1. The learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has correctly stated the only point for decision in this case, which is this. When the defendants' grandfather first took the land from the malguzar more than fifty years ago, did the malguzar say to him:
I give you that land for rent, but instead of paying meney you must serve me as a barber.
or did he say:
I engage you as a barber for wages, but instead of paying you money I allow you to hold that land rent-free?
2. The learned Judge goes on to hold that the burden of proving that what the malguzar said was the first of these two things lay on the defendants and there is no evidence at all to support that proposition and it must therefore, be held not proved. There is, however, a good deal of evidence on the point, some of which is mentioned in the judgment of the lower appellate Court, though the learned Judge regards it as having no bearing on it. It is of course futile to expect evidence of the actual making of the original contract, but it would be strange if there were none of what its terms must have been in what has happened during the long time it has been in force. The finding of the lower Court on this point is not a legal finding, but it is still a finding of fact and under Section 103 of the CPC this Court can give a finding of fact only when none been given in the lower appellate Court; where one has been given, but is found to be illegal, the only course open to this Court under that section is to remand the case for a fresh decision. The parties have however agreed that a this shall be given on that point by Court and it has been fully argued.
3. Before discussing the evidence it is necessary to mention an item in it that was wrongly excluded in the first Court. The defendants pleaded that the suit was barred by the decision of an exactly similar suit filed in 1909. The plaintiff denied that there ever was such a suit. The defendants filed the summons that was served on them in it and all the oral evidence on both sides was to the effect that it had been filed about that time.
4. The further evidence offered is mentioned in the finding of the Court, which is as follows:
The defendants filed a copy of plaint. It was not a certified copy. It was not a public document; even though it had been a certified copy. It ought to have been proved like any other private document. The defendants adduced no evidence to prove it; nor did they care to send for the record. Moreover they have not filed any copy of judgment passed in that suit. Accordingly I find that there was no such suit as alleged by the defendants and the question of res judicata therefore does not arise.
5. There is little in this that is correct except the statement that a plaint is not a public document and must be proved in the ordinary way. The rejected documents, two in number, were apparently, returned to the defendants, who have produced them in this Court and they have been marked Ex. A. land Ex. A. 2. They are a duly certified copy of the plaint and another of all the: entries in the Order Sheet, the last of which is the judgment in the case as it was dismissed by reason of the absence of both parties. The learned pleader for the plaintiff respondent persisted in a come what futile refusal to admit these documents without formal proof. The certified copy of the Order Sheet of course “proves itself,” and the copy of the plaint is proved by the production of the original, as the whole record of the suit happens to be here.
6. The present suit is exempted by R. 4 of O. 9 from being barred by the dismissal of the suit of 1909, but the plaint in that suit and the result of it are valuable evidence just as the incidents of the suit of 1904 are. The first item of the evidence is the entry in the Settlement jamabandi of 1907-1908 the only one produced though it is not suggested that the entry has ever varied. Therein the defendants are described as muafikhairati, with a hypothetical, rent of Rs. 2 which is remitted in lieu of services rendered. Lagan 2 mutajaiuisaba, ewaz nauhari lagan maf). The entry of muafi khairati means little or nothing either way; it has always been indifferently used for an ordinary or occupancy tenant whose rent is paid in service or for a servant who is allowed to hold land in lieu of his wages. The entry of a hypothetical or assumed rent also does not help us.
7. The length of possession is, however, distinctly though perhaps not very strongly, in favour of the defendants.
8. If they were merely servants of the malguzar, allowed to cultivate the land instead of being paid in money for their services, it would be open to him to dismiss them at any time, with of course such notice or compensation as might be equitable, just as he could any other servant paid in money, and that he was dissatisfied with them and wished to get rid of them long before he filed the present suit is proved by the suits of 1904 and 1909. The fact of his allowing them to remain in possession of land even for the thirty years previous to 1904 tends to show that he thought he could not turn them out. In all this however he may have been influenced by the traditional ideas of such servants not being liable to dismissal and of their posts being hereditary. The plaint in the suit of 1904, however, puts the matter beyond doubt. There it is alleged that in March of that year the defendant Sardha, 1 father of the present defendants, had surrendered the land, but in August of the same year had taken possession of it again. It is mentioned that Sardha at the same time ceased to work as the malguzar's barber, but the claim to evict him was based solely on his voluntary surrender of the land. That surrender was found not to have been made, and the suit was dismissed. Now if the plaintiff's contention in the suit of 1909 and the present suit were true, he could have succeeded in that suit on the ground that Sardha had ceased to be his servant and had therefore ceased to be entitled to his wages, which were possession of that land free of rent. The decision of that suit is therefore both a technical bar to the present suit under Explanations 3 and 4 of Section 11 of the CPC and also a practical bar to it as proof of an admission that Sardha was a tenant whose rent was remitted and not a servant holding land for his wages.
9. For these reasons I find that the original contract between the defendants' grandfather and the malguzar was that he was to hold the land as a tenant for rent, but the rent was to be remitted as payment of his wages so long as he remained a servant of the malguzar. The case then is one with which a civil Court cannot deal. The decree of the lower appellate Court will accordingly be set aside and a decree will issue dismissing the suit. The plaintiff-respondent will pay the whole of the costs of both parties in all three Courts. The pleader's fee in this Court will be forty-five rupees, to make up for the allowance of the inadequate sum of Rs. 7-8-0 in each of the lower Courts.
10. Suit dismissed.