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  • Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965.
  • provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965.2.
  • provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965.
  • provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965.2.
  • provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff was employed as a Demonstrator in the Delhi College of Engineering. His services were terminated by an order dated 30 January 1969 under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965, by notice terminating services one month after service of the notice (termination effective 28 February 1969). The plaintiff alleged the termination was illegal, arbitrary and mala fide and raised the applicability of Article 311 of the Constitution. The defendants' written statement said the demonstrator post was under the lien of Shri A.K. Srivastava, who was appointed Associate Lecturer, and that creation of that post abolished the Demonstrator post; another contested point was whether the plaintiff had become quasi-permanent under the Rules of 1965. The trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal the Additional District Judge held the abolition of the post was not established, noted that Srivastava became Associate Lecturer on 28 February 1968 while the plaintiff continued till 28 February 1969, inferred abolition was not the ground for termination, and concluded the termination order (Ex. PW1/2) was passed arbitrarily as punishment with ulterior motives. The present (second) appeal challenges that conclusion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's services were terminated legally or whether the termination was illegal, arbitrary or mala fide (and whether Article 311 was attracted).
  2. Whether the Demonstrator post was abolished by creation of the Associate Lecturer post (i.e., whether abolition was the true ground for termination).
  3. Whether the plaintiff had acquired quasi-permanent status under the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965.
  4. Whether the termination order was in substance a punishment despite being in the form of an order of termination simpliciter (i.e., whether form or facts/circumstances determine character of the order).
  5. Procedural: whether the Second Appeal could be entertained in view of amended Section 100 CPC restricting second appeals to substantial questions of law as formulated.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Respondent

  • Claimed services were terminated illegally, arbitrarily and mala fide.
  • Asserted Article 311 of the Constitution was attracted.

Defendants-Appellants

  • Contended the Demonstrator post was under the lien of Shri A.K. Srivastava and that creation/appointment to the Associate Lecturer post abolished the Demonstrator post, justifying termination.
  • Argued that where an order is expressed simpliciter (termination without further detail), the form of the order is conclusive (i.e., termination simpliciter should be treated as such).
  • Contended the conclusion that the order was passed arbitrarily by way of punishment was not supported by evidence and thus susceptible to challenge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another, A.I.R 1974, S.C 2192 The form of an administrative order is not conclusive; facts and circumstances giving rise to the order determine whether it is punitive or a simple termination. The court applied this principle to consider substance over form and to examine surrounding facts and evidence (or absence thereof) to determine that the termination was, in effect, punitive/arbitrary despite being expressed as termination simpliciter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the factual record and evidence offered (or not offered) by the respondents on the asserted abolition of the Demonstrator post. It noted that Srivastava became Associate Lecturer on 28 February 1968 while the plaintiff continued in post until 28 February 1969, undermining the contention that abolition was the ground for termination. The Court found that the respondents produced no notification or order proving abolition and therefore drew an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act for withholding the best evidence. Applying the principle from Samsher Singh that form is not conclusive, the Court treated surrounding facts and circumstances as determinative and concluded that the termination order (Ex. PW1/2) was passed arbitrarily and by way of punishment with ulterior motives. The Court also observed the limits of the Second Appeal under amended Section 100 CPC—the appeal must be heard only on the substantial question(s) of law as formulated—and noted the grounds of appeal did not challenge mis-reading of evidence, restricting the scope of this second appeal. Ultimately the Court treated the findings as findings of fact based on evidence and adverse inference, not open to be overturned in this second appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The second appeal was dismissed; the Additional District Judge's factual finding that the termination was arbitrary/punitive and that abolition of the post was not proved was upheld.

Implications: The direct effect is that the trial and appellate courts' relief to the plaintiff stands. The Court treated the matter as a factual finding supported by adverse inference from withheld documentary evidence and limited the availability of relief in the second appeal under Section 100 CPC; the opinion does not purport to set a broader new precedent beyond applying established authority (Samsher Singh) and evidentiary principles.

    Union Of India & Ors. v. N.N Srivastava .

    D.K Kapur, C.J:— This is a Regular Second Appeal directed against the judgment of the Additional District Judge decreeing the Suit of the plaintiff-respondent The said respondent had been employed as a Demonstrator in the Delhi College of Engineering. His services were terminated by an order dated 30th January, 1969, passed under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965. This order was by way of a notice informing the plaintiff that his services would be terminated with effect from the expiry of one month from the date on which the notice is served or tendered. Accordingly, the services of the plaintiff stood terminated on 28th February, 1969. The plaintiff had claimed that the services were terminated illegally, arbitrarily and mala fide, and also, attracted the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. The written statement filed by the defendants took up the stand that the post to which the plaintiff was appointed was under the lien of Shri A.K Srivastava, who was appointed to the post of Associate Lecturer. It was alleged that once the post of Associate Lecturer was created the Demonstrator's post got abolished, and thus, the services of the plaintiff got terminated. One other point taken was whether the plaintiff did or did not become quasi permanent under the Central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965.

    2. In any case, the Suit was dismissed by the trial Court, but in appeal the Additional District Judge held that it had not been established that the post of Demonstrator had been abolished by the simultaneous creation of the post of Associate Lecturer. It was also found that Shri A.K Srivastava became an Associate Lecturer on 28th February, 1968, whereas the plaintiff continued till 28th February, 1969. In other words, the plaintiff out-lasted the abolition of the post by about one year. From the various facts and circumstances, the Court inferred that the abolition of the post was not the ground on which the services of the plaintiff had been terminated. It was eventually held on an analysis of the facts as follows:—

    “It can thus safely be concluded from above that the termination order Ex. PW1/2 was passed arbitrarily by way of punishment, with ulterior motives.”

    Learned counsel for the appellant contends that when the order is an order simpliciter without mentioning anything else, then the form of the order is conclusive However, the learned Court has dealt with this point on an application of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another, A.I.R 1974, S.C 2192, and other judgments of the Supreme Court, wherein it has been held that it is not the form of the order which is conclusive, but the facts and circumstances giving rise to the order. Normally, no doubt what is stated in the order would be conclusive, when the facts and circumstances are brought to the Court's notice, then those facts and circumstances would show whether the order has been passed by way of punishment or by way of termination simpliciter.

    3. Learned counsel contends that the conclusion that the order is passed arbitrarily by way of punishment is not based on evidence, and therefore, it can be attacked On the other hand, an analysis of the grounds of appeal shows that five substantial grounds of appeal are mentioned therein and none of them is connected with any mis-reading of the evidence or absence of material in the findings

    4. I may mention here that under the amended provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a Second Appeal lies only on a substantial question of law. and a substantial question of law had to be formulated. It is provided in Sub section (5) that the appeal has to be heard only on the question so formulated As a matter of fact, the admission order shows that the substantial questions of law are those formulated in paragraph No. 16 of the grounds and, paragraph No. 16 of the grounds does not raise any questions of law relating to mis-reading of evidence or mis-reading of the record. Therefore, the scope of this appeal is of a very restricted type.

    5. The impression to be gathered from the judgment is that the conclusion of the Court was based on the various circumstances giving rise to the supposition that the plaintiff's post had been abolished. It appears that the termination order in this case was passed on the assumption that because the previous Demonstrator had become an Associate Lecturer, hence the post stood abolished. This argument could not be substantiated at the time of arguments before the learned Additional District Judge. The Court noted as follows:—

    “Surprisingly enough the respondents have not led any evidence what-so-ever to prove the abolition of the post of the demonstrator. The post in question must have been abolished under the orders of the authorities. A notification in regard there to must have been issued. Thus the said documents were the best possible evidence to prove the factum of the abolition. Neither the said notification nor the said order was produced before this Court. Hence this Court has been deprived of the best possible evidence which this Court could lay its hands on. Consequently an adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the respondents in favour of the appellant under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act.”

    The Court, therefore, had decided this point about the abolition of the post on the basis that the evidence had been kept away from the Court. In other words, the plaintiff's contention that he had been wrongly deprived of the post on wrong assumption was substantiated. This led to the conclusion that the termination order was arbitrary, illegal and passed with an ulterior motive. It may be that the ulterior motive is not strikingly brought out, but it follows that the Court which was dealing with the case was faced with only one question, namely, the plaintiff's services had been terminated because of the abolition of the post and not for any other reason and found that this was not the reason. The Court was thus right in reaching a conclusion that his services were terminated for an ulterior motive.

    6. In my view, this is a finding of fact, which is not open to attack in the second appeal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

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    Comments

    Union Of India & Ors. v. N.N Srivastava .
    (Mar 6, 1986)