Young-Factor Findings Required When NRCP 37(c)(1) Evidence Preclusion Functionally Ends the Case

I. Introduction

Zhang v. Zhang, 142 Nev., Advance Opinion 45 (June 18, 2026), arises from a dispute between two sisters: Yanling Zhang (appellant/plaintiff) and Yanhui Zhang (respondent/defendant). Yanling alleged the parties formed an unwritten joint venture to acquire and operate four Las Vegas investment properties, with Yanling contributing $200,000 and expecting a 50% share of rental income and/or sale proceeds. Title was taken in Yanhui’s name, one property was sold, and Yanling alleged she received none of the proceeds.

The key procedural issue was not the merits of joint venture formation or entitlement to profits, but a disclosure failure: whether Yanling complied with NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(A)(iv) by providing “a computation of each category of damages claimed.” After discovery closed and close to trial, the district court granted Yanhui’s motion in limine to exclude damages evidence for lack of an adequate computation. Because damages are an element of Yanling’s claims (breach of contract, breach of implied covenant, unjust enrichment, and conversion), exclusion of all damages evidence effectively ended the case; the district court then dismissed with prejudice.

The Nevada Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that when a discovery sanction effectively operates as a case-terminating sanction, the district court must conduct an express analysis of the Young factors before imposing it.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• NRCP 16.1 computation required: The court affirmed the district court’s interpretation that Yanling was required to disclose a damages computation under NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(A)(iv), because her claimed damages were tangible and quantifiable (investment amount plus rental/sale proceeds), not the kind of intangible “general damages” discussed in personal injury contexts.
• Sanction procedure was defective: Even if the NRCP 16.1 violation occurred, the district court’s remedy—precluding damages evidence via motion in limine and then dismissing with prejudice—functioned as a case-ending sanction. The district court therefore was required to analyze the Young factors, but did not.
• Disposition: The Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for the district court to apply the Young factors, and noted that doing so will also entail addressing whether the failure was “substantially justified or harmless” under NRCP 37(c)(1).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, Inc.

The opinion’s central procedural rule flows from Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 787 P.2d 777 (1990), which requires an “express, careful and preferably written” analysis of factors before imposing dismissal with prejudice as a discovery sanction. The Zhang court treated the exclusion of damages evidence (though styled as a motion in limine ruling under NRCP 37(c)(1)) as the functional equivalent of dismissal because it eliminated a necessary element of every claim.

Later in the opinion, the court also cites Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc. for the same factor framework, listing the eight factors (willfulness, prejudice, proportionality, irreparable loss of evidence, feasibility/fairness of lesser sanctions, policy favoring merits adjudication, attorney-versus-party fault, and deterrence). Zhang reinforces that what triggers Young is the practical effect—case termination— not the label attached to the sanction.

2. Foster v. Dingwall

Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. 56, 227 P.3d 1042 (2010), supplies the appellate review framework: discovery sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, but a “somewhat heightened standard” applies when sanctions are case-terminating. Zhang uses Foster to connect the Young-factor requirement to appellate scrutiny: sanctions must be “just” and must “relate to the claims at issue in the discovery order that was violated.”

3. Pizarro-Ortega v. Cervantes-Lopez and Calvert v. Ellis

On the duty to disclose damages computations, the court relied on the disclosure purpose articulated in Calvert v. Ellis, No. 2:13-CV- 00464-APG, 2015 WL 631284 (D. Nev. Feb. 12, 2015), and noted it was cited with approval in Pizarro-Ortega v. Cervantes-Lopez, 133 Nev. 261, 396 P.3d 783 (2017): computations allow the opposing party to understand exposure and make informed settlement and discovery decisions.

Zhang also uses Pizarro-Ortega v. Cervantes-Lopez to reject Yanling’s attempt to avoid computation by classifying her damages as “general damages.” Pizarro-Ortega’s discussion (including its footnote on pain-and-suffering as “general or other intangible damages”) is confined to personal injury contexts and does not exempt parties from computing quantifiable economic damages in contract/tort business disputes.

4. Capanna v. Orth

Capanna v. Orth, 134 Nev. 888, 432 P.3d 726 (2018), supports the continuing duty to supplement disclosures when a party learns prior disclosures are incomplete or incorrect, referencing NRCP 26(e)(1). This matters in Zhang because the district court gave an additional week to provide a supplemental computation near trial, yet the plaintiff missed the deadline.

5. Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.

Humphries v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 788, 312 P.3d 484 (2013), is cited for the principle that interpretation of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed de novo. Zhang uses this to affirm the district court’s reading of NRCP 16.1’s plain language: a computation of each category of damages is mandatory where a complaint seeks damages.

6. Reads Co., LLC v. Katz

Reads Co., LLC v. Katz, 72 A.D.3d 1054 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010), is discussed only to dismiss its relevance: it involved New York law and did not address Nevada’s disclosure obligations. Zhang uses this to emphasize that definitional debates about “general damages” in other jurisdictions do not displace Nevada’s rule-based disclosure requirements when damages are quantifiable.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Duty to compute damages under NRCP 16.1 applies to quantifiable business damages

The court’s first holding is straightforward textualism: NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(A)(iv) requires “a computation of each category of damages.” Because Yanling sought monetary relief (return of investment and profit share), she was required to compute it. The court rejected the notion that labeling these amounts “general damages” in a contract setting excuses computation, distinguishing intangible damages (e.g., pain and suffering) from concrete economic damages tied to property income and sale proceeds.

The opinion also clarifies that filing or serving other documents for different purposes (e.g., default-judgment papers or an expert disclosure) does not automatically satisfy NRCP 16.1’s separate initial disclosure requirement—particularly where the party fails to present the documents to the court when compliance is challenged.

2. When exclusion of damages evidence ends the case, Young findings are required

The second holding is the decision’s most important procedural development: the district court’s order granting a motion in limine to exclude damages evidence under NRCP 37(c)(1) “had the same effect” as dismissal under NRCP 37(b)(1)(E) because damages were essential elements of all claims. That functional equivalence triggers the Young requirement—an express analysis of whether case termination is warranted in light of:

1. Willfulness of the offending party;
2. Prejudice to the other party if a lesser sanction is used;
3. Severity of dismissal relative to the misconduct;
4. Whether evidence has been irreparably lost;
5. Feasibility and fairness of less severe sanctions;
6. Policy favoring adjudication on the merits;
7. Risk of penalizing a party for attorney misconduct;
8. Need for deterrence.

Because the district court did not perform that analysis before imposing a sanction that necessarily led to dismissal with prejudice, the Supreme Court held this was an abuse of discretion under the heightened review standard.

3. Interaction with NRCP 37(c)(1): “substantially justified or harmless”

While the court did not resolve the harmlessness/substantial-justification question itself, it expressly noted on remand that analyzing the Young factors “will also entail” addressing whether the failure to properly disclose damages was “substantially justified or harmless under NRCP 37(c)(1).” This signals that Nevada courts should not treat exclusion as automatic; rather, they must assess both the rule’s built-in safety valve and the broader proportionality concerns captured by Young when the sanction is dispositive.

C. Impact

1. Practical effect controls: “motion in limine” can be a dismissal

Zhang’s key contribution is to prevent end-runs around the protections that normally accompany dismissal sanctions. If excluding evidence (particularly damages, causation, or liability evidence) effectively ends a case, district courts must treat it as a case-terminating sanction and must make the Young findings. This is likely to influence litigation tactics: parties moving to exclude essential evidence should expect a more rigorous, factor-driven analysis, and parties opposing exclusion have a clearer appellate framework.

2. Reinforcement of rigorous damages-computation practice in business disputes

The decision also underscores that in contract and business tort cases, courts will view economic damages tied to investments, revenues, and sale proceeds as “tangible, quantifiable” and therefore squarely within NRCP 16.1’s computation requirement. Litigants should not assume that because a dispute’s theme is simple (“I put in $200,000 and want half the profits”), the procedural obligation to compute is satisfied without a concrete, category-by-category disclosure.

3. More written, reviewable sanction orders

By insisting on an “express, careful and preferably written” Young analysis, Zhang should yield sanction rulings that are more transparent, more proportional, and more defensible on appeal—especially where the sanction would foreclose trial on the merits.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• NRCP 16.1 damages computation: An early disclosure that states, in numbers, how you calculated each type of damages you seek (e.g., principal invested, rental income received/expected, sale proceeds, offsets/credits), so the other side can evaluate exposure and litigate efficiently.
• General vs. special (in this context): The opinion treats “general or other intangible damages” as things like pain and suffering (not readily computed early). By contrast, investment amounts and profit shares from property operations are quantifiable and therefore must be computed.
• Motion in limine: A request made near trial to exclude certain evidence. Even though it is “about evidence,” excluding essential evidence can end the entire case.
• Case-terminating sanction: A sanction that effectively prevents a party from proving a required element (here, damages), resulting in dismissal. Courts must be especially careful before imposing such sanctions.
• Young factors: A checklist Nevada courts must analyze before imposing dismissal-like sanctions, focused on willfulness, prejudice, proportionality, alternatives, fairness, and the policy favoring decisions on the merits.
• “Substantially justified or harmless” (NRCP 37(c)(1)): Even if a disclosure was late or inadequate, exclusion may be improper if the failure had a good reason or did not actually harm the other side’s ability to prepare.

V. Conclusion

Zhang v. Zhang establishes and clarifies a procedural safeguard with broad relevance: when a district court’s evidentiary sanction under NRCP 37(c)(1) effectively functions as a dismissal—such as excluding all damages evidence in a damages-based case—the court must conduct an express Young-factor analysis (and, as noted, address whether the failure was substantially justified or harmless). At the same time, the decision reaffirms that NRCP 16.1 requires a concrete computation of quantifiable economic damages in business disputes, and parties cannot avoid that obligation by re-labeling such damages as “general.”