Arbitrators Cannot Rewrite Contractual Sequencing or Bypass Conditions for Conveyance
Case: SHREERAM BUILDERS v. UPENDRA KANTILAL THANAWALA
Citation: 2026 INSC 1176 | Court: Supreme Court of India | Date: 29 October 2026
Bench: Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ. | Judgment by: Sanjay Kumar, J.
1. Introduction
This judgment examines the boundary between interpreting a contract and rewriting it through an arbitral award. The Supreme Court declined to restore an award directing specific performance of a property agreement because the tribunal had disregarded the contractual sequence of obligations, treated an unsettled consideration as final, and substituted financial terms of its own.
The decision is particularly significant for composite development-and-sale arrangements. Its central message is that describing an agreement as an agreement to sell does not permit an arbitrator to disregard development obligations, payment conditions, or other prerequisites governing conveyance. The operative provisions—not the document’s label—control the parties’ rights.
At the same time, the Court refused to allow the landowners to retain consideration received under an agreement they had terminated. Exercising Article 142 of the Constitution, it ordered repayment with interest. The judgment therefore combines contractual fidelity in arbitration with exceptional constitutional relief against continued retention of money.
Background and parties
Shreeram Builders and its partners entered into an “Agreement for Development” dated 6 August 2003 with members of the Thanawala family. The agreement concerned the respondents’ undivided 2/9th share in three adjoining parcels of land at Thane. The wider property was jointly owned, had not been finally partitioned on the ground, and was affected by existing litigation.
The transaction contemplated development, sale of constructed units, and eventual conveyance. Certain property—including a bungalow, its gardens, and a specified room with associated open space—was excluded. The initial consideration of ₹2,28,75,000 was calculated using an estimated 25,000 square feet of available Floor Space Index at ₹915 per square foot. However, contractual provisions allowed the amount payable to change upon specified future events.
Following termination by the respondents on 9 April 2008, the parties invoked arbitration. Two arbitrators granted specific performance; the third dissented.
Principal issues
- Whether the agreement’s title and the stamp duty paid determined its legal character.
- Whether an arbitral tribunal could order conveyance before the agreed prerequisites had been satisfied.
- Whether acceptance of delayed instalments extinguished all subsequent payment deadlines.
- Whether the tribunal could revise the contractual price, allow disputed adjustments, and grant contingent alternative damages.
- What review was permissible under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
- Whether the respondents could retain payments after terminating the agreement.
2. Procedural History and Summary of the Decision
The majority award
The majority award dated 10 December 2011 treated the agreement as an agreement to sell and declared the termination illegal. It directed specific performance upon the claimants depositing ₹10,91,30,164, followed by execution of a conveyance.
In calculating that amount, the majority increased the agreed rate sixfold, from ₹915 to ₹5,490 per square foot, citing the passage of time and escalation in property values. It also adjusted certain earlier payments and allowed an interest-related deduction. Additionally, it quantified alternative damages of ₹23,21,19,892, payable if a superior forum reversed the grant of specific performance. The respondents’ counterclaim was rejected.
A subsequent application by the respondents under Section 33(4), alleging that relevant pricing clauses had not been considered, was dismissed as time-barred. That procedural episode did not become the central question before the Supreme Court.
Proceedings under Sections 34 and 37
Both sides challenged the award under Section 34. Following an initial decision and a consent remand, the Principal District Judge, Thane, dismissed both challenges on 25 January 2020 and upheld the majority award.
On 5 March 2024, the Bombay High Court allowed the respondents’ appeal under Section 37 and set aside the award. It held, among other things, that the tribunal had disregarded the agreement’s conditions and rewritten its terms.
The Supreme Court’s disposition
The Supreme Court left the setting aside of the award undisturbed. Although it disagreed with aspects of the High Court’s reasoning concerning the agreement’s classification and the evidentiary use of admissions, those errors did not undermine the decisive conclusion: the majority award had impermissibly replaced the parties’ bargain with a different one.
The Court nevertheless directed:
- Refund of amounts paid to the respondents under the agreement.
- Simple interest at 9% per annum from the date of each payment until actual refund.
- Return of the appellant’s court deposits, together with accrued interest, if any.
- Each side to bear its own costs.
The appeals were disposed of on those terms. The specific-performance award was not restored.
3. The Governing Statutory Framework
Section 28(3): fidelity to the contract
The Court treated Section 28(3) as central to the dispute. An arbitral tribunal must respect the contractual terms governing the transaction. Where those terms expressly prescribe obligations and their sequence, the tribunal cannot substitute a different arrangement on its own assessment of fairness.
The Court also explained that trade usages ordinarily assist where the contract is silent; they cannot displace clear contractual provisions.
Section 34: the pre-amendment regime applied
Both Section 34 applications had been filed before 23 October 2015. Accordingly, the unamended Section 34 governed, notwithstanding the later remand and subsequent decisions.
Under the applicable judicial interpretation of that provision, an award could be set aside for conflict with public policy, including patent illegality going to the root of the matter. Nevertheless, this was not an unrestricted power to reconsider factual findings or choose a preferred interpretation of the contract.
Section 37: equivalent grounds, not unrestricted appellate review
The High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 37 was coterminous with the Section 34 court’s jurisdiction. It could therefore examine whether the award satisfied Section 34 even though the District Judge had upheld it.
Coterminous jurisdiction does not mean a full appeal on the merits. The appellate court remains confined to the statutory grounds for intervention.
4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
A. Substance of the transaction and evidentiary admissions
- Sasan Power Limited v. North American Coal Corporation (India) Limited — (2016) 10 SCC 813
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This authority establishes that an agreement’s legal character depends on the rights and obligations it creates, rather than its nomenclature. It supported rejection of the proposition that the heading “Agreement for Development” and payment of development-agreement stamp duty conclusively determined the transaction’s nature. The operative clauses required examination.
- Union Of India v. Moksh Builders and Financiers Ltd. and others — AIR 1977 SC 409
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The arbitral majority relied on this decision to treat admissions as substantive evidence, irrespective of whether their maker entered the witness box or was confronted with the statement. Its relevance arose from an earlier written statement in which Upendra and Pankaj acknowledged having agreed to sell the property to Shreeram Builders. That admission supported the majority’s understanding of the transaction, although it could not override the agreement’s express conditions.
- Ramabai Shriniwas Nadgir v. Government Of Bombay — AIR 1941 Bom 144
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The High Court relied on this case for the proposition that an admission could be used against its maker only in the proceedings in which it was made. The Supreme Court rejected that reading. This was an important correction of the High Court’s reasoning, but it did not require restoration of an award independently vitiated by contractual departures.
- Dattatraya Shripati Mohite v. Shankar Ishwara Mohite and another — AIR 1960 Bom 153
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This decision had already explained that Ramabai did not prohibit consideration of admissions made in other suits concerning the same subject matter. The Supreme Court relied on it to demonstrate why the High Court’s exclusionary approach was misplaced.
- Basant Singh v. Janki Singh and others — AIR 1967 SC 341: 1966 SCC OnLine SC 234
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This Supreme Court authority reinforced the correction concerning admissions in earlier proceedings. Together with Dattatraya, it confirmed that a statement does not become legally unusable merely because it was made in another case. Its evidentiary relevance, however, remains distinct from the question whether the relief granted complies with the contract.
B. Appellate jurisdiction and applicability of the 2015 amendments
- Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited — (2025) 7 SCC 1
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The Constitution Bench decision supplied the proposition that Section 37 jurisdiction is coterminous with, and as broad as, Section 34 jurisdiction. It justified the High Court’s renewed scrutiny of the award despite the District Judge’s confirmation. The present judgment relied on this jurisdictional proposition; its restitutionary direction was separately grounded in Article 142.
- Board Of Control For Cricket In India v. Kochi Cricket Private Limited and others — (2018) 6 SCC 287
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This case supplied the temporal rule that the amended Section 34 applies to applications filed on or after 23 October 2015. Since the applications here predated that date, the earlier regime continued to govern. The timing of later adjudication did not change the applicable framework.
- Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) — (2019) 15 SCC 131
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This authority served two purposes. It confirmed the amendment-applicability rule and illustrated the prohibition against imposing a new contractual bargain on an unwilling party. Its warning was equally important: intervention on fundamental-justice grounds is exceptional and cannot rest merely on a court’s belief that a different outcome would be fairer.
C. Public policy, patent illegality, and judicial approach
- Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. — (1994) Supp 1 SCC 644
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This decision provided the foundational public-policy categories: fundamental policy of Indian law, the interests of India, and justice or morality. Historically developed in the foreign-award context, that formulation became the starting point for later Section 34 jurisprudence. Here, it formed part of the doctrinal background rather than the immediate factual basis for intervention.
- Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. — (2003) 5 SCC 705
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This decision expanded public-policy review under Section 34 to include patent illegality. The illegality must affect the foundation of the award, rather than involve a trivial defect. It supported intervention where the tribunal’s departures from the agreement fundamentally altered the parties’ rights and obligations.
- Centrotrade Minerals & Metals Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd. — (2006) 11 SCC 245
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The Court cited this case for the proposition that acting contrary to the express contractual framework, or granting relief on a matter not in dispute, can attract Section 34. Its emphasis on serious, foundational illegality helped distinguish reviewable contractual substitution from an ordinary interpretative disagreement.
- Delhi Development Authority v. R.S. Sharma and Company, New Delhi — (2008) 13 SCC 80
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This authority consolidated the pre-amendment grounds of intervention, including conflict with substantive law, the Arbitration Act, express contractual provisions, and public policy. It directly supported examining whether the award contradicted specific contractual terms, provided the defect met the requisite threshold.
- Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Western Geco International Limited — (2014) 9 SCC 263
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This decision identified judicial approach, natural justice, application of mind, and rationality as elements of fundamental policy. It supplied the framework for assessing seriously irrational adjudication under the applicable older regime. Its discussion of Wednesbury reasonableness concerned decisions outside the range of reasonable outcomes, not merely decisions with which a reviewing court disagrees.
D. Contractual interpretation and the prohibition against rewriting
- Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority — (2015) 3 SCC 49
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This was the essential counterweight to intervention. Interpretation ordinarily belongs to the arbitrator, and a plausible view must be respected. Review becomes permissible when the construction is one no fair-minded or reasonable person could adopt. The present decision rested on the conclusion that the majority had crossed that boundary by replacing, rather than reasonably interpreting, express terms.
- UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh — (2022) 4 SCC 11
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This three-judge decision reinforced the protection afforded to a plausible contractual interpretation. It prevented the analysis from becoming a choice between competing preferred readings. The decisive question was whether the award remained within the contractual bargain at all.
- OPG POWER GENERATION PRIVATE LIMITED v. ENEXIO POWER COOLING SOLUTIONS INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED and another — (2025) 2 SCC 417
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This three-judge authority reaffirmed that an award contrary to contractual terms may be patently illegal. It supported the Court’s treatment of premature conveyance, unauthorized adjustments, and an invented price as substantive departures from the agreement.
- South East Asia Marine Engineering and Constructions Limited (SEAMEC LTD.) v. Oil India Limited — (2020) 5 SCC 164
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This decision required the plausibility of an interpretation to be assessed against the contract read as a whole. It was particularly relevant because the majority had approached the transaction as a conventional sale while overlooking the interlocking development, pricing, payment, and conveyance provisions.
- Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Deccan Chronicle Holdings Ltd. — 2021 SCC Online Bom. 834, (2021) 4 Bom CR 481, (2021) 3 Arb LR 125
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The High Court relied on this authority for the prohibition against arbitral rewriting of contracts. The Supreme Court agreed with that central proposition and its application, notwithstanding its disagreement with other parts of the High Court’s reasoning.
5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning
A. Classification could not replace examination of the operative terms
The High Court placed weight on the agreement’s title and the payment of stamp duty at 1%, rather than the higher rate applicable to an agreement to sell. The Supreme Court rejected that approach as conclusive. The duty actually paid might reflect how the parties presented the document; it did not necessarily establish what the document legally accomplished.
Nor did the agreement fit an ordinary development model. The respondents were not promised a proportion of the completed buildings or sale proceeds. They were to receive monetary consideration calculated principally by reference to FSI, while the builder could sell units and retain the proceeds.
Nevertheless, the Court did not need finally to place the agreement in a single category. Whether it was developmental, sale-oriented, or composite, its express obligations remained binding. This is the judgment’s principal methodological contribution: classify only as far as necessary, but enforce the actual contractual architecture.
B. Specific performance could not bypass the agreed sequence
The majority treated the dispute substantially as a conventional claim for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The Supreme Court considered that approach defective because the agreement prescribed interconnected steps preceding conveyance.
Those steps included payment obligations, municipal approval, determination of available FSI, and other development-related events. Conveyance was linked to payment of all amounts contractually due. The tribunal could not isolate the promise to convey and enforce it independently of those conditions.
The Court also stressed the limited nature of its own task. It was reviewing the validity of an arbitral award under Section 34 standards, not deciding an ordinary appeal from a specific-performance decree. The appellant’s willingness to accept the enhanced price could not cure the tribunal’s departure from the contract.
C. Acceptance of earlier delays did not abolish future deadlines
The first six instalments were paid late and accepted without protest. The majority treated this conduct, together with the absence of notices under Clause 7, as substantially defeating reliance on the payment timetable.
The Supreme Court drew a narrower inference. Acceptance without objection cured the delays in those accepted payments; it did not erase every future deadline or the repeated stipulation that time was essential.
This distinction matters. Waiving a particular default is not necessarily the same as abandoning the contractual requirement for punctual performance thereafter. Equally, the judgment should not be read as generally dispensing with agreed notice-and-cure provisions: its reasoning addressed the consequences of acceptance and the impermissible inference of wholesale abandonment.
D. The consideration had not become final
The stated consideration was a provisional calculation, not an unconditional final price. Three mechanisms could affect the amount payable:
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FSI at municipal sanction: relevant changes before sanction could alter the consideration. After sanction, changes were generally for the builder’s benefit or risk.
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Regularization of additional land: further payment could arise if land allegedly held adversely was regularized and additional FSI became available.
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Basements: an additional ₹5 lakh depended on actual basement construction.
No sanctioned plan had been obtained. The tribunal therefore lacked a contractual basis for treating the estimated FSI and initial consideration as the final foundation for an immediate conveyance.
E. The sixfold price increase was an unauthorized new bargain
The majority sought to account for rising property values by multiplying the contractual rate by six. But the agreement already specified rates and the events permitting adjustment. The award provided neither a contractual foundation nor a reasoned computation justifying its chosen multiplier.
The objection was not simply that the enhanced figure was too high or too low. It was that the tribunal had no authority to substitute that pricing mechanism. A seemingly equitable compromise remains objectionable if it imposes obligations to which the parties never agreed.
F. Prior payments and excluded property revealed further departures
Clause 51 superseded earlier agreements, including the memorandum of understanding dated 15 March 2002. The majority nevertheless credited ₹13,18,334 against the current consideration by reference to payments under that earlier arrangement. The Supreme Court held that this contradicted the supersession clause.
The adjustment of ₹26,222 relating to Gujarat Financial Corporation was also held to be outside the agreement’s scope. These findings concerned the permissibility of those adjustments within this award; they should not be treated as a comprehensive determination of every conceivable independent recovery claim.
The Court further found that the award’s treatment of the excluded bungalow-related property did not match the agreement’s exclusion of that property in its entirety. It emphasized that owners of the remaining 7/9th share were not before the tribunal. The broader point is that an award cannot enlarge the property bargain or adversely determine absent owners’ interests.
G. Alternative damages raised separate difficulties
The Supreme Court criticized both the absence of a contractual foundation for the damages awarded and the award’s unusual structure: damages were made payable if a superior forum later set aside specific performance.
The latter defect is particularly important. An arbitral tribunal cannot use a contingent monetary award to anticipate, and effectively predetermine the consequences of, a reviewing court’s decision that its principal relief is legally unsustainable.
Analytical qualification: the Court’s observation about the absence of a damages clause warrants careful application. Ordinary contractual damages can arise under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 without an express damages clause. The judgment does not separately examine that statutory foundation. Its reasoning should therefore not be converted uncritically into a universal rule that contractual silence always excludes arbitral damages.
H. Restitution under Article 142 was distinct from validating the award
Clause 54 required repayment of consideration if the agreement ended before construction on the respondents’ share. The respondents had terminated the agreement but retained the money.
Although the clause contemplated repayment without interest, the Court reasoned that this protection would have applied had repayment occurred upon termination in April 2008. Continued retention required a different response.
Exercising Article 142, the Court ordered simple interest at 9% from each payment date until refund, avoiding fresh litigation. This was an independent constitutional direction—not restoration or modification of the invalid specific-performance award.
The operative direction did not specify a single aggregate refund figure. It covered amounts paid under the agreement, which should not automatically be equated with every credit the invalid award had allowed.
6. Likely Impact
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Composite property agreements: tribunals must examine the interaction between development rights, title transfer, payment, approvals, and variable consideration rather than forcing the transaction into a single conventional category.
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Arbitral remedies: specific performance must preserve contractual prerequisites. Courts may intervene where an award substitutes a materially different transaction.
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Pricing discretion: market escalation does not itself authorize arbitrators to invent an enhanced contractual rate.
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Waiver arguments: acceptance of particular delayed payments will not necessarily establish permanent abandonment of future deadlines.
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Termination and repayment: a party cannot assume that terminating contractual rights also entitles it to retain refundable consideration.
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Drafting practice: clear provisions on approval milestones, price finalization, permitted credits, conveyance triggers, damages, and post-termination refunds can reduce similar disputes.
Two limits remain essential. First, the judgment applies the pre-amendment Section 34 framework; its discussion of broad public-policy review cannot simply be transplanted wholesale into the amended regime. Second, the Article 142 interest direction is an exceptional constitutional remedy, not a general power available to every court reviewing an award.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Specific performance
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An order requiring a party to carry out its contractual promise, such as executing a conveyance, rather than merely paying compensation.
- Condition precedent
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A requirement that must be satisfied before another obligation becomes enforceable—for example, full payment before transfer of title.
- Floor Space Index (FSI)
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A planning measure governing permissible floor area relative to plot area. Here, its availability affected the price payable to the landowners.
- Patent illegality
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A serious legal defect affecting the foundation of an award, not merely a minor mistake or a debatable interpretation.
- Waiver
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Giving up a right. Overlooking one late payment does not necessarily mean agreeing that every later payment may also be late.
- Partition by metes and bounds
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Physically dividing jointly owned property into separately identified portions, rather than merely recording fractional ownership shares.
- Restitution
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Returning money or benefits that a party is no longer entitled to retain.
- Article 142
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The Supreme Court’s constitutional power to make orders necessary to do complete justice in a matter before it.
8. Conclusion
The judgment reaffirms that arbitral autonomy protects reasonable interpretation, not contractual reconstruction. An arbitrator cannot bypass agreed prerequisites, freeze contingent consideration, invent a new price, or enlarge the property covered by the bargain.
Its complementary message is equally clear: setting aside an unlawful award does not justify retaining refundable payments. Contractual fidelity defeated the claim to immediate conveyance, while Article 142 supplied restitution with interest.