Yan v. State of Texas: No Article III Case or Controversy Against an Adjudicating Judge; Claim-Splitting Dismissal; and Strict Pleading of Civil RICO Predicates and Continuity

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Summary Calendar; unpublished under 5th Cir. R. 47.5)
Date: August 20, 2026
Case: Conghua Yan v. The State of Texas, et al., No. 25-10752

I. Introduction

This appeal arises from a pro se federal action filed by Conghua Yan after developments in his Texas divorce proceedings. Yan alleged a broad conspiracy involving: (i) the State of Texas; (ii) a family-court judge (Associated Judge Lori L. Deangelis); (iii) opposing counsel (Leslie Starr Barrows); (iv) his former counsel (William Albert Pigg); and (v) his ex-wife (Fuyan Wang), her massage-therapy business (Panopyra P.L.L.C.), and two associates (Yuanli Tang and Jiayin Zheng).

Yan sought damages and equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil RICO, and state law. The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss all claims without leave to amend. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, organizing its reasoning around (1) Article III standing, (2) claim-splitting, (3) RICO pleading insufficiency, (4) sovereign immunity, (5) supplemental jurisdiction, and (6) futility of amendment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

• Claims against Judge DeAngelis: Dismissal affirmed for lack of Article III standing because there is no case or controversy between a litigant and a judge acting in an adjudicatory capacity (the court therefore did not reach judicial immunity).
• Claims against Barrows and Pigg: Res judicata did not support affirmance given lack of finality, but dismissal was affirmed as duplicative under the rule against claim-splitting because Yan was simultaneously litigating materially the same dispute in Yan v. State Bar of Texas (Yan I).
• RICO claims against the “Panopyra Defendants”: The court rejected duplicativeness and Younger abstention as grounds on this record, but affirmed on an alternative basis: Yan failed to plead a plausible RICO claim, including failure to plead wire fraud, money laundering, and continuity for a “pattern of racketeering activity.”
• Claims against Texas: Dismissal affirmed under Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; Texas had not waived immunity, and Ex parte Young does not permit suit against the State itself.
• State-law claims: Dismissal affirmed because the district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims.
• Leave to amend: Denial affirmed as futile where Yan had filed multiple iterations across related suits and did not identify facts that would cure the defects.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Outcome)

1. Standing and “no case or controversy” against adjudicating judges

• Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998): Cited for the foundational Article III limitation that federal courts decide only “cases” or “controversies.” The Fifth Circuit uses this baseline to frame the standing defect.
• Reule v. Jackson, 114 F.4th 360 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1431 (2025): The controlling Fifth Circuit authority for the proposition that “There is no case or controversy between a litigant and a judge acting in an adjudicatory capacity.” This case is the opinion’s principal vehicle for dismissing claims against Judge DeAngelis.
• Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003) and Machetta v. Moren, 726 F. App’x 219 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam): Reinforce that suits attempting to convert judicial acts into an Article III controversy are jurisdictionally defective.
• Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998): Supports the sequencing principle: without jurisdiction, courts do not reach merits defenses (here, judicial immunity). The Fifth Circuit explicitly relied on this to avoid addressing immunity once standing failed.

2. Duplicative litigation / claim-splitting vs. res judicata

• Yan v. State Bar of Texas (Yan I), No. 24-10543, 2025 WL 2759560 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (per curiam): The comparator suit. The panel treated the overlap as sufficient to trigger the claim-splitting doctrine even though traditional res judicata was unavailable.
• Armadillo Hotel Grp., L.L.C. v. Harris, 84 F.4th 623 (5th Cir. 2023): Provides the operative definition: claim-splitting “prohibits a party or parties in privity from simultaneously prosecuting multiple suits involving the same subject matter against the same defendants.” The court applied it to Barrows and Pigg because they were defendants in both suits and the factual nucleus was the same.
• Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013): Used to reject res judicata as an affirmance ground: a judgment is final for res judicata only when properly entered and not modified on appeal. Because Yan I lacked the required finality, res judicata could not carry the day, but claim-splitting could.

3. RICO elements, predicate pleading, and continuity (“pattern”)

• Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013): Supplies the appellate principle that the court may affirm on any basis supported by the record, enabling affirmance on pleading failure rather than abstention/duplication.
• HCB Fin. Corp. v. McPherson, 8 F.4th 335 (5th Cir. 2021): Cited for the basic civil RICO requirement: plead a criminal RICO violation and resulting injury to business or property.
• D&T Partners, L.L.C. v. Baymark Partners Mgmt., L.L.C., 98 F.4th 198 (5th Cir. 2024) and Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2007): Provide the “three common elements” framing of § 1962: (1) a person, (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to acquisition/operation/control of an enterprise.
• Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. 1997): Provides the minimum “at least two predicate acts” requirement for the pattern element.
• Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997): Supports applying Rule 9(b) heightened pleading to fraud-based predicates like wire fraud when used to establish RICO racketeering activity.
• H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989): The leading Supreme Court authority on “continuity” for RICO patterns. The Fifth Circuit applied both the “closed-ended” and “open-ended” continuity concepts and found Yan pleaded neither.
• In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1993) and again D&T Partners: Used to emphasize a recurring Fifth Circuit theme: finite schemes with a limited victim set and a singular objective often fail closed-ended continuity, even if they span years.
• Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s Inc., 238 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2001): Cited to apply Rule 9(b) beyond common-law fraud claims—i.e., to “all averments of fraud,” including structuring allegations when the gravamen is deceptive conduct.

4. Younger abstention’s narrow scope

• Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013): Invoked to limit Younger to three “exceptional circumstances.” The Fifth Circuit declined to affirm on Younger because Yan’s RICO damages claim was not, “at bottom,” a request to invalidate or enjoin a state-court order and allegedly pre-dated the divorce proceedings.

5. Sovereign immunity and limits of Ex parte Young

• McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2004) and Aguilar v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 160 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1998): Support the conclusion that Texas has not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity in this context.
• Bryant v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs., 781 F.3d 764 (5th Cir. 2015): Confirms that the Ex parte Young exception does not allow suit against the State itself (only against appropriate state officers for prospective relief to end an ongoing federal violation).

6. Supplemental jurisdiction discretion

• Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cnty., 826 F.3d 861 (5th Cir. 2016): Sets abuse-of-discretion review for declining supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
• Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam): Emphasizes the district court’s “wide” discretion in retaining or dismissing state-law claims after federal claims are gone.

7. Futility and leave to amend

• Avatar Expl., Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1991): Supports denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile.
• Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2017): Reinforces that a plaintiff’s failure to identify additional facts that would cure defects supports a futility finding.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Standing as a jurisdictional bar to suing judges for judicial acts

The opinion treats the judge-as-defendant question as a threshold Article III problem, not merely an immunity problem. Applying Reule v. Jackson, the panel held that when a judge acts in an adjudicatory capacity—here, presiding over divorce proceedings and entering a temporary order—there is no adverse case-or-controversy relationship between the litigant and the judge. The court anchored this conclusion in the record: the complained-of order was central to the complaint, bore Yan’s signature, and followed a hearing at which Yan appeared.

Critically, by invoking Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the court framed jurisdiction as logically prior to defenses like judicial immunity; lacking jurisdiction, it would not opine on immunity at all.

2. Claim-splitting as a pragmatic tool when res judicata finality is missing

The panel distinguished between res judicata and claim-splitting. Res judicata could not support affirmance because Yan I did not meet the finality requirement described in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.. Nonetheless, the claim-splitting doctrine from Armadillo Hotel Grp., L.L.C. v. Harris barred Yan from simultaneously pressing two suits against the same defendants (Barrows and Pigg) arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts—alleged fraud surrounding a divorce-related temporary order and associated financial harm.

In effect, the decision underscores that claim-splitting is not simply res judicata “early”; it is an independent managerial doctrine aimed at preventing parallel duplicative litigation, inconsistent rulings, and unnecessary expense.

3. Civil RICO: element-by-element pleading and the continuity constraint

For the Panopyra Defendants, the Fifth Circuit rejected the magistrate judge’s duplicativeness and Younger abstention rationales (no privity shown with Yan I; and the damages RICO theory was not a de facto appeal of a state-court order and did not fit Younger’s narrow categories under Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs). Still, it affirmed because Yan’s RICO allegations were implausible and conclusory.

The court’s RICO analysis is structured and demanding:

• Predicate acts must be pleaded with their statutory elements:
  • Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343): Yan failed to identify a concrete “scheme to defraud” and failed to plead use of interstate or foreign wires in furtherance of such a scheme. Because wire fraud “sounds in fraud,” Rule 9(b) particularity applied under Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc..
  • Money laundering (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (c)(7)): Yan did not identify the “specified unlawful activity” generating proceeds, nor facts showing defendants knew the property represented proceeds of unlawful activity.
  • Non-predicates and pleading notes: The court noted perjury is not a RICO predicate under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). It also acknowledged financial structuring can qualify under § 1961(1)(E), but where its gravamen is deception it triggers Rule 9(b) under Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s Inc..
• Pattern requires continuity (H.J. Inc.): Even assuming two predicates, Yan failed to plead either closed-ended continuity (a closed period of repeated conduct that amounts to more than a single, finite scheme) or open-ended continuity (a threat of repetition). The opinion emphasized that allegations focused on one victim and a singular objective tied to the divorce context typically fail continuity in this circuit (D&T Partners; In re Burzynski).

4. Sovereign immunity: the State is not a proper defendant for relief absent waiver

Yan conceded that equitable claims against Texas were barred. The court applied settled Fifth Circuit law that Texas has not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity (McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins; Aguilar v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just.) and reiterated that Ex parte Young does not allow suit against the State itself (Bryant v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs.).

5. Supplemental jurisdiction: routine dismissal of state claims after federal dismissal

After all federal claims were dismissed, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). On abuse-of-discretion review, the Fifth Circuit found the decision comfortably within the “wide” discretion recognized in Noble v. White and applied in Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cnty..

6. Futility: repeated filings without identified curative facts

The panel affirmed denial of further leave to amend. Although Rule 15 favors liberal amendment, a court may deny leave when amendment would be futile (Avatar Expl., Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.), especially where the plaintiff fails to identify new facts that would cure the defects (Edionwe v. Bailey). The court found futility particularly evident given multiple complaint iterations across two federal actions.

C. Impact

1. Practical reinforcement of the “no controversy with adjudicating judges” rule

Even though the opinion is unpublished, it reinforces—through Reule v. Jackson—a jurisdiction-first approach to suits targeting judges for judicial acts. Practitioners should expect early dismissals (standing) rather than extended litigation over immunity when the pleadings show the judge acted in an adjudicatory role.

2. Claim-splitting as a decisive defense when parallel litigation is pending

The opinion highlights claim-splitting’s utility where res judicata is not yet available due to lack of a final judgment. Defendants facing parallel suits in the Fifth Circuit can invoke Armadillo Hotel Grp., L.L.C. v. Harris to seek dismissal even when the “first” case is on appeal or otherwise non-final.

3. Civil RICO discipline: conclusory “financial crime” narratives will not survive

The decision illustrates the Fifth Circuit’s insistence on statutory-element pleading (including identifying specified unlawful activity for money laundering) and on continuity as a meaningful constraint. It signals that RICO theories grafted onto family-law disputes will face significant scrutiny unless the complaint pleads concrete predicate details and a true pattern (not merely an extended, finite dispute with one target and one goal).

4. Younger abstention remains narrow for private damages suits

The court’s refusal to affirm on Younger—citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs—is a notable reminder that not all litigation touching on state proceedings triggers abstention, particularly where the federal plaintiff seeks damages for allegedly independent wrongdoing rather than interference with a state-court order.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Standing (Article III): A plaintiff must show a real dispute that the court can resolve between adverse parties. When a judge is sued for decisions made as a judge in a case, the Fifth Circuit treats that as lacking the required adversarial “case or controversy.”
• Judicial immunity vs. standing: Immunity is a defense on the merits; standing is jurisdictional. If standing is absent, courts dismiss without deciding immunity (Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment).
• Claim-splitting: A rule preventing a party from pursuing two suits at the same time against the same defendants about the same basic dispute—even if the first suit is not “final” enough to trigger res judicata.
• Res judicata (claim preclusion): A final judgment can bar later suits on the same claim. Here, finality was missing under Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., so res judicata could not support affirmance.
• RICO “predicate acts”: Specific crimes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Not every wrongful act qualifies (e.g., perjury does not).
• Rule 9(b): Fraud allegations must be pleaded with particularity (the “who, what, when, where, and how”), which often applies to RICO claims relying on fraud predicates (e.g., wire fraud).
• RICO “pattern” and “continuity” (H.J. Inc.): It is not enough to allege wrongdoing happened more than once. The plaintiff must show either an ongoing threat (open-ended continuity) or enough repeated conduct over a closed period that amounts to more than a one-off, finite scheme (closed-ended continuity).
• Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity: States generally cannot be sued in federal court without consent. The Ex parte Young pathway (for prospective relief) runs against state officials, not the State itself.
• Supplemental jurisdiction: Federal courts may hear related state claims, but often dismiss them once the federal claims are gone.

V. Conclusion

Yan v. State of Texas is a compact but doctrinally dense Fifth Circuit disposition that (1) treats suits against adjudicating judges as jurisdictionally barred for lack of an Article III case or controversy; (2) uses claim-splitting to dismiss duplicative parallel litigation where res judicata finality is absent; (3) demands strict, element-specific pleading for civil RICO predicates—especially fraud-based predicates under Rule 9(b)—and enforces H.J. Inc. continuity as a real limitation on “pattern”; (4) reiterates that Texas retains Eleventh Amendment immunity absent waiver and is not reachable via Ex parte Young; and (5) affirms routine discretionary dismissal of state-law claims and denial of futile amendment.