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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant sued to recover specific immovable properties on the basis that he purchased them from reversionary heirs of one Adinarayana. The plaintiff alleged that on Adinarayana's death his mother, Chendramma, succeeded to a limited estate under Hindu law and that she later alienated the properties. Because the plaintiff's right to recover depended on bringing suit within twelve years of Chendramma's death under article 141 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908), the precise date of Chendramma's death was a material fact. The plaintiff alleged Chendramma died on May 3, 1904; the defendants said she died in February 1904.

After Chendramma's death the father of the second defendant had earlier sued tenants in the Revenue Court under the Rent Recovery Act (VIII of 1865). The Revenue Court judgment contained a recital that Chendramma died on May 3, 1904; that judgment (filed as Exhibit B) was the only evidence the plaintiff produced of the May date. The Subordinate Judge accepted that recital and held the suit not barred by limitation. The District Judge disagreed, rejected the recital as evidence, credited defendants' witnesses, and dismissed the suit as time-barred. The point in Second Appeal (and the Question referred) was whether a recital of a relevant fact in a judgment not inter partes is admissible evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a recital in a judgment not inter partes of a relevant fact is admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. K.P.M. Menon)

  • A judgment is a public record within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence Act.
  • A judge is a public servant and when he writes a judgment he makes a public record; thus a statement in a judgment is an entry made by a public servant in a public record.
  • Where a statement in a judgment relates to a fact in issue or a relevant fact, Section 35 should make that statement admissible in evidence irrespective of whether the judgment is inter partes.
  • Authorities cited in support included Parbutty Dassi v. Purno Chunder Singh, Byathamma v. Avulla, Thama v. Kondan, and Krishnasami Ayyangar v. Rajagopala Ayyangar.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The relevancy and admissibility of judgments are governed by Sections 40 to 43 (and related provisions) of the Evidence Act; a judgment not inter partes is not evidence simply because it contains a recital of a fact.
  • Authorities cited in support included Kashi Nath Pal v. Jagat Kishore and observations of the Privy Council in Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Parbutty Dassi v. Purno Chunder Singh Held that a statement in a decree (an abstract of pleadings required by Court rules) was treated as evidence under Section 35 where the original containing the admission was destroyed. The court analysed and distinguished this decision: it applied in the narrow circumstances where a statutory duty required an abstract and the original was destroyed. The court rejected using it as authority for broadly applying Section 35 to judgments generally.
Byathamma v. Avulla Applied Parbutty Dassi to admit an order reciting a petition; treated as admissible under Section 35 (as cited by earlier judges). The court observed that the reasoning in Byathamma would more properly apply to Section 13 rather than to Section 35 and therefore distinguished it from the present question.
Thama v. Kondan Admission recorded in a prior judgment was held admissible as evidence under Section 35 (in that case the subsequent suit involved the same parties). The court noted that because the suits involved the same parties, recourse to Section 35 was unnecessary (Sections 40–43 could have applied) and therefore the case did not support a general rule that Section 35 renders judgments not inter partes admissible.
Krishnasami Ayyangar v. Rajagopala Ayyangar Cited by appellant (no detailed principle elaborated in the opinion). Referenced by the appellant; the opinion does not discuss or rely on substantive holdings from this case for the court's reasoning.
Kashi Nath Pal v. Jagat Kishore Held that although a judgment not inter partes may be used in evidence in certain circumstances, recitals in the judgment cannot be used as evidence in litigation between the parties. The court accepted this as the correct principle and relied on it in concluding that recitals in judgments are not admissible generally under Section 35.
Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das (Privy Council) The Privy Council held that a judgment was rightly rejected as not by itself evidence of the facts recorded in it. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that a judgment (particularly a judgment not inter partes) is not, by itself, evidence of the matters it records.
Natal Land, etc., Company v. Good English authority on the law that judgments (other than those in rem) are res inter alios acta and do not bind third parties. Used to illustrate that Section 40–44 of the Evidence Act codify similar limits on the admissibility and effect of judgments.
Lehraj Kuar v. Mahpal Singh (Lekraj Kuar) Held that an entry in a settlement register kept under statutory authority is admissible under Section 35 because it is an entry in a public register by a public servant exercising statutory duty. The court treated that decision as distinguishing entries in statutory public registers (covered by Section 35) from judicial recitals in judgments, which are not of the same character for Section 35 purposes.
Sunder Das v. Fatimul-ul-Nissa Begam; Ram Sunder Gope Sikdar v. Haribala Dhubi These cases doubted the correctness of Parbutty Dassi's broad application. The opinion notes these decisions as expressing doubt about Parbutty Dassi, supporting the court's caution in relying on Parbutty Dassi as a general authority for applying Section 35 to judgments.
Ramasami v. Appavu Related to relevancy under Sections 13 and 42 of the Evidence Act (not Section 35). The court observed that Ramasami had nothing to do with Section 35 and therefore could not be pressed as authority for allowing Section 35 to govern the admissibility of judicial recitals.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the referred question by first identifying the statutory framework governing admissibility of judgments and of entries in public records. Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act, the court observed, specifically deal with the relevancy and effect of judgments in courts of justice:

  • Section 40: relevance of judgments or decrees that by law prevent a court from taking cognizance or holding a trial.
  • Section 41: final judgments in rem (probate, matrimonial, admiralty, insolvency) are conclusive proof of specified matters.
  • Section 42: judgments relating to public matters are evidence but not conclusive; evidence may be given to disprove them.
  • Section 43: other judgments (not falling in 40–42) are irrelevant unless their existence is a fact in issue or relevant under some other provision.
  • Section 44: permits proof that a relevant judgment was delivered by an incompetent court or obtained by fraud/collusion.

By contrast, Section 35 applies to entries in public or official registers and books made by public servants or by persons discharging duties specially enjoined by law, and operates in an entirely different category of cases: entries made by public officials in the exercise of statutory duties which regulate public or quasi-public matters. The court emphasised that reading Section 35 as extending to judicial recitals in judgments would amount to "straining the language" of Section 35 and would effectively nullify the careful limits Parliament set out in Sections 40–44 by making most judgments admissible against third parties whenever they contain a relevant recital.

The court therefore analysed earlier authorities relied upon by the appellant and found them distinguishable or inapplicable as general authorities for the proposition that Section 35 makes a judgment not inter partes admissible:

  • Parbutty Dassi was rooted in specific procedural circumstances (court duty to include abstracts of pleadings; destruction of original pleadings) and the decision was not a general endorsement that all recitals in judgments fall under Section 35.
  • Lehraj Kuar concerned entries in a statutory settlement register, a classic Section 35 situation, and thus is not analogous to judicial recitals.
  • Byathamma and Thama were followed in earlier decisions but were distinguishable—Byathamma's reasoning was more properly connected to Section 13, and Thama involved the same parties (so Sections 40–43 were available). The reliance on Parbutty Dassi in these cases did not resolve the present statutory question.
  • The court found Kashi Nath Pal and the Privy Council decision in Ram Parkash Das persuasive: recitals in judgments are not by themselves evidence of the facts recorded.

Synthesising the statutory scheme and the authorities, the court concluded that Section 35 does not apply to judgments such that a judgment not inter partes becomes admissible by reason only of a recital of a relevant fact contained in it. In short, judgments which would not be admissible under Sections 40–43 do not become admissible merely because they contain statements of relevant facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the referred question in the negative: Section 35 of the Evidence Act does not render a judgment not inter partes admissible in evidence merely because it contains a recital of a relevant fact.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties in this reference: the recital in the Revenue Court judgment (Exhibit B) could not be admitted as evidence of Chendramma's date of death under Section 35 simply because it was a statement in a judgment not inter partes.
  • More generally, the decision confirms that the admissibility and effect of judicial decisions are governed by Sections 40–44 of the Evidence Act and that Section 35 applies to entries in public or official records made in the exercise of statutory duties, not to judicial recitals as a class.
  • The opinion distinguishes and limits reliance on earlier authorities (such as Parbutty Dassi and related decisions) when those authorities arose from different statutory or factual contexts (e.g., destruction of original documents, duty to record abstracts, or suits between the same parties).
  • The court grounded its conclusion on the statutory scheme and existing authorities (including Kashi Nath Pal and the Privy Council in Ram Parkash Das) rather than on treating judicial recitals as equivalent to statutory public registers. No broader departure from the established statutory framework was made.
The question referred was answered in the negative.

This summary is limited strictly to the material and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or extrapolate facts or holdings beyond the text.

    Seethapati Rao Dora v. Venkanna Dora

    Schwabe, C.J:— In this case I had the opportunity of reading the judgment of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., and I agree with him entirely.

    Coutts Trotter, J.:— I agree.

    Kumaraswami Sastri, J.:— The question referred to us for determination is whether a recital in a judgment not inter partes of a relevant fact is admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. The suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant to recover the immoveable properties specified in the plaint, on the ground that he purchased them from the reversionary heirs of one Adinarayana on whose death his mother Chendramma succeeded to a limited estate conferred on her by Hindu Law as mother of the last male owner. Chendramma alienated the properties and the suit to recover the properties from the alienees had to be filed within 12 years from the date of Chendramma's death, Under article 141 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908). As the defendant pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, the date of Chendramma's death became material and the plaintiff alleged that she died on May 3, 1904, while the case for defendants was that she died in February 1904, and not in May 1904, and that the suit was barred as it was filed more than 12 years from February 1904. On Chendramma's death the father of the second defendant, in this suit filed a suit in the Revenue Court against certain tenants for the purpose of acceptance of pattas and muchilikas under the Rent Recovery Act (VIII of 1865). The suit was dismissed, but in the judgment there is a statement made by the Judge that Chendramma died on May 3, 1904. The only evidence let in by the plaintiff as to the date of the death of Chendramma was the statement in the judgment which is filed as Exhibit B in the case. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that this statement was relevant to prove the issue as to the date of the death of Chendramma and, acting upon it, he held that Chendramma died within 12 years before the date of the suit and that therefore it was not barred by limitation. On appeal, the District Judge was of opinion that the statement in a judgment not inter partes was not evidence. He believed the evidence of the defendants' witnesses and dismissed the plaintiff's suit as barred by limitation. In Second Appeal the point raised is that the recital of the date of death in the judgment was evidence under-section 3-5 of the Evidence Act and that the District Judge was wrong in rejecting it as irrelevant. The contention of Mr. K.P.M Menon for the appellant is that a judgment is a public record within the meaning of section 74 of the Evidence Act, that a Judge is a public servant, and when he writes a judgment he makes a public record and that a statement in a judgment is therefore an entry made by a public servant in a public record, which if it relates to a relevant fact, would be evidence under section 35, irrespective of whether the judgment in which the statement occurs is or is not between the same parties. In support of his argument he refers to Parbutty Dassi v. Purno Chunder Singh, Byathamma v. Avulla, Thama v. Kondan, and Krishnasami Ayyangar v. Rajagopala Ayyangar. For the respondents it is contended that the relevancy of judgments is governed by sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act and that a judgment not inter partes is not evidence. Reference has been made to Kashi Nath Pal v. Jagat Kishore, and the observations of the Privy Council in Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das. I am of opinion that section 35 has no application to judgments, and a judgment which, would not be admissible under sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act would not become relevant merely because it contains a statement as to a fact which is in issue or relevant in a suit between persons who are not parties or privies. Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act deal with the relevancy of judgments in Courts of justice. Section 40 enacts that the existence of any judgment, order or decree, which by law prevents any Court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial. Section 41 deals with final judgments, orders and decrees, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, or what is known as judgments in rem and states that such judgments, orders or decrees, are conclusive proof of the matters specified in the section, and, by virtue of that section of the Act, evidence would not be allowed to disprove those matters. Section 42 refers to judgments relating to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry and states that such judgments, though evidence, are not conclusive proof of what they state, thus allowing evidence to be given to disprove facts found in the judgments. Section 43 states that

    “judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue or is relevant under some other provision of this Act” (e.g, section 13).

    Section 44 enables a party to show that any judgment, order or decree, which is relevant under sections 40, 41 or 42, was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. It appears to me that these sections codify the law as to the admissibility of judgments in evidence. It is not suggested that under the provisions of these sections a judgment, unless it be a judgment in rem, would bind third parties who are not parties to the judgment or claim under those who are parties. Other judgments would be res inter alias acta and would not be admissible in evidence. The same is the law in England and I need only refer to Natal Land, etc., Company v. Good. Section 35 of the Evidence Act which enacts that an entry in any public or other official book, register or record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties, or by any other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register or record is kept, is itself a relevant fact, deals with a distinctly separate class of cases, namely, entries made by public officials acting in the exercise of a statutory duty or power conferred by special enactments which regulate matters of public or quasi public interest. It would be straining the language of section 35 to hold that a Judge, when he writes a judgment, is making entries in a public or official book, register or record, and that every statement made in a judgment is an entry in such book, register or record. If section 35 is applicable to judgments and if the contention of Mr. Menon is accepted, the result, will be that every judgment would be admissible in evidence to prove a relevant fact if it contains any statement as to a fact in issue or relevant fact, even though that judgment may be between persons who are total strangers to the litigation in which it is sought to be filed as evidence. I find it difficult to hold that the legislature, which in sections 40 to 44 has carefully defined the limits within which judgments are admissible in evidence, would have, in a previous section, practically nullified the provisions as to the relevancy of judgments by including judgments in the category of public or other official books, registers or records. I am unable to agree with the decisions relied on by Mr. Menon. In Parbutty Dassi v. Purno Chunder Singh, the suit was for the possession of a fishery and the plaintiff wanted to let in evidence of an admission alleged to have been made by a predecessor-in-title of the defendants in the written statement in a former suit. This would be evidence under section 21 of the Evidence Act. The written statement was not forthcoming as it was destroyed and the only evidence of the admission was that contained in a decree in the former suit which began by giving a short statement of the pleadings in the suit. The rules of Court required eveiy decree to contain an abstract of the pleadings. Prinsep and O'Kinealy, JJ., held that the statement in the decree was evidence of the admission made under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. The learned Judges begin by stating that the original containing the admission of the defendant's predecessor-in-title could not be produced as it was destroyed and that under a circular issued by the Sudder Court, it was the duty of the Court to enter in the decree an abstract of the pleadings, and they relied on section 35 as authority for the view that the admission sought to be proved can be proved by the abstract prefixed to the decree. At the end of the judgment, however, they go on to state that the admission in the decree would be binding only if the person who is alleged to have made the admission was the predecessor-in-title of the defendants and observe:

    “Whether the defendants are bound by the statements of Rashmoni depends on the question whether Rashmoni was their predecessor-in-title; and this point has not been decided by the Subordinate Judge. If he holds that defendants do not represent Rashmoni, neither the decree nor the admission can be admissible against them. On the other hand if he holds that the defendants do represent Rashmoni, then, in our opinion, so much of the decree as purports to give the statement of Rashmoni is admissible in the present case. The amount of weight to be given to such statement is a matter to be decided by the Court below”.

    Lehraj Kuar v. Mahpal Singh, to which the learned Judges refer, was a case not of a judgment but of a statement made in a settlement register, and their Lordships of the Privy Council were of opinion that being, an entry in a register kept by a public servant under statutory authority, it was admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. It seems to me that if the learned Judges were of opinion that any statement made in a judgment would be a statement made by a public officer in a public record and would bring it under section 35, all the discussion as to the duty of the Judge to make an abstract of the pleadings in the decree, the destruction of the original pleadings containing the admission and as to its relevancy depending upon whether Rashmoni, the person who is alleged to have made, the statement abstracted in the decree, was the predecessor-in-title of the defendants would be immaterial, as a statement recorded under the circumstances mentioned in section 35 would depend for its relevancy on the mere fact that it was made by a public servant in the discharge of his duty apart from the sources of his information or the relationship of the persons giving the information to the persons who were interested subsequently in the matter. The correctness of this decision was doubted in Sunder Das v. Fatimul-ul-Nissa Begam and Ram Sunder Gope Sikdar v. Haribala Dhubi. In Byathamma v. Avulla the question was whether the parties were governed by Makkattayam or Marumakkattayam Law and it was sought to prove that in a previous claim petition to which a preceding karnavan was a party he acted in the capacity of a karnavan, thus showing that the parties were governed by the Marumakkattayam Law. The order of the District Munsif reciting the petition of the previous karnavan was sought to be put in to prove the allegation made by the previous karnavan and it was held on the authority of Parbutty Dassi v. Purno Chunder Singh, cited above, that it was admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. As pointed out by the learned referring Judges, the reasoning in this case would apply to section 13 rather than to section 35. Ramasami v. Appavu, which is referred to by the learned Judges, related to the relevancy of judgments under sections 13 and 42 of the Evidence Act and had nothing to do with section 35. Thama v. Kondan cited above was a suit to redeem a kanom. The kanom document was lost and the judgment in a previous suit brought by a previous Jenmi to redeem the same kanom in which it is stated that defendants admitted their position as kanomdars was sought to be put, in evidence. The learned Judges, following Lekraj Kuar v. Mahpal Singh Parbutty Dassi v. Purno Chunder Singh, and Thama v. Kondan, cited above, held that the judgment was admissible and that the recital in a judgment of the admission of the relevant fact would be evidence of the Jenmi's title under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. As the second suit to redeem was between the same parties as those to the first, suit, it is difficult to see why recourse should be had to section 35 for the purpose of rendering the previous judgment admissible in evidence as the matter could well have been brought under sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act. Neither in this case nor in Byathamma v. Avulla is there any discussion of the authorities and the Judges simply follow the decision in Parbutty Dassi v. Purno Chunder Singh cited above. I think the correct principle has been laid down by Mkerji, J., in Kashi Nath Pal v. Jagat Kishore, where the learned Judge held that

    “Although a judgment not inter partes may be used in evidence in certain circumstances as a fact in issue, or as a relevant fact, or possibly us a transaction, the recitals in the judgment cannot be used as evidence in a litigation between the parties.”

    The judgment of the Privy Council in Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das cited above also makes it clear. The question there, was whether a person was disqualified from being a Mahant by reason of his having been married. Evidence was sought to be let in of a recital in the judgment of a Magistrate of an admission of the marriage made in the course of proceedings before him. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the judgment was rightly rejected as not by itself evidence of the facts recorded therein. It is argued by Mr. Menon that what their Lordships rejected was not the judgment but a statement by one Hanuman Lal, made on oath, that the Mahant was married but a reference to the passage in which the observation of their Lordships occurs makes it clear that they were referring to the judgment. It, is unnecessary in this Reference to consider whether, if admissions made by parties to a suit or their predecessors-in-title are relevant and the originals containing the admissions are not forthcoming, secondary evidence of such admissions can be given by reference to extracts from judgments. The answer to the question will turn not on section 35 but with reference to the provisions of the Act relating to the relevancy of admissions and the sections relating to secondary evidence. On a consideration of the authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, I am clearly of opinion that, section 35 would not render a judgment not inter partes evidence. I would answer the question referred to us in the negative.

    N.R

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    Comments

    Seethapati Rao Dora v. Venkanna Dora
    (Jan 5, 1922)