Date of Decision:15.09.2023
Ranju Ram & anr. ....Appellants. Versus
Tulsi Ram & others. …..Respondents. Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Appellants : Mr. Adarsh Kumar Vashishta, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mr.G. D. Verma, Sr. Advocate, with Mr.B. C. Verma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.4.2009 passed by learned District Judge Bilaspur, vide which the appeal filed by the appellants (plaintiffs before learned Trial Court) was allowed and judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur,was set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were referred before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present case are that plaintiffs filed a civil suit before the learned Trial
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Court for seeking possession of the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 52 min/75 bearing Khasra numbers 87, 154 and 155 min situated in village Loharwin, Pargana Tiun, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur (hereinafter referred to as the suit land) and a declaration that entries in the name of the defendants are wrong, illegal and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs.
3. It was pleaded that the suit land was owned and possessed by Gangu Ram, grandfather of the plaintiffs. Gangu Ram had two sons i.e. Shiv Ram father of the plaintiffs and late Ram Ditta, who pre-deceased Gangu Ram leaving behind his widow Smt. Parsino. Gangu Ram executed a Will of his property in the name of Shiv Ram. Shiv Ram succeeded to his property based on the Will. Smt. Parsino filed a Civil Suit in the Court of learned Sub-Judge,Bilaspur, which was compromised between Shiv Ram and Parsino Devi. The suit land and other property were allotted to Smt. Parsino in the compromise. Judgment and decree dated 30.08.1951 was passed by learned Sub Judge,Bilaspur, only a life interest was created in favour of Parsino Devi. She was allowed to enjoy the suit land and other property given to her during her lifetime and she had no right to
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alienate the suit land and other property. Parsino created a tenancy on the suit land, which was valid during her lifetime. The tenants were bound to handover the possession to Shiv Ram after the death of Parsino. The defendants were wrongly declared as owners of the suit land by Land Reforms Officer, Ghumarwin under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The plaintiffs requested the defendants to hand over the possession, but in vain. Hence the suit was filed for seeking the relief mentioned above.
4. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability, locus standi and jurisdiction, the plaintiffs being estopped from filing the present suit by their act and conduct. The suit being barred by the principle of res judicata improper valuation and the suit being barred by limitation. The contents of the plaint were denied on merits. However, it was admitted that Parsino had filed a Civil Suit, which resulted in the passing of judgment and decree dated 30.08.1951. It was specifically denied that Parsino was a limited owner. It was asserted that she became the owner on the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act,1956. The defendants are the owners in possession of the suit land and
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ownership rights were rightly conferred upon them. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.
5. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed.
6. The following issues were framed by the learned trial court on 7.11.2000:-
1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession, as alleged?...OPP
2. Whether the suit is not maintainable? …OPD
3. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD
4. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit? OPD
5. Whether the suit is barred under the law of res judicata? OPD
6. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the present suit? …OPD
7. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD
8. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD.
9. Relief.
7. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence and plaintiff No.1. examined himself (PW-1). The defendant no.1. examined himself (DW-1).
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8. Learned Trial Court held that a previous suit was filed, in which the present plaintiffs Nand Lal and Tulsi Ram were arrayed as proforma defendants nos. 3 and 4 and the present defendants Durga Ram and Ranju Ram were arrayed as defendants no.1 and 2 in a previous suit. The present plaintiffs filed a separate written statement and admitted the claim of the plaintiff in that suit. The present matter was directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit. The present plaintiffs could have easily pleaded that Parsino had a life interest in the suit land and tenancy was against the judgment and decree passed by learned Sub Judge, Bilaspur, in the year 1951. The previous suit was decided on 27. 3.1995 and the present suit was filed on 5.8.1997. The matter in issue in the present suit might and ought to have been pleaded in the previous suit. Hence, the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata. The plaintiffs were estopped to file the present suit. Hence,the learned Trial Court answered Issue no.5 in affirmative, issue no. 3 and 4 in negative, issue no.1 redundant,issue no.2, 6 to 8 not pressed and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.
9. Being aggrieved from the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiffs filed an appeal.
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Learned District Judge, Bilaspur held that the suit of the plaintiffs could not be said to be barred by the principle of res judicata. Hence, the matter was remanded to the learned Trial Court for recording the findings on the other issues.
10. Being aggrieved from the order passed by learned District Judge Bilaspur, the defendants filed an appeal before this Court,which was registered as FAO (O) No.244 of 2003 and RSA No.244 of 2003. This Court held that the entire material was before the learned First Appellate Court and it should have decided the same instead of remanding the same. Hence, the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court were set aside and the matter was remanded to the learned First Appellate Court for disposal as per the law.
11. Learned First Appellate Court held that Parsino had suffered a consent decree, in which a life estate was granted to her. This life estate would be converted into ownership after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Parsino had possession of the property and the provisions of the Act would apply to her. The tenancy created by her would survive her death and ownership rights could have been conferred upon the
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tenants. Hence, the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside.
12. Being aggrieved from the judgment of decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the present appeal has been filed asserting that the learned First Appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. The earlier judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit number 10/1 of 1995/87 had attained finality and the Court had no jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the dispute, which was involved in the previous suit. The matter was heard and finally decided by a Competent Court and could not have been re- agitated. Even assuming that Parsino had a life interest, she had a right to create a tenancy. The tenants would become the owners under the provisions of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and that judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court be set aside.
13. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 3.7.2009:-
"Whether the suit is barred under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the inference, conclusion
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drawn by the District Judge are erroneous and perverse and not in consonance with Section 11 CPC."
14. I have heard Sh.Adarsh Kumar Vashishta, learned counsel for the appellants-defendants and Sh.G.D. Verma learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sh.B.C. Verma learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs.
15. Sh. Adarsh Kumar Vashishta, learned counsel for the appellants-defendants submitted that learned First Appellate Court erred in holding that the suit was not barred by the principle of res judicata. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the matter in issue in the present suit might and ought to have been made a ground of attack /defence in the previous suit. The plaintiffs had failed to do so and the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court be set aside.
16. Sh. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs supported the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court and submitted that the plea of res judicata could have been established by proving the pleadings in the previous suit. The pleadings were not
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proved on record. Learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the plea of res judicata based on the judgment passed in the previous suit. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
17. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
Substantial Question of Law:-
18. The learned Trial Court held that the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata.Learned First Appellate Court held that the bar of res judicata does not apply to the present case.The defendants filed the certified copy of the plaint (Mark- X), judgment (Ext.P-1), decree (Ext. P-2) and written statement (Mark -Y) to establish the plea of res judicata. Learned Trial Court relied upon the written statement (Mark-Y), judgment (Ext.P-1) to hold that the present suit was barred by the principle of res judicata.
19. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa, (1976) 4 SCC 780, that, the respective pleadings of the parties in the previous suit have
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to be brought on record to determine the case of the parties. The recitals in the pleadings cannot be inferred from the judgment. It was observed (at page 790):
"8. In the instant case according to the plaintiffs- respondents, the identity of the subjectmatter in the present suit is quite different from the one which was adjudicated upon in the suits which formed the basis of the previous litigation. In our opinion, the best method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suits and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgments which operate as res judicata. Unfortunately however in this case the pleadings of the suits instituted by the parties have not at all been filed and we have to rely upon the facts as mentioned in the judgments themselves. It is well settled that pleadings cannot be proved merely by recitals of the allegations mentioned in the judgment."
20. This position was reiterated in V. Rajeshwari (Smt) v. T.C Saravanabava ., (2004) 1 SCC 551: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1405, wherein it was observed at page 556:
"12. The plea of res judicata is founded on proof of certain facts and then by applying the law to the facts so found. It is, therefore, necessary that the foundation for the plea must be laid in the pleadings and then an issue must be framed and tried. A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or issues at the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal [see (Raja) Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb v. Gour Hari Mahato AIR 1936 PC 258: 1936 All LR 786, Medapati Surayya v. Tondapu Bala Gangadhara Ramakrishna Reddi [AIR 1948 PC 3 : (1947) 2 MLJ 511] and
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Katragadda China Anjaneyulu v. Kattaragadda China Ramayya [AIR 1965 AP 177 : (1965) 1 An LT 149 (FB)] ]. The view taken by the Privy Council was cited with approval before this Court in State Of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal . (1970) 3 SCC 656. However, an exception was carved out by this Court and the plea was permitted to be raised, though not taken in the pleadings nor covered by any issue because the necessary facts were present to the mind of the parties and were gone into by the trial court. The opposite party had ample opportunity of leading the evidence in rebuttal of the plea. The Court concluded that the point of res judicata had throughout been in consideration and discussion and so the want of pleadings or plea of waiver of res judicata cannot be allowed to be urged.
13. Not only the plea has to be taken, but it has to be substantiated by producing copies of the pleadings, issues and judgment in the previous case. Maybe, in a given case only a copy of the judgment in the previous suit is filed in proof of plea of res judicata and the judgment contains exhaustive or in requisite details the statement of pleadings and the issues which may be taken as enough proof. But as pointed out in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa (1976) 4 SCC 780 the basic method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suit and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgment which operates as res judicata. It is risky to speculate about the pleadings merely by a summary of recitals of the allegations made in the pleadings mentioned in the judgment. The Constitution Bench in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal . AIR 1964 SC 1810 : (1964) 7 SCR 831 placing on a par the plea of res judicata and the plea of estoppel under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that proof of the plaint in the previous suit which is set to create the bar, ought to be brought on record. The plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in
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the two suits and, therefore, it is necessary for the defence which raises the bar to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. Such pleas cannot be left to be determined by mere speculation or inferring by a process of deduction what were the facts stated in the previous pleadings. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secy. of State for India in Council (1887-
88) 15 IA 186: ILR 16 Cal 173 pointed out that the plea of res judicata cannot be determined without ascertaining what were the matters in issue in the previous suit and what was heard and decided. Needless to say, these can be found out only by looking into the pleadings, the issues and the judgment in the previous suit."
21. Therefore, it was necessary for the defendant to prove the pleadings in the previous suit, in the absence of which the plea of res judicata could not have been adjudicated.
22. It was submitted that the certified copy of the pleadings were filed on record as Mark-X and Mark-Y. The pleadings are public record, and therefore, the learned Trial Court had erred in marking the documents and the Court should have exhibited them. This submission cannot be accepted.It was laid down in Akshoy Kumar Bose v. Sukumar Dutta, 1949 SCC OnLine Cal 36 =AIR 1951 Calcutta 320, that the pleadings do not fall within the definition of a public document and cannot be proved without examining the party or lawyer. It was observed.
"9. Admittedly, a very important item of evidence on the side of the defendants would be the admission in Ex. 3. If
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Ex. 3 had been properly admitted in evidence, I would have no hesitation in proceeding on the evidence on the record to record my own finding. I cannot but agree, however, with the learned Advocate for the appellant that EX. 3 has not been properly admitted in evidence. There can be no doubt that the admission in the written statement would be relevant evidence, provided it was shown to be with respect to property which is now in suit. But even relevant evidence has to be brought on the record in the way allowed by law. The written statement is not a public document and so a certified copy of it is not admissible in evidence. The learned Judge remarks that there is authority for the proposition that the certified copy of a written statement can be admitted in evidence without calling for the original. I am not aware of any such authority, nor are the learned Advocates on either side aware of any such authority. In my opinion, the learned Judge is entirely mistaken in this view of the law.
10. The original of this written statement being more than 30 years old could, of course, be admitted in evidence if shown to have been produced from proper custody. Production from the Court's office would obviously be production from proper custody. If that could not be produced in spite of proper efforts by the plaintiff, secondary evidence could be given under Section 65 (c) of, the Evidence Act. A certified copy produced without any further evidence would not be sufficient secondary evidence. Evidence could be given either by the lawyer who filed the written statement or by some other person who was present when the written statement was filed and read the written statement at about the time, that the copy filed in Court, whether certified or not, correctly represents the contents of the written statement that was actually filed. No such evidence has been given. Nor am I satisfied that a case was made out for producing secondary evidence within the meaning of Section 65 (c), Evidence Act, for while it is shown that the records of case No. 71 of 1909 were called, there is nothing to
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support the further statement of the learned Advocate that that case was the same as 646 of 1908 of the First Munsif's Court." (Emphasis supplied)
23. Patna High Court also took a similar view in Gulab Chand Vs. Sheo Karan Lall Seth, AIR 1964 Patna 45 and it was held:
"12. For the respondent (defendant No. 6) it was contended that Ext. E-2, being a certified copy of a plaint, it would prove, without any further evidence, the contents of the original plaint including the signatures of the plaintiffs on that point. In other words, the argument was that the plaint filed in a Court was a public document, a certified copy of which could be granted under Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, and when so granted, it would prove the contents of the original by the mere filing of it under Section 77. What are public documents are stated in Section 74 of the Evidence Act:
Documents forming the acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals, and of public fficers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth or a foreign country have been described as public documents. I cannot see how a plaint filed by a private person in Court to institute a case against some others can come within the descriptions of the documents given in that sub- section. Sub-section (2) of Section 74 can in no way include a plaint. The plaint is neither an act nor the record of an act of any public officer. There can be no strength in the contention that when the plaint is presented and the Court makes an order admitting or registering it, the plaint becomes an act or the record of an act of a public officer presiding over the Court. At the most, it will become a part of the record maintained by the Court in that case after the plaint is admitted and registered, but that itself will not make it a public document. If it were, then anything filed in a case in a court of law either petitions or pleadings, private
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communications or documents which a party would file in a case would become public documents for the simple reason that they are on the record of a case in Court. The judgment and decree passed in a case are undoubtedly the acts of the Court, and they will be public documents on that account. Similarly, a petition of compromise which is made a part of the decree forms a part of the public document, but before its incorporation in the decree, it remains a private document, though filed in Court, forming a part of the case record. xxxxxxx
14. I have already referred to the case of AIR 1926 Pat 180, where a plaint was held not to be a public document and the certified copy thereof was rejected from evidence. In the case of Akshoy Kumar Bose vs. Sukumar Dutta, AIR 1951 Cal 320, a written statement filed in a previous suit was set down as not a public document and its certified copy was not admissible in evidence without calling for the original. Mere production of a certified copy in such a case was found to be not sufficient secondary evidence of its contents without any further evidence. An admission in that written statement was sought to be relied upon by the defendants and for that purpose, they had marked its certified copy as Ext. 3 in the trial Court. In the High Court, it was dismissed from consideration as it was not proper secondary evidence under the provisions of Sec. 65 of the Evidence Act.
In the case of Usuf Hasan vs. Raunaq Ali, AIR 1943 Oudh 54,
it was similarly held that the plaint is a private document and it must be proved by direct evidence. No formal evidence was given about that plaint. The lower Courts had drawn a presumption from the certified copy of the plaint about its genuineness but that was held to be an incorrect approach. A similar view that a plaint is not a public document and that it should be proved like any other private document was taken in the case of
Manbodh vs. Hirasai, AIR 1926 Nag 339. I need not multiply citations except to make a reference to the case
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of Lakshan Chandra vs. TakimDhali, 39 Cal LJ 90: (AIR 1924 Cal 558), where the celebrated Judge, Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee observed that the distinction between the admissibility of a document as evidence of a transaction and the admissibility of a document In proof of a statement contained therein is of a refined but of a fundamental character though frequently overlooked. For that, the learned Judge referred to several cases including Seethapathi V/s. Venkanna, AIR 1922 Mad 71 (FB). A plaint may be admissible in proof of the fact that a particular suit was brought by a particular person against someone on a particular allegation, but it cannot be admissible to prove the correctness of a statement contained therein unless it is proved by direct evidence or by secondary evidence as provided in the Evidence Act. In the instant case before us, the question was whether the statement that the two brothers Ramnarain Lal and Baiju Lal were separate as contained in the plaint (Ext. E-
2) was made by both or one of them in March 1918. That could not be proved by definite evidence that they made such a statement in that plaint. This could be done either by direct or by secondary evidence but certainly not by merely producing a certified copy of the plaint, or by the kind of evidence given by D.W. 2 on the side of defendant No. 6."
24. Bombay High Court also held similarly in Manohar (deceased) through LRs. VS Vishweshwar Tukaram Giripunje, AIR 2008, Bombay 155 as under:
"It appears that the learned judge of the trial court, as well as the appellate court, have relied upon the certified copy of the plaint in Civil Suit No.312 of 1965 (Exh.52). Both the judges have held that the document i.e. plaint can be read as it is a public document. Both seem to be under misconception. The certified copy of the plaint is not a public document. Hence, it requires proof. For
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proving such a document, the original plaint should have been called in court. That is not done, hence the certified copy of the plaint could not be said to be proved at all. The courts below, therefore, were not justified in putting reliance on this copy of the plaint."
25. Odisha High Court recognised the same position in
Baijayanti Nanda VS Jagannath Mahaprabhu Marfat Adhikari Mahanta Bansidhar Das Goswami, AIR 2014 Odisha 128, and observed:
"13. In the case of Akshoy Ku. Bose v. Sukumar Dutta, AIR 1951 Cal. 320, the written statement filed in a previous suit was set down as not a public document and its certified copy was not admissible in evidence without calling for the original. Mere production of a certified copy in such a case was found to be not sufficient secondary evidence, of its contents without any further evidence.
14. In the case of Usuf Hasan v. Raunaq Ali, AIR 1943 Oudh 54, it was similarly held that the plaint is a private document and it must be proved by direct evidence and no formal evidence was given about the plaint. The lower Courts had drawn a presumption from the certified copy of the plaint about its genuineness but that was held to be an incorrect approach.
15. A similar view that a plaint is not a public document and that it should be proved like any other private document was taken in the case of Manbodh v. Hirasai, AIR 1926 Nag 339. The learned Single Judge of Patna High Court referredLakshan Chandra Mandal v. TakimDhali and others, 39 Cal. LJ 90 - AIR 1924 Cal. 558 where the learned Celebrated Judge Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee observed that the distinction between the admissibility of a document as evidence of a transaction and admissibility of a document in proof of a statement contained therein is of
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a refined but of a fundamental character though frequently overlooked and for that the learned Judge has referred to several cases including the case of Seethapathi
v. Venkanna, AIR 1922 Mad 71 (FB) and held that a plaint may be admissible in proof of the fact that a particular suit was brought by a particular person against someone on a particular allegation; but it cannot be admissible to prove the correctness of a statement contained therein unless it is proved by direct evidence or by secondary evidence as provided in the Evidence Act.
16. In Smt. ShamalataWd/o. Manohar Raut and others v. VishweshwaraTukaramGiripunje and another, AIR 2008 Bombay 2008, it is held as follows:
The certified copy of the plaint is not a public document. Hence, it requires proof. For proving such document, original plaint suit have been called for in the Court. That is not done, hence the certified copy of the plaint could not be said to be proved at all."
17. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner on the judgment of this Court in
RadhashyamMohanty and another (supra) this Court held that the only pleadings in the suit were that of the plaintiff and defendants and therefore, evidence is bound to be confined to the said pleadings. Therefore, evidence should be led to prove or disprove any of the facts comprised in the pleadings of the plaintiffs or defendants but the defendant cannot be permitted to lead evidence on a plea, which was not there before the Court"
18. In paragraph 12 of the judgment in Jagdish Chandra Chandulal Shah (supra), the Gujarat High Court has held as follows:
"So far as the document at SI. No.9 is concerned, it is the certified copy of the plaint filed against MahobatsingMansinghJadeja by the complainant and it is a public document as it forms part of the
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record, as held by the High Court in the case of
ShazadaMohomedShahaboodeen v. Daniel Wedgeberry reported in (1873) 10 Beng LR (Appendix) 31 and therefore, that is also admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contents thereof. However, when the question arises with regard to the signature thereon, it will be required to be proved in the same manner in which execution of the document is to be proved."
19. Referring to the aforesaid judgment learned counsel for the defendant-opposite party no.4 argued that a certified copy of a plaint filed in the Civil Court would be a public document and hence admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contents thereof.
20. In view of the analysis of the judgments cited before the Court in the forgoing paragraphs, the ratio decided in
Jagdish Chandra Chandulal Shah (supra), may constitute to be a per incuriam judgment as the earlier judgment available has not been taken into consideration whereas in Gulab Chand and others (supra) various judgments in the subject has been taken into consideration and after analyzing Section 74 of the Evidence Act, cogent reason has been assigned that plant may be admissible in proof of fact that a particular suit was brought by a particular person against someone on a particular allegation; but it cannot be admissible to prove the correctness of a statement contained therein unless it is proved by direct evidence or by secondary evidence as provided in the Evidence Act."
26. The Kerala High Court also took a similar view in
Saritha S.Nair versus Union of India ILR 2023 (3) Kerala 1047, and observed that:
"8. The petitioner's right to obtain certified copies has to be adjudged in terms of the provisions of Sections 74 and 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. "Document" means any
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matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures, or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter (S.3 of the Evidence Act). Documents are divided into two categories: Private Documents and Public Documents. Public documents are (1) documents forming the acts or records of the acts (i) of the sovereign authority, (ii) of official bodies and tribunals and (iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of India or of a commonwealth or of a foreign country and (2) public records kept in any State of private documents (S.74 of the Evidence Act). Documents that do not fall within the above description are private documents (S.75 of the Evidence Act).
9. Documents which are records of acts of public officers, legislative, judicial, and executive are public documents going by Section 74(1)(iii). "Public Officer" has been defined under Section 2(17) of the Code of Civil Procedure which includes every judge and every officer of a court f justice. To be a public document, it should be a record of the act of the court. The record itself would not be a public document. There is a distinction between the record of the court and the record of the acts of the court. It is only the record of the acts of the court that is a public document. Thus, the deposition of witnesses recorded by a judge/an officer of the court, judgment, and decree are public documents as they are records of acts of court. But pleadings, affidavits, and petitions filed in court cannot be said to form such acts or records of acts, and are, therefore, not public documents."
27. Thus, it is apparent from the views of the different High Courts, that the pleadings do not fall within the definition of a public record and cannot be proved by mere production of the certified copy; hence, no reliance could have been placed
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upon the certified copy of the pleadings filed in the present case, which were not proved by examining the competent person.
28. Thus, the learned Trial Court had relied upon inadmissible evidence to hold that the present suit was barred by the principle of res judicata. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
29. It was submitted that the learned First Appellate Court had erred in holding that Parsino became the full owner on the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act. However, no substantial question of law was framed to this effect.
30. The jurisdiction of this Court is confined to determining the substantial questions of law framed at the time of the admission. This position was recognized in Union of India
v. N.N. Srivastava, 1986 SCC OnLine Del 109= 1986 (11) DRJ 213 as under:
"4. I may mention here that under the amended provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a Second Appeal lies only on a substantial question of law and a substantial question of law had to be formulated. It is provided in Sub-section (5) that the appeal has to be heard only on the question so formulated. As a matter of fact, the admission order shows that the substantial questions of law are those formulated in paragraph no. 16 of the grounds and, paragraph no. 16 of the grounds
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does not raise any questions of law relating to misreading of evidence or misreading of the record. Therefore, the scope of this appeal is of a very restricted type."
31. In Raman dead by LRs vs. R. Natarjan, 2022 (10) SCC 143:2022 SCC OnLine SC 1212, the High Court reversed the findings on the questions of limitation without framing a substantial question of law. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the High Court erred in reversing a finding on limitation without framing a substantial question of law. It was observed:-
"Next, the High Court reversed the finding of the First Appellate Court on the question of limitation, without framing a substantial question of law and without even referring t the statutory provisions".
32. Therefore, it is not permissible to go into the other questions related to the acquisition of the title of the widow.
Final Order:
33. Hence, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge
15thSeptember, 2023 (pathania)