With-Prejudice Dismissal After One Repleader Opportunity for Shotgun Pleadings, and Appellate Jurisdiction Limited to Orders Designated in the Notice of Appeal

1. Introduction

In Melissa Madaffari v. Hayes Wood (11th Cir. Aug. 18, 2026) (unpublished), a pro se plaintiff, Melissa Madaffari, appealed the dismissal with prejudice of her second amended complaint filed in the Southern District of Florida. The complaint named at least twenty defendants (including individuals, an insurer, and The Florida Bar) and asserted federal claims under the Civil RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), and Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, plus Florida-law theories (fraud/conspiracy).

The central issues on appeal were whether the district court properly dismissed the operative pleading as a “shotgun pleading” (and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim), whether the plaintiff was denied due process through the court’s handling of her many filings and asserted ADA accommodation requests, and whether the appellate court could review an alleged recusal error under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit:

  • Affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the second amended complaint as a shotgun pleading.
  • Declined to reach the alternative Rule 12(b)(6) failure-to-state-a-claim basis because shotgun-pleading dismissal was sufficient.
  • Rejected due-process and ADA-accommodation arguments tied to the court’s insistence that allegations and exhibits be contained within the single operative complaint.
  • Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the challenge to the district judge’s failure to recuse because the recusal motion was filed (and ruled on) after the notice of appeal, and the notice designated only the dismissal order.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Shotgun pleadings: definition, categories, and standard of review

  • Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2021) supplied the governing definition: a shotgun pleading violates Rule 8(a)(2), Rule 10(b), or both, and is disfavored because it obscures claims, wastes resources, and burdens courts and litigants. The opinion relied on Barmapov both for (i) abuse-of-discretion review and (ii) the “four rough types” taxonomy—especially the category involving multiple defendants without specifying who did what.
  • Pinson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 942 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2019) provided the counterweight: pro se litigants are given more drafting leeway, but not immunity from the shotgun-pleading doctrine.
  • Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) was invoked for the practical test: whether the complaint identifies claims with sufficient clarity to allow defendants to frame a responsive pleading.
  • Magulta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001) was used to condemn the hallmark defect—allegations that “the defendants” did misconduct without defendant-by-defendant attribution.

Required opportunity to replead; with-prejudice dismissal after noncompliance

  • Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) controlled the procedural safeguard: before dismissal on shotgun-pleading grounds, the court must provide one opportunity to remedy the defects by explaining what is wrong and ordering repleader.
  • Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., 898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018) supplied the consequence: if, after that opportunity, the plaintiff persists, the district court is within its discretion to dismiss the case with prejudice on shotgun-pleading grounds.

Due process and the “four corners” of the operative complaint

  • Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) was cited for the baseline due-process principle: an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
  • Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2014) supported the district court’s insistence that legal sufficiency be assessed from the operative pleading rather than extraneous filings.
  • Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998) and Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014) were paired to explain the boundary: courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, but cannot rewrite deficient pleadings to create viable claims.

Recusal review and appellate jurisdiction limits

  • Jenkins v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) was cited for the general standard of review (abuse of discretion) for recusal decisions.
  • Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2013) and Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1983) controlled the jurisdictional rule: the court of appeals may review only those rulings designated in the notice of appeal, and will not infer an intent to appeal omitted orders unless evident from the notice.
  • In a cautionary footnote, the panel referenced United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2004) (objective observer standard) and Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir.2001) (adverse rulings alone are not grounds for recusal) to signal that even if jurisdiction existed, the recusal argument would likely fail on the merits.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Shotgun pleading dismissal was within discretion

The court focused on the recurring defect: the second amended complaint named many defendants and asserted serious labels (RICO predicates such as mail/wire fraud, obstruction, retaliation; ADA exclusion; and state-law wrongdoing), but did not plead who did what, when, or how it injured the plaintiff. That defect placed the pleading squarely in the shotgun category described in Barmapov v. Amuial: “multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions,” and also the category “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts.”

The panel gave concrete examples: Count 1 (civil RICO under § 1962(c)) alleged only conclusory statements about an enterprise and pattern of racketeering; other counts were similarly conclusory. Attachments did not cure the problem because they primarily offered a table of roles and “verified misconduct” without factual particulars and referenced missing “exhibits” outside the pleading—contrary to the magistrate judge’s explicit instruction that the second amended complaint be a single document containing all allegations, with only relevant exhibits attached.

(b) One meaningful repleader opportunity satisfied Eleventh Circuit requirements

Under Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, the district court had to provide one chance to cure a shotgun pleading by explaining the deficiencies and ordering repleader. The magistrate judge did so during the § 1915(e)(2) screening, instructing compliance with Rules 8 and 10 and warning that noncompliance could lead to dismissal. When the plaintiff’s second amended complaint persisted in the same fundamental defects, Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A. authorized dismissal with prejudice.

(c) Due process was not violated by refusing to treat scattered filings as the operative pleading

Madaffari argued the district court ignored numerous filings and thereby violated due process. The panel rejected this under Mathews v. Eldridge because she had notice of pleading requirements and an opportunity to be heard through the repleader process. The district court was also entitled to evaluate legal sufficiency based on the operative complaint and its attached exhibits, not a shifting record of separate filings, consistent with Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp..

(d) ADA accommodation complaints were too undeveloped to show error

Madaffari asserted the court ignored her ADA accommodation requests, but she did not identify the accommodations or connect them to any inability to litigate. The panel noted that even if the issue were e-filing access, the record reflected extensive participation (over 200 filings in three months), undermining any showing of prejudice.

(e) Recusal issue was jurisdictionally barred

The court drew a strict jurisdiction line: Madaffari moved to recuse Judge Dimitrouleas only after she filed the notice of appeal. The subsequent recusal ruling was not designated in her notice of appeal. Under Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ. and Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review that later order, so the recusal challenge was dismissed.

3.3. Impact

  • Reinforcement of disciplined pleading in multi-defendant cases. The opinion underscores that “enterprise” or “pattern” rhetoric (especially in civil RICO pleadings) cannot substitute for defendant-specific factual allegations; mass accusations against “defendants” will be treated as quintessential shotgun pleading.
  • Procedural finality after one clear repleader chance—even for pro se IFP litigants. By affirming dismissal with prejudice after a single explained repleader opportunity, the decision reinforces Vibe Micro/Jackson as a practical two-step: (1) explain and allow repleader; (2) if defects persist, dismissal with prejudice is permissible to protect docket integrity.
  • Operative-pleading primacy. The ruling cautions litigants that voluminous motion practice and evidentiary submissions do not “amend” a complaint; factual predicates must be pleaded coherently in the complaint itself (and attached exhibits must be complete and self-contained, not placeholders referencing missing materials).
  • Appellate practice lesson on recusal and post-judgment orders. Even potentially significant allegations (like judicial bias) can be lost on appeal if not properly preserved and designated. Challenges to orders entered after the notice of appeal generally require a new or amended notice identifying that order.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Shotgun pleading”: a complaint written so vaguely or collectively that neither the defendants nor the court can tell which facts support which legal claims against which defendants. The common failure is grouping everyone together (“the defendants did X”) without specific acts tied to specific parties.
  • Rule 8 and Rule 10: Rule 8 requires a short, plain statement showing entitlement to relief; Rule 10 requires numbered paragraphs and, when helpful, separate counts for separate transactions/occurrences.
  • § 1915(e)(2) screening: when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss if it fails to state a claim, among other grounds. Screening often triggers early correction of pleading defects.
  • Dismissal “with prejudice”: the case is over and cannot be refiled in the same form; it is a merits-ending sanction for continued noncompliance after a fair chance to fix the pleading.
  • Notice of appeal “designation”: the appellate court’s jurisdiction generally extends only to orders identified in the notice of appeal. Later orders usually require a separate notice (or an amended notice) to be reviewable.
  • Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): a judge must step aside when an objective observer would reasonably question impartiality; disagreement with the judge’s rulings is typically not enough.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Melissa Madaffari v. Hayes Wood is a procedural roadmap more than a substantive ruling on RICO or ADA elements. It reaffirms that (1) even pro se litigants must provide defendant-specific factual allegations; (2) after one clear opportunity to replead, persistent shotgun pleading can be dismissed with prejudice; (3) courts may insist that the operative complaint—not a constellation of separate filings—contain the complete factual basis; and (4) appellate review is jurisdictionally constrained by what the notice of appeal designates, barring review of later recusal rulings absent a proper notice.