Wyoming TPR Rule: No “Reasonable Efforts” Prerequisite Under § 14-2-309(a)(v), and Unchallenged Independent Grounds Sustain Termination

1. Introduction

In In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights To: CCC, CCC and CCC, Minor Children, Hailey Nicole Keller v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Family Services, the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed an order terminating the parental rights of Hailey Nicole Keller (Mother) and Corey Phillip Cruz (Father) to three minor children (referred to as oldest, middle, and youngest child). The State of Wyoming, ex rel. Department of Family Services (DFS) sought termination under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) and § 14-2-309(a)(v).

The case arose after repeated incidents of inadequate supervision (including the middle child found wandering unsupervised) and ongoing concerns about substance use, instability, and inconsistent parental engagement. After a juvenile neglect case and a later permanency shift to adoption, DFS filed a termination petition. Following a bench trial, the district court terminated both parents’ rights on both statutory grounds and found termination was in the children’s best interests.

On appeal, Father primarily argued DFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to follow internal policies and procedures (invoking MB v. Laramie Cnty. Dep't of Fam. Servs.). Mother challenged termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v), arguing DFS should have been required to prove “reasonable efforts” at reunification and disputing the district court’s fitness finding.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the termination of both parents’ rights.

  • Father: The Court held DFS’s shortcomings (e.g., failure to update plans, incomplete risk assessments) were distinguishable from the failures in MB v. Laramie Cnty. Dep't of Fam. Servs. and did not impermissibly affect his fundamental parental rights. Critically, Father did not challenge termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v); therefore, he abandoned any sufficiency challenge to that independent ground, which alone sustained affirmance.
  • Mother: The Court held § 14-2-309(a)(v) does not require proof of reasonable reunification efforts. The Court further held the record contained clear and convincing evidence supporting the district court’s finding that Mother was unfit at the time of trial under § 14-2-309(a)(v).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and “one ground is enough” doctrine

  • Matter of BAR, 2026 WY 13 and Matter of PML, 2024 WY 37: The Court relied on these cases for the governing review framework in termination cases—strict scrutiny, proof by clear and convincing evidence, and appellate review that views evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
  • Matter of MMD, 2024 WY 35 (citing Matter of ALRW, 2023 WY 20): These cases supplied the controlling principle that the “various statutory bases for termination of parental rights are separate and independent,” so an appellate court may affirm if any one ground is sufficiently supported. This principle was decisive as to Father because he did not challenge § 14-2-309(a)(v).

2) DFS policy/procedure failures and fundamental fairness

  • MB v. Laramie Cnty. Dep't of Fam. Servs., 933 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1997): Father argued DFS’s deviations from its policies rendered termination improper. The Court explained why MB was not controlling: in MB, DFS provided no meaningful roadmap for compliance (no tasks, no copy of the plan, no visitation plan, no documentation of directives, no notice that termination could result). In contrast, here DFS created a case plan with tasks, a visitation plan, quarterly MDT review, MDT reports, and notice of intent to seek termination. The Court thus treated DFS shortcomings as not rising to the kind of deprivation that, in MB, impacted the parent’s fundamental right to remain a legal parent.

3) “Reasonable efforts” not required under § 14-2-309(a)(v)

  • Matter of KCS, 2019 WY 15 (citing In re SJJ, 2005 WY 3): These cases were invoked for the express holding that neither the text of § 14-2-309(a)(v) nor Wyoming precedent requires DFS to prove reasonable reunification efforts prior to termination under that subsection.
  • Matter of BAD, 2019 WY 83 (Fox, J., specially concurring), and Boode v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 458 P.2d 653 (Wyo. 1969): Mother relied on the special concurrence in BAD, which advocated importing a reasonable-efforts requirement into § 14-2-309(a)(v). The Court rejected that approach, using Boode to emphasize that concurring opinions are not binding precedent and cannot “decide” the law for stare decisis purposes.
  • Matter of JPL, 2021 WY 94 (Kautz, J., specially concurring): Cited to underscore that it is the majority opinion in BAD, not the concurrence, that controls Wyoming law on the issue.
  • Matter of AM-LR, 2018 WY 76 (quoting In re MN v. State, 2003 WY 135), and In re SJJ, 2005 WY 3: Mother alternatively invoked Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-440(a) (Child Protection Act) to argue “reasonable efforts” should be required. The Court relied on these cases to reaffirm that juvenile neglect proceedings are “entirely separate and distinct from” termination proceedings, and § 14-3-440(a) applies to neglect cases (juvenile court) rather than termination trials (district court). SJJ specifically held § 14-3-440 inapplicable in a termination proceeding.
  • Int. of VS, 2018 WY 119: Used to address Mother’s argument raised for the first time on appeal under plain error. Because controlling law does not require reasonable efforts under § 14-2-309(a)(v), she could not show “transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law.”

4) Defining and proving “unfitness” under § 14-2-309(a)(v)

  • LeBlanc v. State Dep't of Fam. Servs., 2017 WY 107: Provided the commonly cited list of factors relevant to assessing parental fitness (e.g., substance use patterns, instability, inability to meet emotional needs, lack of bond, unsafe environment, adverse visitation effects).
  • Matter of GGMC, 2020 WY 50 and Matter of JPL, 2021 WY 94 (quoting Matter of BAD, 2019 WY 83): These cases supported two linked principles: (1) fitness is assessed at the time of trial, but (2) prior conduct is “plainly relevant,” and fitness is usually manifested by numerous incidents over time.
  • Matter of NRAE, 2020 WY 121: Cited for the structure of termination analysis—after statutory grounds are proven, the court must also determine best interests. Mother did not appeal the best-interests finding.
  • Matter of ALRW, 2023 WY 20: Quoted for the child-centered principle that when parental rights and a child’s need for stability and permanency collide, the parent’s rights yield; children are entitled to permanency.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Father: DFS policy failures, MB, and abandonment of an independent ground

The Court treated Father’s appeal as largely a structural/fairness challenge—DFS allegedly failed to follow internal policies, making its conduct arbitrary and capricious. The Court accepted that some procedural shortcomings existed (e.g., incomplete updates and assessments) but held they were not of the constitutional magnitude present in MB. Unlike MB, Father had a case plan with concrete expectations, an established visitation plan, periodic MDT review, and notice of possible termination.

The decisive appellate move, however, was doctrinal: because termination grounds are independent, and Father did not challenge termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v), the Court deemed any sufficiency challenge to that ground abandoned and affirmed on § 14-2-309(a)(v) alone.

2) Mother: § 14-2-309(a)(v) elements, no reasonable-efforts prerequisite, and proof of unfitness

The Court framed § 14-2-309(a)(v) as requiring proof of two elements: (1) the child has been in foster care under state responsibility for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, and (2) the parent is unfit to have custody and control. Mother did not dispute the foster-care-duration element.

On “reasonable efforts,” the Court applied a straightforward textual-and-precedential analysis: § 14-2-309(a)(v) does not include a reasonable-efforts requirement, and Wyoming cases (Matter of KCS, In re SJJ) have already rejected importing one. The Court also rejected two attempted pathways to change that result: (a) reliance on a special concurrence (Matter of BAD), which is not binding under Boode; and (b) reliance on § 14-3-440(a), which is confined to neglect proceedings and inapplicable to termination trials (Matter of AM-LR, In re MN v. State, In re SJJ).

On unfitness, the Court accepted the district court’s fact-intensive assessment anchored in LeBlanc factors and affirmed under the clear-and-convincing standard. It emphasized that fitness is assessed at trial but evaluated in light of sustained patterns and past behavior (Matter of GGMC, Matter of JPL). The district court found Mother’s unfitness was supported by multiple interrelated deficiencies over time, including: inconsistent contact, contribution to the children’s behavioral and emotional problems, unstable employment/home circumstances, a pattern of substance use, insufficient responsibility-taking, limited bond with younger children, and inadequate parenting skills—plus adverse effects associated with resumed video visitation shortly before trial.

C. Impact

  1. Reaffirmation of a bright-line feature of § 14-2-309(a)(v): This opinion reinforces that Wyoming courts will not impose a “reasonable efforts” prerequisite for termination under § 14-2-309(a)(v), and they will treat neglect-statute reasonable-efforts language as confined to juvenile neglect proceedings rather than termination trials.
  2. Appellate strategy and waiver/abandonment consequences: The decision illustrates that a parent who fails to challenge an independent statutory ground—especially § 14-2-309(a)(v)—risks automatic affirmance, even if other arguments exist.
  3. Limits on “agency policy noncompliance” arguments: The Court signals that DFS’s internal policy deviations matter most when they meaningfully deprive a parent of notice, a realistic opportunity to comply, or other essentials of fairness of the kind identified in MB. Lesser administrative shortcomings, without that constitutional-level effect, may not undo termination.
  4. Child permanency emphasis: By re-quoting Matter of ALRW, the Court continues its modern trend of emphasizing that extended foster care combined with persisting parental unfitness justifies permanency through termination and adoption.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Termination grounds are “separate and independent”: If the district court finds two statutory grounds for termination, an appellate court can affirm on just one of them—so long as that one is supported.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A higher standard than “more likely than not.” The evidence must make the court believe the claim is “highly probable.”
  • Strict scrutiny (in TPR context): Because parenting is a fundamental right, courts demand careful adherence to statutory requirements and a heightened proof standard.
  • “Reasonable efforts”: Generally refers to an agency’s efforts to help a family reunify. This opinion reiterates that such proof is not required under § 14-2-309(a)(v), even if it may be relevant elsewhere.
  • Unfitness: Not a single mistake, but an inability—viewed in context and over time—to meet a child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs. Past behavior matters because it helps predict whether improvement is durable.
  • Plain error (raised first on appeal): To win, the appellant must show violation of a “clear and unequivocal rule of law.” Because Wyoming law clearly rejects a reasonable-efforts requirement under § 14-2-309(a)(v), Mother could not meet that test.
  • Concurring opinions: Judges may write separately, but those writings do not create binding precedent unless they represent the court’s majority holding.

5. Conclusion

This decision solidifies two practical rules in Wyoming termination litigation. First, termination under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v) requires proof of foster-care duration and current parental unfitness— not proof of reasonable reunification efforts; neither a concurrence nor neglect-proceeding statutes can supply that missing requirement in a termination trial. Second, where multiple termination grounds are found, an appellant’s failure to challenge an independent ground—particularly § 14-2-309(a)(v)—will typically sustain affirmance. In the broader child-welfare context, the opinion continues Wyoming’s emphasis on permanency and stability for children when prolonged foster care coincides with persisting parental unfitness.