A Section 37 Appeal Cannot Be Converted by Consent into a Section 17 Arbitration Application

Case: UNION OF INDIA v. HARIOM PROJECTS PVT. LTD.

Citation: 2026 INSC 1044

Court: Supreme Court of India

Date: 18 September 2026

Coram: Aravind Kumar and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.

1. Introduction

This decision clarifies the institutional boundary between judicial appellate powers and the interim powers of an arbitral tribunal under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court held that a statutory appeal pending before a court under Section 37(1)(b) cannot, even with the parties’ consent, be remitted to an arbitral tribunal and treated as an application under Section 17.

The dispute arose from a contract awarded by the Union of India to Hariom Projects Pvt. Ltd. for construction of administrative and training infrastructure at NDA Khadakwasla. Disagreements emerged regarding payment adjustments, escalation calculations, workmanship and design issues.

After a Dispute Resolution Board rejected Hariom Projects’ claims, the company invoked arbitration and sought interim protection under Section 9. The District Judge rejected that application. Hariom Projects then filed an appeal under Section 37 and separately sought appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11.

While appointing a sole arbitrator, the High Court directed that the pending Section 37 proceedings be remitted to the tribunal and treated as a Section 17 application. The legality of that direction formed the central issue before the Supreme Court.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

  1. Hariom Projects was awarded a works contract relating to infrastructure at NDA Khadakwasla.
  2. A Dispute Resolution Board was constituted pursuant to a High Court order and rejected the contractor’s claims on 26 April 2025.
  3. The contractor invoked arbitration on 6 May 2025.
  4. The Union issued a show-cause notice and subsequently demanded recovery of approximately Rs.1.46 crore as an alleged overpayment.
  5. Hariom Projects applied under Section 9 for interim relief, including an injunction against cancellation or termination of the contract. The District Judge dismissed the application on 15 October 2025.
  6. The contractor challenged that decision under Section 37 and separately filed proceedings under Section 11 for appointment of an arbitrator.
  7. The Union terminated the work order on 3 January 2026. The High Court temporarily stayed the termination.
  8. By consent, the High Court appointed Maj. Gen. R.K. Mattu as sole arbitrator. It also directed that the Section 37 proceedings be remitted to the tribunal and treated as an application under Section 17.
  9. The Union challenged only the remittal and conversion direction, not the appointment of the arbitrator.

3. Issue Before the Supreme Court

Whether a High Court exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(1)(b), against the rejection of a Section 9 application, can by consent remit the appeal to a subsequently constituted arbitral tribunal and direct the tribunal to treat it as a Section 17 application.

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative. It held that:

  • Appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is vested exclusively in the “Court” contemplated by Section 2(1)(e).
  • An arbitral tribunal exercising powers under Section 17 does not possess appellate jurisdiction over an order passed by a court under Section 9.
  • The source, nature and scope of powers under Sections 17 and 37 are fundamentally different.
  • Consent of the parties cannot interchange those powers or authorize the tribunal to decide a statutory judicial appeal.
  • The High Court could, at most, have granted the contractor liberty to file an independent Section 17 application before the tribunal.

The impugned order was therefore set aside only insofar as it remitted the Section 37 proceedings to the tribunal and converted them into Section 17 proceedings.

The tribunal’s constitution was left undisturbed. Since the tribunal had commenced proceedings and the parties had entered into a Supplementary Agreement dated 24 April 2026, the Supreme Court allowed the arbitration to continue, with all legally permissible contentions left open.

5. Analysis

5.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment does not cite or rely upon any previous reported judicial decision. Its conclusion rests directly on the text and structure of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

This absence is significant: the Court treated the distinction between Sections 9, 17 and 37 as flowing from the statutory allocation of functions itself. The decision consequently operates as a direct and authoritative clarification of the Act’s jurisdictional framework.

5.2 Distinct Statutory Functions

Provision Authority Function
Section 9 Court Grants interim measures before, during or after arbitration within the statutory limits.
Section 11 Court or designated authority Facilitates the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
Section 17 Arbitral tribunal Grants interim measures in the exercise of original arbitral jurisdiction.
Section 37(1)(b) Court Provides a statutory appeal against specified orders granting or refusing relief under Section 9.

A Section 37 court reviews the legality and correctness of a judicial order. By contrast, a tribunal considering a Section 17 request exercises original—not appellate—power to grant interim protection connected with the arbitration.

Converting the appeal into a Section 17 application would require the tribunal to reconsider a court’s Section 9 decision as though it were an appellate authority. The Act confers no such power on the tribunal.

5.3 Consent Cannot Create or Transfer Statutory Jurisdiction

The ruling reinforces the principle that parties may agree upon procedure or the identity of an arbitrator, but they cannot confer a statutory jurisdiction that the law has assigned to a different forum.

Consent therefore could support the appointment of the sole arbitrator, but it could not authorize the transfer of the High Court’s Section 37 appellate function to that arbitrator. Jurisdiction derived from statute cannot be delegated or transformed merely for procedural convenience.

5.4 The Legally Permissible Course

Once the tribunal had been constituted, the High Court could have allowed Hariom Projects to approach it through a fresh and independent Section 17 application. That application would have required:

  • a specific request for interim relief;
  • consideration of the circumstances existing at that time;
  • an independent decision by the tribunal within its original jurisdiction; and
  • compliance with the remedies and appellate structure prescribed by the Act.

This preserves both arbitral autonomy and the statutory judicial hierarchy.

5.5 Effect of the Contract’s Termination

The original Section 9 application sought to restrain the Union from terminating the contract. Once termination occurred on 3 January 2026, that preventive prayer had “spent itself”: the event sought to be prevented had already taken place.

Any later protection would have to address the consequences or operation of the termination and be framed in light of subsequent events. It could not simply be treated as the same unaltered request originally made under Section 9.

5.6 Limited Interference and Procedural Finality

The Supreme Court adopted a narrow remedial approach. It invalidated only the jurisdictionally defective portion of the High Court’s order while preserving:

  • the appointment of the sole arbitrator;
  • the arbitral proceedings already conducted;
  • orders already passed by the tribunal, subject to law;
  • the parties’ Supplementary Agreement; and
  • their right to raise all permissible contentions in arbitration.

This balanced doctrinal clarity with commercial practicality, particularly because the project was described as being of national importance.

6. Ratio Decidendi

A statutory appeal under Section 37(1)(b) against an order passed under Section 9 is vested exclusively in the competent court. It cannot, even by consent, be remitted to an arbitral tribunal or converted into an application under Section 17. The tribunal may entertain only an independent Section 17 application within its original statutory jurisdiction.

7. Potential Impact

  • Preservation of judicial hierarchy: Courts cannot delegate their statutory appellate functions to arbitral tribunals.
  • Clear separation of remedies: Section 17 is not a substitute for, continuation of or appeal against Section 9 proceedings.
  • Limits on party consent: Procedural consent cannot cure the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.
  • Fresh applications after changed circumstances: Subsequent events must be addressed through appropriately framed relief rather than mechanical transfer of earlier proceedings.
  • Guidance for High Courts: Once a tribunal is constituted, a court may grant liberty to seek relief under Section 17, but it must independently dispose of any pending Section 37 appeal according to law.
  • Protection of arbitral legitimacy: Tribunals remain adjudicators within the authority conferred by contract and statute, not appellate bodies supervising court orders.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Interim Relief

A temporary order intended to preserve rights, property or the existing situation until the dispute is finally decided.

Original and Appellate Jurisdiction

Original jurisdiction involves deciding a request for the first time. Appellate jurisdiction involves reviewing an earlier decision. A tribunal under Section 17 exercises original jurisdiction; a court under Section 37 exercises appellate jurisdiction.

Remitting Proceedings

To remit proceedings is to send them to another decision-maker. Such remittal is valid only where the law permits the receiving body to decide the matter.

Relief Having “Spent Itself”

A preventive request becomes ineffective when the event it sought to prevent has already occurred. A party must then seek fresh or consequential relief suited to the changed circumstances.

Tribunal as a Creature of Contract and Statute

An arbitral tribunal derives authority from the arbitration agreement and the governing legislation. It cannot exercise powers that neither source grants to it.

9. Conclusion

UNION OF INDIA v. HARIOM PROJECTS PVT. LTD. establishes a firm jurisdictional boundary: judicial appellate proceedings under Section 37 cannot be transformed by consent into arbitral interim proceedings under Section 17.

The decision protects the statutory division of authority between courts and tribunals while recognizing that parties remain free to seek fresh interim relief from a constituted tribunal. Its broader significance lies in affirming that procedural convenience and party consent cannot override the jurisdictional architecture created by Parliament.