Zielinski “Reasonable-Probability” Standard Governs Denials of Vacatur Petitions Under the 2023 Felony-Murder Relief Act

Case: Ryan Grant v. State of Minnesota
Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date: August 19, 2026
Disposition: Reversed and remanded to the court of appeals

1. Introduction

Ryan Grant v. State of Minnesota addresses a procedural—and ultimately outcome-shaping—question under Minnesota’s 2023 statutory relief scheme for certain aiding-and-abetting felony-murder convictions (the Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864–68). Ryan Grant, convicted by guilty plea of second-degree unintentional felony murder (and related offenses) under an aiding-and-abetting theory, sought to vacate his conviction under the Act.

The district court denied Grant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a “reasonable probability” definition borrowed from postconviction/ineffective-assistance jurisprudence. After the court of appeals ruled, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided State v. Zielinski, which clarified the Act’s “reasonable probability” standard at the preliminary-application stage. The key issue in Grant was whether Zielinski’s clarified “reasonable probability” meaning also governs denial of a petition under subdivision 6(e)(2) of the Act—and whether the court of appeals used the wrong standard.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Minnesota Supreme Court held:

  • The “reasonable-probability” standard clarified in State v. Zielinski applies not only to preliminary applications under subdivision 5, but also to denials of petitions under subdivision 6(e)(2) of the Act.
  • Because the court of appeals affirmed using a materially different reasonable-probability definition (one drawn from State v. Mosley), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals for reconsideration under the proper Zielinski standard.

The Court did not decide whether Grant ultimately is entitled to relief; it instead corrected the governing legal framework and required reconsideration under the correct standard.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

State v. Zielinski

State v. Zielinski is the central interpretive anchor. It defined “reasonable probability” (in the Act’s preliminary-application process) as follows: there is a reasonable probability of entitlement to relief if the applicant alleges facts that would cause a rational person to believe that at an evidentiary hearing, the applicant might be able to prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence. Conversely, there is not a reasonable probability if the materials would cause no rational person to believe the applicant might meet that burden.

In Grant, the Supreme Court extended that interpretation to subdivision 6(e)(2) (petition denial) because the statute uses the same “reasonable probability” phrase, in the same Act, in adjacent procedural stages.

Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Second Chance Invs., LLC

The Court relied on the interpretive presumption stated in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Second Chance Invs., LLC: when the same language appears throughout a statute, it is presumed to have the same meaning absent evidence to the contrary. This canon supplied the doctrinal bridge from Zielinski (subdivision 5) to subdivision 6(e)(2).

State v. Mosley

The court of appeals defined “reasonable probability” as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case,” quoting State v. Mosley. The Supreme Court held that this was “materially different” from the Act-specific Zielinski standard. Mosley thus functioned as the contrast case illustrating a common judicial error: importing a familiar phrase from one doctrinal area (postconviction prejudice) into a specialized statutory screening mechanism (Act-based vacatur procedure).

State v. Manska

State v. Manska supplied the principle that an appellate court errs when it applies an incorrect legal standard. This supported reversal once the Supreme Court determined the court of appeals used the wrong “reasonable probability” test.

State v. Boettcher

For remedy, the Court cited State v. Boettcher to justify remanding to the court of appeals when that court applied the wrong legal standard. Grant follows that institutional practice: the Supreme Court corrects the rule; the intermediate court applies it on remand (or sends it to the district court).

Patterson v. State

Although not necessary to the syllogism about “reasonable probability,” Patterson v. State provided an important procedural clarification: denials under subdivision 6(e)(2) are reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo. This matters because it reshapes how courts of appeals should evaluate petition denials and how litigants frame arguments (legal error vs. factual sufficiency vs. discretionary judgment).

Riley v. State

Riley v. State was cited to articulate what “abuse of discretion” means: a decision based on an erroneous view of the law or against logic and the facts in the record; legal determinations are reviewed de novo and factual findings for clear error. In context, Riley supplies the operational content of Patterson’s standard-of-review rule.

Lussier v. State

Lussier v. State entered the case through the district court’s effort to define “extreme indifference to human life.” The district court borrowed Lussier’s characterization of “extreme indifference” as involving “recklessness or at a minimum, gross negligence.” The Supreme Court did not endorse or reject that substantive definition in Grant; however, the citation shows the lower court searching for meaning in analogous homicide doctrine when the Act itself leaves the term undefined.

Blakey v. Jones

Blakey v. Jones supplied the forfeiture rule: issues not raised in the court of appeals are forfeited before the Supreme Court. The Court used Blakey to frame the parties’ dispute over whether Grant forfeited the “major participant” argument and concluded he had not (because his consistent claim was that merits determinations required a hearing).

State v. Griffin (Griffin I)

State v. Griffin (Griffin I) provided the background facts of the underlying robbery and shootings, including Grant’s conduct (possession and transfer of the firearm; participation in attempted robberies; events leading to the fatal shooting). Although not a procedural precedent, Griffin I anchors the “major participant” and “extreme indifference” debates that will be revisited under the correct screening standard on remand.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The interpretive move: identical statutory language, identical meaning

The Court’s core reasoning is textual and structural: subdivision 5 (preliminary application) and subdivision 6(e)(2) (petition denial) both use the same phrase—“reasonable probability” of entitlement to relief—within the same Act’s three-step process. Applying the presumption from Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Second Chance Invs., LLC, the Court found no indication the Legislature intended different meanings at different steps.

(b) The functional difference between stages does not alter the phrase’s meaning

The Court acknowledged that the petition stage differs practically: the State responds, and the petition record is typically more developed. The Act itself recognizes this by allowing denial when “additional information or submissions” establish no reasonable probability. But that difference speaks to what materials the court considers, not what “reasonable probability” means. Thus, Zielinski’s meaning carries over, while the evidentiary base expands at the petition stage.

(c) Reformulating the standard for subdivision 6(e)(2)

Because subdivision 6(e)(2) is phrased negatively (“there is not a reasonable probability”), the Court restated the operative rule:

  • A petition may be denied without a hearing only if the petition-stage “additional information or submissions” would cause no rational person to believe that, at an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner might be able to prove entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence.

This is a screening test focused on plausibility of meeting the burden at a hearing—not a merits adjudication by paper record.

(d) Identifying error: importing the wrong “reasonable probability” doctrine

The court of appeals used State v. Mosley’s “undermine confidence in the outcome” formulation, which is typical of prejudice analyses (e.g., ineffective assistance; trial error). The Supreme Court deemed that formulation materially different from the Act’s screening mechanism as clarified in Zielinski. Under State v. Manska, applying the wrong legal standard necessitated reversal.

(e) Procedure on remand

Following State v. Boettcher, the Court remanded to the court of appeals for application of the correct standard (with discretion for that court to apply Zielinski itself or remand to the district court).

(f) Additional clarifications: standard of review and the role of chapter 590

The Court provided two clarifications that will shape future litigation under the Act:

  • Under Patterson v. State, denials under subdivision 6(e)(2) are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with the framework explained in Riley v. State.
  • The Act’s plain language—rather than chapter 590 caselaw—governs when an evidentiary hearing is required. Chapter 590 procedures may apply at the hearing stage (as the Act references Minn. Stat. § 590.04), but the trigger for a hearing is set by the Act’s own subdivision 6(e) structure.

3.3. Impact

(a) Uniform “reasonable probability” across the Act’s steps

The decision establishes a uniform, Act-specific meaning of “reasonable probability” across both the preliminary application (subdivision 5) and petition denial (subdivision 6(e)(2)). This reduces doctrinal drift and prevents courts from importing unrelated definitions (like Mosley) that can raise or lower the screening threshold.

(b) Reinforcing the Act’s design: screening vs. merits adjudication

By reaffirming the “might be able to prove” / “rational person” standard, Grant signals that subdivision 6(e)(2) is not meant to be a paper-only merits trial. The statutory default is a hearing unless the petition-stage record makes it irrational to believe the petitioner could meet the preponderance burden.

(c) Appellate review recalibration

Coupled with Patterson v. State, the opinion indicates that future appeals will focus on whether the district court abused discretion in applying the correct legal standard to the petition-stage materials, rather than re-deciding entitlement de novo.

(d) Substantive consequences for “major participant” and “extreme indifference” litigation

Although the Court did not decide the substantive meaning of “extreme indifference to human life” under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2a(b) (or the Act), its hearing-trigger rule affects how those concepts will be litigated: close factual questions—such as foreseeability from providing a firearm, or culpability levels short of intent—are more likely to proceed to evidentiary hearings rather than being resolved on a cold record.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Felony murder (second degree): A murder charge based on a death occurring during the commission (or attempted commission) of a felony, even if the defendant did not intend to kill.
  • Aiding-and-abetting liability: A person can be convicted for a crime committed by another if they intentionally assisted or encouraged the underlying felony and the law attributes the resulting crime to them under the applicable rules.
  • 2023 change to Minn. Stat. § 609.05 (subd. 2a(b)): For second-degree felony murder based on someone else causing the death, liability now requires the defendant to be a major participant and to have acted with extreme indifference to human life.
  • Major participant (as relevant here): The statute includes, as a major participant, someone who provided a deadly weapon where it was reasonably foreseeable it would be used in the underlying felony.
  • Extreme indifference to human life: A heightened culpability concept; the district court used Lussier v. State’s “recklessness or, at a minimum, gross negligence” phrasing, though the Supreme Court did not definitively adopt that definition for Act cases in this opinion.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: The ordinary civil burden of proof—more likely than not.
  • Reasonable probability (Act context after Zielinski and Grant): A screening question—would the materials cause a rational person to believe the petitioner might prove entitlement by a preponderance at a hearing?
  • Abuse of discretion review: On appeal, the question is not “what would we decide fresh,” but whether the lower court applied the correct law and reached a decision consistent with logic and the record.
  • Remand: Sending the case back to a lower court to apply the correct legal rule.

5. Conclusion

Ryan Grant v. State of Minnesota establishes that the State v. Zielinski definition of “reasonable probability” governs not only preliminary applications under the 2023 felony-murder relief Act but also petition denials under subdivision 6(e)(2). The decision corrects a common interpretive misstep—borrowing “reasonable probability” from unrelated postconviction prejudice doctrine (State v. Mosley)—and reinforces the Act’s structure: a hearing is the default unless the petition-stage record makes it irrational to believe the petitioner could prove entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence. On remand, the court of appeals must reassess Grant’s petition under that Act-specific screening standard, with the understanding (per Patterson v. State) that subdivision 6(e)(2) denials are reviewed for abuse of discretion.