Wyoming Felony Expungement Limited to “Records of Conviction”: Deferred-Prosecution Dismissals Are Ineligible Under Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-1502

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Russell Lee Lynch’s attempt to expunge records connected to a 1979 felony case in Albany County. Mr. Lynch had pled guilty to felony Unauthorized Use of Automobile, but the sentencing court placed him on a probationary “deferral-like” disposition under then-effective law. After he successfully completed probation, the court permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea and dismissed the case.

Decades later, Mr. Lynch petitioned for expungement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1502, Wyoming’s felony expungement statute. Although the State did not object, the district court denied the petition on the ground that § 7-13-1502 applies only to felony convictions, and Mr. Lynch’s case ended in dismissal without an adjudication of guilt. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.

Central issue: whether a deferred prosecution / deferral disposition—ending in dismissal after withdrawal or annulment of a guilty plea—can be expunged under the felony expungement statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1502.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1502 authorizes expungement only for “records of conviction,” and eligibility is limited to a “person convicted of a felony” petitioning the “convicting court.” A successful deferral that culminates in withdrawal/annulment of the plea and dismissal produces no conviction, leaving nothing that § 7-13-1502 can expunge.

The Court rejected Mr. Lynch’s argument that statutory context (other expungement statutes and deferral statutes) renders § 7-13-1502 ambiguous or expands it to include deferrals. It held the statute is unambiguous and must be applied as written.

The Court nonetheless emphasized that Mr. Lynch’s DCI record inaccurately listed him as a convicted felon and stated the “Disposition” as “CONVICTED.” While affirming denial of expungement, the Court noted the record should be corrected to reflect the deferred-sentencing disposition and ultimate dismissal.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Matter of Birkholz, 2019 WY 19, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Ramirez v. State, 2016 WY 128, ¶ 7, 386 P.3d 348, 349 (Wyo. 2016))
  Used for the standard of review: statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo and the “primary objective” is giving effect to legislative intent. These authorities framed the Court’s method: start with statutory text and apply plain meaning when unambiguous.
• Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Laramie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 2016 WY 113, ¶ 10, 384 P.3d 679, 682 (Wyo. 2016)
  Quoted within Birkholz to reinforce the interpretive goal of effectuating legislative intent, primarily derived from statutory language.
• Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. Infrassure, Ltd., 2021 WY 65, ¶ 12, 486 P.3d 990, 994 (Wyo. 2021)
  Provided the Court’s plain-language framework: if clear and unambiguous, the statute’s text controls.
• Roman v. State, 2022 WY 48, ¶ 15, 507 P.3d 453, 457 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Rosen v. State, 2022 WY 16, ¶ 9, 503 P.3d 41, 44 (Wyo. 2022))
  Defined ambiguity narrowly: a statute is ambiguous only if vague/uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. This definition supported the Court’s refusal to treat § 7-13-1502 as ambiguous based on policy concerns or cross-statute comparisons.
• Bohling v. State, 2017 WY 7, ¶ 18, 388 P.3d 502, 506 (Wyo. 2017) (citing Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 2014 WY 37, ¶ 19, 320 P.3d 222, 228 (Wyo. 2014))
  Cited for the next step only if ambiguity exists—use general principles of construction. The Court cited this line of cases but ultimately did not apply broader construction because it found the key expungement text unambiguous.
• Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1037-38 (Wyo. 1979)
  Used in a clarifying footnote: “parole” in former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-203 referred to “probation.” This mattered because Mr. Lynch’s 1979 disposition used probationary mechanics typical of deferral schemes.
• Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 412 (Wyo. 1990)
  Central to the deferral analysis. The Court relied on Billis to treat “new 301” as clarifying “old 203,” and to confirm that old 203’s “annul the verdict or plea of guilty” feature was retained and functionally meant no adjudication of guilt/no conviction after successful completion. This directly undercut the argument that old 203 deferrals should be treated as convictions for expungement purposes.
• Bankers Standard Ins. Co. v. JTEC, Inc., 2025 WY 51, ¶ 20, 567 P.3d 1183, 1189 (Wyo. 2025); Barlow Ranch, Ltd. P'ship v. Greencore Pipeline Co. LLC, 2013 WY 34, ¶ 49, 301 P.3d 75, 91 (Wyo. 2013)
  Cited to reject policy-based rewriting of a statute. The Court acknowledged the parties’ policy arguments but reiterated that policy judgments belong to the legislature when the statutory text is unambiguous.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in four steps:

1. Textual trigger in § 7-13-1502: conviction-based eligibility. Section 7-13-1502 allows a “person convicted of a felony” to petition the “convicting court” for expungement of “records of conviction.” The Court treated these repeated conviction terms as dispositive and unambiguous.
2. Meaning of “conviction” and “convicting court.” The Court reinforced plain meaning by referencing dictionary definitions (Merriam-Webster and Black’s Law Dictionary) to describe “conviction” as a judicial finding of guilt and/or final judgment entered after such a finding. Under this framework, an expungement statute keyed to “records of conviction” cannot reach a case that ends with dismissal after the plea is withdrawn/annulled.
3. Deferral dispositions under old 203 and new 301 do not produce a conviction after successful completion. The Court compared former Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-203 (1977) (“old 203”) with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301(d) (“new 301”). New 301 expressly provides that discharge and dismissal are “without adjudication of guilt” and “not a conviction for any purpose.” Relying on Billis v. State, the Court held new 301 merely clarified the effect already embedded in old 203’s power to “annul the verdict or plea of guilty.” The Court then applied that principle to Mr. Lynch: his guilty plea was withdrawn and the matter dismissed; thus, no conviction remained.
4. Context statutes (§ 7-13-1401 and § 7-13-1501) do not expand § 7-13-1502. Mr. Lynch argued that because § 7-13-1401 expressly excludes deferrals while § 7-13-1502 does not, the legislature must have intended § 7-13-1502 to include deferrals. The Court rejected that negative-implication argument, reasoning the legislature had no need to exclude deferrals from a statute already limited to convictions. Likewise, the Court rejected reliance on misdemeanor expungement language in § 7-13-1501, noting it too authorizes expungement only of “records of conviction,” and expressly declined to opine on any broader scope of § 7-13-1501 beyond that clear phrasing.

3.3 Impact

• Bright-line “conviction” requirement for felony expungement petitions. Litigants and courts in Wyoming should expect § 7-13-1502 challenges to turn first—and often exclusively—on whether a final judgment of conviction exists. Where the disposition is a successful deferral culminating in dismissal, courts are directed to deny expungement under § 7-13-1502 for lack of statutory eligibility.
• Old 203 dispositions treated like new 301 dismissals for expungement eligibility. By rejecting ambiguity in old 203 and treating “annul” as functionally erasing the plea/verdict, the decision limits arguments that pre-301 deferrals can be recast as convictions to access felony expungement.
• Practical shift toward record correction rather than expungement for deferral dismissals. The Court highlighted that Mr. Lynch’s “CONVICTED” DCI entry was inaccurate and “should be corrected.” Future petitioners in similar procedural postures may increasingly pursue administrative/judicial correction mechanisms (rather than expungement) to resolve erroneous “convicted felon” labeling.
• Legislative pressure point. The Court acknowledged strong policy concerns (including the seeming inequity that some convicted felons may later qualify for expungement while successful deferral participants cannot), but held such concerns cannot override unambiguous text. If Wyoming wishes to permit expungement (or sealing) of deferral-dismissal records, the path suggested by this opinion is statutory amendment, not judicial construction.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Expungement (as used here): A statutory remedy allowing a court to order certain criminal records removed from public view or otherwise treated as expunged. Under § 7-13-1502, the remedy targets “records of conviction.”
• Deferral / deferred prosecution (Wyoming context): A court-supervised outcome where proceedings are effectively paused while the defendant completes conditions (often probation-like). If successful, the case is dismissed without an adjudication of guilt.
• “Without adjudication of guilt” / “not a conviction for any purpose”: Language (express in § 7-13-301(d)) that means the system treats the person as not having been convicted once the deferral is successfully completed and the case is dismissed.
• “Annul the verdict or plea of guilty” (old 203): The Court reads “annul” to mean legally void—i.e., the plea or verdict is wiped out so that no conviction remains.
• In pari materia: A canon of interpretation urging courts to read related statutes together. The Court’s key point is that related-statute context cannot be used to override a statute’s unambiguous eligibility requirement (“convicted of a felony”).
• De novo review: The appellate court gives no deference to the district court’s statutory interpretation; it decides the meaning anew.

5. Conclusion

Russell Lee Lynch v. The State of Wyoming cements a textual rule: felony expungement under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1502 is available only when there is a felony conviction—a final judicial determination of guilt memorialized in a judgment. A successful deferral that ends in withdrawal/annulment of the plea and dismissal is not a conviction and therefore falls outside § 7-13-1502’s reach.

The opinion also underscores a practical corollary: while expungement may be unavailable, erroneous criminal-history entries (such as labeling a dismissed deferral as “CONVICTED”) should be corrected to reflect the true disposition. In the broader legal landscape, the decision signals that any expansion of relief for deferral-dismissal records must come from legislative change, not judicial policy balancing.