BNSS Inherent Powers Cannot Bypass a Second-Revision Bar: Timely Challenges and Necessary Defence Evidence

Case: BANSI LAL BHARDWAJ v. S GANGANDEEP SINGH

Court: High Court of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu

Judge: Justice Sanjay Dhar

Decision: 22 October 2026 | Proceeding: CRM(M) No. 1058/2025

This commentary addresses the judgment as supplied.

1. Introduction

This judgment considers the limits of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), where an accused has already unsuccessfully challenged a trial court’s order through revision. It also addresses how promptly that jurisdiction should be invoked and whether a fair trial requires permission to examine every witness proposed by the defence.

Bansi Lal Bhardwaj, the accused and petitioner, sought to overturn orders restricting his proposed defence witnesses in a prosecution brought by the respondent, identified in the judgment as S. Gagandeep Singh, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The underlying complaint concerned a cheque dated 20 September 2009 for ₹10,00,000, drawn on Jammu Rural Bank, Bohri Patta, Jammu.

The High Court dismissed the petition on three grounds: it was, in substance, an impermissible second revision; it had been filed after an unexplained delay of approximately eleven months; and the excluded witnesses were unnecessary because the relevant land transactions could be established through documentary evidence.

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

The accused’s explanation for issuing the cheques

After the complainant completed his evidence, the accused’s statement under Section 342 of the Jammu and Kashmir Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded on 20 April 2019. He denied owing money to the complainant and elected to lead defence evidence.

According to his explanation, the complainant was a property dealer who had purchased approximately 30 kanals of land from the accused’s friends and relatives. The accused claimed to have facilitated these transactions and witnessed the sale deeds. He alleged that the complainant purchased the land at ₹1.46 lakh per kanal and resold it at ₹2.30 lakh per kanal.

When these price differences became known, one relative, Sham Lal, allegedly refused to sell his land. The accused asserted that a subsequent settlement required the complainant to recover land from his clients and repay them at ₹3 lakh per kanal. Six cheques were allegedly issued by the accused under that settlement, but the complainant failed to return the land.

These were the accused’s assertions, not factual findings establishing either the settlement or its breach.

The disputed witness list

To support his defence, the accused submitted a list of 19 witnesses and deposited their attendance expenses. Most were proposed to establish the land transactions.

By its order dated 11 September 2023, the Judicial Magistrate First Class (City Judge), Jammu, restricted the list, considering the remaining proposed evidence an attempt to prolong proceedings. Paragraph 6 of the judgment refers to two already-examined witnesses, permission to examine one of witnesses 18 and 19, and permission to examine witness 17, the Income Tax Department’s record keeper.

The judgment’s descriptions of the precise number of permitted witnesses are not entirely consistent. Its material conclusion, however, is clear: the trial court permitted limited defence evidence rather than excluding the defence altogether.

Successive challenges

  • 11 September 2023: The trial Magistrate restricted the proposed defence witnesses.
  • 16 November 2024: The Third Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, upheld that order in revision.
  • 15 October 2025: The accused approached the High Court under Section 528 BNSS.
  • 22 October 2026: The High Court dismissed the petition.

The petitioner argued that truncating his witness list prejudiced his defence and infringed his right to a fair trial.

3. Principal Issues

  1. Could Section 528 BNSS be invoked to obtain another review after an unsuccessful revision before the Sessions Court?
  2. Could unexplained delay justify refusing inherent relief despite the absence of an expressly prescribed limitation period?
  3. Did restricting the proposed witnesses deny a fair opportunity to defend the cheque-dishonour prosecution?
  4. Were the additional oral witnesses necessary when the relevant sale transactions could be demonstrated through sale deeds?

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Court rejected the petition on three distinct grounds.

First: the petition functioned as a second revision

Section 438(3) BNSS bars a further revision application by the same person after that person has approached either the Sessions Judge or the High Court. The petitioner had already pursued revision before the Sessions Court. The High Court therefore treated the subsequent Section 528 petition as a second revision disguised as an invocation of inherent powers.

Although Section 528 preserves powers to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, the Court held that those powers could not be used to circumvent the statutory prohibition.

Second: the delay was unexplained

The petitioner approached the High Court approximately eleven months after the revisional order without explaining the delay. While acknowledging that Section 528 petitions have no prescribed limitation period, the Court adopted 90 days—the period it identified for filing a revision—as an analogous benchmark of reasonable promptness.

Third: the additional witnesses were unnecessary

On the merits, the Court held that the relevant land transactions could be established through original sale deeds or certified true copies. Since the accused needed only to make his defence probable, not prove it beyond reasonable doubt, examining the deeds’ executants and marginal witnesses was unnecessary in the circumstances.

The petition was accordingly dismissed. The Court did not determine the accused’s guilt or finally decide whether the cheque represented an enforceable liability.

5. Precedent Cited and Its Influence

Eapen Chakoo v. Union Territory of J&K

The judgment cites Eapen Chakoo v. Union Territory of J&K, CRM(M) No. 78/2020, decided on 5 July 2022, in support of its approach to delay in invoking inherent jurisdiction.

As relied upon here, that decision supports the proposition that the absence of a prescribed limitation period does not permit an applicant to approach the High Court indefinitely. A petition must be filed within a reasonable time, and substantial delay requires a convincing explanation.

Its influence was specific: it supported treating the revision period of 90 days as an analogous measure of reasonable time. The petitioner’s unexplained eleven-month delay therefore supplied an additional basis for refusing relief.

Importantly, this is not a holding that Section 528 itself contains a statutory 90-day deadline. The judgment expressly acknowledges the absence of a prescribed limitation period and requires an explanation when the analogous period is exceeded.

This is the only judicial precedent expressly cited in the supplied judgment. No separate authority is cited for the second-revision analysis or the ruling on defence witnesses.

6. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Substance, not the petition’s label, determines its character

The Court examined what the petitioner was actually seeking: another challenge to the trial Magistrate’s order after the Sessions Court had already reviewed it. Describing the proceeding as an application under Section 528 did not alter that substance.

This reasoning protects the statutory structure of criminal revision. If an unsuccessful revision applicant could routinely seek the same reconsideration through inherent jurisdiction, Section 438(3) would lose practical effect.

The judgment therefore distinguishes the availability of inherent powers from an entitlement to use them as an additional revisional remedy. On the Court’s assessment, the petitioner’s complaint about the restricted witness list did not justify bypassing the statutory bar.

The ruling should nevertheless be understood in its factual setting. It rejects a petition characterised as a disguised second revision; it does not undertake a comprehensive examination of every exceptional circumstance in which inherent jurisdiction might otherwise be invoked after revisional proceedings.

B. Absence of limitation does not eliminate the requirement of diligence

The Court’s delay analysis distinguishes a fixed statutory deadline from the discretionary requirement to act promptly. Even where legislation prescribes no limitation period, unexplained inactivity can weigh against intervention.

The stated concern was that a belated challenge should not disturb the progress of the criminal case. The underlying cheque dated from 2009, and the defence stage had been reached in 2019. Although the Court did not separately attribute the entire procedural history to the petitioner, that chronology underscores the practical importance of avoiding further unnecessary interruption.

The decisive omission was the absence of any explanation for waiting approximately eleven months after the revisional order. The judgment did not find the explanation inadequate; it found that no reason had been furnished.

C. A fair defence does not require every proposed witness

The petitioner framed the restriction as a denial of fair trial. The Court instead asked whether the excluded testimony was necessary to establish the defence actually advanced.

Its reasoning was evidentiary rather than merely numerical. The fact that 19 witnesses had been listed did not itself establish entitlement to summon all of them. The central question was what their testimony would add, particularly where the sale transactions were documented.

Since original or certified copies of the sale deeds could establish those transactions, the Court considered the additional examination of executants and marginal witnesses unnecessary. Restricting repetitive proof, while preserving essential evidence, was therefore not treated as an infringement of the right to defend.

D. The accused’s evidentiary burden informed the assessment of necessity

The Court expressly stated that an accused need not prove the defence beyond reasonable doubt and need only “probablise” it. That distinction was central to its conclusion that extensive oral evidence was unnecessary.

The reasoning is that a defence which must be made probable need not be supported by every conceivable witness to the same documented transactions. The opportunity to rely on the deeds, together with the permitted witnesses, was considered sufficient in this case.

This did not amount to a finding that the defence had already succeeded. The Court addressed the means available to present it, not the weight the trial court must ultimately assign to that evidence.

E. Documentary sufficiency is a case-specific conclusion

The ruling should not be extended into a universal proposition that certified sale deeds resolve every evidentiary dispute. Its immediate subject was proof of the land-sale transactions described by this accused.

A document establishing a sale does not necessarily establish every alleged collateral promise, settlement, condition attached to a cheque, or subsequent breach. Where a proposed witness has distinct evidence on such a matter, the necessity of that testimony would require separate consideration.

The supplied judgment does not record a witness-specific demonstration of such an indispensable additional purpose. Its conclusion is therefore strongest as authority against unnecessary repetition of documentary proof.

7. Potential Impact

Challenges following an unsuccessful revision

The decision strengthens scrutiny of Section 528 petitions that effectively seek a second revisional hearing. Applicants will need to identify a genuine basis for inherent intervention rather than simply repeat objections already rejected in revision.

Promptness in seeking inherent relief

The judgment provides a concrete warning that petitions without a statutory limitation period remain vulnerable to delay and laches. Within the approach adopted here, filing beyond 90 days requires an explanation; the passage of 90 days is not itself an automatic statutory bar.

Management of defence evidence

Trial courts may rely on the decision when assessing whether proposed witnesses add material evidence or merely repeat what available documents establish. Defence applications will be stronger when they explain each witness’s distinct relevance, especially where the underlying transaction is documented.

Conversely, the judgment does not justify rejecting witnesses solely because a list is lengthy. Its reasoning depends on the availability of an adequate alternative means of proof and the preservation of essential defence evidence.

Limited effect on the underlying cheque prosecution

The decision concerns procedural review and the presentation of defence evidence. It establishes neither the complainant’s substantive entitlement nor the accused’s guilt. Those questions remain for adjudication in the trial.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Inherent powers
Powers preserved for the High Court to prevent misuse of court proceedings and secure justice. They are not an ordinary additional appeal or revision.
Revision and the second-revision bar
Revision permits a superior criminal court to examine an inferior court’s order. Section 438(3), as applied here, prevents the same person from seeking another revision after choosing the Sessions Court or High Court.
Delay and laches
Unreasonable, unexplained delay that can justify refusing discretionary relief, even without a fixed filing deadline.
Making a defence probable
Presenting sufficient evidence to make the defence reasonably probable, rather than proving it beyond reasonable doubt.
Executants and marginal witnesses
Executants are the persons who execute a document. Marginal witnesses are witnesses whose signatures appear on it.
Certified true copy
An officially authenticated copy of a document. The Court regarded such copies of the sale deeds, or the originals, as sufficient for proving the transactions relevant here.
Quashment
Judicially setting aside an order or proceeding. The petitioner sought this relief against both the trial and revisional orders.

9. Conclusion

The judgment links procedural finality with proportionate opportunities to defend. It rejects the use of Section 528 BNSS as a substitute for a prohibited second revision, requires reasonable promptness in invoking inherent jurisdiction, and permits restriction of unnecessary oral evidence where documentary proof adequately serves the defence.

Its central lesson is that a fair trial guarantees a meaningful opportunity to present material evidence—not unlimited successive challenges or examination of every proposed witness. Equally, its documentary-evidence ruling remains tied to the particular defence and does not authorise blanket restrictions on genuinely necessary testimony.