Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (c) Is Not Retroactive to Final Board Decisions; Correction Officers Are Not “Other Person[s] Certified to Provide Medical Care in Emergencies” Under § 10 (3) (b)

1. Introduction

Matter of Croom v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision (2026 NY Slip Op 03709 [3d Dept June 11, 2026]) addresses two recurring issues in New York workers’ compensation claims for psychological injury: (1) whether a new statutory protection for certain PTSD/stress claims applies to cases already decided by the Workers’ Compensation Board but still on appellate review; and (2) whether a correction sergeant qualifies for the special “first responder” exception that limits the Board’s ability to deny PTSD claims on the ground that the stress was not greater than normal.

The claimant, a correction sergeant at Albion Correctional Facility, participated in emergency lifesaving efforts (CPR and defibrillator use) for an incarcerated individual who ultimately died. The claimant later sought mental-health treatment, received a PTSD diagnosis, stopped working, and filed for workers’ compensation benefits. A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge established the claim, but on administrative review the Workers’ Compensation Board disallowed it, finding no compensable injury under the then-governing “greater-than-normal stress” standard. The claimant appealed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed the Board’s disallowance.

  • No remittal for Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (c): The court held that the 2025 enactment of Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (c)—which restricts denials of certain PTSD/stress claims based on “not greater than normal” stress—does not apply to this matter because the Board’s October 2024 decision was final and conclusive (subject only to appeal) before the statute’s June 4, 2025 effective date, and there was no indication of legislative intent for retroactive application.
  • Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (b) does not cover correction officers: The claimant did not qualify as an “other person certified to provide medical care in emergencies” under § 10 (3) (b). The catch-all is limited by the specific terms “emergency medical technician” and “paramedic,” and correction officers are not included by text or implication.
  • Substantial evidence supported the Board’s “no extraordinary stress” finding: The record supported the conclusion that responding to medical emergencies—including providing lifesaving measures—was part of claimant’s normal job environment and not an exceptional stressor compared to similarly situated workers.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Retroactivity and effective-date analysis

  • Matter of Jeter v Poole, 43 NY3d 241 (2024): Central to the court’s retroactivity analysis. The Third Department relied on the principle that statutes are presumed prospective absent contrary legislative intent and cautioned against reading new statutes to impose “new duties” as to completed determinations. The court borrowed both the presumption and the “new duties” framing to conclude § 10 (3) (c) is inapplicable to this already-decided Board claim.
  • People v Galindo, 38 NY3d 199 (2022): Reinforced the general presumption against retroactivity and the need for clear legislative intent before applying a new statute to past events or completed adjudications.
  • Matter of Deutsch v Catherwood, 31 NY2d 487 (1973): Older but foundational authority on prospective application, used here to support the default rule that new statutes do not reach backward.
  • Matter of Mealing v Hills, 132 AD2d 759 (3d Dept 1987), lv denied 70 NY2d 612 (1987): Cited as a contrast (via “cf.”) illustrating that amendments may apply to pending matters before the Board. The Third Department distinguished that type of posture from this case, where the Board had already issued a final decision before the effective date.
  • Matter of McMillan v Town of New Castle, 162 AD3d 1425 (3d Dept 2018): Another contrast. There, the Board should have considered a change in law that became effective before a motion for reconsideration. Here, by comparison, there was no Board reconsideration posture that would bring the new statute into play before finality.
  • Matter of Wallace v New York City Sch. Support Servs., Inc., 247 AD3d 1401 (3d Dept 2026): Mentioned in a footnote as a comparator (“cf.”) on the developing appellate conversation about § 10 (3) (c), underscoring that Croom is among the first decisions to directly address the statute’s effect on already-decided Board matters pending appeal when the statute took effect.

B. Standards for compensability of stress-induced psychological injury and the first-responder carveout

  • Matter of McLaurin v New York City Tr. Auth., ___ NY3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op 06529 (2025): The court used this recent Court of Appeals articulation of the “general rule” that stress-induced psychological injury is accidental/compensable only if workplace stress was greater than that experienced by similarly situated workers in the normal work environment.
  • Matter of Leggio v Suffolk County Police Dept., 96 NY2d 846 (2001): Cited for the longstanding “greater-than-normal stress” rule for emotional-stress psychological injuries.

C. Statutory interpretation (no deference; textual limits; ejusdem generis)

  • Matter of Sanchez v Jacobi Med. Ctr., 182 AD3d 121 (3d Dept 2020): Cited for the proposition that where the question is pure statutory interpretation, the agency’s view is not entitled to deference.
  • Matter of Walsh v New York State Comptroller, 34 NY3d 520 (2019): Reinforced the same “pure statutory interpretation” principle.
  • Matter of Matzell v Annucci, 183 AD3d 1 (3d Dept 2020): Used to emphasize that courts cannot add omitted categories into a statute; omissions are presumed intentional. This supported rejecting the invitation to treat correction officers as covered where they are not listed in § 10 (3) (b).
  • Matter of Town of Riverhead v New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs., 5 NY3d 36 (2005): Cited for the same principle of statutory text fidelity and the inference from omission.
  • People v Bartkow, 96 NY2d 770 (2001): The key interpretive tool for the “catch-all” phrase “other person certified to provide medical care in emergencies.” The court applied the rule that general language is limited by preceding specific terms (a form of ejusdem generis), confining the catch-all to roles like EMTs/paramedics rather than any job that sometimes performs CPR/first aid.
  • Employer: County of Westchester, 2019 WL 118204, 2019 NY Wrk Comp LEXIS 4 (Jan. 2, 2019, WCB No G126 4973): A Board decision consistent with the Third Department’s reading that correction officers are not among the categories covered by § 10 (3) (b). The court cited it approvingly as aligned with its statutory interpretation.

D. Appellate review of Board fact-finding (substantial evidence)

  • Matter of Rivenburg v County of Albany, 187 AD3d 1282 (3d Dept 2020): Provided the “substantial evidence” standard for reviewing the Board’s factual determination regarding whether stress exceeded normal levels for similarly situated workers; also cited in the concluding affirmance.
  • Matter of Kraus v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 156 AD3d 1132 (3d Dept 2017): Another “substantial evidence” case reinforcing deference to the Board’s factual resolution when supported by the record.
  • Matter of Guess v Finger Lakes Ambulance, 28 AD3d 996 (3d Dept 2006), lv denied 7 NY3d 707 (2006): Cited as an example supporting affirmance where the Board’s view of whether stress was greater-than-normal was supported by substantial evidence.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Why Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (c) did not apply

The court treated the question as one of temporal reach: whether a statute enacted in 2025, effective June 4, 2025, should govern a Board decision issued in October 2024 that was “final and conclusive” under Workers’ Compensation Law § 23 unless disturbed on appeal. Applying the presumption of prospective operation (anchored in Matter of Jeter v Poole, People v Galindo, and Matter of Deutsch v Catherwood), the court found the delayed effective date inconsistent with any intent to reopen or alter already-completed Board determinations.

The court also implicitly drew a procedural boundary: a legal change may matter if the case remains actively before the Board (as in Matter of Mealing v Hills or Matter of McMillan v Town of New Castle), but not where the Board has already rendered the decision at issue and only appellate review remains.

B. Why Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (b) did not cover correction officers

The court first clarified that it owed no deference to the Board because the scope of § 10 (3) (b) is a pure question of statutory interpretation (Matter of Sanchez v Jacobi Med. Ctr.; Matter of Walsh v New York State Comptroller). Turning to the text, § 10 (3) (b) identifies covered roles (police officers, firefighters, EMTs, paramedics, “other person[s] certified to provide medical care in emergencies,” and emergency dispatchers). Correction officers are not named, and the court refused to insert them by interpretation (Matter of Matzell v Annucci; Matter of Town of Riverhead v New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs.).

Critically, the court rejected the claimant’s attempt to use the “other person certified…” catch-all to include correction officers who may have CPR/first-aid training. Applying People v Bartkow, the court limited the catch-all to persons akin to EMTs and paramedics—i.e., roles whose defining function is certified emergency medical care—rather than roles that may incidentally perform first aid. The court reinforced that reading by comparing the statutory/regulatory framework governing emergency medical services certification (referencing Public Health Law provisions and 10 NYCRR regulations).

C. Why the Board’s “no extraordinary stress” finding survived review

On the factual question—whether the claimant’s stress exceeded what similarly situated employees experience in the normal work environment—the court applied the “substantial evidence” standard (Matter of Rivenburg v County of Albany; Matter of Kraus v Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc.). The evidence supporting the Board included:

  • Testimony that providing lifesaving measures to incarcerated individuals was among claimant’s job duties.
  • The claimant’s acknowledgment that medical emergencies were not uncommon in the facility.
  • Record evidence that deaths had previously occurred at the facility.
  • The claimant’s statement that her working relationship with the deceased incarcerated individual was not meaningfully different from her relationships with others at the facility.

Given that evidentiary foundation, the court concluded it could not disturb the Board’s determination (Matter of Guess v Finger Lakes Ambulance).

3.3. Impact

  • Non-retroactivity boundary for § 10 (3) (c): The decision signals that § 10 (3) (c) will not be used to revisit or remand cases where the Board issued a final decision before the statute’s effective date, even if an appeal is pending. Practically, claimants cannot rely on the appellate process alone to obtain the benefit of § 10 (3) (c) for pre-effective-date Board determinations.
  • Constrained reading of “other person certified…” in § 10 (3) (b): By applying People v Bartkow to limit the catch-all to EMT/paramedic-like positions, the court narrows attempts by other occupations (with CPR/first-aid requirements) to claim § 10 (3) (b) coverage. Unless the Legislature amends the statute to include correction officers expressly, claimants in that role will generally remain in the “greater-than-normal stress” regime (at least for periods and claims governed by that standard).
  • Evidence framing for “normal work environment” in institutional settings: The affirmance underscores how job-duty descriptions, frequency of emergencies, and institutional history (prior deaths) can make even traumatic incidents “normal” for purposes of workers’ compensation psychological-injury analysis. Future litigants will likely focus on distinguishing the event’s severity, atypicality, or personal involvement beyond ordinary duties.
  • Legislative churn noted but not outcome-determinative: The footnote describing the 2024 removal and 2025 restoration of first-responder language in § 10 (3) (b) highlights an evolving statutory landscape—yet the court anchored its holding in the enacted text applicable to the adjudication and the effective-date rules.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Compensable injury” (psychological): A mental health condition (like PTSD) can be covered by workers’ compensation, but (under the rule applied here) the claimant had to prove the work stress was greater than what similarly situated employees ordinarily face.
  • “Greater-than-normal stress” test: Not every distressing workplace event qualifies. The comparison is to the baseline stress of the same job in the same environment—what other comparable workers typically experience.
  • Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (b): A special rule for specified emergency roles. When it applies, the Board cannot deny the claim merely because the stress was not greater than normal.
  • Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (c): A later-enacted provision that further restricts denials based on the “not greater than normal” rationale when its criteria are met. Croom holds it does not automatically reach back to final Board decisions issued before its effective date.
  • Prospective vs. retroactive statutes: Courts generally apply new laws going forward. To apply a statute to earlier-decided matters, courts look for clear legislative intent; a delayed effective date often suggests the opposite.
  • “Substantial evidence” review: On appeal, courts do not re-try the facts. If the Board’s decision is supported by “substantial evidence” (enough relevant proof that a reasonable person could accept it), the court will uphold it even if other evidence could support a different outcome.
  • Ejusdem generis (from People v Bartkow): When a statute lists specific items (EMT, paramedic) and then adds a general phrase (“other person…”), the general phrase is read to include only things similar to the specific items—not anything broadly imaginable.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Croom establishes two practical guideposts. First, Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (c) will not be treated as retroactively applicable to undo or remand Board determinations that were final before the statute’s effective date, even if appellate review is pending. Second, correction officers—even if trained in CPR/first aid—are not “other person[s] certified to provide medical care in emergencies” under Workers’ Compensation Law § 10 (3) (b), because the catch-all is limited to EMT/paramedic-like roles.

On the merits, the decision also reaffirms that, outside statutory carveouts, compensability for stress-induced psychological injury turns heavily on whether the event is shown—factually—to exceed the normal stress profile of the job, a determination appellate courts will rarely disturb when supported by substantial evidence.