Adult Consent as a Bar to “Missing/Enticement” FIRs: Police Cannot Investigate a Consensual Marriage Between Majors

1. Introduction

The petition arose from an FIR dated 19.04.2026 (Crime No. 108 of 2026) registered under Section 87 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 at P.S. Suriyavan, District Bhadohi. The informant (respondent no. 4), the father of the woman petitioner (treated by the Court as the “prosecutrix”), alleged that his daughter had been taken away by “blandishment” and her whereabouts were unknown.

The petitioners’ consistent case was that they are majors, had been in a relationship, and had solemnised marriage on 18.02.2026 at Arya Vedic Sabha, Prayagraj. They asserted threats from the woman’s family, apprehended police action to forcibly separate them, and sought quashing of the FIR as a misuse of criminal law against an adult’s marital choice.

A pivotal feature of the case was that, at admission, the High Court personally recorded the woman petitioner’s statement viva voce, in which she affirmed her age, education, marriage, and her clear desire to live with her husband and not return to her parental home.

2. Summary of the Judgment

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment, as provided, does not cite or rely on any named precedents (no earlier case titles are quoted). Instead, the Court grounds its decision directly in:

• the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226, and
• the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21, expressly including an adult’s liberty to marry a person of choice.

Notably, the Bench also refers to its own institutional experience (“We have repeatedly reminded the Police...”), signalling continuity with settled constitutional understanding on adult autonomy, even though no specific prior decision is named in the text.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) Adult autonomy and the “no crime” finding

The Court treated the determinative fact as the woman petitioner’s adulthood and unequivocal consent. Her statement—recorded in open court—confirmed that she is a major, educated, married the second petitioner, and wished to live with him. On these facts, the Court held there was “absolutely no angle of enticement or blandishment,” and therefore no criminality calling for investigation.

(b) The High Court’s recorded statement as a dispositive safeguard

A distinctive aspect of the ruling is the Bench’s insistence that, after the prosecutrix’s statement has been recorded by a Division Bench in Article 226 proceedings, police and subordinate criminal courts should not insist on further statement-recording in a manner that reopens or second-guesses the adult’s expressed choice in a case of consensual marriage. The Court stated:

The Court went further to say that, if the police wished to close the matter, they could have done so on the basis of the High Court-recorded statement itself, reflecting an approach that prioritises swift protection of liberty where the facts reveal adult consent.

(c) Police role delineation: “Investigate crimes, not marriages”

The judgment draws a bright line between legitimate policing and impermissible intrusion:

• Police may register/investigate where facts disclose a genuine offence.
• But where the core allegation collapses upon confirmation of adult consent and marriage, continued pursuit becomes “nosy” and constitutionally suspect.

This framing is important: the Court is not merely quashing on technical grounds; it is articulating a normative constraint that criminal process cannot be deployed as a tool for familial control over adult marital choice.

(d) Constitutional axis: Article 21 as the controlling principle

The Bench explicitly links the investigation to a “gross violation” of Article 21. The operative constitutional proposition is clear and categorical in the text:

• Personal liberty includes the liberty to marry a person of one’s choice (for a major).
• State machinery cannot be used to curtail that liberty through coercive investigation/arrest when facts show an adult, voluntary union.

(e) Costs and accountability as a remedial device

Beyond quashing, the Court imposed monetary costs:

• On the police leadership and station-level officer (SP and SHO) jointly and severally, reflecting institutional accountability for persisting with an unjustified investigation.
• On the father/informant, reflecting judicial disapproval of initiating criminal process against a major daughter’s marriage.

The recovery mechanism—deposit with the Registrar General, and on default, recovery as arrears of land revenue—signals that the Court intended the costs order to be real and enforceable, not symbolic.

3.3 Impact

• Stronger protection against “honour” or family-driven criminalisation: The decision strengthens the practical ability of adult couples to neutralise FIRs framed as “missing/enticement” once the adult’s consent is judicially verified.
• Operational guidance to police: The judgment sharply cautions against prolonging investigations aimed at undoing adult marriages, reinforcing that police should not function as an instrument to restore “custody” of adult women to their natal families.
• Procedural deterrence through costs: Personal costs on SP/SHO and informant may deter repeat patterns of harassment—both by families lodging such FIRs and by police persisting despite clear indications of adult autonomy.
• Writ-court fact-finding in liberty cases: The Court’s reliance on a viva voce statement recorded in writ jurisdiction underscores a model in which High Courts can provide swift, liberty-protective adjudication when criminal process is being misused.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Quashing of FIR: The High Court can nullify an FIR if continuing it would be unjust—e.g., where the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not warrant criminal investigation on the admitted facts.
• Article 226: A constitutional power of High Courts to issue directions/orders to protect rights and correct misuse of state power, including in criminal justice matters.
• Article 21 (personal liberty): Protects an individual’s autonomy. In this judgment, the Court treats choice of spouse as part of liberty for adults.
• Cognisable offence: An offence for which police may register a case and investigate without prior court permission. The Court’s point here was: even if registered, investigation must stop when facts show no offence survives.
• “Blandishment/enticement” allegation: A claim that someone was lured away. The Court held such a narrative is untenable when an adult, educated woman clearly affirms voluntary marriage.
• Contumacious: Nearly wilful disobedience or defiance of authority. The Court used this to criticise police insistence on further statements despite the High Court’s own recording.
• Joint and several liability (costs): Either of the liable officials can be made to pay the full amount; it is then for them to sort out contribution between themselves.
• Recovery as arrears of land revenue: A strong enforcement method allowing the State to recover money like it recovers unpaid government dues.
• General Diary (GD) “red ink” entry: An administrative/police record notation—here, ordered to ensure there is no ambiguity at the police station level that the case stands quashed.

5. Conclusion

This decision crystallises a firm rule: once it is clear that two majors have voluntarily married, criminal process cannot be used to “investigate” or undo that choice. The Allahabad High Court treated continued investigation into such a marriage as an abuse of process and a direct affront to Article 21. By coupling quashing with personal costs, enforceable recovery directions, and compliance measures (including a GD entry), the Court reinforced that constitutional liberty in adult-marriage cases is not merely declaratory—it is meant to be operationally protected against both familial pressure and institutional overreach.