Workers’ Compensation IME Obstruction: Suspension Is the Exclusive Statutory Sanction (Dismissal Unavailable)

1. Introduction

In Hooker v. Labor Commission, 2026 UT 16, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed (on certification from the court of appeals) whether the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board could dismiss a workers’ compensation claim as a discovery sanction when an employee allegedly “obstructs” an employer-requested independent medical examination (IME).

Parties. Petitioner Laura Nycole Hooker (employee/claimant) sought workers’ compensation benefits for alleged workplace injuries and resulting complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS). Respondents were the Utah Labor Commission and Hooker’s employer, The Kroger Company.

Key issues. After three failed IMEs with physicians selected by Kroger, an ALJ suspended Hooker’s claim and imposed costs/fees. The Appeals Board went further and dismissed the claim with prejudice under Utah R. Civ. P. 37, reasoning that IMEs are discovery and that “three strikes” warranted dismissal. The Supreme Court addressed (i) whether dismissal is an available sanction given Utah Code section 34A-2-602(2)’s express remedy of “suspension,” and (ii) whether Hooker had standing to challenge monetary sanctions imposed on her attorneys.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that, for obstruction (or refusal) of a workers’ compensation IME under Utah Code § 34A-2-602(2), the only permissible sanction is suspension of the claim “during the period of the refusal or obstruction.” Because that statute prescribes a specific remedy, the Appeals Board erred by dismissing the claim under Rule 37(b).

The Court also declined to reach (a) whether Hooker’s conduct met the statutory standard of “obstruction,” and (b) due process arguments, because the dismissal issue was dispositive of the relief sought.

On monetary sanctions, the Court held Hooker lacked standing to challenge sanctions imposed on her attorneys, because relief would redress the attorneys’ injury, not Hooker’s.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Gamez v. Utah Lab. Comm'n, 2022 UT 20: Cited for the framework that judicial review of administrative decisions depends on the type of agency action and any governing standard under UAPA; supports the Court’s choice to review statutory interpretation for correctness.
  • Elks Lodges No. 719 (Ogden) & No. 2021 (Moab) v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189 (Utah 1995): Reinforces correctness review for statutory construction absent an explicit delegation of discretion.
  • New Star Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Dumar, LLC, 2025 UT 14: Anchors the Court’s interpretive method—legislative intent is best evidenced by plain statutory text.
  • Cougar Canyon Loan, LLC v. Cypress Fund, LLC, 2020 UT 28: Supplies the parallel principle for interpreting court rules (e.g., Rule 37) by their plain language.
  • Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6: Used to emphasize that “shall” is ordinarily mandatory, undercutting any suggestion the Board had discretion to substitute dismissal for suspension.
  • McKitrick v. Gibson, 2021 UT 48: Cited for expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the expression of one remedy (suspension) implies exclusion of others (dismissal).
  • Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 961 (Utah 1996): Provides the hierarchy principle that an agency rule “cannot trump” a statute—critical because the Board relied on incorporated civil rules.
  • Barker v. Labor Commission, 2023 UT App 31: The central authority the Board invoked. The Supreme Court distinguished it: Barker treated Rule 35 as filling a gap where statutes/rules were silent, but reaffirmed the broader rule that civil rules apply only when not inconsistent with specific statutory or agency provisions.
  • GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Utah State Univ. Rsch. Found., 2018 UT 50: Supports the Court’s practice of citing the current rule version where differences from the operative version are inconsequential.
  • Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2002): Cited for the “specific-general” canon: specific provisions typically govern over general ones.
  • Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75: Cited (re: absurdity doctrine) to reject rewriting unambiguous statutory language unless results are so absurd that no rational legislator could intend them.
  • Schroeder Invs., L.C. v. Edwards, 2013 UT 25: Reinforces judicial restraint: courts do not override legislative policy judgments even if they seem unwise.
  • S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Kane Cnty. Comm'n, 2021 UT 7: Cited for the baseline proposition that standing is jurisdictional.
  • Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. State, 2024 UT 28: Supplies the Court’s three-part standing test and the note that third-party standing generally requires satisfying traditional standing first.
  • Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18: Confirms courts may raise standing sua sponte at any time.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The statutory command is mandatory and exclusive. The Court began with text. Section 34A-2-602(2) states that if an employee “refuses to submit” or “obstructs” an IME, the employee’s right to have the claim considered “shall be suspended” during the period of refusal/obstruction. Relying on Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., the Court treated “shall” as mandatory, leaving no discretion to select an alternative sanction (like dismissal).

(b) Rule 37(b) cannot expand sanctions where the statute speaks. The Labor Commission’s rules incorporate Rule 37 sanctions for failure to obey discovery orders (Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1(F)(9)), and UAPA allows discovery rules or defaults to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But once the Court found a conflict—Rule 37(b) authorizes dismissal while § 34A-2-602(2) prescribes suspension—the statute controlled. Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt supplied the hierarchy: agency rules (even those adopting civil rules) cannot override a statute.

(c) Canons of construction confirm exclusivity. The Court used expressio unius (from McKitrick v. Gibson) to infer that by specifying suspension, the legislature excluded other sanctions for IME obstruction. It also invoked the “specific-general” canon (citing Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com): a specific statutory remedy for IME obstruction prevails over general discovery-sanction provisions.

(d) Barker does not authorize dismissal; it reaffirms the opposite limitation. The Board treated Barker v. Labor Commission as establishing that IMEs are “discovery,” thereby triggering the “full panoply” of Rule 37 sanctions. The Supreme Court rejected that reading. Barker permitted Rule 35 to fill a procedural gap (recording) precisely because statutes/rules did not address it; it did not permit civil rules to contradict a statute that does address the issue—here, the sanction for obstruction.

(e) The Court refused to “fix” the statute via policy or absurdity doctrine. Even accepting the Board’s practical concern that repeated IME obstruction could leave claims in limbo, the Court held the statute is not absurd in the legal sense (Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc.) and that courts cannot substitute their policy preferences for the legislature’s chosen remedy (Schroeder Invs., L.C. v. Edwards). The Court also noted that suspension is not toothless: it prevents benefits and stalls the claim, creating incentives to comply.

(f) Standing bars Hooker’s challenge to attorney sanctions. Applying S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Kane Cnty. Comm'n and the three-part test in Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. State, the Court found Hooker lacked a redressable injury because the monetary sanctions were imposed on her attorneys, not on her. Since the remedy would benefit the attorneys, Hooker had no personal stake, depriving the Court of jurisdiction to reach the merits (a point it could raise sua sponte under Gregory v. Shurtleff).

3.3. Impact

1) A clear remedial boundary in workers’ compensation IME disputes. The decision establishes a bright-line rule: for IME refusal/obstruction under § 34A-2-602(2), adjudicators may not use Rule 37(b) dismissal (or other non-statutory sanctions) to punish that conduct; the remedy is suspension during the period of obstruction.

2) Limits on agency use of incorporated civil rules. The opinion is a reminder that incorporation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure into administrative practice is conditional: those rules apply only to the extent they do not conflict with governing statutes or agency rules.

3) Litigation strategy consequences. Employers retain leverage—claims can be suspended indefinitely so long as obstruction continues—but lose the ability to terminate claims via dismissal solely for IME obstruction. Claimants gain protection against case-ending sanctions in this narrow context, but also face meaningful pressure because suspension halts adjudication and benefits.

4) Likely legislative/administrative responses. If repeated obstruction is perceived as inadequately addressed by suspension, the remedy lies with legislative amendment to § 34A-2-602(2) or new Commission rules that operate within statutory limits, not adjudicative innovation through Rule 37.

5) Standing discipline in sanctions appeals. Parties must ensure the sanctioned person/entity is the appellant (or that a valid standing theory exists). Sanctions against counsel generally must be challenged by counsel (or via an appropriate procedural route).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Independent Medical Exam (IME): A medical evaluation ordered in a claim, conducted by a physician chosen by the employer/insurer, used to assess diagnosis, causation, impairment, and treatment.
  • “Obstructs” an exam: The statute uses this term but the Court expressly did not define it here; it decided only what sanction is legally available if obstruction is found.
  • Suspension vs. dismissal: Suspension pauses the claim (and typically benefits) while the refusal/obstruction continues; dismissal ends the case (here, “with prejudice,” meaning it cannot be refiled).
  • Incorporation of civil rules into agency proceedings: Agencies may adopt discovery procedures similar to civil litigation, but those rules cannot contradict statutes that directly govern the subject.
  • Expressio unius: When a law lists one remedy, courts often infer others were intentionally excluded.
  • Specific-over-general canon: A specific statute aimed at a particular situation usually controls over a more general rule that could also apply.
  • Standing: A jurisdictional requirement that the person bringing the challenge personally suffers an injury that the requested court relief would likely remedy.

5. Conclusion

Hooker v. Labor Commission sets an important limitation on sanctions in Utah workers’ compensation adjudications: when an employee refuses or obstructs an employer-requested IME, Utah Code § 34A-2-602(2) makes suspension the exclusive sanction, displacing Rule 37(b) dismissal even though IMEs may be treated as part of “discovery.” The Court also reinforces jurisdictional rigor on sanctions appeals by holding that a claimant lacks standing to challenge monetary sanctions imposed solely on her attorneys.