“Young Women in Guatemala” Is Not a Cognizable Particular Social Group Absent Record Evidence of Social Distinction

Case: Elodia Jimenez Diaz v. Attorney General United States of America (3d Cir. July 22, 2026) (Not Precedential)
Agency: Board of Immigration Appeals affirming Immigration Judge David Cheng
Relief Sought: Asylum (8 U.S.C. § 1158), withholding of removal (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)), and CAT protection (8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c))

1. Introduction

Elodia Ercilia Jimenez Diaz, a Guatemalan citizen, petitioned the Third Circuit for review after the BIA denied her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The case centered on three recurring questions in removal defense: (i) whether asylum could be denied on the merits notwithstanding an asserted time bar; (ii) whether the proposed particular social group (PSG) “young women in Guatemala” is legally cognizable; and (iii) whether feared harm in Guatemala would more likely than not rise to “torture” with government “acquiescence” under CAT.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit denied the petition for review. Although the Immigration Judge found the asylum application untimely and unexcused, the IJ also evaluated the underlying merits and found the claims insufficient; the BIA affirmed. The court declined to reach the timeliness dispute because the BIA affirmed denial on the merits and the court agreed the claims failed substantively.

On withholding of removal, the court held that “young women in Guatemala” was not a cognizable PSG on this record because there was no evidence that Guatemalan society views that category as socially distinct; the adjective “young” did not meaningfully cure the breadth of the group. On CAT, the court agreed that petitioner did not show a greater-than-50% likelihood of torture, nor did she establish harm inflicted by, or with the acquiescence of, public officials—especially given findings that Guatemala had made efforts, “albeit imperfect,” to investigate and punish such crimes.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987)
  Used for the foundational distinction between asylum’s “well-founded fear” standard and withholding’s higher burden (“more likely than not”). The panel relied on this framework to emphasize that failure to satisfy asylum-level protection generally forecloses withholding.
• Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 340, 348–49 (3d Cir. 2008)
  Cited for the proposition that withholding of removal requires a “clear probability” and is more demanding than asylum. The panel invoked it to streamline analysis: if the applicant’s theory cannot meet asylum-like persecution requirements, it necessarily cannot meet withholding.
• Chavez-Chilel v. Att'y Gen., 20 F.4th 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 2018))
  Central to the PSG issue. These decisions supply the Third Circuit’s three-part test for PSG cognizability—immutability, particularity, and social distinction—and specifically the requirement that social distinction must be supported by record evidence about the society in question. The panel also relied on Chavez-Chilel’s reasoning that “Guatemalan women” was not shown to be a socially distinct group targeted for persecution based solely on gender; the present panel treated “young women in Guatemala” as materially similar on this record.
• S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 552
  Quoted for particularity: PSG boundaries must be “discrete and definable,” not “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.” The panel used this to criticize the breadth of the proposed category.
• Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005)
  Used as an example of an overly broad, vague grouping (“[p]overty, homelessness, and youth”) to illustrate that adding a descriptor (like “young”) does not necessarily create a legally bounded PSG.
• Kamara v. Att'y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 212–13 (3d Cir. 2005)
  Cited for the CAT burden: the applicant must show it is “more likely than not” she will be tortured if removed.
• Myrie v. Att'y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516–17 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Kaplun v. Att'y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010))
  Supplies the two-prong CAT framework: (1) what is likely to happen on removal; (2) whether it meets the legal definition of torture. Myrie also structures the “acquiescence” inquiry into likely official response and whether that response constitutes acquiescence. The panel applied these steps to uphold denial due to insufficient likelihood of torture and lack of official acquiescence.
• Green v. Att'y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012)
  Stands for the procedural logic that if an IJ/BIA finds a claimant fails one prong of the Kaplun test, it need not make additional findings on the other. The panel used this to validate the agency’s abbreviated CAT analysis once a dispositive failure was identified.
• 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) (and Myrie’s gloss)
  Defines acquiescence to include actual knowledge or willful blindness. The panel relied on this to conclude the record did not support a finding that Guatemalan officials would knowingly turn a blind eye to torture.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Asylum: Merits Affirmance Makes Timeliness Dispute Non-Dispositive

Although the IJ found the asylum application untimely and unexcused, the IJ also issued an alternative merits ruling. The BIA affirmed on the merits, and the Third Circuit treated that as sufficient to deny review without resolving the time-bar argument. In practical terms, the panel applied a judicial restraint principle: when an independent merits ground sustains the result, the court need not decide ancillary procedural disputes.

B. Withholding of Removal: “Young Women in Guatemala” Fails PSG Social Distinction (and Remains Overbroad)

The court focused on PSG cognizability. Under the Chavez-Chilel/S.E.R.L. framework, a group must be immutable, particular, and socially distinct. The panel rejected the proposed group because the record lacked evidence that Guatemalan society perceives “young women in Guatemala” as a distinct social group. The decision also reasons that adding “young” does not meaningfully narrow the group’s breadth; it remains too close to a population-wide demographic category rather than a socially marked class.

Having found no cognizable PSG, the causal nexus requirement (“because of” a protected ground) could not be met for withholding.

C. CAT: Failure to Show (i) Likely Torture and (ii) Government Acquiescence

The panel upheld the CAT denial on two related grounds. First, petitioner did not show a greater-than-50% likelihood that she would be subjected to conduct meeting the legal definition of torture upon return. Second, she did not show torture by, or with the acquiescence of, a public official. The BIA emphasized the IJ’s finding that Guatemala had undertaken efforts—“albeit imperfect”—including a “mechanism to investigate and punish criminals.” That finding undercut the claim that officials would be willfully blind or would knowingly acquiesce.

The panel also endorsed the agency’s ability to stop once a dispositive prong fails, consistent with Green v. Att'y Gen.

3.3 Impact

Although non-precedential, the decision reinforces several practical points likely to influence litigation and agency adjudication:

• PSG proof remains evidence-driven: Broad demographic labels (even when narrowed by age) will fail without concrete record evidence that the relevant society recognizes the group as distinct in a socially meaningful way.
• “Young” is not a cure-all modifier: The opinion signals skepticism that adding age to a gender-based national grouping is enough to create “discrete and definable boundaries” or establish social distinction.
• CAT acquiescence is hard to prove where the state shows imperfect enforcement: Evidence of functioning investigative or punitive mechanisms, even if ineffective in practice, may be treated as inconsistent with “willful blindness” absent stronger proof of official complicity or deliberate inaction.
• Alternative holdings matter: If the BIA affirms on the merits, timeliness and other threshold disputes may become irrelevant on review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Asylum vs. withholding of removal: Asylum generally requires showing a “well-founded fear” of persecution; withholding requires showing persecution is “more likely than not.” Withholding is harder to win.
• Particular Social Group (PSG): A PSG is not any group a person can describe; it must have (i) an immutable trait (hard to change), (ii) clear boundaries (not vague or huge), and (iii) “social distinction” (the society actually recognizes it as a distinct group).
• CAT “torture”: Not all serious harm qualifies. CAT focuses on severe harm and requires a probability showing (“more likely than not”).
• Government “acquiescence”: CAT can apply even if the government is not the direct torturer, but the applicant must show officials would knowingly allow it or be willfully blind. Evidence that the state investigates/punishes similar crimes can defeat this element unless the applicant can show those mechanisms are a sham or officials purposely ignore the applicant’s situation.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit denied relief because the proposed PSG—“young women in Guatemala”—lacked record evidence of social distinction and remained overly broad, defeating withholding of removal, and because petitioner failed to establish the probability of torture and government acquiescence required for CAT. The opinion’s core takeaway is evidentiary: claims framed around broad demographic categories must be supported by society-specific proof that the society views the group as distinct and that officials would likely acquiesce to torture despite any formal enforcement mechanisms.