Wisconsin Revokes Law License for Sexual Misconduct Based on Underlying Conduct (Not Charge Level) and Exploitation of Power Imbalance

1. Introduction

Case: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jerome J. Babiak, 2026 WI 17 (Wis. May 29, 2026).
Parties: Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) as complainant; Attorney Jerome J. Babiak as respondent.
Posture: Attorney discipline following a criminal conviction and a prior summary suspension under SCR 22.20.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed a referee’s recommendation of a four-year suspension for two counts of misconduct stemming from (1) criminal conduct resulting in two convictions for fourth-degree sexual assault and (2) conduct deemed a violation of the Attorney’s Oath to “abstain from all offensive personality,” enforceable via SCR 20:8.4(g) and SCR 40.15.

Key issues: (a) whether discipline should be anchored to the misdemeanor conviction level or to the nature of the conduct proved/stipulated; (b) how the “offensive personality” clause applies to sexually aggressive communications where the recipient was not a client but a vulnerable, information-seeking party; and (c) what level of discipline is required to protect the public and the integrity of the profession.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court adopted the referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as to misconduct but rejected the recommended four-year suspension. It held that the proven conduct—two forceful, penetrative sexual assaults two weeks apart (one in a courthouse), preceded by sexually aggressive messaging that exploited an unequal power dynamic—warranted revocation, not suspension.

The court made the revocation effective January 26, 2024, matching the effective date of its prior SCR 22.20 summary suspension, and imposed full costs of $13,224.55. No restitution was sought or ordered.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747
    Used for standards of review: factual findings upheld unless clearly erroneous; legal conclusions reviewed de novo.
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686
    Cited for the court’s authority to impose discipline independent of the referee’s recommendation.
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritland, 2021 WI 36, 396 Wis. 2d 509, 957 N.W.2d 540
    Central to the court’s approach under SCR 20:8.4(b): the analysis focuses “not on the particular criminal charges” but on “the nature of the conduct” stipulated/proved in the disciplinary case. The opinion also relied on Ritland for the proposition that Wisconsin’s recent cases make it “exceedingly clear that attorneys who engage in sexual misconduct do so at their professional peril.”
  • In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Johns, 2014 WI 32, 353 Wis. 2d 746, 847 N.W.2d 179
    Quoted for the fitness standard: criminal behavior can be so revealing of character defects and so undermining of public confidence that it necessarily reflects adversely on fitness as a lawyer (supporting the SCR 20:8.4(b) finding).
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kratz, 2014 WI 31, 353 Wis. 2d 696, 851 N.W.2d 219
    Key authority on “offensive personality” in the context of sexualized communications: the court analogized sexually suggestive messages to a vulnerable recipient to conclude that Babiak’s aggressive messaging (including “plenty of penis pics”) violated the Attorney’s Oath.
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 12, 510 N.W.2d 129 (1994)
    Supplies a limiting principle: an “offensive personality” claim must relate to conduct that reflects adversely on fitness as a lawyer. The court used this to frame its conclusion that the messaging conduct satisfied that fitness nexus.
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Siderits, 2013 WI 2, 345 Wis. 2d 89, 824 N.W.2d 812
    Cited for the methodological point that attorney discipline “is not an exact science,” supporting the court’s rejection of rigid “comparison thresholds” or a “revocation floor” based on the most extreme prior cases.
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Meyer, 2022 WI 39, 401 Wis. 2d 732, 975 N.W.2d 229
    The court treated Meyer as a guiding analogy on sanction: revocation is justified where conduct shows “a complete and utter disregard” for obligations as an attorney, and where “[n]o sanction short of revocation” suffices to protect the public, deter similar behavior, and impress upon the attorney the seriousness of misconduct. The court imported that rationale directly to Babiak’s sexual misconduct, especially given the courthouse assault and exploitation of authority.
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dudas, 2021 WI 5, 395 Wis. 2d 345, 953 N.W.2d 870
    Discussed by the referee as an exemplar of severe criminality warranting revocation; used by the court also for a procedural point: aligning the effective date of revocation with the effective date of the SCR 22.20 summary suspension (“consistent with past disciplinary matters”).
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Moodie, 2020 WI 39, 391 Wis. 2d 196, 942 N.W.2d 302 (Ziegler, J., dissenting)
    Cited in Justice Ziegler’s concurrence to highlight concerns about the terminology of “revocation” given reinstatement eligibility after five years.
  • S. Ct. Order 19-10 (issued Dec. 18, 2019) (Ziegler, J., dissenting)
    Cited by Justice Ziegler to renew her view that Wisconsin should allow “permanent revocation” in rare cases and should avoid creating “false perceptions” about revocation.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Misconduct under SCR 20:8.4(b): look to the conduct, not the label

The court reaffirmed that SCR 20:8.4(b) turns on whether the criminal act reflects adversely on “honesty, trustworthiness or fitness,” and that in evaluating that question it focuses on what the lawyer did, not the charging decision or misdemeanor/felony label. Following In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ritland, 2021 WI 36, the court treated as established fact the stipulated conduct: two forceful, penetrative sexual assaults two weeks apart, including one occurring in a courthouse just before appearing in court.

Using In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Johns, 2014 WI 32, the court characterized this conduct as the kind that necessarily undermines public confidence and reveals character defects incompatible with the professional role, thus satisfying SCR 20:8.4(b).

B. Misconduct under SCR 20:8.4(g) / SCR 40.15 (“offensive personality”): narrowing to a clearly defined theory

The court criticized Count 2 as “not particularly well pled,” noting ambiguity in how it described “physical sexual contact” versus “without her consent.” Rather than rest discipline on an unclear pleading theory, it limited its Count 2 analysis to the sexually aggressive communications via phone/text/Snapchat.

Even though Amy was not Babiak’s client, the court found an “unequal balance of power” because Babiak was counsel for her ex-boyfriend and had access to information she valued for a custody dispute. The ethical breach was framed as exploitation of the authority and access flowing from licensure. Drawing from In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kratz, 2014 WI 31 and bounded by In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beaver, 181 Wis. 2d 12, the court held that sending sexually aggressive messages (including explicit photos) reflected adversely on fitness and constituted “offensive personality.”

C. Sanction selection: rejecting a “revocation floor” and emphasizing protection of the public

The principal doctrinal move in the sanction analysis is the court’s refusal to treat prior revocation cases as establishing a minimum “severity threshold.” Citing In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Siderits, 2013 WI 2, the court emphasized that discipline is “not an exact science” and that case comparisons are analogical, not mechanical.

The court found In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Meyer, 2022 WI 39 instructive for the sanction rationale: when conduct demonstrates “complete and utter disregard” for professional obligations, revocation may be the only adequate measure to protect the public and deter others. It applied that rationale to Babiak because:

  • He committed a forcible, penetrative sexual assault in a courthouse, violating law and the “decorum, dignity, and sanctity” expected in a justice setting.
  • He committed a second forcible, penetrative sexual assault in the victim’s home two weeks later, showing repetition rather than an isolated lapse.
  • He engaged in a course of sexually aggressive messaging leading up to the assaults, exploiting a power imbalance tied to his role as a lawyer.
  • He “used the power and authority derived from his law license for his own ends,” supporting the conclusion that he was unwilling or unable to conform to professional standards.

Mitigation was expressly considered (no prior discipline, cooperation, counseling, criminal penalties, remorse), but the court rejected treating “embarrassment” and marital consequences as mitigation, reasoning these are natural consequences rather than “other penalties or sanctions,” citing the American Bar Association, Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 9.32(k) (as quoted in the opinion’s footnote).

D. Effective date and costs

Following the practice referenced in In re Dudas, 2021 WI 5, revocation was made effective as of the earlier SCR 22.20 summary suspension date (January 26, 2024), preventing a gap between interim public protection and final discipline. Full costs were imposed under SCR 22.24(1m).

3.3 Impact

  • Conduct-based discipline is reinforced. The opinion strengthens the message that prosecutorial charging choices (misdemeanor vs felony) do not constrain attorney discipline where the underlying facts show grave misconduct.
  • Sexual misconduct + professional context can be revocation-worthy even without a client relationship. The court treated power derived from being “a lawyer with case information and legal knowledge” as sufficient to create an ethically relevant imbalance.
  • Courthouse misconduct is treated as uniquely corrosive. By emphasizing the courthouse as a location that should be safe and dignified, the decision signals especially severe professional consequences for misconduct occurring in justice-system spaces.
  • “Offensive personality” remains viable for sexualized communications, but courts may narrow to clearer theories. The court’s critique of Count 2 pleading suggests future OLR charges should draft “offensive personality” counts with specificity (what conduct, when, and why it reflects adversely on fitness), and respondents may challenge vague formulations.
  • Revocation comparisons are analogies, not thresholds. The court rejected the idea that only the most extreme prior cases justify revocation, broadening the functional space in which revocation may be deemed necessary to protect the public and deter misconduct.
  • Terminology debate continues. Justice Ziegler’s concurrence underscores that “revocation” in Wisconsin is not necessarily permanent (reinstatement eligibility after five years under SCR 22.29(2)), inviting continuing policy discussion about “permanent revocation.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

SCR 20:8.4(b)
A lawyer commits professional misconduct by committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or overall fitness as a lawyer. The focus is on what the conduct reveals about professional suitability, not merely the criminal statute name or penalty level.
SCR 40.15 (“Attorney’s Oath”) and “offensive personality”
Wisconsin lawyers swear, among other things, to “abstain from all offensive personality.” Through SCR 20:8.4(g), violating that oath is itself professional misconduct. Courts have limited this concept to conduct that reflects adversely on fitness as a lawyer (not mere rudeness), and have applied it to sexualized, exploitative communications.
SCR 22.20 summary suspension
An interim, immediate suspension used when a lawyer has been convicted of a serious crime, designed to protect the public while discipline proceeds. Final discipline (here, revocation) can be made effective retroactively to the date of the summary suspension.
Revocation vs. suspension
A suspension is time-limited permission to return after meeting conditions; revocation terminates the license, requiring a reinstatement petition process. As Justice Ziegler notes, Wisconsin “revocation” is not necessarily permanent because reinstatement can be sought after five years (SCR 22.29(2)).
Aggravating and mitigating factors
These are circumstances that make discipline more severe (aggravating) or less severe (mitigating). The court emphasized that personal embarrassment and relationship fallout are typically considered natural consequences, not mitigation credit.

5. Conclusion

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jerome J. Babiak, 2026 WI 17, establishes a clear and consequential disciplinary principle: Wisconsin will assess attorney discipline for sexual misconduct by the proven underlying conduct and its exploitation of professional power—rather than by the misdemeanor/felony charging label—and will impose revocation where that conduct demonstrates fundamental unfitness and demands maximum public protection.

The decision also clarifies how “offensive personality” can apply to sexually aggressive communications in a power-imbalanced, lawyer-adjacent relationship, and it signals that revocation is not reserved only for the most extreme criminal case comparisons. The concurrence further spotlights an ongoing policy tension: whether “revocation” should mean permanent revocation in rare cases, and whether current terminology accurately communicates outcomes to the public.