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  • S. 33 of the Evidence Act
  • Code. Evidence Act S. 3
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  • S. 33 of the Evidence Act
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenges an order passed under Section 319 CrPC. Criminal Case C.C. 69 of 1985 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Cannanore, was charge-sheeted by police only against three accused persons (referred to as respondents 3 to 5). The second respondent (the de facto complainant) had implicated the petitioner in the first information statement, but the police omitted the petitioner from the charge-sheet. During trial the Magistrate examined the second respondent as PW-1 (there is a dispute whether he was examined-in-chief only or fully examined). On the application of the second respondent the Magistrate, being satisfied from the evidence, issued process under Section 319 CrPC to the petitioner as the fourth accused. The petitioner filed Crl. R.P. 107/86 in revision, which was dismissed by the Sessions Judge. The petitioner therefore approached the High Court seeking to quash the Magistrate's order in exercise of the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the scope and ambit of the powers conferred on criminal courts by Section 319 CrPC to proceed against any person not being an accused who appears to have committed the offence?
  2. Can a person whom the police have omitted or released (including those exonerated by police during investigation) be brought under Section 319(1) CrPC during inquiry or trial?
  3. Does the word "evidence" in Section 319(1) CrPC include (a) statements recorded by police under Section 161 Evidence Act or other materials collected during investigation, and (b) witness depositions before court if the witness has not been cross-examined or re-examined?
  4. Whether before forming an opinion under Section 319(1) the Magistrate was obliged to examine additional witnesses?
  5. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to interfere with an order under Section 319(1) where the Magistrate's satisfaction is challenged on sufficiency of the material?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that the evidence relied upon (PW-1's deposition) was incomplete because PW-1 was not cross-examined (and there is a factual dispute whether he was fully examined), and therefore the deposition could not be treated as "evidence" for the purposes of Section 319(1).
  • The petitioner argued that he had been effectively exonerated or omitted by the police during investigation and that such police action should bar the court from proceeding against him under Section 319(1).
  • The petitioner further contended that before forming an opinion under Section 319(1) the Magistrate should have examined additional witnesses (i.e., more than the de facto complainant) to reach a satisfaction permitting process to be issued.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S. S. Khanna v. Chief Secretary, Patna ((1983) 3 SCC 42 : AIR 1983 SC 595) Established/quoted the principle that Section 319 CrPC is an extraordinary provision to be used sparingly; quoted with approval the observation in Joginder Singh. The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that S. 319 confers an extraordinary power and should be exercised only in compelling cases; used to support the view that Magistrate's satisfaction need not be lightly disturbed.
Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab ((1979) 1 SCC 345 : AIR 1979 SC 339) Recognised principles about the court's duty to identify offenders and that S. 319 may be invoked to include persons not previously named, including unknown persons becoming known during trial. The Court cited Joginder Singh to show that S. 319 may be applied to bring persons on record who were omitted earlier and that the court has the duty to find out offenders; it supports the view that persons dropped by police may be added during trial.
Phani Bhusan v. Sibakatt Basu (AIR 1952 Calcutta 218) Held that evidence of a witness not fully examined (and not cross-examined) could not be considered; such evidence was expunged in those facts. The Court distinguished and declined to follow this decision for the present purpose, explaining that those cases involved acceptance of evidence as between parties on record entitled to cross-examine; here the petitioner was not an accused at the time and therefore was not entitled to cross-examine PW-1.
John Manjooran v. Stephen (1973 KLT 376) Followed Phani Bhusan and held that a witness examined only in-chief and not cross-examined could not be considered as evidence in certain contexts. The Court treated this decision as distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the present situation for reasons explained (petitioner was not a party entitled to cross-examine when PW-1 was examined).
Srt Mahant Amar Nath v. State of Haryana ((1983) 1 SCC 391 : AIR 1983 SC 288) Illustrated that adding omitted persons under Section 319 may be a matter of appreciation of evidence and such action is challengeable at the final stage after trial. The Court relied on this case to support the proposition that the correctness of accepting evidence for forming satisfaction under S. 319(1) is ultimately a matter for final appreciation at trial and not ordinarily for earlier interference.
Gunaram Tantt v. State of Assam (1883 Crl. L.J 289) Expressed the view that the "evidence" in S. 319(1) means evidence produced at the inquiry or trial and not merely materials collected during investigation. The Court agreed with this view, adopting the distinction that police materials collected during investigation are not 'evidence' under S. 319(1) unless proved and tendered at inquiry or trial.
Delhi Municipality v. Ram Klshan ((1983) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1983 SC 67) Noted for the proposition that "Prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court." The Court observed this proposition and reconciled it with its view that the word "evidence" in S. 319(1) refers to evidence produced at inquiry or trial; thus prosecution may produce evidence at any stage but the evidence must be brought and proved at the relevant stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequential and principled manner, adhering to the text of Section 319 CrPC, the Code's structure and relevant authorities:

  1. Nature and scope of Section 319 CrPC:

    Section 319 is located in Chapter XXIV (general provisions as to inquiries and trials). It confers an extraordinary power on criminal courts to proceed against a person not already an accused if, in the course of inquiry or trial, it appears from the evidence that such person has committed an offence triable along with the accused. Because this power is extraordinary, it should be exercised sparingly and only where compelling reasons exist.

  2. Validity of the Magistrate's action and revisional outcome:

    The Magistrate acted within statutory power when, on his judicial satisfaction from the evidence, he issued process against the petitioner under Section 319(1). The revisional court considered the matter and dismissed the revision. The High Court emphasised that the Magistrate's satisfaction, when based on materials envisaged by Section 319(1), is not ordinarily open to interference on sufficiency grounds in revision or by the High Court's inherent jurisdiction except in exceptional cases.

  3. Effect of proceeding under Section 319:

    Proceeding under Section 319(1) does not amount to a finding of guilt. The order indicates that the evidence discloses material sufficient for issuing process; under Section 319(4)(a) proceedings against the added person shall be commenced afresh and witnesses re-heard. Any perceived prejudice is limited to undergoing the trial where the person can demonstrate innocence.

  4. Persons omitted or released by police:

    The fact that the police omitted a person from the charge-sheet or released/exonerated him during investigation is not a bar to the court exercising Section 319(1). Investigation and filing of report are police functions; once the final report is before the court, it is the court's province to decide how to proceed. The phrase "any person not being the accused" therefore includes persons dropped by the police, and the court has a duty to bring on record those who appear from evidence to have been involved in the offence.

  5. Meaning of "evidence" in Section 319(1):

    The Evidence Act defines 'evidence' to include statements made before court by witnesses and documents produced for inspection of court. The Court concluded that the "evidence" in Section 319(1) means evidence tendered and produced during inquiry or trial (oral evidence before court or documents proved in court), not merely materials or statements recorded during investigation (e.g., statements under Section 161). Police statements and investigation materials are not automatically 'evidence' for the purposes of Section 319(1) unless they are proved and tendered at the stage of inquiry or trial.

  6. Whether witness deposition not cross-examined can be used:

    The petitioner relied on decisions holding that a witness not fully examined and not subjected to cross-examination cannot be treated as evidence. The Court distinguished those authorities on facts. It reasoned that at the stage when PW-1 was examined the petitioner was not an accused and therefore had no right to cross-examine. The satisfaction required under Section 319(1) is akin to the satisfaction under Sections 204, 228 or 240 — a preliminary judicial opinion based on evidence before the court at that stage. The opportunity to cross-examine and test the witness will arise at the fresh trial mandated by Section 319(4)(a). Thus, non-cross-examination by parties who were on the record at that time does not render the material inadmissible for forming the Magistrate's satisfaction under Section 319(1).

  7. Whether the Magistrate should have examined more witnesses:

    The Court rejected the submission that the Magistrate was obliged to examine additional witnesses before forming an opinion under Section 319(1). The statutory requirement is the Magistrate's satisfaction based on evidence during inquiry or trial; no strict guideline prescribes a minimum number of witnesses. The matter of sufficiency of such evidence is ultimately an issue of appreciation to be tested at the final stage.

  8. Scope of High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482:

    The Court reiterated that the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC are to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases, and are not intended to enable the High Court to sit in judgment on the correctness or sufficiency of materials underlying judicial pronouncements at preliminary stages such as formation of satisfaction under Section 319(1).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under Section 482 CrPC is DISMISSED. The Magistrate's order issuing process against the petitioner under Section 319 CrPC was within jurisdiction and the revisional court rightly declined interference.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The petitioner must stand trial; the order under Section 319(1) stands and the added accused is entitled to a fresh trial with opportunity to re-hear witnesses and to cross-examine them.
  • On the meaning of "evidence": The Court clarified that the "evidence" referred to in Section 319(1) is evidence produced at inquiry or trial (oral statements made before court or documents proved in court), and does not, by itself, include raw investigation materials or Section 161 statements unless they are proved and tendered as evidence during inquiry or trial.
  • On police omission/exoneration: Police decision to omit or release a person is not conclusive; the court may, if satisfied by evidence at inquiry/trial, add such person under Section 319(1).
  • On remedies: The High Court will not ordinarily exercise Section 482 to re-evaluate the sufficiency of materials underlying a Magistrate's satisfaction under Section 319(1); such substantive appraisal is to be done at trial.
  • Precedential effect: The decision reaffirms existing principles (as discussed in cited authorities) concerning the sparing use of Section 319 and the distinction between investigation materials and evidence at trial; the opinion does not announce a novel rule but applies and explains established principles to the facts at hand.

No other procedural orders or ancillary directions were pronounced beyond the dismissal; the opinion concludes with the petition being dismissed.

    Narayanan Nambiar v. State Of Kerala

    1. The simple but interesting and useful question posed far judicial scrutiny in this petition filed under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is concerning the scope and ambit of the powers of criminal courts under S. 319 of the Code to proceed against any person, not being an accused, who appears to have committed the offence. The Section may with advantage be extracted here:

    “(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.

    (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.

    (3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence when he appears to have committed.

    (4) Where the Court proceeds agaimt any person under sub-s. (1) then—

    (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard;

    (b) subject to the provision of clause (a), the case may proceed as If such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced”.

    2. C.C 69 of 1985 pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Cannanore was charge-sheeted by the police only against three accused (respondents 3 to 5). Second respondent is the de facto complaisant, who implicated the petitioner also in the first information statement, but the police omitted him. During trial the Magistrate examined second respondent as Pw. 1 (there is a dispute whether he was examined in chief alone or fully examined). Thereafter on the application of the 2nd respondent the Magist rate ordered process against the petitioner as fourth accused on the satisfaction from the evidence that he also appears to have involvement in the crime. Crl. R.P 107/86 filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Sessions Judge and hence he requests this Court to quash the order in exercise of the inherent powers.

    3. Many interesting aspects of the matter were discussed at the Bar and I am considering them only by way of academic importance. Even without considering those aspects this petition has only to be dismissed because no situation has arisen justifying interference under the inherent powers. The Magistrate was only acting within his powers under the Code on his judicial satisfaction that there are grounds for proceeding against the petitioner. Against the order the revisional jurisdiction was resorted to and failed. The satisfaction of the Magistrate or the opinion formed by him, if based on materials mentioned in S. 319(1), is normally not liable to be disturbed even by the revisional court on the sufficiency of the material. Proceeding under S. 319(1) does not mean that there is a finding that he committed the offence. The order only means that the evidence disclosed materials for taking cogniz ance of the offence as against him also and there are sufficient grounds to issue process against him. As provided in S. 319(4)(a) the effect of such an action is to have a fresh trial as against him in which event the witnesses examined will have to be re-heard. No question of prejudice is involved except the ordeal of a trial in which he could show his innocence if that is the position. The order passed with jurisdiction and confirmed by the revisional court does not involve any question of illegality and there is no abuse of the process of court to be prevented or ends of justice being otherwise secured. Powers under S. 482 could be exercised only sparingly in exceptional cases and it is not intended to authorise the High Court to sit in judgment over judicial pronouncements in order to find out their correctness or sufficiency of materials on which they are based.

    4. The Section appears in Chapter XXIV dealing with general provisions as to inquiries and trials as distinguished from Chapters XIV, XV and XVI relating to initiation of proceedings, complaints to Magistrates and commencement of proceedings before Magistrates. Cognizance and issue of process are dealt with in those chapters. This particular provision in Chapter XXIV really confers an extraordinary power on criminal courts. Therefore it should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the person against whom action has not been taken. (See S. S. Khanna v. Chief Secretary, Patna ((1983) 3 SCC 42 : AIR 1983 SC 595) in which the observation in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab ((1979) 1 SCC 345 : AIR 1979 SC 339) was quoted with approval). The Section (S. 319) clearly applies to all criminal courts including a Sessions Court. Sessions Court also is having the power to add any person, not being the accused before it, but against whom there appears during trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence, as an accused and direct him to be tried along with the other accused. Both under Ss. 209 and 193 commitment is of the ‘case’ and not of the ‘accused’ as distinguished from S. 193(3) and S. 207A of the old Code where commitment was of the ‘accused’ and not the ‘case’. For committing a case there must be an offence and involvement of a person who committed the same. Even though the case is committed, cognizance taken is of the offence and not the offender. Office the case in respect of the offence qua the accused, who are before the Court, is committed and cognizaace is taken the embargo under S. 193 regarding taking cognizance only by committal goes. Summoning additional persons will then be regarded as incidental to the cognizance already taken on committal and as a part of the normal process that follows. A fresh committal of such person is not necessary. Further, S. 319(4)(b) enacts a deeming provision in that behalf dispensing with the formal committal order by providing that the person added will be deemed to have been an accused even when cognizance was taken first. Cognizance is of the offence and not the offender and it is the duty of the court to find out who the offenders are. Proceedings could be instituted and cognizance taken also against persons not known at that time. This is clear if the provisions of S. 190 of the Code are read along with the definition of complaint in S. 2(d) which include allegations against unknown person also. Making the unknown persons known is therefore within the powers of the court. When such persons become known by the evidence during inquiry or trial it is not only the right but also the duty of court to bring them on record and proceed against them in an attempt to bring them to justice. (See Joginder Singh's case—(1979) 1 SCC 345 : AIR 1979 SC 339). There cannot therefore be any dispute regarding the powers of court to bring the person under S. 319(1).

    5. Then the question was whether a person who was also complained of but exonerated by the police as a result of his innocence disclosed by investigation could be brought in under S. 319 (I). En this case the first information statement given by the second respondent implicated the petitioner also but in the police report he was not made an accused. But that cannot be a bar to the powers of court under S. 319(1). What the Section says is ‘any person not being the accused’. Investigation alone is the province of police. It is true that it is within the powers of the investigating agency to assess the materials collected during investigation to decide whether the accused has to be placed for trial or a refer report has to be filed. But once when a final report is filed it is within the powers of court to decide as to how to proceed with it. Court is not bound by the opinion formed by the investigating agency. The only conditions required far the applicability of S. 319(1) are (1) it must appear from the evidence during inquiry or trial that such person appears to have committed the offence and (2) the offence is one for which he could be tried along with the other accused. ‘Any person not being an accused’ cannot exclude from its operation a person who has been released by the police under S. 169. Even persons dropped by the polios during investigation could be roped in under S. 319(1) if evidence showing their involvement comes before court (See Joginder Singh's case, (1979) 1 SCC 345 : AIR 1979 SC. 339).

    6. Then the argument turned on the question of ‘evidence’ mentioned in S. 319(1). The word evidence has not been defined in the Code. Evidence Act S. 3 defiaea ‘evidence’ as meaning and including all statements made before court by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under enquiry and all documents produced for inspection of court. In this case we are concerned only with the first category namely oral evidence. That category includes only statements before court by witnesses. It was argued that PW. 1 was the only witness examined and he was not cross-examined (but this fast is disputed). The learned counsel for the petitioner told me that ‘evidence’ mentioned in S. 319(1) cannot take in the deposition of a witness during inquiry or trial who was not cross-examined and re-examined because the deposition will be complete only when these processes are undergone.

    7. In support of. this contention be relied on two decisions, Phani Bhusan v. Sibakatt Basu (AIR 1952 Calcutta 218) and John Manjooran v. Stephen (1973 KLT 376). The first decision was followed in the second and both decisions held that if a witness is not examined in full in chief and also allowed to be cross-examined, and re-examined that evidence cannot be considered except in the circumstances mentioned in S. 33 of the Evidence Act which do not exist in this case. I do not think those decisfons will be applicable for our purpose. In the first case Pws. 3 and 4 were not tendered for cross-examication and hence their evidence expunged even though they were in favour of the defence. In the second case the evidence of Dw. 3, who wes examined in chief but not tendered for cross-examination, was expunged though it was favourable to the prosecution. The first case was a revision against conviction and the second an appeal against acquittal. With due respect to the learned Judges who decided those cases, I disagree with their views for reasons stated hereunder. But on that count the case need not be referred to a larger Bench since these decisions could be distinguished on facts. Cross-examination is a weapon given to the opposite party to challenge the veracity of the evidence given by a witness in chief-examination. A party entitled to cross-examine a witness, but did not get an opportunity for that purpose can say that the evidence cannot be acted upon and the court is bound to accept that contention. Question of re-examination will arise only when the witness is cross-examined. The opposite party can refuse to cross-examine a witness whose, evidence is favourable to him. So also there may be cases where the opposite party wanted to cross-examine a witness but he did not get an opportunity for that purpose. In the first case the opposite party is bound by the evidence. In the second case he has the right to say that the evidence cannot be considered. In both these cases the party who examined the witness has no option to say that the evidence has to be expunged. In the first case the evidence has to be accepted as a whole and in the second it has to be accepted subject to the option of the opposite party. Only thing is that if the opposite party opts to accept the evidence it will have to be considered as a whole. There is no question of accepting the evidence on the option of the party who brought the witness.

    8. In those two cases the question was acceptance of the evidence as between parties on record entitled to cross-examine the witnesses. Here that question does not arise. When Pw. 1 was examined and when the impunged order was passed the petitioner was not an accused and he was not entitled to cross-examine the witness. Even if the other accused who were then on the array of parties, did not cross-examine the witness it is none of his concern. So far as the petitioner is concerned the examination of the witness for the purpose of treating it as evidence under S. 319(1) had only the effect of examination under S. 200 or 202 for the formation of opinion whether or not there ere sufficient grounds for proceeding against him. He was nowhere in the picture at that time and he was not entitled to Cross-examine the witness also. Refusal of cross-examination by others or denial of opportunity to them for that purpose is not a matter of which he is concerned. So far as ground to proceed against him is concerned the question was only between the complainant and the Magistrate. The satisfaction required to proceed against him under S 319(1) is just like the one under Ss. 204, 228 or 240. Petitioner became an accused only when process was issued to him. Thereafter there will be retrial under S. 319(4)(a) and the petitioner will be getting an opportunity to cross-examine the witness also. At the stage of S. 319(1) the question is only taking cognizance of the offence against him and proceeding against him. Therefore these decisions are not of any avail to the petitioner even though what is stated in S. 319(1) is evidence during inquiry or trial. The question whether the court was correct in accepting the evidence for the purpose of forming an opinion under S. 319(1) in such a situation falls within the domain of appreciative of evidence to be done finally at the end of the trial before pronouncing upoo the guilt or otherswise of (the petitioner after be is proceeded against. (See Srt Mahant Amar Nath v. State of Haryana ((1983) 1 SCC 391 : AIR 1983 SC 288).

    9. Petitioner had another contention that before forming an opinion under S. 319(1) the Magistrate had to examine not only the de facto complainant but some more witnesses also. I do not think that there is any besis for this contention also because what is required under S. 319(1) is only the satisfaction of the Magistrate for which specific guidelines are not given except saying that it must be on the basis of evidence in the course of inquiry or trial. Sri. Mahant Amar Nath's case ((1983) 1 SCC 391 : AIR 1983 SC 288) is a case in which the police omitted four persons whose involvement in the crime was spoken to by all the witnesses examined during investigation. On the application of one of the injured, the Sessions Judge, after committal. Issued process to all the omitted four persons under S. 319(1) after examining only one of the injured persons among the witnesses examined during investigation. Even the evidence of that solitary witness given before cort during trial, on which the Sessions Judge acted, contained many details which were not given in his S. 161 statement. The Supreme Court said that it is only a matter of appreciation of evidence which could be challenged only at the final state after trial.

    10. One other aspect on which the parties joined issue before me was whether the ‘evidence’ mentioned in S. 319(1) includes statements of witnesses examined before court or documentary evidence proved before court only or whether they also include materials collected during investigation and produced before court. This question as such does not arise for a decision of this case. But I shall consider that aspect also since it was argued. I have already adverted to the definition of ‘evidence’ in the Evidence Act and also said that what is mentioned in S. 319(1) is “in the course of any inquiry into or trial of” and “it appears from the evidence”. Evidence must be such as is tendered during inquiry or trial. Oral evidence cannot include police statements. Such statements under S. 161 could be used only for the limited purpose mentioned in S. 162 and such statements cannot be termed ‘evidence’. Documents will become evidence only when they are proved in an inquiry or trial. It is true that the Court can consider the records of the case and the documents submitted therewith by the police under S 173(2) to form an opinion under S. 228 that thera is sufficient; ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence in order to frame charge or to discharge the accused under S. 227 on the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. What is said therein is “upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith”. At that stage what is available to the court is only the police records because enquiry or trial did not begin. These two Sections have avoided the word ‘evidence’ used in S. 319(1). In answer to this it was pointed out that the word ‘evidence’ is used in S. 319(1) only rather loosely as is evident from Ss. 173(8) and 226 of the Code. It is true that the word ‘evidence’ is used in those sections. But the ‘evidence’ mentioned in those sections is not evidence recorded during inquiry or trial and it refers only to materials collected during investigation. They are not described as evidence during inquiry or trial. S. 319(1) states otherwise. The use of that word in Ss. 173(8) and 226 could only be the result of legislative inadvertence as pointed out in the decision in Gunaram Tantt v. State of Assam (1883 Crl. L.J 289). At those stages the evidence available are materials collected by investigation which are not items of evidence coming within the scope of S. 319(1). Those provisions cannot have the effect of including police statements within the meaning of “evidence” ‘in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of mentioned in S. 319(1). The words “commenced afresh, and the witnesses re-heard” appearing ia S. 319(4)(a) gives sufficient indication of the legislative intention that the right under S. 319(1) has to be exercised only after the witnesses are beard, that is, their evidence had been laid in the court. What S. 319(1) mentions is not satisfaction at the time of taking cognizance under S. 190 or proceeding under S. 204 but at a later stage during inquiry or trial on the basis of evidence brought to court at those stages. Otherwise the position will be that after cognizance and issue of process, at every stage during inquiry or trial, the court can go on looking into the police records and add accused without any further evidence brought before it during inquiry or trial. That cannot be what the legislature intended.

    11. Though not directly Delhi Municipality v. Ram Klshan ((1983) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1983 SC 67) said in this respect “Prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court”. What is stated in Joginder Singh's case ((1979) 1 SCC 345 : AIR 1979 SC 339) quoted with approval in S.S Khanna's case ((1983) 3 SCC 42 : AIR 1983 SC 595) is “if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfied the court”. On the basis of the above discussions, I am in agreement with the views expressed in Gunaram Tanti's case (1983 Crl. L.J 289) that the evidence referred to in S. 319(1) is evidence produced at the inquiry or trial and not the evidence collected during investigation. Evidence produced at the stage of inquiry or trial may include in given cases such of the materials collected during investigation and proved as evidence during inquiry or trial. It is not their collection during investigation that counts, but their proof as evidence during inquiry or trial.

    12. In any view of the matter the petitioner cannot successfully challenge the orders in a proceeding under S. 482. He will have to stand trial. The petition is without any merit and it is hereby dismissed.

    13. Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Narayanan Nambiar v. State Of Kerala
    (Apr 6, 1987)