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  • provisions in the Transfer of Property Act Section 111(c)
  • provisions of s. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • ss. 76 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • s. 5. Section 12
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions in the Transfer of Property Act Section 111(c)
  • provisions of s. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • ss. 76 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • s. 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • s. 5. Section 12
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Court Opinion (Patel, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from two appeals concerning whether monthly tenants, who were inducted into possession by a mortgagee before the date of suit, can claim protection under the (Bombay) Rent Act (referred to in the text as the Rent Restriction/Control legislation). The central factual premise is that the mortgagee had been in possession and had created tenancies (monthly tenancies are specifically raised in argument). The procedural posture is appellate: Patel, J. examines the question of law and references authorities relied upon by counsel (notably Mr. Kotwal for the tenants) and several precedents. The opinion addresses whether tenants inducted by the mortgagee before suit are entitled to protection or to remain in possession after redemption of the mortgage.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a monthly tenant, inducted into possession by a mortgagee before the date of suit, can claim protection under the Rent Act (specifically whether such a tenancy survives redemption and binds the mortgagor).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' / Tenants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Counsel for the tenants (Mr. Kotwal) argued that under s.76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act a mortgagee in possession is entitled to manage the property as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it, i.e., as if it were his own; therefore the mortgagee could create monthly tenancies.
  • It was contended that, because of that right to manage and create tenancies, such tenancies created by the mortgagee should bind the mortgagor on redemption and the tenants should be entitled to protection under the Rent Act.
  • Mr. Kotwal relied on authorities said to support the proposition that tenancies created by a mortgagee in possession bind the mortgagor after redemption (specific cases cited in support are catalogued in the precedents section).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chinnappa Thevan v. Pazhaniappa Pillai [1916] A.I.R. Mad. 911 Cited for the proposition that tenancies created by a mortgagee in possession are binding on the mortgagor after redemption, such that the landlord–tenant relationship continues and the mortgagor must terminate tenancy by regular proceedings. The court considered this authority as supporting the tenants' broad proposition but ultimately found the broad statement difficult to accept because it conflicts with the Supreme Court's principles in Mahabir Gope's case; the court declined to follow the wide proposition as a universal rule.
Harder v. Wahid Khan [1954] A.I.R. All. 16 Discussed the effect of redemption on tenancies created by the mortgagee; held (as cited) that a tenancy entered into by a mortgagee in exercise of prudent management does not automatically lapse on redemption unless the mortgagor exercises his option to terminate it. The court treated this decision as ambiguous with respect to the statutory provision s.111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act and criticized it for not addressing how s.111(c) affects leases created by persons with limited powers; the court was not persuaded that Harder resolves the s.111(c) issue in favour of tenants in every case.
Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain [1952] A.I.R. S.C. 205 Supreme Court rule: a mortgagee cannot create an interest in mortgaged property which will enure beyond termination of his interest; leases granted by a mortgagee must come to an end at redemption (general rule). The court relied on this Supreme Court authority as a controlling statement of principle that a mortgagee cannot create enduring interests beyond the mortgage period; it formed the central legal anchor against which other authorities were tested.
Pramatha Nath v. Sashi Bhusan [1937] A.I.R. Cal. 763 Cited as an instance where tenants were held entitled to remain in possession by virtue of statutory rights that arose from their possession. The court noted that cases like this involved tenants who had statutory rights arising from possession; such cases were distinguished and held not to apply to the facts before the court where no statutory right had been demonstrated.
Seshamma Shettati v. Chickaya Hegade 1902 I.L.R. 25 Mad. 507 Discussed tenancy created by mortgagee and observed that tenancy between tenant and mortgagee would have continued until redemption; limitation and accrual of cause of action were considered in that context. The court observed that the principle in Seshamma Shettati was more limited than later broad statements; it noted that the judgment itself contained qualifying language and therefore did not establish a universal rule that tenancies always bind the mortgagor after redemption.
Bhanshali Khushalchand v. Ska Shamji [1957] 59 Bom. L.R. 682 Cited for the view (as stated by M.C. Shah, J.) that aligns with the position that mortgagee-created tenancies do not automatically confer rights to continue in possession after redemption absent statutory backing. The court expressly agreed with the view in this Bombay Law Reports decision and cited it as consistent with the court's conclusion in the present matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in a stepwise fashion grounded in statutory text and precedent:

  1. The court accepts that a mortgagee in possession has the right to manage the property prudently (citing s.76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act as the tenants' basis for argument). That right, however, is coterminous with the mortgagee's right to remain in possession; it ends when the mortgagee's right ends.
  2. The court distinguishes between (a) leases validly created during the mortgagee's possession which are binding during the mortgagee's period of possession, and (b) whether those leases bind the mortgagor after redemption. The court emphasizes that whether a lease survives depends on the nature of the interest created and on special statutory provisions.
  3. The court relies on s.111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, which the opinion summarizes as a clear provision that a lease granted by a person whose power to dispose of the property is limited will terminate when that person's authority ends. The court reads s.111(c) as directly applicable to leases created by mortgagees whose powers are limited and concludes that such leases generally terminate on redemption.
  4. The Supreme Court decision in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain is cited and quoted to reinforce the proposition that a mortgagee cannot confer a better title than he has and that leases granted by him must come to an end at redemption; that constitutes the general rule.
  5. The court acknowledges an exception recognized by the Supreme Court: where statute confers rights on the tenant arising from possession (for example, a statutory tenancy arising from possession for a requisite period), those statutory rights may protect the tenant even after redemption. The court therefore turns to the Rent Act to see if such statutory rights exist in the present case.
  6. Examination of the Bombay Rent Act (specifically s.12 read with the definition of “tenant” in s.5) shows, in the court's view, that s.12 imposes a disability on the landlord (a bar to recovery of possession while the tenant pays standard rent) rather than directly conferring a right to remain in occupation on the tenant. The definition of “tenant” in s.5 is wide, but s.12 is not expressed as creating a substantive proprietary or estate right in the tenant that would survive redemption and make the mortgagor a landlord in relation to the tenant.
  7. The court analyzes the definition of “landlord” (a person receiving or entitled to receive rent) and reasons that unless the law contemplates the continuation of the tenancy after redemption, the mortgagor cannot be treated as the landlord entitled to receive rent. Given s.111(c), the court finds no basis to say that the tenancy continued after redemption so as to make the mortgagor the landlord for s.12 purposes.
  8. The court distinguishes earlier cases where tenants were protected because of statutory rights that accrued from possession (e.g., Mahabir Gope, Pramatha Nath), finding those authorities inapplicable to the present facts, where no statutory right enabling continuation of tenancy after redemption has been demonstrated.
  9. The court critically examines Chinnappa Thevan and Seshamma Shettati. It concludes Seshamma Shettati is more limited and that Chinnappa Thevan's broad proposition (that mortgagee-created tenancies always bind the mortgagor after redemption) is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's formulation in Mahabir Gope and therefore cannot be accepted as a general rule.
  10. Harder v. Wahid Khan is noted as taking a somewhat different view, but the court finds it unclear how that decision reconciles with s.111(c) and thus does not treat it as displacing the statutory rule that leases created by persons of limited authority terminate with that authority unless a statute creates rights in the tenant.
  11. On balance, the court holds that absent statutory conferral of rights on a tenant by virtue of possession, a tenant inducted by a mortgagee before redemption cannot claim the protection of the Rent Act to remain in possession after redemption; s.111(c) and the Supreme Court's rule in Mahabir Gope are determinative.

Holding and Implications

The court held that, as a general proposition, monthly tenancies created by a mortgagee in possession do not bind the mortgagor after redemption and that the tenants in this case do not have a right to continue in possession under the Rent Act unless a statute specifically confers such rights on them.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The court's reasoning supports the mortgagor's entitlement to recover possession after redemption when the tenancy was created by the mortgagee and no statutory right in the tenant exists to continue in occupation.
  • Limitation/exception preserved: If there exists a statutory provision that creates rights for a tenant by virtue of possession (i.e., a statutory tenancy or protection arising directly from the statute), then that statutory protection may operate as an exception and preclude recovery by the mortgagor; the court acknowledges and preserves this exception.
  • Precedential effect: The court expressly rejects a broad rule that all tenancies created by a mortgagee automatically bind the mortgagor after redemption; it aligns with the Supreme Court's principle in Mahabir Gope and adopts the view expressed in Bhanshali Khushalchand v. Ska Shamji. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying existing statutory and appellate/supreme-court authority.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the text.

    Kamalakar & Co. v. Gulamashafi Imambhai Musalman

    Patel, J.:— [His Lordship after stating the facts, proceeded.] The first question, therefore, that arises in both the appeals is, whether or not a monthly tenant, of the mortgagee inducted before the date of the suit can claim protection of the Rent, Act, 1947. It is contended on behalf of the tenants that under s. 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, a mortgagee in possession is entitled to manage the property as a person of ordinary prudence would manage it, as if it were his own. It is argued that in view of this provision the mortgagee would be entitled to create monthly tenancies in respect, of the properties in dispute, and if that is so, on redemption the mortgagor is bound by the creation of such tenancies.

    2. Mr. Kotwal relies on two eases which support his contention. These eases are Chinnappa Thevan v. Pazhaniappa Pilloi . [1916] A.I.R Mad. 911. and Harder v. Wahid Kham . [1954] A.I.R All. 16. We will first examine the question on principle apart from authority. It is undoubtedly true that a mortgagee has got the right of making prudent management of a property that has come into his possession. That right must necessarily be coterminous with his right to continue as a mortgagee and it must come to an end as soon as his right to continue in possession ends. If during that period the mortgagee creates any leases as any other ordinary prudent person would do in respect, of his own property, the mortgagor cannot, make any grievance whatsoever. From this, the further proposition, that if the original lease or grant was within the power of the mortgagee, then it would continue even after the redemption and would bind the mortgagor does not necessarily follow. Much would depend upon the nature of the interest, created by the mortgagee. In respect of leases the rights of the parties are governed by the special provisions in the Transfer of Property Act Section 111(c) provides that a lease of immoveable property determines when the interest of the lessor in the properly terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event by the happening of such event. This section in clear and unmistakable terms lays down that once the authority of the lessor to lease the property ends, the lease also necessarily terminates. This section must apply to all powers and authorities derived either from the Transfer of Property Act or from any other law. The mortgagee's rights cannot be any higher than that of any other lessor whose rights are limited in point, of time by the very nature of the relationship between the lessor and the owner. If once this position is reached, the Court must hold that, the mortgagor is entitled to get possession of the property unless there is some provision in law which creates an exception to this doctrine. This conclusion is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain . [1952] A.I.R S.C 205. In para 6 of their judgment, their Lordships observed:—

    “The general rule is that a person cannot by transfer or otherwise confer a better title on another than he himself has. A mortgagee cannot, therefore, create an interest in the mortgaged property which will enure beyond the termination of his interest as mortgagee…. It follows that he may grant leases not extending beyond the period of the mortgage; any leases granted by him must come to an end at redemption,”

    3. An exception, however, is recognised to the general rule as formulated by their Lordships. It is (p. 206):

    “A permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period is a different matter altogether. It 4th an exception to the general rule.”

    4. If, therefore, by a statute a tenant is given a protection or is given certain rights in the property, then certainly to that, extent, the rights of the mortgagor to recover Khas possession will be affected. We must, therefore, turn to the Bombay Kent Act. It must be noted that there is no provision in the Rent Act under which any rights as such are conferred on the tenant. The only section on which Mr. Kotwal can possibly rely is s. 12 read with the definition of the word “tenant” in s. 5. Section 12 imposes merely a disability on the landlord and provides that he.

    “…shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent…”

    5. It is contended that a restriction on the right of the landlord must necessarily mean a right in the tenant, in view of the definition of the word “tenant” contained in s. 5, sub-s. (II). A tenant is defined to mean

    “…any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes—…

    (b) any person remaining, after the determination of the lease, in possession, with or without the assent of the landlord, of the premises leased to such person or his predecessor who has derived title before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959”.

    6. It is undoubtedly true that this definition of the word “tenant” is very widely worded and may possibly in elude even a tenant in possession of the premises under the circumstances of the present ease. But then s. 12 does not give the tenant a right to remain in possession of the properties, but it imposes a disability on the landlord and unless the person who seeks to recover possession is brought within the definition of the word “landlord” the tenant cannot claim possession. The word “landlord” has been defined to mean any person who is for the time being, receiving, or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any Other person. It also further includes a tenant, who has sublet the premises to a sub-tenant. Now clearly, unless it could be shown that the mortgagor claims the properly on redemption through the mortgagee, it is impossible to hold that he is within the definition of the word “landlord”. Mr. Kotwal emphasises the word “who is for the time being, receiving, or entitled to receive, rent” in the definition and argues that the mortgagor would be within this definition. But there is no legal basis for this contention. If the law had contemplated that the tenancy of the tenant continued in spite of redemption then and only then the mortgagor would have been the person “entitled to receive the rent” whether he consented to the continuance of the tenancy or not. In view, however, of the provisions of s. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, it cannot be, said that the tenancy continued and, therefore, the, mortgagor was entitled to recover the rent, of the premises. There is no relationship either contractual or by privity of estate between the mortgagor and the tenant, lie not being a landlord, s. 12 does not come in the way of his recovering possession. In Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain and Pramatha Nath v. Sashi Bhusan . [1937] A.I.R Cal. 763. the tenants were held to be entitled to remain in possession by virtue of statutory rights created in them because of their being in possession. These cases do not apply to the present case. The case very strongly relied upon by Mr. “Kotwal namely, Chinnappa Thevan v. Pazhaniappu Pillai, undoubtedly supports the wide proposition which lie has made, wherein it is said (p. 912):

    “…tenancies thus created by a mortgagee in possession are binding on the mortgagor after the redemption of the mortgage, in so far that the relationship of landlord and tenant continues, and that if the mortgagor desires to bring the tenancy to a close, he must do so by a regular suit under the Tenancy Act.”

    7. In support of this proposition Seshamma Shettati v. Chickaya Hegade . 1902 I.L.R 25 Mad. 507. was relied upon. The principle there stated does not go to the length to which the learned Judges have taken it. In Seshamma Shettati the suit for possession was filed within one year of redemption by the mortgagor against those who were claiming to be either permanent tenants or to be in adverse possession on their acquisition of possession from the mortgagee. While negativing that contention Mr. justice Bhashyam Ayyangar made only this observation (p. 512):

    “In the present case, on the footing that the defendants were let into possession by the mortgagee, whether as tenants from year to year or professedly as tenants with a permanent right of occupancy, the tenancy between them and the mortgagee would have continued until the redemption of the mortgage in 1894, and such possession cannot be adverse either to the mortgagee or much less to the mortgagor, and the plaintiffs' cause of action would have accrued— and the period of limitation commenced to run— only in 1894, if such tenancy ceases by the mere fact of redemption, or subsequent thereto, when the term of notice to quit had expired, if the right view should be that a lease given by the mortgagee as being incidental to the management of the mortgaged property, is binding upon the mortgagor— at any rate, as a lease from year to year,— until he determines the same.”

    8. It is difficult from this to bring out the principle that the lease would be binding on the mortgagor in every case. Even the learned Judge himself limits it by saying “if that view is right” in respect of which there was no discussion. In view of what we have stated above, we find it difficult to agree with the broad proposition as laid down in Chinnappa Thevan v. Pazhamiappa Pillai. It goes counter to the principles formulated in the Supreme Court, judgment in Mahabir Gopa's case. In Harder v. Wahid Khan, on redemption the mortgagor filed a suit against the tenants of the mortgagee and the tenants claimed protection under the Kent Restriction Act The learned Judges referred to ss. 76 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act and then said (p. 17):

    “No doubt, on the redemption of the mortgage, the mortgagor is not bound by the transfers made by the mortgagee or by contracts entered into by him unless his action can be supported on the ground that it was authorised by law or that he was empowered to act under some power or authority, express or implied, conferred on him by the mortgagor. The mortgagor in such a case may be entitled to claim back possession of the property free from any liability created by the mortgagee after the redemption of the mortgage, but this does not mean that, if in the exercise of his powers of due management as a person of ordinary prudence he has entered into an agreement of tenancy, on the mere redemption of the mortgage without the mortgagor exercising his option of putting an end to the tenancy the tenancy automatically and ‘ipso facto’ lapses on the date of the redemption”.

    9. It is not clear, with respect, from the judgment how their Lordships got over the provisions of s. 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act which is a special provision in respect of leases created by those having limited powers. As we have stated above, undoubtedly, if there is a statutory provision which creates in the tenant, a right once be is on the land by virtue of his tenancy then certainly to that extent he will be entitled to protection. If it is intended to lay down that in every case a tenant automatically becomes a tenant of the mortgagor, with respect, we cannot agree with that proposition. In view of the fact that no right is given to a tenant as such, it is difficult to hold that the appellants have got the right to continue in possession after redemption. The same view was taken in Bhanshali Khushalchand v. Ska Shamji . 1957 59 Bom. L.R 682. by Mr. Justice M.C Shah, with which we agree.

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    Kamalakar & Co. v. Gulamashafi Imambhai Musalman
    (Mar 26, 1962)