Womble v. Chrisman: Maintenance Work Orders Do Not Eliminate Triable Eighth Amendment Sanitation Claims Where Inmates Lack Meaningful Reporting Access

1. Introduction

Parties: Joseph Z. Womble (Oklahoma state prisoner; Plaintiff–Appellant) sued MACC officials Jerry Chrisman (Warden) and Tommy Sharp (Deputy Warden) (Defendants–Appellees) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement violations.

Factual setting: After a May 2014 influx of 128 inmates, the Mack Alford Correctional Center’s A-South unit population increased from 100 to 132. MACC added 32 temporary bunks in common areas. Those temporarily housed inmates lacked in-area bathrooms and were directed to use toilets in two (later three) converted cells; 132 inmates shared 11 showers. Womble alleged (1) prolonged food rationing (“blanking the slots”) and contamination, and (2) unsanitary and unsafe toilet/shower conditions including frequent overflows, feces/urine exposure, poor lighting, delays in repairs, and long waits that caused him to soil himself.

Procedural posture: After earlier appellate rulings in Womble v. Chrisman, 770 F. App’x 918, 921 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (Womble I) (reversing dismissal as to food deprivation and sanitation claims) and Womble v. Chrisman, No. 21-7015, 2022 WL 334107 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2022) (unpublished) (Womble II) (reversing on exhaustion because no “usable grievance process”), the district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on both remaining claims and awarded costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Womble appealed both the merits and the cost award.

Key issues on appeal: (i) whether summary judgment was proper on the nutrition and sanitation claims under the Eighth Amendment’s objective/subjective framework; (ii) whether certain evidence was wrongly excluded (expert report, inmate letter, declaration portions); and (iii) whether costs could stand when appellate disposition altered prevailing-party status.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit (Matheson, J.) held:

  • Nutrition claim: Affirmed summary judgment for Defendants—Womble’s evidence did not permit a reasonable jury to find either (a) a sufficiently serious deprivation/substantial risk of serious harm or (b) deliberate indifference.
  • Facilities (toilets/showers) claim: Reversed summary judgment—Womble produced evidence creating genuine disputes as to both the objective seriousness (regular feces exposure, poor lighting, inadequate toilets-to-inmates ratio) and the subjective prong (Defendants’ awareness and failure to take reasonable measures).
  • Costs: Because the case was remanded and no “prevailing party” was yet established, the court vacated and remanded the cost award. See Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1095 (10th Cir. 2006).

The court also declined to decide whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence, because—even assuming admission—the excluded materials would not change the outcomes on either claim.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Summary judgment and appellate posture

  • Amparan v. Lake Powell Car Rental Cos., 882 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 2018) and Litzsinger v. Adams Cnty. Coroner’s Off., 25 F.4th 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 2022): framed the summary-judgment lens—record and inferences viewed favorably to the nonmovant.
  • Cruz v. City of Deming, 138 F.4th 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 2025): de novo review of summary judgment on qualified immunity, applying Rule 56 standards.
  • Est. of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014) and Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2015): the plaintiff must show evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a constitutional violation; if a jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, summary judgment is improper.
  • Jiang v. City of Tulsa, — F.4th —, —, 2026 WL 741188, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 17, 2026): reiterated the requirement to resolve factual disputes and draw reasonable inferences for the nonmovant; the panel used this to fault the district court for effectively crediting Defendants on disputed facts.
  • Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2002): where unresolved disputes of historical fact bear on qualified immunity, summary judgment should be denied.

B. Qualified immunity framing

  • Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015): qualified immunity protects officials unless they violate clearly established law.
  • Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2017): “on point” precedent requires materially similar conduct or obvious clarity.
  • Paugh v. Uintah Cnty., 47 F.4th 1139, 1159 (10th Cir. 2022): where clearly-established prong is conceded or satisfied, courts focus on whether evidence supports a constitutional violation.

C. Substantive Eighth Amendment doctrine

  • Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1981): the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” standard and “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”
  • Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 847 (1994): established the conditions-of-confinement duty and the two-prong test—objective substantial risk/serious deprivation plus subjective deliberate indifference (knowledge and disregard by failing to take reasonable measures).
  • Shannon v. Graves, 257 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001), Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993), Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 303 (1991), and Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999): supplied the objective/subjective components and deliberate-indifference articulation in Tenth Circuit terms.
  • Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008): officials who take reasonable efforts to avoid harm are not liable even if harm occurs.
  • Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1996): requires considering conditions “as a whole” because multiple deprivations may have a mutually enforcing effect.

D. Food and sanitation lines of authority

  • Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 570-71 (10th Cir. 1980) and Thompson v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002): recognize a right to nutritionally adequate food prepared and served without immediate danger to health.
  • Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006): “substantial deprivation of food” can satisfy the objective prong.
  • DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974-75 (10th Cir. 2001) and McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291-92 (10th Cir. 2001): emphasized the special constitutional seriousness of exposure to human waste and the role of duration relative to severity (“length of time required…decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases”).
  • Out-of-circuit persuasive support: Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2007) and Elder v. Bass, 24-30653, 2025 WL 2219005, at *1-3 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025), cited to reinforce that extreme waste exposure conditions are constitutionally actionable.
  • Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2002): used to underscore subjective deliberate indifference requires awareness and disregard of an excessive risk.

E. Costs after partial reversal

  • Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1095 (10th Cir. 2006): where merits disposition changes and the case is remanded, “prevailing party” status is unsettled and a cost award must be vacated.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Evidence exclusion deemed non-dispositive

Applying the evidentiary-review standard from Hafen v. Howell, 121 F.4th 1191, 1201 (10th Cir. 2024) (abuse of discretion for evidentiary rulings at summary judgment, including expert testimony) and United States v. Silva, 889 F.3d 704, 709 (10th Cir. 2018) (abuse-of-discretion definition), the panel bypassed the admissibility dispute. It held that even considering the excluded expert report, inmate letter, and declaration portions, the outcome would not change.

B. Nutrition claim: why the evidence did not meet either prong

Objective prong: The court accepted that some rationing could be found, but concluded the record would not allow a jury to find a deprivation so severe as to deny “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” or create a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Key factual drivers:

  • The extent of rationing was unclear and internally inconsistent: Womble offered an “example” day suggesting rationing at all three meals, but deposition testimony described rationing “one to two meals a day.”
  • The expert’s caloric deficit calculations were tethered to the “example” meals and therefore undermined by the inconsistency.
  • Weight evidence did not show sustained starvation-like decline: medical records reflected an initial drop, then fluctuations within a “relatively narrow range,” including periods of gain, undermining an inference of chronic caloric deprivation.
  • The court also noted Womble was overweight and rejected any suggestion the Constitution requires calories sufficient to maintain “excess weight.”

Subjective prong: Even assuming arguable objective seriousness, Womble did not present evidence that Defendants knew the rationing created a substantial risk of harm to him and disregarded it. The court emphasized the absence of evidence of adverse health effects attributable to rationing, and critically, the absence of evidence that Defendants were aware of such effects.

The court also addressed allegations of spoiled food and pests, but found the testimony too vague as to frequency and lacking proof that Defendants were aware—thus failing the subjective prong.

C. Facilities claim: why it should go to a jury

Objective prong: The court applied Mitchell v. Maynard’s “conditions as a whole” approach and the special concern for waste exposure recognized in DeSpain v. Uphoff and McBride v. Deer. It held a jury could find sufficiently serious conditions based on:

  • Overcrowding-driven toilet access problems (temporary bunks relying on 2–3 toilets; periods when staffing decisions allegedly reduced effective access further).
  • Regular clogging/overflow producing feces on floors and the need to wear boots/roll up pants to avoid contact.
  • Poor lighting (“pitch black” at night) increasing the risk of contact with contaminated surfaces.

The court’s most practically significant move was its treatment of maintenance records: it rejected the district court’s reliance on work orders showing repairs often within a day. Because Womble testified inmates could not submit written work orders and had to “just hope” staff would do so, a jury could infer that many problems went unreported, unresolved, or repeatedly recurred despite sporadic repairs. Thus, the existence of repair records did not negate triable disputes about actual conditions.

Subjective prong: The panel held Womble produced evidence from which a jury could find deliberate indifference:

  • Defendants’ regular facility walks and alleged observation of open-and-obvious conditions;
  • Chrisman’s deposition concession that overflow/flooding occurred, placing urine and feces on floors;
  • Womble’s testimony that he told Defendants he was being exposed to feces and they responded that “nothing can be done,” calling it “a permanent situation” and instructing him to “do your time”;
  • Documentary complaint activity (RTSs/grievances) and evidence that Defendants could have sought additional DOC funding but did not.

Critically, the panel faulted the district court for dismissing Womble’s version as unsupported “in light of additional conflicting evidence” without identifying it, and for impermissibly resolving disputed facts for Defendants—contrary to Jiang v. City of Tulsa.

3.3 Impact

  • Sanitation claims are not defeated by paper compliance alone: The opinion signals that maintenance work orders and repair logs do not automatically eliminate triable issues where the plaintiff can show structural barriers to reporting, recurring failures, or lived conditions inconsistent with the records.
  • Overcrowding-toilet access problems can mature into an Eighth Amendment case when coupled with waste exposure: The court did not constitutionalize a fixed “toilet ratio,” but it treated inadequate access plus recurring feces exposure and poor lighting as capable of meeting the objective prong.
  • Nutrition claims require evidence of seriousness and harm-risk, not merely dissatisfaction or intermittent shortfalls: Plaintiffs should expect closer scrutiny of caloric-proof methodology, internal consistency, medical metrics, and evidence linking rations to substantial harm risk.
  • Cost awards are unstable after partial reversal: Following Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., district courts should anticipate vacatur of § 1920 costs when appellate rulings unsettle prevailing-party status.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: A defense that blocks damages unless the plaintiff shows (1) a constitutional violation and (2) the right was “clearly established.” Here, the fight was mostly over (1), because the court treated the governing rights (adequate nutrition and sanitation) as clearly established.
  • Objective vs. subjective prongs (Farmer test):
    • Objective: Were conditions serious enough—either denial of basic necessities or a substantial risk of serious harm?
    • Subjective: Did officials actually know of that serious risk and disregard it (i.e., fail to take reasonable measures)?
  • Deliberate indifference: More than negligence. The plaintiff must show the official perceived a substantial risk and ignored it. Evidence can include admissions, repeated complaints, obviousness of conditions, or patterns showing inadequate responses.
  • Summary judgment: A case-ending ruling before trial. It is inappropriate if a reasonable jury could resolve material facts for the nonmoving party. Courts cannot weigh credibility or choose between competing factual accounts.
  • “Prevailing party” costs (28 U.S.C. § 1920): Costs are generally awarded to the winner. If an appellate court revives a claim and remands, there may be no “winner” yet—so prior cost awards typically must be vacated.

5. Conclusion

Womble v. Chrisman draws a sharp evidentiary line between (a) generalized, inconsistently supported allegations of food insufficiency—insufficient here to show a constitutionally significant deprivation and deliberate indifference—and (b) detailed, experience-grounded evidence of recurrent toilet overflows, feces exposure, poor lighting, and inadequate access driven by overcrowding—sufficient to require a jury trial on Eighth Amendment sanitation claims.

The opinion’s most operationally important precedent for future litigation is its refusal to treat maintenance work orders as dispositive when inmates plausibly lack meaningful access to trigger those records and when conditions allegedly persist despite nominal repairs. It also reinforces that courts must not resolve factual disputes in defendants’ favor at the qualified-immunity summary-judgment stage, and it confirms that cost awards cannot stand when appellate reversal prevents any final determination of the prevailing party.