Date: May 1, 2025

Wire Fraud and Traditional Property Interests: Recognizing Wages and Benefits as “Money or Property” and Restricting the “Right to Control” Theory

1. Introduction

United States v. Nadege Auguste (11th Cir. 2025) addresses two consolidated appeals in which the appellant, Nadege Auguste, was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and substantive wire fraud based on her role in a scheme selling fraudulent nursing diplomas and transcripts. The defendants recruited aspiring nurses, procured fake credentials from Florida‐licensed institutions (Sacred Heart International Institute and Siena College of Health), and sold them for thousands of dollars apiece. The purchasers used these false documents to obtain state nursing licenses and employment, thereby defrauding “unwitting” healthcare employers of salaries, benefits, and other compensation.

Two key issues arose on appeal:

Whether the government impermissibly relied on the Supreme Court’s disapproved “right to control” theory of wire fraud from Ciminelli v. United States (598 U.S. 306 (2023)).
Whether the object of the fraud—salaries and benefits paid by healthcare employers to the fake nurses—qualified as “money or property” under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, or was merely incidental to a scheme whose true object was obtaining nursing licenses.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed. Key holdings:

The government did not rely on the disapproved “right to control” theory; instead, it properly alleged deprivation of concrete property interests—namely, money in the form of wages and benefits.
Salaries and benefits paid by healthcare employers to the fraudulently credentialed nurses are “money or property” under the wire fraud statute. The Eleventh Circuit joined other circuits in holding that employment compensation can be the object of a wire (or mail) fraud prosecution.
Because those payments were an object, not merely an incidental by‐product, of the fraudulent scheme, convictions for both conspiracy and substantive wire fraud stand.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

This case discusses and distinguishes several Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedents:

Ciminelli v. United States (598 U.S. 306 (2023)) – Held that depriving a party of its “right to control” its assets, by concealing information, is not a traditional property interest protected by the wire fraud statute. The Eleventh Circuit stressed that in Ciminelli the government had relied solely on that theory.
Cleveland v. United States (531 U.S. 12 (2000)) – Confirmed that “scheme to defraud” under § 1343 must target “money or property,” defined by reference to interests recognized at the time of enactment.
Kelly v. United States (590 U.S. 399 (2020)) – Distinguished schemes whose object is non‐pecuniary (e.g., access or influence) rather than obtaining traditional property; incidental labor costs do not transform an otherwise non‐fraud into wire fraud.
United States v. Schmitz (11th Cir. 2011) – Affirmed a mail fraud conviction where salary and other benefits were explicitly the property at issue.
Other Circuits on Employment Compensation: United States v. Sorich (7th Cir. 2008), Doherty (1st Cir. 1989), Granberry (8th Cir. 1990) – Each recognized wages, promotions, or salary increases as “money or property.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in two main steps:

“Right to Control” Theory Rejected but Inapplicable Here:
– While Ciminelli reaffirmed that depriving a victim of informational control over assets is not “money or property,” this case turned entirely on depriving employers of wages/benefits. – The indictment and trial strategy here never relied on “right to control” as the property strip; instead, they charged direct deprivation of concrete funds.
Wages and Benefits Are “Money or Property”:
– § 1343 requires that “money or property” be “an object of the fraud.” – The court cited Schmitz to confirm that salary and benefits can qualify, and noted other circuits’ similar holdings. – Auguste’s attempt to recast wages/benefits as merely “incidental” was defeated by the indictment’s express allegation that the scheme aimed to obtain “employment, pay, and other benefits.” – The conspirators understood and foreseen that purchasers paid for fraudulent credentials in order to get that job compensation.

3.3 Impact

United States v. Auguste has several important implications:

Clarity in the Post‐Ciminelli Landscape: Eleventh Circuit reaffirms that so long as “money or property” refers to traditional, concretely identifiable interests (wages, benefits, contracts, real property), wire/mail fraud prosecutions remain robust.
Limits on Informational Theories: Mere allegations that a fraudster concealed facts from a victim do not amount to a “right to control” theory if the prosecution identifies a clear property interest at stake.
Reinforcement of Circuit Consensus: Aligns the Eleventh Circuit with the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in treating employment compensation as property for fraud statutes.
Guidance for Indictment Drafting: Prosecutors should explicitly identify the property (e.g., wages, benefits, contract proceeds) they allege was misappropriated, to avoid any misinterpretation as an impermissible “right to control” theory.
Advisory for Defense Strategy: Defendants challenging fraud indictments must show either (a) the alleged property interest is non‐traditional, or (b) the fraud’s object is truly non‐pecuniary so the payments were merely incidental.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Right to Control” Theory vs. Traditional Property: – “Right to control” means the ability to decide how to use an asset. Post‐Ciminelli, depriving someone of that decision‐making power (by hiding information) is not itself “property” under § 1343. – Traditional property includes cash, real estate, contracts, wages—i.e., things with recognized economic value at the statute’s 1952 enactment.

Incidental By‐Product vs. Object of a Scheme: – If X is merely a cost or side‐effect of a fraudulent plan whose real aim is Y (e.g., hindering traffic flow), X is incidental and not a fraud object. – If the fraudster specifically schemes to obtain X (e.g., salaries), X is the object—and fraud statutes apply.

Conspiracy Liability: – A co‐conspirator need not personally mail or wire the fraudulent document or receive the victims’ money. It suffices to knowingly join a scheme in which another conspirator commits the wire/mail use and property deprivation.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Nadege Auguste confirms that, in the Eleventh Circuit, wire fraud prosecutions remain alive and well so long as the government identifies a traditional property interest (here, wages and benefits) as the object of the scheme. Mere concealment of information from a victim, without an allegation of stripping the victim of recognized property, does not revive the invalid “right to control” theory. This decision thus secures prosecutors’ ability to charge and prove schemes that target employment compensation while drawing clear boundaries around permissible theories of fraud.