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  • article 144 of the schedule II and section 28 of the Limitation Act,
  • provisions of the Limitation Act (XIV) of 1859,
  • SECTION 111 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • article 144 of the Limitation Act,
  • article 139 of the Limitation Act,
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • article 144 of the schedule II and section 28 of the Limitation Act,
  • provisions of the Limitation Act (XIV) of 1859,
  • SECTION 111 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • article 144 of the Limitation Act,
  • article 139 of the Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1832 the proprietor of the land mortgaged it with possession to Devappa Kamti. The plaintiffs, as assignees of the equity of redemption, discharged the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgage in 1894. The plaint alleges that the defendants have been holding the land as tenants from year to year under the usufructuary mortgagee; that the plaintiffs gave due notice to quit and instituted the present suit to eject the defendants. The defendants assert that their assignors received a permanent lease from the proprietor (apparently in conjunction with the mortgagee), that they paid annual rent (partly to Government and Rs. 60 to the mortgagee), and that after redemption they remitted Rs. 60 by postal money order to the plaintiffs who refused to accept it. The defendants also pleaded that the plaintiffs' suit is barred by the law of limitation.

Both lower Courts dismissed the suit as barred by the Limitation Act under Article 144 on the ground that defendants had, to the knowledge of plaintiffs' predecessor in title, been asserting a permanent right of occupancy for upwards of twelve years before the suit and that plaintiffs acquired the equity of redemption with notice of that claim. The appellate court reversed that decree and remanded the matter to the District Judge for disposal according to law on the remaining issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants occupy the land as tenants under the mortgagee (mortgagee's tenants) or as permanent lessees under the proprietor.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs' suit for ejectment is barred by limitation and, if so, which article of the Limitation Act governs (Article 139 or Article 144).
  3. Whether a lease purportedly granted by a mortgagee can bind the mortgagor or persons claiming under him after redemption.
  4. Whether a person lawfully in possession as a tenant (including a tenant from year to year or a mortgagee in possession) can acquire by prescription a title inconsistent with the relation of tenancy during the continuance of that relation.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs, as assignees of the equity of redemption, redeemed the mortgage in 1894 and thereby succeeded to the mortgagor's rights to eject persons who were tenants under the mortgagee.
  • They allege the defendants entered possession as tenants from year to year under the usufructuary mortgagee and that they gave due notice to quit before instituting the suit within four years after redemption.
  • Implicitly, the plaintiffs' position is that a purported permanent lease given by the mortgagee would be effective only against the mortgagee and not against the mortgagor or successors (hence the plaintiffs can eject the defendants).

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contend that their assignors received a permanent lease from the proprietor (apparently with concurrence of the mortgagee) and therefore they hold a right of permanent occupancy that binds the plaintiffs.
  • They assert that they have paid the rent components (Government assessment and Rs. 60 to the mortgagee) and that after redemption they tendered the Rs. 60 to the plaintiffs who refused to accept it.
  • They pleaded that the suit is barred by limitation, and both lower Courts accepted that plea under Article 144 of the Limitation Act on the basis that defendants had asserted a permanent right of occupancy for over twelve years, of which plaintiffs had notice when they became assignees of the equity of redemption.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Runchadas Vandravandas v. Parvathy Bhai Identified by the Court as illustrative of a recurrent error: treating every other article of the Limitation Act as subordinate to Article 144. The Court criticises the lower Courts for falling into the same error and for dismissing the suit under Article 144 despite the defendants' case that they entered as tenants under the mortgagee.
Rangasami Reddi v. Gnanasammantha Pandora Sannadhi Principle that onus is on the party asserting that they derived a permanent right of occupancy from the proprietor to establish it. The Court applies this to hold that defendants bear the burden of proving a lease from the proprietor; if proved, it would defeat plaintiffs' ejectment suit.
Chidambara Pillai v. Tiruvengadath Ayyangar (unreported) Cited in support of the onus rule referenced in Rangasami Reddi. Used as an additional authority to emphasise that defendants must prove title by lease from the proprietor.
Vasudeva Patrudu v. The Zamindar of Salur Support for the proposition that tenants from year to year cannot acquire permanent occupancy by prescription while the tenancy subsists. The Court cites it to show that, absent proof of a lease from the proprietor, defendants' position remains that of year-to-year tenants who cannot by prescription obtain permanent occupancy simply by asserting it during the tenancy.
Srinivasa Ayyar v. Muthusami Pillai Similar authority on the limitation principle vis-à-vis tenants' claims to higher title during tenancy. Invoked to support the proposition that a tenant cannot by mere long assertion during tenancy prescribe for a superior estate.
Ammu v. Ramakishna Sastri; Vittobha Bin Chaba v. Gangaram; Puttappa v. Timmaji; Chinto v. Janki Cited in the context of considering forcible dispossession and the applicability of Article 144 where dispossession or trespass is alleged. The Court notes these cases but holds that it is unnecessary to decide those points here because there is no plea of forcible dispossession by the defendants in the present case.
Maharani Beni Pershad Koeri v. Dudh Nath Roy (Privy Council) Passage quoted to show that mere notice by a tenant claiming a higher tenure during the continuance of a valid life-holding does not render possession adverse for Limitation Act purposes. The Court quotes this to reinforce that asserting a higher title while in lawful possession does not necessarily make possession adverse so as to start the running of limitation against the true owner.
Budesur v. Hanmanta Held that a landlord allowing a tenant to assert validity of an invalid lease for statutory period may be debarred from later questioning it (on facts where tenancy had been determined and tenant remained as trespasser). The Court distinguishes this case from the present because, in Budesur, the tenancy was treated as having been determined and the tenant remained as a trespasser, whereas in the present case the defendants' pleaded position is that they entered as tenants (not as trespassers) under the mortgagee or proprietor.
Drobomoyi Gupta v. Davis Authority where lessees became trespassers upon the death of the lessor and acquired rights by prescription against reversioners because they held as trespassers for the statutory period. The Court distinguishes the facts: in Drobomoyi Gupta the lessees were trespassers from a clear point in time, which is not alleged here.
Gossain Dalmar Puri v. Bepin Behary Mitter Held that a permanent lease granted by a judgment-debtor after sale in execution was void as against prior purchaser, and the lessee was a trespasser vis-à-vis the purchaser and could acquire occupancy by prescription. Cited to show that where possession is truly that of a trespasser (invalid lease as against the person suing), prescription can operate; distinguished from present facts where trespass is not pleaded.
Tekaetnee Goura Coomaree v. Mussamat Saroo Coomaree (Privy Council) Case where plea of limitation was overruled because the landlord had no notice that the tenant was claiming a permanent right; also involved holding wrongful after termination of lease. The Court states that this decision has no bearing on the present case and distinguishes it on the ground of lack of landlord's notice and the tenant's wrongful holding after lease determination.
Maidin Saiba v. Nagapa Held that a tenant who trespassed and encroached on lands not comprised in a lease could, by holding such trespass for the statutory period, acquire rights by prescription in respect of the encroachment. Used to illustrate that trespassious possession can ripen into prescriptive rights; distinguished from the present facts where trespass to extra lands is not alleged.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeds by first identifying the factual alternatives pleaded: (a) defendants entered as tenants under the mortgagee, or (b) defendants derive a permanent right of occupancy from a lease granted by the proprietor (plaintiffs' predecessor in title). The Court addresses the legal consequences of each alternative strictly on the basis of the text.

Key legal principles applied:

  • A permanent lease purportedly granted by a mortgagee is effective only against the mortgagee and, if at all, only until redemption of the mortgage; it cannot bind the mortgagor or persons claiming under him after redemption.
  • A tenancy created by a mortgagor may or may not terminate ipso facto upon redemption; the Court deems it unnecessary to decide that abstract question because here notice to quit was given and suit was brought within four years after redemption (per the plaintiffs' case).
  • The proper Limitation Act article for a landlord’s suit to recover possession from tenants is prima facie Article 139; Article 144 applies to cases not otherwise provided for and is relevant where the possessor is in truth a trespasser or where the possession is adverse to the person suing.
  • A person who lawfully comes into possession as a tenant (whether year-to-year or for a term) cannot during the continuance of that relationship set up, and thereby acquire by prescription, a title inconsistent with the relation of tenancy (i.e., cannot convert tenancy into permanent occupancy by asserting such a right during the tenancy).
  • The period of limitation for a landlord’s ejectment claim (Article 139) runs only when the tenancy is determined; reference is made to section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act to show when a tenancy determines.
  • If a tenant remains in possession after determination as a trespasser, prescription (e.g., Article 144) may run and may give rise to a prescriptive right; but that situation requires the factual predicate of forcible or wrongful holding after determination, which is not pleaded here.

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court reasons as follows:

  1. If defendants were let into possession by the mortgagee (whether as year-to-year tenants or professedly as permanent tenants), such tenancy would continue until redemption in 1894 and could not be adverse to the mortgagee or mortgagor. Therefore any cause of action for ejectment by plaintiffs would have arisen only at redemption (or upon expiry of notice to quit thereafter), and the limitation period would commence from that point — making the lower Courts' reliance on Article 144 inappropriate.
  2. If defendants claim a lease from the proprietor, they bear the onus of proving it; if proved, plaintiffs are bound and cannot succeed in ejectment. If not proved, defendants remain year-to-year tenants and cannot acquire permanent occupancy by prescription merely by asserting such a right during the tenancy.
  3. The Court criticises the lower Courts for treating Article 144 as a catch-all that overrides specific articles applicable to landlord-tenant disputes (notably Article 139), and it distinguishes authorities relied upon by the lower Courts where the factual situation involved trespass or wrongful holding after determination of tenancy.
  4. The Court examines and distinguishes a range of authorities relied upon (cases where lessees were trespassers, where leases were void as against certain parties, or where tenancy was determined) to show that in those circumstances Article 144 or similar prescriptive principles could apply — but that those factual predicates are absent here.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the lower Courts' finding that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 144 cannot be supported on the facts as pleaded, and accordingly the decree is reversed and the appeal remanded to the District Judge for disposal according to law with reference to the remaining issues in the case.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The plaintiffs' ejectment suit was not properly dismissed on the preliminary ground of limitation under Article 144 insofar as the defendants' case is that they entered as tenants under the mortgagee; the limitation period relevant to a landlord's suit (Article 139) would commence only upon determination of the tenancy (or redemption as appropriate).
  • If the defendants establish a lease from the proprietor, that will defeat plaintiffs' claim; if they fail to do so, they will be treated as tenants from year to year and cannot, during the continuance of that relation, acquire permanent occupancy by prescription merely by asserting such a right.
  • The matter is remitted to the District Judge to examine and decide the remaining issues on the merits (the costs of this second appeal will abide and follow the result as stated by the Court).
  • The opinion distinguishes prior cases where prescriptive rights were acquired only because the possessors were, from a defined point, in true trespass or holding under an invalid lease; no wider rule or new precedent beyond these reasoned distinctions is proclaimed in this opinion.

    Seshamma Shettati v. Chickaya Hegade

    JUDGMENT

    The proprietor of the land in question mortgaged it with possession to one Devappa Kamti in 1832. The plaintiffs, as the assignees of the equity of redemption, discharged the mortgage-debt and redeemed the mortgage in 1894. It is alleged in the plaint that the defendants have been holding the land as tenants from year to year under the usufructuary mortgagee, that the tenancy has been terminated by due notice to quit given by the plaintiffs and the suit is accordingly brought to eject them from the land. The defendants contend that the land was given to their assignors by the proprietor, apparently in conjunction with the mortgagee, on a permanent lease, that out of the total annual rent of Rs. 130-14-9 they have been paying Government assessment and the balance of Rs. 60 to the mortgagee and that subsequent to the redemption of the mortgage by the plaintiffs, they remitted the said sum of Rs. 60 by postal money order to the plaintiffs who refused to accept the sanm. They also contend that plaintiffs' suit to eject them is barred by the law of limitation.

    If, as alleged by the plaintiffs, the defendants came into possession of the land as tenants under the mortgagee, plaintiffs' title to eject them is clear, whether the mortgagee let them into possession as tenants from year to year or professed to let them as tenants with a permanent right of occupancy, A permanent lease granted by a mortgagee can hold, good only as against the mortgagee and that until the redemption of the mortgage. It cannot bind the mortgagor or persons claiming under him. Whether a tenancy created by a mortgagor will ipso facto terminate with the redemption of the mortgage or whether it can be determined only by the mortgagor giving notice to quit as in the case of a tenant from year to year it is unnecessary to consider in this case, as in fac notice to quit has been given and the suit brought within four years after the redemption of the mortgage.

    But if, as alleged by the defendants, their right of permanent occupancy is founded upon a lease granted by the mortgagor, the plaintiffs, of course, are bound by such lease and they cannot sue to eject the defendants. This is the substantial question in the case, but both the Courts have dismissed the suit as, barred by the law of limitation, under Article 144 of the Limitation Act, on the ground that the defendants have, to the knowledge of the plaintiffs, or rather their predecessor in title; been setting up a right of permanent occupancy for upwards of 12 years before date of suit and that plaintiffs became assignees of the equity of redemption, with notice of such claim on the part of defendants.

    The suit being brought by the plaintiffs, as landlords, to recover possession from tenants, the article of the Limitation Act applicable thereto is primâ facie article 139 and certainly, according to the case of the defendants, that article must govern the suit Article 144 of the Limitation Act can he applied only to a suit not otherwise specially provided for, and if a suit be otherwise specially provided for, the defendants' plea of adverse possession, for whatsoever length of time, is perfectly immaterial for purposes of limitation. Both the lower Courts have fallen into an error Runchadas Vandravandas v. Parvathy Bhai(1) by no means an uncommon one, that every other article of the law of limitation relating to immoveable property should be subordinated or read subject to article 144 and have dismissed the suit as barred by the law of limitation, notwithstanding that, according to the defendants' own case, they did not some into possession of the land as trespassers, but as tenants let in by the plaintiffs' predecessor in title.

    The land in question was held in proprietary right under a raiyatwari settlement with Government by the plaintiffs' predecessor in title and if, as the defendants allege, they derived a permanent right of occupancy therein from such proprietor—the onus of establishing which is entirely, on them (Rangasami Reddi v. Gnanasammantha Pandora Sannadhi(2), and the unreported decision in Chidambara Pillai v. Tiruvengadath Ayyangar(3) therein cited)—it is, of course, a complete answer to the plaintiffs' suit, inasmuch as it is not based of the footing of the defendants having incurred a forfeiture of a permanent right of occupancy and the suit is bound to fail on that ground.

    In considering the question of limitation, and dismissing the suit on such preliminary ground, it must, of course, be assumed that the plaintiffs' case i.e, that the defendants came into possession of the lands as tenants from year to year and not as permanent tenants—as alleged by the defendants—is true. If so it is impossible to uphold the decision of the lower Courts that the defendants have, by adverse possession extending over a period of 12 years, acquired, under the combined operation of article 144 of the schedule II and section 28 of the Limitation Act, the limited right of permanent occupancy subject to the payment of a fixed rent. Defendants do not say that they came into possession of the land really as trespassers, though professing to have come into possession as permanent lessees—in which case no doubt article 144 would be applicable; nor do they say that the plaintiffs' predecessor in title was dispossessed or that he discontinued possession of the land and that they have taken possession claiming to hold under a permanent right of occupancy—in which case article 142 would he applicable, the result in either case being the same. A person who lawfully came into possession of land as tenant from year to year or for a term of years, or as mortgagee, cannot, by setting up, during the continuance of such relation, any title adverse to that of the landlord or mortgagor, as the case may be, inconsistent with the real legal relation between them,—and that however notoriously and to the knowledge of the other party—acquire, by the operation of the law of limitation, title as owner or any other title inconsistent with that under which he was let into possession. In the case of a mortgage, the title of the mortgagor will be extinguished only at the expiration of the period prescribed for redemption of the mortgage, and in the case of a lease, the landlord's title can be extinguished only at the expiration of the period prescribed by article 139 of the Limitation Act, and under the latter article such period will commence to run only when the tenancy is determined. A reference to section 111 of the Transfer or Property Act will show when a tenancy in respect of immoveable property determines. If, after the determination of the tenancy, the tenant remains in possession as trespasser for the statutory period, he will, by prescription, acquire a right as owner or such limited estate as he might prescribe for. A person coming into possession of land under a lease which is invalid or void as against the person seeking to eject him is really a trespasser and as such, after the expiration of the period proscribed by article 144, acquires by prescription the limited right under the lease, whether it be a lease for a term of years or a lease in perpetuity.

    In the present case, on the footing that the defendants were let into possession by the mortgagee, whether as tenants from year to year or professedly as tenants with a permanent right of occupancy, the tenancy between them and the mortgagee would have continued until the redemption of the mortgage in 1894, and such possession cannot be adverse either to the mortgagee or much less to the mortgagor, and the plaintiffs' cause of action would have accrued—and the period of limitation commenced to run—only in 1894, if such tenancy ceases by the mere fact of redemption, or subsequent thereto, when the term of notice to quit had expired, if the right view should he that a lease given by the mortgagee as being incidental to the management of the mortgaged property, is binding upon the mortgagor—at any rate, as a lease from year to year,—until he determines the same.

    If, as alleged by defendants, they were let into possession by plaintiffs' predecessor in title as tenants, but they fail to establish that they were let into such possession with rights of permanent occupancy, their position will be only that of tenants from year to year (see Vasudeva Patrudu v. The Zamindar of Salur and they can acquire by prescription no right of permanent occupancy by the fact that they were setting up a right of permanent occupancy, to the knowledge of plaintiffs' predecessor in title for upwards of twelve years before date of suit (Srinivasa Ayyar v. Muthusami Pillai.

    There being in this case no plea of dispossession of the mortgagee by the defendants or their assignors, as trespassers, it is unnecessary to consider whether in the case of such forcible dispossession, there could be any adverse possession against the mortgagor, within the meaning of Article 144 of the Limitation Act, until the mortgagor had redeemed the mortgage (Ammu v. Ramakishna Sastri; Vittobha Bin Chaba v. Gangaram(4); Puttappa v. Timmaji(5); Chinto v. Janki(6)).

    In support of the position that a tenant cannot, by the operation of the law of limitation, prescribe for a higher title than he has under the tenancy, by setting up such higher right during the tenancy, I may quote the following passage from the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Maharani Beni Pershad Koeri v. Dudh Nath Roy:—“Their Lordships, however, think that the argument fails on a broader ground. They have already expressed their opinion that Ramgolam was, at that time, entitled to hold the mouzah for his life and that no suit for possession could then have been brought against him. And they do not think that a mere notice by a person holding for his life, that he claimed to be holding on a hereditary or perpetual tenure, would make his possession adverse within the meaning of the Limitation Act so as to bar a suit for possession on expiration of the life tenancy. Even if, therefore, the plaint of 1879 did convey the notice which the respondent attributes to it, their Lordships do not think it would support the defence of limitation.”

    The case of Budesur v. Hanmanta, relied upon by the District Judge—in which it was held that a “landlord allowing the tenant to assert the validity of an invalid lease for the statutory period of more than twelve years may he debarred from subsequently questioning the right of the tenant to hold under its terms”—proceeds upon the footing that the tenancy alleged by the landlord to be only from year to year was determined and a suit brought to eject the tenant was dismissed for default of prosecution.

    According to the case of the landlord, therefore, the tenant remained in possession as a trespasser. He, however, having claimed to hold possession as a tenant with a permanent right of occupancy and such possession haring continued for upwards of twelve years after the tenancy was determined, according to the case of the landlord, it was held that he acquired a right of permanent occupancy by prescription. That case is thus clearly distinguishable from the present one.

    The case of Drobomoyi Gupta v. Davis is also clearly distinguishable from the present case. In that case a Hindu widow granted a permanent lease to certain tenants, which, on her death, was void as against her two daughters, the survivor of whom died nearly twenty years after the death of the widow. The lessees having, as trespassers from the date of the death of the widow, continued to hold the lands for upwards of the statutory period, professing to hold the same as permanent tenants under the lease granted by the widow, it was held (at page 345) that they had acquired a right of permanent occupancy by prescription against the daughters and therefore, under the provisions of the Limitation Act (XIV) of 1859, also as against the male reversionary heirs who succeeded the surviving daughter;

    In Gossain Dalmar Puri v. Bepin Behary Mitter, a permanent lease of certain mouzahs was granted by the judgment-debtor, after his right, title and interest therein had been sold in execution of the decree and the purchaser, who obtained only symbolical possession against the judgment-debtor in a suit brought by him for the recovery of his shares, against the judgment-debtor and his co-sharers, subsequently brought a suit against the alleged permanent lessee to recover possession of the share purchased by him. The lessee having been let into possession under a permanent lease by the judgment-debtor, it was void as against the prior purchaser, and the lessee, therefore, was in possession really as a trespasser as against the purchaser, professing to hold for upwards of thirteen years the land as a permanent lessee. It was, therefore, held that he acquired a right of permanent occupancy by prescription.

    The decision of the Privy Council in Tekaetnee Goura Coomaree v. Mussamat Saroo Coomaree which was also cited on behalf of the respondent has no hearing upon the present case. In that case the plea of limitation was overruled on the ground that the landlord had no notice that the tenant was claiming a permanent right of occupancy. It also appears in that case that, according to the plaintiffs' case, the tenant was holding wrongfully after the termination of a lease for a term of years.

    In Maidin Saiba v. Nagapa, the tenant had a permanent lease granted to him of certain lands, but he trespassed and encroached upon certain lands not comprised in the lease and professed to hold the same as if it was part of the land comprised in the lease, and such trespass and encroachment having continued for upwards of twelve years, it was held that he had acquired a right of permanent occupancy as regards that land also, by the operation of the law of limitation.

    It will thus be seen that in the cases above referred to, in which it was held that title to a right of permanent occupancy in land subject to the payment of a fixed rent was acquired by the operation of the law of limitation, the person who thus acquired title was, at the time from which the period of limitation was reckoned, in possession of the land really as a trespasser under an invalid lease or under a lease which prior thereto had been determined either by the landlord having given notice to quit or otherwise.

    The District Judge having disposed of the appeal on the preliminary question of limitation, alone, which forms the subject of the seventh issue, and as his finding on that issue cannot be supported, the decree is reversed and the appeal remanded to him for disposal according to law, with reference to the remaining issues in the case. The costs of this second appeal will abide and follow the result.

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    Comments

    Seshamma Shettati v. Chickaya Hegade
    (Feb 14, 1902)