Anticipatory Bail Bar under SC/ST Act: FIR-Only Prima Facie Test for Section 18 and “Public View” Roadside Caste Insult

1. Introduction

The Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench), by order dated 26.09.2025, decided two connected criminal appeals filed under Section 14A(2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC & ST (POA) Act”). The appellants, Mukesh/Mahesh Kumawat and Mohit Jat, sought anticipatory bail after the Special Judge, SC & ST (POA) Act, Dhar rejected their applications on 11.04.2025.

The FIR (Crime No. 99/2025, P.S. Sardarpur, District Dhar) was lodged by Respondent No. 2, a school teacher belonging to the Scheduled Caste community. The allegations included restraint, assault, extortion/blackmail, threats, and caste-based insults in a “place within public view”, attracting Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), and 3(2)(va) of the SC & ST (POA) Act alongside offences under the BNS, 2023.

The core legal issue was whether the statutory bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18 of the SC & ST (POA) Act applied— i.e., whether the FIR, read on its face, disclosed a prima facie offence under Section 3 so as to exclude Section 438 Cr.P.C.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed both appeals and affirmed the Special Judge’s view that the Section 18 bar applied. Relying substantially on KIRAN v. RAJKUMAR JIVRAJ JAIN and another - 2025 INSC 1067, the Court held:

  • For deciding whether Section 18 bars anticipatory bail, the Court must primarily look at the contents of the FIR to see if a prima facie SC/ST offence is made out.
  • If the FIR discloses a prima facie offence under Section 3, anticipatory bail is barred; if it does not, the Court may exercise discretion under Section 438 Cr.P.C.

Applying this test, the Court found the FIR alleged caste-based insult/humiliation and threats on a road (treated as a place within public view), and that the complainant disclosed her SC status while the appellants were not SC/ST. The Court also inferred an intention to humiliate from the surrounding circumstances (including reference to a news item describing the complainant as “Chindi Chor”). Consequently, the appellants could not overcome Section 18.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

(a) Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand -(2020) 10 SCC 710

Though the High Court’s order notes that the Special Judge discussed this case, the reasoning aligns with the well-known proposition that the SC & ST (POA) Act is not triggered by every dispute involving an SC/ST person; the offence must satisfy statutory ingredients such as intentional insult/humiliation connected to caste and the “public view” requirement where applicable. The High Court’s focus on whether the FIR itself contains the necessary ingredients reflects this ingredient-centric approach.

(b) Girija Pandya v. State of Andhra Pradesh -(2008) 12 SCC 531 (as cited in the order)

The Special Judge is recorded as having discussed this authority while considering the Section 18 bar. The High Court separately relied on Gorige Pentaiah v. State Of Andhra Pradesh and others - (2008) 12 SCC 531 (also reproduced in the order), which is central to the “missing ingredients” argument often advanced in anticipatory bail/ quashing matters under the Act.

(c) Pritviraj Chouhan v. Union of India - (2020) 4 SCC 727

This decision is typically relied upon for the post-amendment position that Section 18/18A bars anticipatory bail where a prima facie case exists, but courts retain limited power to examine whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose the offence. The High Court’s approach—testing the FIR’s allegations for a prima facie offence—tracks this doctrinal line.

(d) Gorige Pentaiah v. State Of Andhra Pradesh and others - (2008) 12 SCC 531

The High Court reproduced para 6, highlighting that if the complaint lacks basic ingredients (e.g., not stating the accused is not SC/ST, or not alleging intentional insult/intimidation with intent to humiliate in a place within public view), continuing the prosecution may be an abuse of process.

In the present case, the High Court distinguished this line by finding that the FIR did disclose: (i) the complainant’s SC status, (ii) appellants’ non-SC/ST status, (iii) casteist remarks coupled with assault/threats, and (iv) the location as a road—treated as “within public view.”

(e) Asmathunnisa v. State of Andhra Pradesh - (2011) 11 SCC 259

Paras 8 and 9 (reproduced) emphasize the meaning of “within public view”: the insult contemplated under the relevant clause requires that the person insulted must be present and the insult occur in circumstances visible to the public. The extracted discussion (via the Kerala High Court decision below) draws a conceptual distinction between insults by physical acts and insults by words requiring “public view.”

The High Court used this framework to accept that the alleged incident on a road satisfies “public view” on the FIR’s narration.

(f) E. Krishnan Nayanar v. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan & Others 1997 Crl. L.J. 2036

Quoted within Asmathunnisa, this authority is used to explain that “within public view” is not synonymous with “public place”; it focuses on whether the public can view the victim being insulted. The High Court’s conclusion that “Road was certainly a place within public view” adopts a pragmatic application of this test.

(g) Ummed Singh And Others v. State Of M.P And Another - 2013 (3) MPHT 229

The High Court reproduced paras 14–15, which stand for two crucial propositions in anticipatory bail under the SC/ST Act context:

  • The court may look at the complaint/FIR on its face to see if a prima facie offence is made out.
  • If no specific averments disclose intentional caste-based humiliation, Section 18 may not bar anticipatory bail.

The High Court held the appellants could not benefit from this approach because the FIR here did disclose the ingredients.

(h) KIRAN v. RAJKUMAR JIVRAJ JAIN and another - 2025 INSC 1067

This was the controlling authority in the High Court’s reasoning. The High Court relied on para 6 to crystallize the operative test:

  • Section 18 bars anticipatory bail “in absolute terms” for persons facing specific accusations under the Act.
  • The “rider” is where, on the face of the FIR, the Section 3 offence is not made out or is devoid of prima facie merit.
  • The court must not travel into the evidentiary realm, consider other materials, or conduct a mini trial at this stage.

The High Court then explicitly stated that “only the contents and allegations in the FIR would be decisive” for the appeals and concluded those contents disclosed a prima facie SC/ST offence; hence Section 18 applied.

(i) Mohit Jat v. State of M.P & others (W.P.No.17350/2025)

The State relied on an enquiry report prepared pursuant to the writ proceedings to argue the complainant committed no offence and that the appellants’ complaint was defensive. However, the High Court’s dispositive reasoning was anchored in the Kiran principle that the anticipatory bail bar analysis must not expand into weighing external evidentiary material beyond the FIR.

(j) Vilas Pandurang Pawar (as referenced in Ummed Singh)

Although not set out in full, its role in the reproduced passage is to support the “litmus test” approach: the court can examine whether the FIR/complaint, on its face, makes out the offence for the limited purpose of Section 18’s bar.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The legal reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:

  1. Governing standard: Applying KIRAN v. RAJKUMAR JIVRAJ JAIN and another - 2025 INSC 1067, the High Court treated the FIR’s narrative as decisive and disallowed a deeper evidentiary enquiry at the anticipatory bail stage.
  2. Ingredient check on the FIR: The Court tested whether the FIR disclosed:
    • the complainant’s Scheduled Caste status,
    • the appellants’ non-SC/ST status,
    • allegations of casteist remarks/insult/humiliation,
    • and occurrence “within public view” (treated as satisfied because the incident was on a road).
    On this reading, the FIR passed the threshold of a prima facie offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s).
  3. Inference of intent: Responding to the argument that the FIR did not show intent to insult/humiliate, the Court held intent can be inferred from surrounding circumstances. It referred to the appellants’ claim of being journalists and a publication describing the complainant as “Chindi Chor,” treating this as reinforcing humiliation. On this basis, the Court rejected the submission that the FIR was insufficient to indicate intent.

Having found a prima facie case on the FIR, the Court held Section 18 operated as a statutory bar, making the appellants ineligible for anticipatory bail.

3.3 Impact

This order’s practical significance lies less in novel statutory interpretation and more in its method of deciding Section 18-bar questions in anticipatory bail appeals in Madhya Pradesh:

  • FIR-centric threshold: The order reinforces that, after KIRAN v. RAJKUMAR JIVRAJ JAIN and another - 2025 INSC 1067, the anticipatory-bail court’s scrutiny is tightly confined to whether the FIR’s allegations, taken at face value, satisfy the ingredients of Section 3 offences.
  • “Public view” in roadside incidents: By treating a road as “certainly” within public view on these pleadings, the order may encourage courts to treat roadside allegations as readily satisfying the “public view” element unless the FIR itself indicates privacy or lack of visibility.
  • Intent inferred contextually: The Court’s readiness to infer intent from contextual circumstances (including media-related assertions) indicates that “intent to humiliate” may be assessed broadly at the prima facie stage—so long as the court does not conduct a detailed evidentiary appraisal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Anticipatory bail (Section 438 Cr.P.C.): A pre-arrest protection order. If granted, it prevents arrest or ensures release on bail if arrest occurs.
  • Section 18, SC & ST (POA) Act: A statutory bar that generally disallows anticipatory bail for offences under the Act. Courts may bypass the bar only if the FIR, on its face, does not make out an offence under Section 3.
  • Prima facie case: A “first look” satisfaction—whether the allegations, if assumed true for the moment, contain the essential ingredients of the offence. It is not a finding of guilt.
  • “Within public view”: Not merely a “public place,” but a situation where the victim is allegedly insulted in circumstances visible to others (members of the public). A road is often treated as visible to the public unless the facts indicate otherwise.
  • No “mini trial”: At anticipatory bail stage under the SC/ST framework, courts avoid assessing credibility, weighing competing documents, or deciding disputed facts. They look primarily to the FIR’s allegations (as emphasized in Kiran).

5. Conclusion

The High Court’s dismissal of the appeals affirms a clear operational rule: when an FIR, on its face, discloses the elements of offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC & ST (POA) Act and indicates “public view,” the Section 18 bar excludes anticipatory bail. Anchored in KIRAN v. RAJKUMAR JIVRAJ JAIN and another - 2025 INSC 1067, the order underscores that this determination is largely FIR-driven and must not expand into an evidentiary contest at the pre-arrest stage. In future SC/ST Act anticipatory bail litigation, the drafting and contents of the FIR—and whether they squarely plead the statutory ingredients—remain decisive.