Article 28(1) “Religious Instruction” Has a Narrow Meaning: Non-coercive Moral/Cultural Recitations in State Schools Not Barred; Challenge Premature Without Concrete Injury

1) Introduction

Case: ABDUL SALAM RIZVI v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH (2026 CGHC 27135)
Court/Bench: High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, Single Bench (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Date: 02-07-2026
Proceeding: WPC No. 3372 of 2026 (writ petition)

The petition challenged a School Education Department directive dated 12.06.2026 (to be followed from the academic session 2026–27) prescribing daily school assembly items, including the National Anthem/Song and certain Sanskrit verses described as Deep Mantra, Saraswati Vandana, Guru Mantra, Shanti Mantra, Bhojan Mantra, Gayatri Mantra, and a Kalyan Mantra (along with accounts of “Great Personalities”).

Petitioners’ core claim: the directive effectively mandates religious prayers in State-funded schools, allegedly violating Articles 14, 21, 25, 28(1), 29, and 30 of the Constitution, and undermining secularism by compelling minority students to participate in practices not of their faith.

State’s core response: the petition is politically motivated, the petitioners lack locus, no student/parent complaint exists, implementation is harmonious, and the directive is not coercive or denominational; it is consistent with value-based education/Indian Knowledge Systems and supported by Article 51A (fundamental duty to value and preserve India’s composite culture). The State also placed extensive “literal meanings” and “pedagogical significance” of the verses to argue they are universal, ethical, and ecological rather than sectarian worship.

Key issues before the Court: (i) whether the directive amounts to “religious instruction” prohibited by Article 28(1) in State-funded schools; (ii) whether the directive is coercive so as to infringe freedom of conscience/religion and equality; (iii) whether the petition is maintainable at this stage absent concrete injury (prematurity) and material particulars.

2) Summary of the Judgment

• The Court found that the impugned order, read as a whole, does not contain any mandatory or coercive direction compelling students to act contrary to their beliefs, conscience, or faith.
• The petitioners failed to place relevant material showing violation of fundamental rights; no individual or direct injury was demonstrated.
• The Court held that “religious instruction” in Article 28(1) has a restricted meaning: it prohibits teaching religious customs/rituals/practices/modes of worship in State-funded institutions, but does not ban moral instruction disassociated from denominational doctrines.
• Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as premature, based on apprehension rather than actual grievance, with liberty to re-approach the Court with cogent material if a future exigency arises.

3) Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment does not cite or rely upon any prior judicial precedents by name. The Court’s reasoning proceeds primarily from: (i) the text and structure of Article 28(1) (and the conceptual distinction between “religious instruction” and “moral instruction”); and (ii) the evidentiary posture typical of writ review—requiring concrete material showing infringement rather than speculative apprehension.

This is significant as the Court frames the outcome not as a balancing exercise drawn from precedent, but as a threshold determination on coercion, proof of injury, and the narrow semantic scope of Article 28(1).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Non-coercion as the factual and constitutional fulcrum
   The Court’s first decisive move is interpretive and factual: it reads the impugned order “as a whole” and concludes it contains no express requirement obligating participation in a manner interfering with freedom of conscience or religion. In constitutional challenges of this kind, the presence (or absence) of coercion often determines whether a policy becomes a rights-infringing compulsion rather than a permissible institutional routine.
2. Failure of foundational pleadings/material
   The Court treats the petitioners’ case as lacking the minimum factual substrate: no identified student (or parent/guardian) grievance, no instance of punishment/exclusion, and no material showing an operational compulsion. On that basis, the Court holds the petitioners have not demonstrated a concrete infringement of Articles 14, 21, 25, 28(1), 29, or 30 in the manner pleaded.
3. Restricted meaning of “religious instruction” under Article 28(1)
   The Court articulates a doctrinal distinction:
   • Article 28(1) prohibits teaching of religious customs, rituals, practices, and modes of worship in educational institutions wholly maintained from State funds.
   • It does not ban moral instruction that is disassociated from denominational doctrines, described as a legitimate part of training in citizenship, maintenance of law and order, and social cohesion.
   This becomes the judgment’s central legal proposition: constitutional secularism, in this framing, does not automatically invalidate all culturally-rooted or Sanskrit-origin content; it targets denominational propagation and worship-oriented instruction in State-funded schools.
4. Prematurity and liberty to renew
   Even while rejecting the petition, the Court leaves the door open: if future “exigency” arises (i.e., evidence of coercion, exclusion, discrimination, or denominational enforcement), petitioners may return with “cogent and relevant material.” This preserves judicial supervision while avoiding an abstract or advisory determination.

3.3 Impact

• Higher evidentiary threshold for abstract challenges to school routines
  The decision signals that policies alleged to infringe religious freedom in schools may be dismissed at the threshold if petitioners cannot show concrete instances of coercion, punishment, exclusion, or discriminatory implementation.
• Operational test: “religious instruction” vs “moral/value instruction”
  By adopting a “restricted meaning” of Article 28(1), the judgment gives State authorities a constitutional vocabulary to defend value-based recitations if framed (and administered) as non-denominational, non-compulsory in effect, and unlinked to worship or conversion.
• Administrative drafting and implementation will matter
  Future disputes will likely focus on: (i) the language used in circulars (e.g., “mandatory,” “ensure,” consequences for non-participation), and (ii) real-world enforcement (attendance marking, humiliation, exclusion from class, denial of benefits). The Court’s liberty clause implicitly invites such fact-specific litigation if coercion emerges.
• Minority-rights claims may shift to “as-applied” challenges
  While Articles 29 and 30 were invoked, the dismissal on prematurity indicates that minority-rights arguments may succeed (if at all) through evidence of adverse impact on minority students’ educational access, dignity, or equality in day-to-day practice rather than through a purely facial challenge.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of Certiorari

A constitutional remedy by which a High Court can quash an illegal or unconstitutional order of a public authority.

Writ of Mandamus

A direction issued by a constitutional court ordering a public authority to do (or not do) something it is legally bound to do (or refrain from doing).

Article 28(1): “Religious instruction” in State-funded educational institutions

Article 28(1) bars imparting “religious instruction” in institutions wholly maintained out of State funds. In this judgment, the Court construes “religious instruction” narrowly as teaching religious customs/rituals/practices/modes of worship, and distinguishes it from non-denominational moral/value instruction.

Freedom of conscience (Articles 21 and 25 context)

The petitioners argued that forced participation burdens conscience and religious freedom; the Court rejected the claim at this stage because it found no coercive mandate and no concrete injury shown.

Prematurity

A case is “premature” when it is brought before a real, concrete dispute has crystallized—i.e., when it rests on apprehension rather than evidence of actual infringement.

Facial vs. as-applied challenge

A facial challenge attacks a policy in all its applications; an as-applied challenge targets unconstitutional implementation in specific circumstances. The judgment effectively pushes potential future litigation toward as-applied, evidence-driven challenges.

Article 51A (Fundamental Duties)

The State invoked Article 51A to justify cultural/value content. The Court did not build its holding expressly on Article 51A, but the State’s reliance illustrates a broader framing: heritage/value education as civics rather than religion—subject to the non-coercion and non-denominational limits implied by Article 28(1).

5) Conclusion

The Chhattisgarh High Court dismissed the writ petition challenging the 12.06.2026 school assembly directive primarily because the challenge was premature and unsupported by material showing coercion or concrete rights-injury. Crucially, the Court articulated that “religious instruction” under Article 28(1) has a restricted meaning—prohibiting worship-oriented religious customs and rituals in State-funded schools, but not barring non-denominational moral instruction tied to citizenship and social cohesion. The judgment’s practical significance lies in its emphasis on how a policy is worded and enforced, and its invitation to re-litigate with evidence if implementation later becomes coercive or discriminatory.