Writ Quashed with Horsley Disclaimer: No Implied Endorsement of Lower-Court Reasoning in an Abandonment-Based TPR Appeal

1. Introduction

In Ex parte M.P. (Ala. July 10, 2026), the Supreme Court of Alabama addressed—procedurally rather than merits-wise—a dispute arising from a termination-of-parental-rights (“TPR”) case in the Baldwin Juvenile Court. The mother, M.P., sought termination of the father’s rights, contending (among other things) that the father, W.C.M., had abandoned their child, E.H.P.. After appellate proceedings in the Court of Civil Appeals culminating in W.C.M. v. M.P. (“W.C.M. II”), the mother petitioned for discretionary certiorari review, asserting a “conflict” with binding precedent under Rule 39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P.

The Supreme Court ultimately quashed the writ it had issued. Two separate writings frame the stakes: Justice Parker’s special concurrence (emphasizing the narrow “conflict” gateway for certiorari and the institutional division of labor) and Justice Bryan’s dissent (arguing that the Court of Civil Appeals both reweighed evidence and relied on a legally flawed, increasingly “novel” rule tying financial abandonment to the existence of a child-support order).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s disposition is succinct:

“The writ is quashed.”

Crucially, the Court adds a classic caution:

In quashing the writ, the Court does not wish to be understood as approving all the language, reasons, or statements of law in the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion, citing Horsley v. Horsley, 291 Ala. 782, 280 So. 2d 155 (1973).

Thus, the practical effect is that the Court of Civil Appeals’ judgment in W.C.M. II remains in place, but the Supreme Court expressly withholds any endorsement of its reasoning.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Writ-Quash Disposition and the Separate Writings)

A. Procedural/Institutional Frame

  • Horsley v. Horsley: The Court uses Horsley to clarify the meaning of a procedural termination of review. The “quash with disclaimer” signals: (i) the lower court result stands; (ii) the Supreme Court is not adopting the lower court’s analysis as its own; and (iii) future litigants should not treat the quash as substantive approval.
  • Rule 39(a)(1)(D), Ala. R. App. P.: Justice Parker’s concurrence focuses on the petition’s reliance on “conflict” jurisdiction. He distinguishes between genuine legal conflict (irreconcilability with precedent or a material misstatement of law) and fact-bound sufficiency arguments framed as conflict.

B. The Abandonment/Support Debate Highlighted by the Dissent

Justice Bryan’s dissent argues the Court of Civil Appeals’ abandonment analysis rests on a shaky premise: that without a child-support order a juvenile court cannot find “failure” to provide financial support as part of abandonment under § 12-15-301(1), Ala. Code 1975. To critique that premise, the dissent marshals statutes, common-law cases, and decisions about parental support duties.

  • M.W. v. Marshall County Department of Human Resources, 399 So. 3d 287 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) and J.M. v. Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 399 So. 3d 280 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024): These are the key modern Court of Civil Appeals decisions invoked for the proposition that, absent a support order, a court cannot find “failure” to support within abandonment. Bryan treats these as part of a recent doctrinal drift.
  • B.L. v. Elmore County Department of Human Resources, 324 So. 3d 829 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020): Bryan contends the “no order, no failure” rule is incorrectly attributed to B.L. He emphasizes B.L. also reasoned that the evidence was not clear the father was able to provide support and failed to do so—suggesting ability and conduct, not merely the presence of an order, should drive analysis.
  • A.E. v. M.C., 100 So. 3d 587 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012): Cited to show the Court of Civil Appeals previously treated “maintenance” in the abandonment definition as synonymous with “support,” without anchoring it to a particular enforcement mechanism like a juvenile-court support order.
  • Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117 (Ala. 2009), and older common-law authorities including Brock v. Brock; Ingalls v. Ingalls; Murrah v. Bailes; Scott v. Scott (with references to Bridges v. Bridges, Farmer v. Coleman, Chandler v. Whatley); McWhorter Transfer Co. v. Peek; Brown v. Brown, 2 Ala. App. 461, 56 So. 589 (1911) (with references to Neville v. Reed, Winslow v. State, Englehardt v. Yung's Heirs, Kirkbride v. Harvey): These cases supply the dissent’s central normative proposition: the parental duty of support is inherent at common law and does not arise only from an order.
  • Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57, 22 So. 2d 525 (1945): Used to insist statutes must be read in light of common law and that legislatures do not alter foundational principles absent clear intent.
  • DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270 (Ala. 1998): Invoked for the “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation—supporting Bryan’s view that “maintenance” in § 12-15-301(1) should not be artificially narrowed.
  • Ex parte Brooks, 513 So. 2d 614 (Ala. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1990): Bryan relies on Brooks for the policy that TPR statutes should not become a tool to facilitate abandonment or evade support obligations.
  • Brown v. Brown, 719 So. 2d 228 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (and its references to State ex rel. Shellhouse v. Bentley, Ex parte University of South Alabama, Anderson v. Loper): Used to underscore that Alabama law allows support obligations (including retroactive support) even where no pendente lite order existed—again challenging the logic that an order is a prerequisite to “failure.”
  • Keener v. State, 347 So. 2d 398 (Ala. 1977): Cited in connection with paternity adjudication and the obligations that follow a finding of fatherhood.
  • Ex parte J.W.B., 933 So. 2d 1081 (Ala. 2005) (quoting the dissent in K.W.J. v. J.W.B., 933 So. 2d 1075 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), and referencing R.K. v. R.J. and Lehr v. Robertson): Deployed to emphasize that “court papers” do not substitute for the lived formation of parent-child bonds—important to abandonment as relational and practical conduct, not merely litigation posture.
  • Ex parte C.D. (and the Court of Civil Appeals decision B.F. v. C.D.): Mentioned (in a footnote) as recently setting a “new standard” for when courts measure voluntary forfeiture of a putative father’s rights—“when a putative father knows, or should know, of his paternity.” Though not a holding of this case, it situates the abandonment/support debate within evolving fatherhood-rights doctrine.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The Majority’s Minimalist Disposition: Quash + Non-Endorsement

The Supreme Court’s operative legal move is procedural. By quashing the writ and invoking Horsley, the Court:

  • ends further Supreme Court review in this case;
  • leaves the Court of Civil Appeals’ judgment undisturbed; and
  • prevents the quash from being read as an implicit adoption of the lower court’s reasoning.

B. Justice Parker (Special Concurrence): What “Conflict” is (and is Not)

Justice Parker’s opinion supplies the clearest articulation of why, in his view, this petition was an imperfect vehicle for certiorari:

  • The mother’s arguments were characterized as “extremely fact-intensive” (reweighing evidence, ore tenus credibility, sufficiency).
  • He suggests “conflict” is more properly found where the decision below is “factually or legally irreconcilable” with binding precedent, or “materially misstates the law,” rather than where it simply reaches a different conclusion about whether evidence was “clear and convincing.”
  • The concurrence emphasizes institutional roles: intermediate appellate courts resolve many fact-bound sufficiency questions, and the Supreme Court’s discretionary review should focus on true doctrinal conflicts.

C. Justice Bryan (Dissent): Reweighing + a Substantive Statutory/Common-Law Error

Justice Bryan argues the Court should have reached the merits and reversed. His critique has two layers:

  1. Standard-of-review concern: the Court of Civil Appeals allegedly reweighed evidence that the juvenile court could reasonably have viewed as “clear and convincing,” aligning with Judge Fridy’s dissents in W.C.M. I and W.C.M. II.
  2. Abandonment/support rule concern: Bryan targets the proposition derived from M.W./J.M. (and attributed to B.L.) that without a child-support order the juvenile court cannot find “failure” to provide financial support as abandonment under § 12-15-301(1). His reasoning is that:
    • “Maintenance” in § 12-15-301(1) should not be confined to court-ordered “child support” under § 12-15-314(e).
    • Alabama common law recognizes a parental support duty independent of court order.
    • The statutory scheme (including § 12-15-319(a)(9) and retroactive support concepts referenced via §§ 30-3-110 through 30-3-115) coheres with an inherent duty model, not an “order-first” model.
    • Therefore, the absence of an order should be evidentiary context—not a legal bar—to a finding of abandonment.

3.3. Impact

A. Immediate Practical Impact

  • The Court of Civil Appeals’ judgment in W.C.M. II remains operative in this case, meaning the juvenile court’s termination decision remains reversed (as a practical matter), subject to whatever procedural posture W.C.M. II produced on remand.
  • The Supreme Court’s Horsley disclaimer makes clear that litigants should not cite the writ-quash itself as substantive approval of the Court of Civil Appeals’ reasoning.

B. Doctrinal Signal to Future Litigants (Certiorari Strategy)

  • Justice Parker’s concurrence signals that petitions framed as “conflict” should isolate a crisp legal contradiction or misstatement—rather than repackage record-bound sufficiency disputes.
  • Practitioners seeking Supreme Court review in TPR cases may need to (i) identify a concrete misstatement of a statutory element (e.g., abandonment), or (ii) show an explicit departure from ore tenus deference, rather than arguing the appellate court merely drew the “wrong” inference.

C. Unresolved Tension in Abandonment Law

Justice Bryan’s dissent highlights an emerging fault line: whether certain Court of Civil Appeals decisions effectively require a prior support order before financial non-support can be treated as abandonment. Because the Supreme Court quashed the writ, that issue remains unresolved at the high-court level—and may recur until squarely addressed.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Writ quashed”: The Supreme Court stops reviewing the case. The lower appellate court’s judgment stands, but the Supreme Court may still refuse to endorse the lower court’s reasoning.
  • Horsley disclaimer: A standard statement meaning: “We’re not saying the lower court’s reasoning is correct in all respects.”
  • Ore tenus findings: When a trial judge hears live testimony, the judge’s credibility determinations get deference on appeal because the judge directly observed the witnesses.
  • “Clear and convincing evidence”: A heightened proof standard—more than “preponderance,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • “Abandonment” under § 12-15-301(1): A broad statutory definition that includes withholding “presence, care, love, protection, maintenance” or failing to perform parental duties—conceptually encompassing both relational absence and (depending on interpretation) financial non-support.
  • Common-law duty of support: The long-standing rule (recognized in multiple Alabama cases) that a parent must support minor children even without a specific court order—a key premise of the dissent’s critique.

5. Conclusion

Ex parte M.P. is a procedural endpoint with substantive reverberations. The Supreme Court quashed certiorari while expressly declining to approve all aspects of the Court of Civil Appeals’ reasoning (Horsley v. Horsley). Justice Parker’s concurrence underscores the narrowness of “conflict” review under Rule 39(a)(1)(D), especially where the petition is driven by fact-intensive sufficiency and ore tenus-deference disputes. Justice Bryan’s dissent, by contrast, spotlights a potentially consequential doctrinal issue: whether financial “abandonment” can be found absent a prior child-support order—an issue he argues must be answered in light of Alabama’s common-law support duty and the statutory text of § 12-15-301(1).

The key takeaway is not that the Supreme Court validated W.C.M. II, but that it left the lower-court judgment intact without endorsement—preserving, for future cases, both the contested abandonment/support question and the certiorari “conflict” threshold debate.