Article 226 “Moulded Relief” in AYUSH/PG Admissions: Next-Session Admission on Prior AIAPGET Score for Arbitrary Denial Despite Cut-off Extension
1. Introduction
In Vaskar Shil v. The Union of India and 9 Ors. (Meghalaya High Court, decided on 28.07.2026),
the petitioner, Vaskar Shil, sought admission to the MD (Homeopathy) programme at the
North Eastern Institute of Ayurveda and Homeopathy (NEIAH). He was Serial No. 1 in the merit list,
but his candidature was rejected for belated reporting at counselling (late by about two minutes).
The dispute broadened after (i) the petitioner’s earlier round of litigation (WP(C) No. 649 of 2025) resulted in a direction to explore
a supernumerary seat, (ii) the Institute rejected the representation asserting the cut-off date had expired,
and (iii) the National Commission for Homeopathy subsequently issued a notification extending the
last date to 23.01.2026. Additionally, the respondents’ affidavit disclosed that the Commission had
provisionally permitted an intake of 8 PG seats, while the Institute had advertised far fewer seats—raising
concerns of non-disclosure/suppression and arbitrariness.
The key issues framed by the Court were:
(1) sustainability of rejection despite later extension of the deadline; (2) reasonableness of denying admission for marginal delay;
and (3) whether admission could be granted in the next academic session using the same AIAPGET 2025 score.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court allowed the writ petition and, exercising powers under Article 226, directed NEIAH to
grant admission to the petitioner in the next academic session on the basis of his AIAPGET July 2025 marks.
The Court characterised the direction as a one-time relaxation and stated it was “not to create any precedent.”
The Court’s decisive factual pillars were:
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The rejection was premised on the admission process being “over”, but on the same day the petitioner received the rejection,
a notification extended the cut-off to 23.01.2026, removing the asserted impediment.
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In the earlier proceedings, a statement was made that only 2 sanctioned PG seats existed, whereas the later affidavit indicated
8 PG seats had been provisionally permitted, undermining the earlier factual basis for “supernumerary seat” exploration.
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The petitioner’s delay was marginal, not deliberate, and he acted promptly to seek redress.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
This decision was the jurisprudential fulcrum for the High Court’s remedy. The Meghalaya High Court relied particularly on the principle that
where (i) admission cannot be granted in the same academic year, (ii) the authorities’ action is arbitrary or in breach of
rules/prospectus affecting students’ rights, (iii) the candidate is meritorious, and (iv) the candidate approached the court
promptly, the Court may mould relief by directing admission in the next academic year, typically by
increasing seats (and, where appropriate, balancing equities through seat adjustments).
The High Court used this authority to overcome the respondents’ “academic-year finality” objection and to justify a forward-looking, equitable
correction once the 2025–26 session had progressed too far for immediate intake.
This local precedent reinforced that, in suitable cases, the High Court can direct admission in the next academic year with the
same examination score, as a calibrated equitable measure. The Court cited paragraphs indicating that moulding relief can extend
beyond MBBS to other postgraduate courses, and can be ordered to “balance the equities,” sometimes with an explicit caveat that the order is not to
operate as a general precedent.
In the present case, Dr. Shireen Dkhar supported the Court’s willingness to grant next-session admission on the same AIAPGET score despite
the respondents’ argument that score validity was confined to 2025–26.
(c) Shreya Kumari Tirkey v. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. (SLP (Civil) No. 27139 of 2024)
The petitioner relied on this to emphasise that procedural lapses should not defeat substantive rights and that
equitable relief is appropriate where authorities act unfairly. While the Meghalaya High Court’s reasoning ultimately rested more squarely on
S. Krishna Sradha and its own precedent, this citation aligned with the Court’s fairness-centric approach to marginal delay and the
administrative handling of the representation.
(d) Respondents’ authorities and how the Court dealt with them
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Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh & Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 258:
relied upon to argue against carrying admissions to a subsequent academic year. The petitioner argued it reflected older jurisprudence and must be
read in light of later developments permitting moulded relief where illegality/arbitrariness is shown.
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Chandigarh Administration & Anr. v. Jasmine Kaur & Ors. (2014) 10 SCC 521:
invoked similarly to resist next-year accommodation. The petitioner contended that the later and larger-bench approach in
S. Krishna Sradha permits next-year admission in appropriate cases.
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Sadhana Yadav vs. Union of India & Ors. (2025) 3 HCC (Del) 196:
distinguished by the petitioner as factually dissimilar. The High Court, on its own facts, treated the present dispute as involving
a “unique set of facts” featuring arbitrariness and material non-disclosure about seat capacity.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
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Rejection premised on “deadline over” became untenable after extension:
The respondents rejected the representation stating the admission process was over on 22.12.2025. Yet a notification dated 13.01.2026 extended the
cut-off to 23.01.2026. The Court reasoned that, once extension existed, there should have been no impediment to consider the
petitioner’s representation, undercutting the very foundation of rejection.
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Material inconsistency on sanctioned seats supported arbitrariness:
In the earlier proceedings, an instruction was conveyed that only 2 seats were sanctioned, but the later affidavit appended a
letter showing 8 seats intake capacity “in 4 subjects.” This discrepancy mattered because the earlier order had asked the
Commission to explore a supernumerary seat; if existing sanctioned capacity existed, the administrative response should have been different.
The Court treated this as a significant feature pointing to unfairness/arbitrariness.
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Marginal delay was not treated as a disqualifying moral fault:
The Court considered the delay (about two minutes) to be non-deliberate and immediately explained by the petitioner. It weighed the harshness of
strict procedural enforcement against the consequence: denial to a top-merit candidate. The Court also noted the petitioner’s prompt resort to
administrative and judicial remedies.
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Relief structured around feasibility and academic reality:
Recognising that the 2025–26 session had substantially progressed, the Court adopted the S. Krishna Sradha mechanism—moulding
relief—to avoid a purely declaratory finding and provide an effective remedy.
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Exercise of Article 226 powers with an express limiting caution:
The Court explicitly framed its direction as a “one-time relaxation” and “not to create any precedent,” signalling that the
remedy was driven by the specific combination of (i) deadline-extension dynamics, (ii) seat-capacity disclosure issues, and (iii) marginal-delay
disproportionality.
3.3 Impact
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Administrative transparency on seat capacity:
Institutions and regulators in AYUSH/Homeopathy admissions may face closer scrutiny on sanctioned intake vs. advertised seats.
Where courts perceive inconsistent statements or non-disclosure affecting earlier judicial directions, claims of arbitrariness are more likely to
succeed.
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Cut-off extensions must be operationalised fairly:
If a regulatory authority extends a cut-off date, institutions may be expected to apply that extension in a manner consistent with fairness—at
least when an applicant’s representation is pending or rejected solely because “time is over.”
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Strengthening of “moulded relief” in Meghalaya’s admission disputes:
Although the Court stated the order should not create precedent, the judgment reinforces (especially alongside
Dr. Shireen Dkhar v. State of Meghalaya) the practical availability of next-session admission remedies under Article 226
where denial is tainted by arbitrariness and the petitioner is meritorious and diligent.
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Score-validity arguments may yield to equitable correction in exceptional cases:
The respondents argued AIAPGET 2025 scores are valid only for 2025–26. The Court nonetheless directed next-session admission on that score, implying
that strict score-validity rules may be relaxed judicially in exceptional situations to remedy injustice.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Article 226 (writ jurisdiction): Constitutional power of High Courts to issue directions/orders to public authorities to correct
illegality, arbitrariness, and rights violations.
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Supernumerary seat: An “extra” seat created over and above the sanctioned intake, typically as a corrective/equitable measure so
that an existing batch’s admissions are not disturbed.
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Moulding the relief: Instead of only declaring that an action was wrong, the Court designs a practical remedy suited to the
circumstances—here, admission in the next academic year.
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Cut-off date extension: A regulator may extend the last permissible date for admissions. Disputes arise if institutions treat
admissions as “concluded” despite an extension that arguably keeps the window open.
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Merit list / counselling: Candidates are ranked by exam score; seats are allotted during counselling. Missing the reporting time
often triggers loss of the seat, but courts may intervene if strict enforcement produces disproportionate injustice amid administrative unfairness.
5. Conclusion
The Meghalaya High Court’s decision is significant for affirming that procedural rigidity in admissions cannot be insulated from
constitutional scrutiny when administrative handling shows arbitrariness, particularly where (i) the rejection rationale is
undercut by a subsequent cut-off extension, and (ii) there are troubling inconsistencies about sanctioned seat capacity.
By relying on S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. and its own precedent
Dr. Shireen Dkhar v. State of Meghalaya, the Court crafted an effective remedy—next-session admission on the same
AIAPGET score—while limiting the order as a one-time measure. The judgment thus exemplifies how Article 226 can be used not merely to
identify wrongdoing, but to restore lost educational opportunity in a way the Court deems equitable and workable.