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citation codes
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Acts
  • section 262(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, including sections 319 and 223 Section 20A
  • section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 319 and 223(d) of the Code
  • section 223(d) of the Code.
  • section 19(1) of the Code,
  • section 7 nor section 14
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 262(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, including sections 319 and 223 Section 20A
  • section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 319 and 223(d) of the Code
  • section 223(d) of the Code.
  • section 19(1) of the Code,
  • section 7 nor section 14
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Padmanabhan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text.

A Food Inspector (first respondent) prosecuted the second respondent for selling adulterated skimmed milk powder. The second respondent produced a warranty/invoice showing purchase from the third respondent, a wholesale dealer of “Foremost Dairies” (a manufacturing concern based in Bombay). The second respondent applied to implead the third respondent and he was impleaded as second accused. On production of an invoice purportedly from “Foremost Dairies”, further impleadings followed: a fourth respondent and later the petitioners were impleaded as accused numbers 3 to 8.

The petitioners (including the company “Foremost Dairies” and certain officers) sought quashing of the order(s) and all further proceedings against them by invoking the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petition came before the Court on a reference that expressly doubted the correctness of the decision in Damodaran v. Abdulla Kunhi (1987 2 KLT 838).

The petitioners admitted that “Foremost Dairies” (a public limited company) was the manufacturer, that the third respondent was its wholesale dealer, and that the second respondent had purchased the product from that dealer. They argued that, if anyone were to be proceeded against in the company, only the person who was statutorily the "person responsible" under section 17(1)(a) should have been made an accused (the opinion states this person was the fifth respondent at the time of the transaction).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned orders impleading the petitioners (accused 3 to 8) and further proceedings against them should be quashed under the inherent powers of the Court (section 482 CrPC).
  2. Whether the decision in Damodaran v. Abdulla Kunhi (1987 2 KLT 838) was correctly decided with respect to the scope of section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (and whether that decision should be followed).
  3. How section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (regarding summary trial) interacts with the Magistrate's discretion and provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (notably sections 260 and 262(2) CrPC).
  4. What degree of satisfaction and what kind of evidence are required to implead additional persons under section 20A — specifically, whether prima facie satisfaction (and documentary/affidavit evidence) suffices and whether a speaking order is necessary.
  5. Whether and in what circumstances a manufacturer, distributor, dealer and last vendor can be jointly tried and the availability of the defence under section 19(2) to successive vendors, distributors or dealers.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contended that if the company was liable as manufacturer, the only person who could have been made an accused (in a personal capacity) was the person responsible under section 17(1)(a) — identified in the opinion as the fifth respondent — and not the petitioners themselves.
  • They argued that impleading certain petitioners after impleading respondents 3 and 4 contravened the spirit of section 20A as that provision had been interpreted in Damodaran's case and other decisions.
  • They argued that impleading was ordered without evidence and without a speaking order and therefore was invalid and an abuse of process justifying interference under section 482 CrPC.

Prosecution / Other Parties' Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The Food Inspector prosecuted the second respondent for selling adulterated skimmed milk powder.
  • The second respondent produced a warranty/invoice showing purchase from the third respondent; the third respondent produced an invoice said to be issued by the company (“Foremost Dairies”) together with an affidavit. Those materials were treated by the Magistrate as prima facie evidence supporting impleading of the manufacturer and others.
  • The opinion does not set out a detailed adversarial brief from the prosecution beyond the factual steps that led to impleading (i.e., production of invoice and affidavit and the Magistrate's consequent satisfaction to implead).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Damodaran v. Abdulla Kunhi (1987 2 KLT 838) Earlier interpretation concerning the scope and application of section 20A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (limiting successive impleadings and the interplay with section 19). The Court doubted and held that Damodaran was incorrectly decided on two main assumptions about section 20A; the opinion departs from and corrects that reasoning.
Siddappa v. Patel Shivappa (AIR 1967 Mys. 248) That in a summons case the trial begins when the accused enters appearance and particulars of the offence are stated to him. Used to determine when "trial" commences for the purpose of applying section 20A and to support the proposition that evidence adduced before formal framing of charge can amount to trial evidence.
State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey (AIR 1957 SC 389) That "trial" in certain statutory contexts may include proceedings before the framing of charge; evidence adduced earlier may be sufficient for statutory purposes. Followed to hold that proceedings before charge framing can be treated as trial for section 20A purposes and that evidence at that stage can support impleading.
Pure Ice Cream Pvt. Ltd. v. Narendrajitsingh (1975 2 FAC 385) Followed the principle that pre-charge proceedings can be treated as part of trial for statutory provisions. Relied upon as authority consistent with Ram Naresh Pandey that evidence taken before charge can suffice for section 20A.
Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala (1987 1 KLT 871) That the satisfaction required under section 19(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is analogous to satisfaction under sections 204, 228 or 240 CrPC. The Court equated the prima facie satisfaction required for impleading under section 20A with the satisfaction standard under section 19(1) and the cited CrPC provisions; used to justify that impleading may rest on prima facie materials.
Food Inspector v. Indian Medical Practitioners Pharmacy and Stores Ltd. (1961 KLT 980) Discussed in relation to whether section 19 applies to successive warranties; relied on an English authority (Halsbury) about false warranty not being excused by prior purchase under warranty. The Court distinguished that decision and the English text; held the issue in that decision was different from the present questions about successive warranties and section 20A.
Ramanatha Agencies v. Food Inspector (1973 KLT 295) Held (in that decision) that the plea under section 19(2) was available only to the vendor and not to manufacturer, distributor or dealer. The Court criticized and declined to follow this restrictive view, holding that vendor can include distributor/dealer/manufacturer in different contexts and that section 19(2) can be available to them when prosecuted as vendors.
Banarsi Das v. Municipal Council (1975 Crl L.J 674) Observes that the offence committed by the manufacturer is more serious than by the dealer who trusted him. Cited to support the proposition that manufacturer, distributor and dealer can all be responsible and jointly tried; used to reinforce the policy behind section 20A.
Bhagwan Das v. Delhi Administration (1975 1 SCC 866) Authority for viewing anterior sales as cause and effect and for joint trial of connected offences without separate proof of conspiracy or common design in strict-liability contexts. Relied upon to justify joint trial of manufacturer, distributor and vendor as part of the same transaction under section 223(d) of the Code.
Mangasdas v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1966 SC 128) Held that "vendor" is not only the person from whom a sample was taken; there can be successive vendors and such vendors are subject to the disability under section 19(1) and can avail section 19(2). Used to demonstrate that successive vendors exist and that the defence under section 19(2) can be available to them; used to repudiate the restrictive holding in Damodaran's case.
Dhian Singh v. Saharanpur Municipality (1969 2 SCC 371) That section 20 (of the Act) confers authority to institute prosecution and that the grant of consent does not prescribe any mode of applying the mind to facts before consent is given. Applied to hold that section 20 does not limit or affect section 20A and that section 20A must be read along with relevant CrPC provisions (including sections 319 and 223(d)).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal determinations, applying statutory text and cited authorities strictly as they appear in the opinion:

  1. Company and personal liability (section 17): The Court emphasised that primary criminal liability rests with the manufacturing company itself. Section 17 creates an additional statutory personal liability on the "person responsible" (section 17(1)(a)), but that does not negate the company's own liability. Consequently, impleading the company as accused was proper; separately, the person responsible should be impleaded in his personal capacity. The Court accepted that some individual officers were unnecessarily impleaded and indicated which impleadings were excessive.
  2. Section 16A and summary trial discretion: The Court interpreted the word "shall" in section 16A as not eliminating the Magistrate's discretion to choose summary procedure; it read "shall" as equivalent to "may" in context, so that section 260 CrPC's discretion is preserved. The Court noted the maximum sentences applicable under the Act and under CrPC to show why mandatory summary trial would render statutory sentencing limits meaningless.
  3. When "trial" begins and admissibility of pre-charge evidence: Relying on Siddappa and State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey (and Pure Ice Cream), the Court held that proceedings and evidence prior to formal framing of charge can be treated as "trial" for the purpose of section 20A. Therefore, evidence adduced at the pre-charge stage (including affidavits and documentary invoices) may constitute the basis for the Magistrate's satisfaction to implead third parties.
  4. Standard of satisfaction for impleading under section 20A: The Court held that the Magistrate must have a prima facie satisfaction that the person sought to be impleaded is concerned in the offence — a satisfaction less than that required for conviction but comparable to the satisfaction under section 19(1) and CrPC sections 204, 228 or 240 (as reflected in Narayanan Nambiar). The Court observed that this satisfaction need not be demonstrably evidenced by a detailed speaking order, and that evidence supplied by the accused (e.g., an invoice with affidavit) can satisfy the Magistrate prima facie.
  5. On the necessity of a speaking order and reviewability: The Court held that a speaking order was not essential for valid impleading when the Magistrate's prima facie satisfaction is evidenced by the proceedings; such satisfaction is not a matter easily subject to appellate or revisional interference unless shown to be illegal or without jurisdiction. The genuineness of the invoice or other documentary proof can be tested during trial.
  6. Interpretation and scope of section 20A and relation to section 19(2): The Court rejected the restrictive interpretations in Damodaran and some other decisions. It held that (a) successive impleadings under section 20A are permissible and not barred merely because some parties (manufacturer, distributor or dealer) have already been impleaded; (b) the defence under section 19(2) is not confined to the "last vendor" — distributors and dealers prosecuted as vendors can also invoke section 19(2) where appropriate; and (c) the power to implead under section 20A turns on the Magistrate's prima facie satisfaction that another person is concerned in the offence, not on whether impleading would assist an accused in establishing a section 19 defence.
  7. Joint trial and connecting legal provisions: The Court explained that offences by manufacturer, distributor, dealer and vendor are often parts of the "same transaction" and can be jointly tried under section 223(d) of the Code and section 20A (read along with section 319 CrPC). It emphasised that in strict-liability contexts under the Act, separate proof of conspiracy or common design is not necessary; the fact that adulterated food reached the consumer through those agencies provides the necessary link for joint trial.
  8. Procedural conclusion as to the present impleadings: Applying the above principles to the facts, the Court found that impleading the company (represented by certain petitioners) was proper, that some individual officers had been unnecessarily impleaded (petitioners 3 and 4 and the fourth respondent), and that the true "person responsible" at the time (the fifth respondent) had not been impleaded and should be added. The Court held that the impugned orders were made with jurisdiction and did not amount to an abuse of process justifying quashing under section 482, except to the limited extent of correcting the parties to be in line with section 17 and the evidentiary record.

Holding and Implications

CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS CASE DISMISSED SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION

Holding (core rulings)

  • The Court refused to quash the impugned impleading orders in their entirety under section 482 CrPC; the orders were held to have been passed with jurisdiction and were not an abuse of the process of the Court.
  • However, the Court ordered limited interference: petitioners 3 and 4 and the fourth respondent were to be removed from the array of accused, and the fifth respondent (the person who was statutorily the "person responsible" at the time of the transaction) was to be added as an accused in his capacity as the person responsible under section 17.
  • The Criminal Miscellaneous petition was dismissed subject to the above modifications.

Immediate consequences for the parties

  • The company (“Foremost Dairies”) and certain officers who were appropriately impleaded may remain as accused (the opinion indicates the company represented by certain petitioners would have been sufficient).
  • Petitioners 3 and 4 and the fourth respondent are to be removed from the proceedings as unnecessary impleadments.
  • The fifth respondent is to be impleaded as an accused in his capacity as the person responsible under section 17.

Wider legal implications (as stated in the opinion)

  • The Court explicitly held that the earlier decision in Damodaran v. Abdulla Kunhi was not correctly decided with respect to section 20A, and it articulated a broader reading of section 20A consistent with provisions of the Code (sections 319 and 223(d)) and the object of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
  • The opinion clarifies that: (a) the Magistrate retains discretion whether to try a case summarily under section 16A read with the CrPC; (b) the prima facie standard is sufficient for impleading under section 20A and may rest on documentary/affidavit materials produced before framing of charge; and (c) distributors and dealers (when prosecuted as vendors) can invoke section 19(2) and may also be impleaded under section 20A when the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied they are concerned in the offence.
  • The Court emphasised that section 20A should be read along with CrPC provisions and should not be treated as curtailing joinder or joint trial provisions available in the Code; it is an enabling/additional provision to facilitate identification and trial of all persons concerned in the same transaction.

End of summary. This narrative reflects only the findings, reasoning, and statements present in the provided opinion text; no external facts or inferences have been added.

    Chandak v. Food Inspector .

    Padmanabhan, J.:— This petition, under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, came up before us on reference doubting the correctness of the decision in Damodaran v. Abdulla Kunhi 1987 2 KLT 838..

    2. First respondent, Food Inspector, prosecuted the second respondent for having sold adulterated skimmed milk powder. Second respondent produced warranty for having purchased the article from third respondent, a wholesale dealer of the manufacturing concern, “Foremost Dairies”, Bombay, and applied to implead him. He was impleaded as second accused. On his application, supported by production of the invoice received from “Foremost Dairies” the fourth respondent and later the petitioners were impleaded as accused 3 to 8. This order and all further proceedings against the petitioners are sought to be quashed on various grounds in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court. Petitioners admit that “Foremost Dairies” (second petitioner), represented by its Chairman (sixth petitioner) and Chief Executive (first petitioner), is the manufacturing concern of the product and the third respondent is its wholesale dealer. It is from this wholesale dealer that the second respondent purchased the food article sold by him. “Foremost Dairies” is admittedly a public limited company. Under section 17, when an offence under the Act is committed by a company, liability thereof falls on the company. In addition, under section 17(1)(a), subject to the proviso and sub-section (2), the person, if any, who has been nominated under sub-section (2) to be in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business (the person responsible) is also having personal liability. It is not disputed that at the time of transaction involved in this case the fifth respondent was the person responsible even though now he is out of service and the fifth petitioner was appointed in his place. The first contention of the petitioners is that even if the company is liable to be proceeded in the present case as manufacturer, the only person who could have been made an accused is the fifth respondent and nobody else.

    3. We are not in a position to accept that contention. Primary liability, even without reference to section 17, is that of the manufacturing company itself. Over and above that liability, the substantive law embodied in section 17 only created statutory criminal liability on the part of certain persons under certain circumstances. That is how criminal liability is fastened on the “person responsible” over and above the primary liability of the company itself. Therefore, in addition to the person responsible”, the company itself is liable to be impleaded. We agree that many officers of the company ought not to have been impleaded. Second petitioner company represented by petitioners 1, 5 and 6, was sufficient. Petitioners 3 and 4 and the 4th respondent were unnecessarily impleaded. Since the person responsible under section 17(1) at the time of the transaction was the fifth respondent, he ought to have been impleaded, but he was not impleaded. These defects will have to be rectified.

    4. The provision in section 16A that all offences under section 16(1) “shall” be tried in a summary way, need be understood only as “may”, accord ing to the discretion of the Magistrate. Under section 16(1), the penalty can go upto imprisonment for a period of three year's. In a case tried in the summary way, the sentence cannot go beyond a term of imprisonment for three months under section 262(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is an exception to that. Even there the sentence of imprisonment cannot go beyond one year when tried summarily. If all such cases are to be tried summarily, without any discretion in that respect to the Magistrate, the provision for maximum sentence will become meaningless. The discretion given in this respect under section 260 of the Code is not in any way affected by section 16A. When the case is’ tried in a summary way, the procedure to be followed is that of a summons case. Trial in a summons case begins when the accused enters appearance and the particulars of the offence stated to him Siddappa v. Patel Shivappa AIR 1967 Mys. 248. It could be said that when the case is tried as a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report, the trial commences only when the charge is framed after compliance with section 244. But, as held in Stare of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey AIR 1957 SC 389., followed in Pure Ice Cream Pvt. Ltd. v. Narendrajitsingh 1975 2 FAC 385., “trial” in section 20A or even under certian provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be understood to mean proceedings after framing of charge alone. The proceedings even before that could be treated as trial for the purpose of section 20A and evidence adduced at that stage also may be sufficient.

    5. Satisfaction on the evidence adduced before it during trial need not be from the complainant's evidence itself. It can be from the materials furnished by the accused also. Evidence is either oral or documentary. It can in some cases be by affidavit also when permitted by court. A fact is said to be proved when after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act on the supposition that it exists. In order to invoke the powers under section 20A, the satisfaction of the Magistrate, on the evidence adduced, that the person proceeded against is also concerned with the offence is necessary. That satisfaction is not an empty formality. But what is required at that stage is not a satisfaction necessary for conviction, but only a prima facie satisfaction for proceeding against the person?. That can be equated with the satisfaction required under section 19(1) of the Code, which is just like the one under sections 204,. 228 or 240, as held in Narayanan Nambiar v. State Of Kerala 1987 1 KLT 871.. We said so because an argument was raised that impleading was ordered without evidence and without a speaking order and hence invalid in this case, the company is admitted to be the manufacturer and the third respondent, from whom the second respondent made the purchase, to be its dealer. The third respondent produced the invoice alleged to be issued by the company with an affidavit. That document was accepted as prima facie evidence of sale made by the company to the third respondent and impleading was ordered by a speaking order. In our opinion, even such a speaking order was not necessary. The mere fact of proceeding against the person will be proof of satisfaction. Such satisfaction is not appealable. A revisional court also may not lightly interfere with that satisfaction which cannot be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction. Proof of genuineness or otherwise of the bill is a matter that may arise during trial when it is challenged. On that ground, we do not think that the order is liable to be challenged under section 482 as abuse of the process of Court.

    6. Then the contention was that the impleading of petitioners after respondents 3 and 4 were impleaded is against the spirit of section 20A as interpreted in Damadarans case (supra) and some other unreported decisions of this court. Relying on the decision in Food Inspector v. Indian Medical Practitioners Pharmacy and Stores Ltd. 1961 KLT 980, it was contended that section 19 does not apply to successive warranties and the case of successive warranties does not fall under the provisions of the Act. Halsbury's Laws of England, relied on in that decision, only said that when a man is prosecuted for giving a false warranty, it is no defence for him to say that he himself purchased under a warranty from another man. We are not at that question. In the decision in Ramanatha Agencies v. Food Inspector 1973 KLT 295, this court said that the plea under section 19(2) is available only to the vendor and not to the manufacturer, distributor or the dealer. It was held in that decision that the word “vendor” is not defined in the Act and it is used in the Act in different meanings in different contexts. In section 10, it may include manufacturer, distributor and dealer also, whereas in section 14, they are excluded. But it may not be correct to say that “vendor” in section 19(1) and (2) will not include manufacturer, distributor or dealer. Vendor is only the person who sells or exposes for sale. The definition of “sale” in the Act is very wide. Sale by the manufacturer to the distributor or dealer and the sale by the distributor or dealer to the vendor are also sales. They can sell to the ultimate consumer directly also. In all these cases, what is involved is sale and the person who sells is the vendor and he could come under the term “vendor” used in section 19(1) and (2) if he is prosecuted for having sold adulterated or misbranded articles of food. When the manufacturer is prosecuted for having sold or distributed adulterated article of food, he may not be able to raise a plea under section 19(2) because he cannot claim to have purchased from anybody else. All others when prosecuted for sale of an adulterated item of food could rely on section 19(2) on the basis of the purchase made by him, whether it be from the dealer, distributor or manufacturer. All these terms are relative.

    7. Manufacture for; sale or storing or selling or distributing in contravention of section 7 are violations punishable under section 16, whoever be the offender. When prosecution is for manufacture or sale without warranty or licence, the question of invoking section 19(2) may not arise. In all other cases, when a person, whether he be distributor, dealer or vendor, is prosecuted for possession, sale or distribution of adulterated food, he can rely on section 19(2) if that plea is available. In such cases, irrespective of the question whether he is the distributor or dealer, he is the vendor and the person to whom he sold the article is his vendee. He can turn against his immediate seller. It may not be correct to say that the benefit of section 19(2) is available only to the last vendor in contradistinction to the dealer or distributor who is also prosecuted for vending. Otherwise an absurd position may arise whereby the plea under section 19(2) could be resorted to only by the last vendor and it may not be available to the dealer or distributor who also purchased under a warranty and satisfies the requirements of section 19(2) when they are posecuted for such sales. That could, not have been what the legislature would have meant.

    8. With due respect, we are of the view that Damodaran's case (supra) was not correctly decided. That decision proceeded under two wrong assumptions concerning section 20A. Firstly, the decision assumes that if a manufacturer or distributor or dealer is already an accused in the case and the trial is pending against any one of them also along with the last vendor, section 20A has no application. That means if in a case instituted against the last vendor alone for having sold adulterated article of food, the distributor or dealer was impleaded and prosecuted along with him for having sold adulterated food to the “vendor”, his seller cannot be impleaded and he may not be entitled to raise the plea under section 19(2) even if he is capable of proving it. Such a contingency was not at all contemplated in section 20A. What section 20A contemplates is only trial of any offence alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer. In a case against the last vendor, if his immediate seller (whether he be distributor or dealer) is impleaded under section 20A on the application under section 19(2) and prosecuted along with him for having sold adulterated food to him, the case will not cease to be one for an offence committed by the last vendor. Secondly, the distributor or dealer is not prosecuted as such, but only as vendor. The position may be different if they are prosecuted along with the last vendor only for some other offence, e.g sale without warranty or licence. In such cases, the question of benefit of section 19(2) may not arise. Otherwise if the distributor or dealer is impleaded along with the last vendor only as vendors, further impleading under section 20A is not barred. Even without resort to section 20A, at the initial stage itself, a prosecution jointly against vendor, distributor, dealer and manufacturer could be had for offences alleged to have been committed by them. In appropriate cases, all or any of them could be impleaded under section 20A also.

    9. Another erroneous assumption we find in that decision is that the plea under section 19(2) is available only to the last vendor and not to the distributor or dealer even when he is prosecuted as the vendor and that the right to implead under section 20A is co-related to the defence under section 19(2). We have already stated that the defence under section 19(2) is available not only to the last vendor, but to the distributor and dealer also when they are prosecuted as vendors. The power to implead under section 20A is conditional only on the satisfaction on the evidence adduced during trial that the dealer, distributor or manufacturer is also concerned with that offence. It is part of the right and duty of the court to identify and proceed against ell the offenders when cognizance is taken of the offence. It is not concerned with the defence of the accused, under s???iaa 19(2) even though an application for impleading may be filed under section 20A unconnected with that defence provided the person impleaded appears to be concerned in the offence for which the trial is in progress. The provisions of section 20A are not intended to enable the accused to prove his defence under section 19(2) The said defence could be established even without impleading the manafacturer, distributor or dealer, from whom the article was purchased under a bill with or without warranty.

    10. It appears that some of the decisions, particularly those of the Supreme Court, relevant on the point were not cited at the bar before His Lordship when the decision in Damodaan's case (supra) was rendered. If an article of food produced by the manufacturer, which reaches the consumer, is found adulterated, all the three agencies (manufacturer, distributor or dealer and vendor) are responsible just like persons accused of the same offence. Once a valid complaint is made against a dealer, it will include the prosecution not only against him, but also of all the persons who committed that offence. That is exactly what section 20A seeks to achieve. Offences committed by the dealer, distributor and manufacturer are part of the same transaction and they could all be jointly tried. In fact, the offence committed by the manufacturer is much more serious than that of the dealer who trusted him Banarsi Das v. Municipal Council 1975 Crl L.J 674..

    11. A manufacturer and a distributor can also sell and each such sale can incur liability under section 7 and be prosecuted for it. The description of “vendor” in section 14 cannot affect the liability under section 7. Sale of an article of food by a manufacturer, distributor or dealer is a distinct and a separate offence. Section 14 was not meant to carve out an exception in favour of a distributor or manufacturer who sells articles of food, found to be adulterated, irrespective of the question whether any warranty was given. Neither section 7 nor section 14 bars trial of several offences by the same accused person, be he a manufacturer or a distributor or a last vendor referred to as vendor in section 14. Sale or distribution by the manufacturer to the distributor and that by the distributor or dealer to the last vendor are parts of the same transaction coming under section 223(d) of the Code. In view of the strict/liability under the Act and the object sought to be achieved, seperate proof of a common design or conspiracy is not necessary to establish that fact. The mere fact that an adulterated or misbranded article of food was manufactured for sale to be used by the consumer and it reached the consumer through these agencies or any of them is sufficient to establish the common design enabling joint trial of all of them. Lack of care and attention will then be presumed and that itself is sufficient to provide the common link. A sale at an anterior stage by a manufacturer or distributor to a vendor and a sale by the vendor to the actual consumer could be viewed as linked with each other as cause and effect Bhagwan Das v. Delhi Administration 1975 1 SCC 866.

    12. In Mangasdas v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1966 SC 128, it was held that “vendor” is not the only person from whom sample was taken. The word “vendor” means the person who sold the article, There can be successive “vendors” of the same art cle though sample was taken only from the last vendor. The vendor, whatever be the stage at which he became the vendor, is subject to the disability under section 19(1) from merely alleging that he was ignorant of the nature, substance or quality of the food sold by him. The corollary is that such a vendor can also avail himself of the defence under section 19(2). It is, therefore, clear that the propositions of law laid down in Damodaran's case (supra) in relation to section 20A are not correct.

    13. Section 20A is not an isolated provision. It is only an exception to section 20 of the Act as well as section 319 of the Code. The provisions of the Cods of Criminal Procedure regarding joinder of charges and trial are not in any way curtailed by section 20A. It only gives an exception by enlarging the scope Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander's case (supra) is authority for the position that in a suitable case, a vendor, a distributor and a manufacturer could be tried together. The connecting links between them could be provided by (i) the fact that an anterior sale could be viewed as the cause of subsequent sale, (ii) the allegation that each parted with the food when it was adulterated, and (iii) the common object that it should reach the consumer to be used as food which could be presumed. The last one is the most decisive factor. The discretion for ordering joint trial vests with the court. When joint trial is likely to jeopardise a fair trial, separate trials ought to be ordered. That should be determined on the facts of each case and the requirements of justice. Section 20A, just like section 223(d) of the Code, is only an enabling provision. It has to be read along with section 319 and 223(d) of the Code in the matter of joint trial.

    14. Section 20 of the Act cannot be equated with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or other Acts, which require the sanctioning authority to apply its mind before ordering prosecution of a person. All that the provision enjoins is that prosecution shall be instituted only with the consent of the authorities mentioned in the section. No mode or manner is prescribed as to how consent is to be given. No question of applying the mind to the facts of the case arises before sancion ion is given. It is only conferment of an authority to institute a case or class of cases. The section merely prescribes that the person or authorities designated are also competent to file complaints Dhian Singh v. Saharanpur Municipality 1969 2 SCC 371. Therefore, the provisions of section 20 need not, in any way, affect the application of section 20A which will have to be read along with the relevant provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, including sections 319 and 223 Section 20A need only be treated as an addition or exception to the provisions in the Code. The impugned orders are, therefore, passed with jurisdiction. They cannot be treated as abuse of prccess of court liable to be interfered with in exercise of inherent powers. Petitioners 3 and 4 and the fourth respondent will have to be removed from the party an ay and fifth respondent will have to be added as an accused, in his capacity as the person responsible. That is all the interference required and we interfere with the orders only to that extent.

    15. Subject to what is stated in the preceding paragraph, the Crl. M.C is dismissed.

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    Chandak v. Food Inspector .
    (Feb 6, 1990)