Acquittal Appeals: “Possible View” Deference and Pre‑2014 Age of Consent (16) Under Section 376 RPC in J&K
1) Introduction
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court (Srinagar Bench), by judgment dated 31.07.2026, decided two connected criminal acquittal appeals
(CRAA No.23/2013 and CRAA No.27/2014) arising from a judgment of the Principal Sessions Judge, Bandipora dated 31.12.2012.
The trial court had acquitted the respondent-accused, Mohammad Ramzan Mir, of charges under Sections 363 and 376 of the Ranbir Penal Code (RPC).
The prosecution case (FIR No.120/2007, Police Station Bandipora) alleged that the complainant’s daughter (the prosecutrix) left home on 22.06.2007,
was kidnapped by the accused, and was subjected to sexual intercourse. The State and the complainant challenged the acquittal primarily on two planks:
(i) the prosecutrix was a minor, making consent irrelevant; and (ii) the prosecutrix had supported the prosecution version and should have been believed.
The High Court’s decision is notable for (a) a structured restatement and application of the Supreme Court’s “limited interference” framework in acquittal appeals,
and (b) a clear clarification of the applicable “age of consent” under Section 376 RPC for an occurrence in June 2007 (16 years), with the subsequent enhancement to 18 years
taking effect only from 22.03.2014.
2) Summary of the Judgment
- The High Court dismissed both appeals and affirmed the acquittal.
- It held that, on the prosecution’s own material, the prosecutrix was above 16 years at the relevant time and therefore had attained the age of consent under then-applicable Section 376 RPC.
- On facts, the Court found the trial court’s view—that the prosecutrix voluntarily accompanied the accused and that the alleged intercourse was consensual—to be a “possible view” based on record.
- The Court emphasized that, in an acquittal appeal, unless the trial court’s judgment is perverse or based on misreading/omission of material evidence, interference is unwarranted.
3) Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
(a) Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471
The High Court relied on this decision as a gateway to the governing principles on acquittal appeals, particularly the Supreme Court’s synthesis of prior law.
The judgment in Rajesh Prasad reiterates that appellate courts have full power to reappreciate evidence, but must respect the reinforced presumption of innocence
following acquittal and avoid substituting a different possible view for the trial court’s view.
Quoted via Rajesh Prasad, Chandrappa is treated as the canonical statement of five principles, including:
(i) plenary reappreciation power; (ii) no statutory restriction on that power; (iii) “substantial and compelling reasons” language is cautionary, not limiting;
(iv) “double presumption” of innocence after acquittal; and (v) if two reasonable conclusions are possible, the appellate court should not disturb acquittal.
In the present case, the High Court used these principles not merely as abstract doctrine but as an operative filter: it examined whether the trial court’s inference
of voluntary accompaniment/consensual relationship was a reasonable conclusion on the evidence.
(c) H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581
The High Court extracted the Supreme Court’s structured summary for appeals under Section 378 Cr.P.C (by analogy to acquittal appeals generally):
the reinforced presumption of innocence; entitlement to reappreciate evidence; and the decisive question—whether the trial court’s view is a “possible view”.
The High Court effectively adopted H.D. Sundara as a checklist and concluded that the trial court’s view met the “possible view” threshold.
(d) Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoundar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149
The High Court relied on this decision to further tighten the interference standard into three “four corners” constraints:
(1) patent perversity; (2) misreading/omission of material evidence; and (3) only one view possible—consistent with guilt.
This framing directly informed the High Court’s concluding approach: since the evidence admitted of a reasonable view consistent with innocence/consent,
the acquittal could not be reversed.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(I) Determining the applicable “age of consent” under Section 376 RPC
A central appellate contention was that the prosecutrix was minor and hence consent was immaterial. The High Court addressed this by:
- Fixing the time of occurrence: June 2007.
- Stating the then-applicable rule: under Section 376 RPC at that time, the age of consent was 16 years.
- Rejecting retroactive application of later enhancement: the age of consent was raised to 18 in J&K only by the Jammu and Kashmir Criminal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2013, effective 22.03.2014; this could not govern a 2007 occurrence.
- Assessing age on record: the Board registration card recorded date of birth as 07.09.1989; the mother (PW-2) affirmed the same; the doctor (PW-7) opined approximate age 18 years or more. Therefore, in June 2007, the prosecutrix was above 16.
This reasoning matters because it reframes the legal inquiry: once the prosecutrix is above the statutory threshold, the case turns on voluntariness, coercion,
and credibility—rather than statutory rape by age alone (as the prosecution had urged).
(II) Evaluating voluntariness, coercion, and credibility from the prosecutrix’s own testimony
The High Court’s factual analysis focused on internal consistencies and conduct-based inferences drawn from cross-examination admissions:
- The prosecutrix admitted she stayed with the accused for one month and seven days.
- She admitted that during daytime the accused would leave her behind in the shop and return in the evening.
- Despite opportunities, she admitted she did not raise an alarm or seek help.
- She travelled in a passenger vehicle with other persons and even encountered a police naka, yet did not complain or disclose alleged abduction/rape.
The Court treated these admissions as undermining the prosecution narrative of continuous coercion and forcible confinement. Importantly, it did not rest on
a generalised stereotype about how victims “should” behave; rather, it anchored its inference in the specific opportunities described by the prosecutrix herself
(daytime absence of accused; travel with third parties; police checking) and the sustained duration of non-disclosure.
On this basis, the High Court concluded that the trial court’s inference—voluntary accompaniment and consensual intimacy—was at least a reasonable possibility,
and therefore protected by the acquittal-appeal restraint doctrine.
(III) Defence version of marriage and the evidentiary role of the “marriage agreement”
The accused asserted in his Section 342 J&K Cr.P.C. statement that the prosecutrix accompanied him voluntarily and married him. A photocopy of a marriage agreement,
apparently registered by the Sub-Registrar, Kargil, was produced. Though the prosecutrix denied her signatures and execution, the defence witness
DW-Bashir Ahmad Mir (a witness to the agreement) supported execution before the Sub-Registrar.
The High Court did not treat the document as conclusively proving a valid marriage for all purposes; instead, it used it in the narrower way acquittal jurisprudence permits:
as material that probabilises the defence version and reinforces the possibility that the prosecutrix’s accompaniment was voluntary.
This probabilisation—combined with the prosecution’s age material and the prosecutrix’s conduct admissions—helped maintain reasonable doubt.
(IV) Applying acquittal-appeal restraint to the case outcome
After reappreciating the evidence, the High Court held that the trial court had “properly analysed and appreciated” the record and reached a conclusion “irresistible”
on the evidence. Crucially, it framed the question not as whether an alternative view (conviction) was possible, but whether the acquittal suffered from perversity,
misreading, or omission of material evidence—and whether guilt was the only possible conclusion. It answered these in the negative and dismissed both appeals.
3.3 Impact
(A) On acquittal appeals in J&K and Ladakh
The judgment reinforces a disciplined methodology for High Courts dealing with appeals against acquittal: even where reappreciation is permissible,
reversal demands a finding of perversity/misreading/omission and a conclusion that guilt is the only possible view. This discourages “second-guessing”
trial courts merely because another interpretation of evidence is arguable.
(B) On legacy prosecutions under RPC for pre-2014 incidents
By explicitly stating that the age of consent under Section 376 RPC was 16 in 2007 and that the enhancement to 18 applied only from 22.03.2014,
the judgment provides clear guidance for adjudicating older (pre-amendment) cases. It signals that age-based arguments must align with the law in force
at the time of occurrence, and the prosecution must be prepared to prove coercion/lack of consent where the prosecutrix was above 16.
(C) On evidentiary appreciation in “elopement/relationship” fact patterns
The decision illustrates how courts may treat conduct evidence (opportunities to seek help, interactions with third parties, duration of stay) as relevant to
the plausibility of abduction/rape allegations, while still operating within the appellate constraints of deference to reasonable trial court findings.
It also shows that documents such as a “marriage agreement,” even if disputed, may contribute to reasonable doubt when supported by witness testimony.
4) Complex Concepts Simplified
- “Double presumption of innocence”: Every accused is presumed innocent; after acquittal, this presumption becomes stronger because a trial court has already found the evidence insufficient.
- “Possible view”: If the trial court’s conclusion is one that a reasonable judge could reach on the evidence, an appellate court should not overturn it merely because it might have reached a different conclusion.
- “Perversity”: A decision is perverse when it is irrational, ignores crucial evidence, relies on inadmissible considerations, or no reasonable court could have reached it.
- Age of consent (as used here): The statutory age below which a person’s consent is legally ineffective for the offence of rape. The Court held it was 16 under Section 376 RPC in June 2007, and became 18 only from 22.03.2014 after amendment.
- Section 342 J&K Cr.P.C. statement: The accused’s opportunity to explain incriminating circumstances appearing in prosecution evidence (akin to Section 313 of the central Cr.P.C.).
5) Conclusion
The High Court’s judgment affirms the acquittal by applying two interconnected legal controls: (i) strict appellate restraint in acquittal appeals—interference only on perversity,
misreading/omission, or where guilt is the only possible conclusion; and (ii) the correct temporal application of substantive criminal law—recognising that in June 2007
the age of consent under Section 376 RPC was 16, not 18. On the record (date-of-birth evidence and the prosecutrix’s own cross-examination admissions),
the Court found the trial court’s inference of voluntary companionship and consensual relations to be a reasonable view, thereby preserving the acquittal.