Acquittal in “False Promise of Marriage” Rape Allegations Where Prosecution Evidence Is Uncorroborated and Defence Pre-Complaint Indicates Motive

1. Introduction

In RAJU SAHU v. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH (2026 CGHC 26334), the Chhattisgarh High Court (Single Bench, Sanjay S. Agrawal J.) decided a criminal appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C. against a conviction for rape (Section 376(1) IPC) and criminal intimidation (Section 506 Part-II IPC).

The prosecution case was that the prosecutrix was repeatedly subjected to sexual intercourse from 29.09.2006 onwards on the appellant’s assurance of marriage and threats, that she allegedly became pregnant, and that she ultimately lodged an FIR on 22.12.2006 after he refused to marry. The Trial Court convicted, holding that consent obtained on a “false promise of marriage” was not valid consent.

The principal issues before the High Court were: (i) whether the evidence established rape on the basis of a false promise of marriage; (ii) whether the prosecutrix’s testimony was reliable and sufficiently corroborated; (iii) the significance of delay in FIR and surrounding circumstances, including defence documents showing a prior complaint and legal notice by the accused; and (iv) whether the conviction could stand in the absence of supporting medical/forensic evidence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence dated 23.04.2008, and acquitted the appellant of charges under Sections 376(1) and 506 Part-II IPC.
  • The Court found the prosecutrix’s version unreliable and uncorroborated on material particulars, including the claim of pregnancy and the manner of coercion.
  • The Court noted the absence of supportive forensic linkage (FSL report not produced) and the medical evidence indicating no injuries and “habitual to intercourse.”
  • Significant weight was given to the fact that the accused had lodged a prior complaint (Ex.D-7 dated 11.11.2006) and issued a legal notice (Ex.D-3 dated 15.11.2006), which the Trial Court had ignored.
  • The appellant’s bail bond was directed to remain operative for six months under Section 437-A Cr.P.C.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment, as provided, does not cite any prior Supreme Court or High Court precedents. The decision is therefore grounded primarily in a direct appraisal of facts, witness credibility, medical evidence, missing forensic support, and the defence documentary record.

Notably, although “consent on a false promise of marriage” often invokes established jurisprudence on “misconception of fact,” the Court did not anchor its reasoning in case-law; instead, it focused on the failure of proof and the internal and external inconsistencies in the prosecution case.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The High Court’s reasoning proceeds in a credibility-and-corroboration framework typical of appellate review in sexual offence convictions:

(a) Scrutiny of the prosecutrix’s testimony for inherent probability and consistency

  • The Court highlighted that the alleged place of occurrence was near a pond and adjoining a thoroughfare, allegedly capable of attracting attention; yet the prosecutrix did not raise alarm or resist.
  • The Court relied on her statement suggesting that intercourse occurred “every other day” and, critically, that it was “voluntarily” (as reflected in para 13 of her testimony, as discussed by the Court).
  • The Court treated these features as undermining the prosecution theory of coercion and threats forming the basis of non-consensual intercourse.

(b) Lack of support from parent-witnesses on key prosecution assertions

  • The father (PW-7) spoke to Panchayat discussions and pressure to marry, but the Court observed that the parents did not substantiate key elements as narrated in the FIR, including the nature of coercion.
  • The mother (PW-6) was away and did not provide meaningful support to the prosecution version.
  • On the Court’s reading, these testimonies did not materially corroborate the prosecutrix on decisive facts.

(c) Medical evidence and the “pregnancy” assertion

  • The medical report (Ex.P-7) recorded that the prosecutrix was “habitual to intercourse” and found no internal or external injuries.
  • The Court noted that the pregnancy test was not positive (as per Dr. Saroj Kachhap, PW-5), treating this as a direct blow to the prosecution’s narrative that repeated intercourse led to pregnancy and triggered the accused’s conduct.

(d) Forensic gap: seizure without report

  • Although vaginal slides and clothing were seized and allegedly sent for chemical examination (Ex.P-25), the Court recorded that no chemical examination report was placed on record.
  • This absence prevented scientific corroboration linking the accused to the alleged acts and reinforced the Court’s conclusion that conviction could not rest on the prosecutrix’s “bald allegations” in the circumstances.

(e) Defence documents and the Trial Court’s failure to engage with them

  • A central appellate pivot was the accused’s prior complaint (Ex.D-7) and legal notice (Ex.D-3) predating the FIR, acknowledged by the prosecutrix’s father (PW-7).
  • The High Court treated these as strongly suggestive that the FIR could be retaliatory or motivated, and criticised the Trial Court for completely ignoring them.
  • This was not treated as a minor omission: the Court considered it sufficient to render the Trial Court’s approach unsustainable.

(f) Delay in FIR in the particular factual matrix

The High Court did not treat delay as a standalone ground, but as an additional factor when combined with: (i) absence of medical/forensic corroboration; (ii) contradictions and improbabilities; and (iii) the defence showing pre-FIR apprehension and complaint. In such a matrix, the Court held it unsafe to maintain conviction.

3.3 Impact

Although not framed as a broad doctrinal ruling, the decision is significant in practice for “rape on promise of marriage” prosecutions because it signals:

  • Heightened scrutiny where the prosecution theory depends on a promise-of-marriage narrative but the surrounding circumstances suggest voluntariness or an ongoing relationship.
  • The importance of defence documentary chronology: a complaint/legal notice by the accused prior to FIR may be treated as probative of motive or falsity, particularly when acknowledged by prosecution witnesses.
  • Forensic non-production matters: seizures alone do not help unless the resulting reports are proved and brought on record, especially where the case otherwise turns on credibility.
  • Appellate correction where the Trial Court fails to engage with material defence evidence—reinforcing that criminal adjudication must consider the whole record, not merely the prosecution narrative.

For future cases, this judgment may be cited (factually) to argue that “false promise of marriage” cannot substitute for proof of rape when the evidence suggests consensual relations and when corroboration is weak or missing.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Consent vitiated by “false promise of marriage”
In sexual offence law, consent must be free and informed. If consent is obtained by deception (for example, a promise made without any intention to fulfil), it may be argued that the consent was not real. However, courts examine whether the promise was dishonest from the start versus a relationship that later broke down. In this case, the High Court did not affirmatively apply a “false promise” doctrine to convict; it found the prosecution failed to prove the allegation reliably.
Corroboration
A conviction can rest on the sole testimony of a prosecutrix if it is credible and trustworthy. But where testimony contains inconsistencies, improbabilities, or is contradicted by medical/forensic circumstances, courts often look for supporting material. Here, the High Court found corroboration lacking.
Medical finding: “habitual to intercourse”
This phrase indicates that medical examination did not show signs inconsistent with prior sexual activity. By itself, it does not prove consent or non-consent. The Court used it alongside the absence of injuries and the negative pregnancy assertion to assess the prosecution narrative.
Section 374 Cr.P.C.
Provides the right to appeal against conviction.
Section 437-A Cr.P.C.
Even after acquittal, courts may require bonds to ensure appearance if the matter proceeds further (e.g., appeal to a higher court). That is why the bail bond was kept operative for six months.

5. Conclusion

The High Court’s acquittal in RAJU SAHU v. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH turns on the foundational criminal-law principle that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found that the prosecutrix’s account—particularly allegations of repeated coercive intercourse and pregnancy—was not supported by medical evidence, lacked forensic confirmation, was not meaningfully corroborated by parent-witnesses, and was undermined by defence documents showing a prior complaint and legal notice that the Trial Court overlooked.

The broader significance lies in reinforcing that “promise of marriage” allegations require careful fact-based scrutiny, and that courts must engage with material defence evidence and evidentiary gaps before sustaining a conviction for rape.