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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Revision Under Section 20-A, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from proceedings against the petitioners under Section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Mohd. Ashraf Khan, a Food Inspector of Srinagar, took a sample of ghee from the accused Abdul Samad Gujri, who was standing trial before the Municipal Magistrate, Srinagar. A portion of that sample was sent to the Chemical Examiner, who reported that the sample was adulterated and did not conform to prescribed standards. Abdul Samad Gujri contested the charge; while prosecution witnesses were being examined under Section 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, he applied for summoning the petitioners under Section 20-A on the ground that they were manufacturers of the adulterated article and therefore liable to prosecution.

The Food Inspector supported the application to prosecute the petitioners. The trial court, after hearing arguments, by order dated 11-6-1974, being satisfied that the petitioners were connected with the alleged offence, directed that they be summoned and arrayed as accused. The petitioners challenged that order by way of revision to this court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is ultra vires as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (i.e., whether it introduces impermissible discrimination).
  2. Whether the procedure prescribed by Section 20-A deprives persons summoned under it (manufacturers or distributors) of the special protection accorded by Section 20 of the Act (consent/sanction to institute prosecution).
  3. Whether summoning the petitioners for joint trial with the dealer (Abdul Samad Gujri) would cause serious prejudice to the petitioners because their defences are allegedly antagonistic, thus vitiating a joint trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. R. P. Sethi)

  • Section 20-A is discriminatory and contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution.
  • The procedure under Section 20-A deprives manufacturers/distributors of the protection available to other accused under Section 20 (i.e., prosecution may not be instituted with the requisite written consent of designated authorities for manufacturers/distributors).
  • The petitioners would be prejudiced by a joint trial because their defences are diametrically opposed to that of the dealer who sought their summons.
  • An ancillary argument was made about warranty (i.e., warranty issues between dealer and manufacturer), but the court declined to decide that point at the revision stage, noting it was a matter for trial.
  • A specific contention on behalf of petitioner Om Prakash was that there was no material linking him to the firm (Banarsi Das / Jammu Khalis Ghee Laboratories) that manufactured the adulterated ghee.

Prosecution / Complainant's Position

  • The Food Inspector (complainant) supported the application to summon the petitioners as they were alleged manufacturers/distributors connected with the adulterated article.
  • The trial court likewise considered the evidence placed before it and was satisfied that the petitioners were connected with the offence, thus ordering their summons.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarjoo Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 631 (1961-1 Cri LJ 747) Illustrates that prohibition of sale of adulterated food is imposed for public health; liability may extend to owners, agents or servants involved in sale of adulterated food. Used to support the proposition that manufacturers and distributors who are part of the production-distribution-sale chain cannot escape criminal liability merely because a dealer sold the article; this supports reasonable classification underlying Section 20-A.
Dhian Singh v. Saharanpur Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 371; AIR 1970 SC 318 Holds that Section 20 (consent to prosecute) is a conferment of authority to institute complaints and does not require the sanctioning authority to apply its mind to particular facts before an offence occurs. Relied upon to conclude that Section 20 does not impose a pre-prosecution "apply-your-mind" requirement and that Section 20-A's mechanism is a permissible alternative for summoning manufacturers/distributors once the court is satisfied on available evidence.
Full Bench, Delhi High Court, ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 771; (1973 Cri LJ 690) Addresses validity and permissibility of joint trial of a dealer with a manufacturer or distributor under Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Applied to support the court's conclusion that joint trial of dealer and manufacturer/distributor is valid where offences form part of the same transaction, and therefore the petitioners' claim of prejudicial joint trial was rejected.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the petitioners' contentions in the order they were raised.

  1. On the Article 14 / discrimination challenge to Section 20-A:
    • The court held the contention to be devoid of force. It reasoned that production, distribution and sale of food are three distinct processes and that manufacturer, distributor and dealer form part of the same chain. Holding all three liable when adulteration is found is not discriminatory but reflects a reasonable classification aimed at protecting public health and curbing the social evil of adulteration.
    • Addressing the petitioners' point about the dealer's statutory right under Section 13(2) to seek further testing at the Central Food Laboratory (and the practical difficulty that manufacturers/distributors may not have an equivalent opportunity), the court found this argument unsubstantial: (a) if the dealer exercises Section 13(2) and obtains a favourable certificate, manufacturers/distributors also benefit; (b) if the dealer does not exercise that right, the absence of that opportunity does not constitute a valid defence for the manufacturer; and (c) the offence by the manufacturer was characterized as more serious than that by the dealer because the dealer may have relied on the manufacturer.
    • The court relied on Sarjoo Prasad to reinforce that those involved in sale/production cannot escape liability.
  2. On the contention that Section 20-A deprives manufacturers/distributors of the protection of Section 20 (i.e., consent to prosecute):
    • The court examined Section 20 and concluded it merely prescribes that specified persons or authorities are competent to file complaints; it does not prescribe a mode requiring the sanctioning authority to apply its mind to facts of each case at the stage of instituting prosecution.
    • The court relied on Dhian Singh v. Saharanpur Municipality to explain that Section 20 is a conferment of authority to institute complaints and does not import a requirement of pre-prosecution application of mind to facts.
    • Section 20-A was interpreted as a valid substitution in respect of manufacturers/distributors because it conditions summoning on the court being “satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it,” that the manufacturer/distributor is concerned with the offence. The court stressed that the term “satisfied” is strong and requires sufficient materials before the Magistrate to make an order under Section 20-A.
    • Applying that standard to the present case, the trial Magistrate had given cogent reasons for summoning petitioner No. 1 (Banarsi Das) — including admissions in his petition/affidavit of partnership in the firm which produced the adulterated article — and thus the Magistrate was justified in summoning him.
  3. On the plea that joint trial would cause prejudice because of antagonistic defences:
    • The court rejected this contention. It held that the offences of the dealer and of the manufacturer/distributor arise from the same transaction (the same adulterated article). Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code permits joint trial of offences committed in the same transaction.
    • The court also referred to the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court (ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 771) which had held that joint trial of a dealer with a manufacturer or distributor is valid and permissible.
  4. On the specific case of petitioner Om Prakash:
    • The court found there was no evidence to connect Om Prakash with the firm (Banarsi Das / Jammu Khalis Ghee Laboratories) as partner, manager or employee. The Magistrate had not referred to any evidence tying Om Prakash to the firm and had relied only on an oral statement by one of the accused persons.
    • Although Om Prakash was a brother of Banarsi Das, there was nothing on record to show the firm was a joint family concern. The court concluded that clear evidence is required before Om Prakash could be arraigned and therefore quashed the proceedings against him, while leaving open the prosecution's right to reapply under Section 20-A should sufficient material later be produced.
  5. On the sufficiency of materials generally:
    • The court declined to entertain detailed challenges to the sufficiency of the materials at the revision stage, observing that such issues may properly be tested at trial and that insufficient evidence at trial would lead to acquittal if warranted.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core rulings):

  • The application of petitioner No. 1 (Banarsi Das) is dismissed.
  • The application of petitioner No. 2 (Om Prakash) is allowed; the proceedings and the Magistrate's order against him are quashed.
  • Banarsi Das is directed to appear before the Municipal Magistrate, Srinagar, on 25-11-1974; failing which the Magistrate is to ensure his attendance by taking necessary steps in accordance with law.

Implications:

The direct effect is that proceedings against Om Prakash are quashed while the summons and prosecution against Banarsi Das remain valid and are to proceed. The court upheld the validity of Section 20-A as a constitutionally permissible measure and rejected the claim that Section 20-A unlawfully discriminates or deprives manufacturers/distributors of protection under Section 20. The court also held that joint trial of dealer, manufacturer and distributor is permissible where offences form part of the same transaction. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond applying and relying on earlier authorities; its immediate consequence is limited to the parties in this matter and leaves open the prosecution's right to reapply in respect of Om Prakash should further material be produced.

Order accordingly.

    Banarsi Das And Another Accused v. The Municipal Council, Srinagar And Another

    1. This is a revision application for quashing the proceedings taken: against the petitioners under Section 20-A, of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), The petition arises in the following circumstances.

    2. Mohd. Ashraf Khan, a Food Inspector of the city of Srinagar, took a sample of Ghee from the accused, Abdul Samad Gujri who is standing trial before the Municipal Magistrate Srinagar. A part of the sample was sent to the Chemical Examiner who found that the sample was adulterated and did not conform to the standard prescribed. The accused did not plead guilty, but contested the trial and while the witnesses of the prosecution were being examined under Section 256 of the Criminal P.C, the accused Abdul Samad Gujri filed an application before the trial court for summoning the petitioners under Section 20-A of the Act, inasmuch as they were manufacturers of the adulterated article of fool and were therefore liable to prosecution under Section 20-A of the Act. The Food Inspector, who is the complainant in the case, supported the application of the accused and pressed for the prosecution of the petitioners also. The trial’ court heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and by his order dated 11-6-1974 on being satisfied that the petitioners were connected with the offence alleged against them, directed that they be summoned and arrayed as accused in the case. It is against this order that the petitioners have come up in revision to this court. In support of the rule, Mr. R.P Sethi, learned counsel for the petitioners raised three important contentions before me. In the first place he contended that Section 20-A was itself ultra vires as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Secondly it was contended that the procedure prescribed by Section 20-A deprives the petitioners who are to be summoned under Section 20-A of the special protection provided to the other accused by way of the fact that the complaint against them can be filed by a person authorised by a competent authority. Lastly it was argued that as the defence of the petitioners and that of the accused, Abdul Samad Gujri, were diametrically opposite, the petitioners would be seriously prejudiced if they were jointly tried with the other accused at whose instance they were sought to be summoned. Finally some comment was also made on the question of warranty but it is not necessary for me to go into this question because the validity of the warranty etc, is a matter which has to be gone into at the trial and cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage when the petitioners want the quashing of the proceedings.

    3. As regards the first contention that Section 20-A is discriminatory as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. I am clearly of the opinion that this contention is completely devoid of force. Section 20-A of the Act runs as follows:—

    “Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of S. 351 of the Criminal P.C 1898, (5 of 1898), or in S. 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under Section 20.”

    4. The section merely creates a liability of the manufacturer of an article which is found to be adulterated. In fact the production of an article of food involves three different processes: the actual production which is done by the manufacturer; the distribution of the article which is done by the distributing agency and the actual sale to the people consuming the article which function is performed by the dealer. It would thus appear that the three constituents namely, the manufacturer, distributor and the dealer must be held responsible if an article of food is found to be adulterated. They are just like persons accused of the same offence and therefore the question of discrimination does not at all arise. Indeed if we accept the argument of the counsel for the petitioners that Section 20-A is discriminatory it will be giving free license to, manufacturers and distributors to commit adulteration and get away with it and the only person who would be caught would be the dealer, which however could not have been the intention of the Parliament in passing the Act which is meant to crush and curb social evils. Mr. Sethi however argued that in the case of a dealer if a sample is taken by a Food Inspector, the dealer has the right to get the same examined by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory at Calcutta under Section 13(2) of the Act and under Section 13(3) of the Act the certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory shall supersede the report given by the Public Analyst under Section 13(1) of the Act. The argument was put in this fashion: A Food Inspector takes a sample from a dealer on a particular day and immediately after the report of the Public Analyst is available the dealer has the right to get the sample which is with him examined by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, but this right is not available to a distributor or a manufacturer because by the time they are summoned by the court, sufficient period has elapsed and it will not be possible for the Director of the Central Food Laboratory to test the validity of the report of the Public Analyst. This therefore results in utter discrimination so far as the manufacturer and the distributor are concerned. The argument is attractive but on close scrutiny it seems to me without any substance. It is true that a dealer has the right to get the sample examined by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory under Section 13, but if this right is exercised by the accused i.e the dealer, the manufacturer and the distributor also get the advantage if the certificate of the Director goes in favour of the dealer. Furthermore if the dealer does not choose to exercise his right under Section 13(2), the mere fact that the manufacturer or the distributor are unable to exercise this right does not cause any prejudice to them. The article of food produced by the manufacturer and distributed by the distributing agency is either adulterated or not adulterated. If the article is not adulterated, then naturally the manufacturer and the distributor go scot-free and are not liable to any action. If, however, the article is found to be adulterated it is no defence to say that although the manufacturer also committed adulteration yet he should not be punished, merely because the dealer who has sold the article produced by the manufacturer does not choose to exercise his right under Section 13 of the Act. Furthermore it seems to me that the offence committed by the manufacturer in adulterating an article of food is a much more serious matter than that committed by a dealer, because in such a case the dealer has trusted the manufacturer who has betrayed the former, In these circumstances the main accused should be the manufacturer rather than the dealer, but the dealer is also held liable because it is his duty to get a warranty from the manufacturer in which case he would not be liable to prosecution under the Act itself. Thus, therefore, even if the manufacturer is an accused, the offence committed by him being a more severe and serious one, he stands in a class by itself, and Section 20-A can be justified on the ground that it is based on a very reasonable classification aimed at protecting the society from social evils. In Sarjoo Prasad v. State of U.P, AIR 1961 SC 631 at p. 632 : (1961-1 Cri LJ 747 at p. 749) it was pointed out that every person, be he an employer or an agent, is prohibited from selling adulterated food. In this connection their Lordships observed as follows:—

    “Prohibition of sale of adulterated food is evidently imposed in the larger interest of maintenance of public health. The prohibition applies to all persons who sell adulterated food, and for contravention of the prohibition all such persons are penalised. Because the legislature has sought to penalize a person who sells adulterated food by his agent, it cannot be assumed that it was intended to penalise only those who may act through their agents. If the owner of a shop in which adulterated food is sold is without proof of mens rea liable to be punished for sale of adulterated food, we fail to appreciate why an agent or a servant of the owner is not liable to be punished for contravention of the same provision unless he is shown to have guilty knowledge.”

    5. It is clear from these observations that the manufacturer or the distributor being equally involved in the process of selling adulterated articles of food cannot escape criminal liability.

    6. Coming now to the second argument, namely, that by summoning the petitioners under Section 20-A the manufacturer does not get the benefit of having been prosecuted without the requisite sanction required under Section 20 of the Act, I think the contenion is purely illusory. Section 20 runs thus:—

    “No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, (the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority):

    Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in Section 12, if he produces in a court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint.

    (2) No court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act.”

    7. A careful examination of the language in which the section is couched dearly shows that it cannot be equated with those provisions of the Criminal P.C or other Acta which require the sanctioning authority to apply its mind before ordering the prosecution of a person. All that the provision enjoins is that the prosecution shall be instituted only with the consent of the authorities mentioned in this section. No mode or manner is prescribed as to how the consent is to be given. Secondly this is an internal matter only to determine the convenience of a person or authority who is to file the complaint against the accused who has committed an offence under the Act. I am fortified in my view by the observations of a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Dhian Singh v. Saharanpur Municipality, (1969) 2 SCC 371 : AIR 1970 SC 318 at p. 321 : (1970 Cri LJ 492 at p. 496) wherein their Lordships observed as follows:—

    “Under Section 20 of the Act, 1954, no question of applying one's mind to the facts of the case before the institution of the complaint arises as to the authoriy to be conferred under that provision can be conferred long before a particular offence has taken place. It is a conferment of an authority to institute a particular case or even a class of cases. That section merely prescribes that persons or authorities designated in that section are alone competent to file complaints under the statute in question.”

    8. It follows, therefore, that once a valid complaint is made against a dealer by the Food Inspector, it will include the prosecution not only of the dealer but also of all the persons who have committed the offence, including the manufacturer and the distributor This is exactly what Section 20-A seeks to achieve. Furthermore even if a manufacturer or distributor is deprived of the protection granted by Section 20, these two persons are given the same kind of protection in another form by the provisions of Section 20-A itself which requires that the accused can be summoned only if the court is satisfied on the evidence before it that they were concerned with the offence. The word ‘satisfied’ is a very strong term and clearly denotes that the Magistrate must have sufficient materials before him to show that the manufacturer or the distributor is concerned with the offence alleged before the Magistrate can pass an order under this section. This, therefore, is a good and valid substitution in Section 20 of the Act in the case of a manufacturer or a distributor and they can therefore have no grievance on this score. In the instant case the Magistrate has given cogent and convincing reasons for holding that at least petitioner No. 1 was closely connected with the offence, because on his own showing he was a partner of the firm which had produced the adulterated article of food. For these reasons, therefore, this contention is also overruled.

    9. The learned counsel for the petitioners wanted to take me into the sufficiency or otherwise of the materials but that is not a point which can be agitated at this stage. If the materials are insufficient, then the Magistrate will certainly acquit the petitioners at the proper stage.

    10. Lastly it was argued that the joint trial of the petitioners with the accused, Abdul Samad Gujri, was vitiated as it caused serious prejudice to the petitioners. I am, however, unable to agree with this contention. There can be no doubt that the offences committed by the accused Abdul Samad Gujri and that committed by the petitioners form part of the same transaction in that it is the same article of food which is manufactured by the petitioners and which in turn has been sold by the dealer and therefore the dealer, distributor and the manufacturer are equally liable under the provisions of the Act, and they cannot escape conviction merely by taking shelter under Section 239(d) Of the Criminal P.C which itself justifies joint trial of offences committed in the same transaction. An identical point was raised before a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in ILR (1970) 2 Delhi 771 : (1973 Cri LJ 690) wherein their Lordships clearly held that joint trial of a dealer with a manufacturer or distributor is valid and permissible and is justified by the provisions of Sec. 239 of the Criminal P.C

    11. Lastly it was argued by the counsel for the petitioners that so far as the petitioner Om Prakash was concerned, there was absolutely no material to show that he was in any way connected with the firm of Banarsi Das which had manufactured Ghee found adulterated in the present case. This argument, in my opinion, is sound and must prevail. There is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner No. 2, Om Prakash, had anything to do with the firm of Banarsi Das either as a partner, manager or employee or things like that. In fact the learned Magistrate has also not referred to any evidence which shows any connection between Om Prakash and the firm of Banarsi Das and has relied only on the oral statement made by one of the accused persons. It is true that Om Prakash is a brother of Banarsi Das, but there is nothing on the record to show that the firm of which Banarsi Das is the owner is a joint family firm. These are matters on which clear evidence has to be led before Om Prakash can be arraigned as accused in this case. In these circumstances the proceedings against Om Prakash must be quashed but it will be open to the prosecution to apply to the Magistrate again under Section 20-A of the Act to summon Om Prakash if the prosecution is able to produce sufficient material to show that Om Prakash is in any way connected with the firm of Banarsi Das. So far as Banarsi Das is concerned, there are sufficient materials against him, and in fact in paragraph (1) of his petition in this court Banarsi Das has clearly admitted that he was a partner of the firm of the Jammu Khalis Ghee Laboratories, Gumat Bazar, Jammu. Even in paragraph (2) of the affidavit sworn by the petitioner, the same averment has been reiterated. There is no dispute that petitioner No. 1, Banarsi Das, is the partner of the firm which has manufactured the adulterated article. In these circumstances I am of the opinion that the learned Magistrate was fully justified in summoning petitioner No. 1, Banarsi Das, and directing him to be arrayed as an accused in this case.

    12. The result is that the application of Banarsi Das is dismissed but the application of Om Prakash is allowed and the proceedings taken against him as also the order of the Magistrate passed against him are quashed. The petitioner Banarsi Das shall now appear before the Municipal Magistrate Srinagar on 25-11-1974 failing which the learned Magistrate shall ensure his attendance by taking necessary steps in accordance with law.

    13. Order accordingly.

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    Banarsi Das And Another Accused v. The Municipal Council, Srinagar And Another
    (Oct 31, 1974)