force” rule, and clarified that the two-year period runs from the date of application, not from any later vacancy-related reference point (drawing support from Achyut Ranjan Das & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Ors.). Yet, guided by the Supreme Court’s emphasis on immediacy in compassionate appointments (State of W.B. Vs. Debabrata Tiwari & Ors.), the Court refused to order reconsideration after 13 years, treating the claim as stale. The decision’s notable contribution is its remedial approach: where discriminatory consideration is established but appointment is no longer permissible, the Court may grant compensation (here, Rs. 1,00,000) while avoiding disruption of an existing appointee’s long-settled service.